No cats and flaps ...... back to F35B?
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You are quoting that idiot on this forum????
Just a few thoughts
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Engines,
The fact that F35 is under public scrutiny is a positive as it offers hope that past failures are less likely to be repeated. Avoiding the mistakes of over-promising or under-costing, or whatever combination of them it is that results in too many military projects going off the rails must be best for everybody. The days when the taxpayer would just pick up the tab are gone and unlikely to return for a while yet.
Totally agree - getting it to work is the most important objective left to play for.
My opinion remains that it would be unwise to place firm orders for any version until cost, delivery and performance are much more certain.
The fact that F35 is under public scrutiny is a positive as it offers hope that past failures are less likely to be repeated. Avoiding the mistakes of over-promising or under-costing, or whatever combination of them it is that results in too many military projects going off the rails must be best for everybody. The days when the taxpayer would just pick up the tab are gone and unlikely to return for a while yet.
..the key is how well they meet the KPPs and other requirements that the customers and the design teams have set...
My opinion remains that it would be unwise to place firm orders for any version until cost, delivery and performance are much more certain.
What we have here is a confluence of two programmes that have been linked, probably shouldn't have been, but for a number of co-incidental reasons are inextricably intertwined.
Once upon a time, there was a Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter, which then turned into a STOVL Strikefighter, which also turned into Joint Affordable Strike Technology. That beast was supposed to replace the A10, AV8B, F16 and (implicitly) the A6. Some thought it would also replace the F14. By virtue of part of it being STOVL it also got the prime position replacing the SHAR (and IT/SP AV8). Today we call that beast F35 A, B and C.
Once upon a time there was also a ship called CVSG(R). Then it became CV(R) and in around about 1998 it became CVF. There is a reason that the (R), became an F and that was the realisation (and endorsement) that the UK didn't need a replacement ASW helicopter carrier with the ability to carry a limited number of f/w aircraft. What it needed was a maritime capability to provide both f/w Fleet Air Defence and deployable strike capability for expeditionary warfare. The requirement for Fleet AD has not gone away (despite the enforced capability holiday on retirement of SHAR) and is complementary to delivery of Strike (one set of support facilities, crew etc). That means a substantially bigger ship than CVS, which led inexorably to CVF. The difference in size between CVS and CVF is partly a consequence of this, but also due to correcting the inherent limitations of the CVS design. However, despite size not being proportional to cost, the difference between CVS and CVF/QEC has been used as a stick to beat the project with on a purely subjective basis for the last 10+ years. Shrinking the design has been looked at, but gave little cost saving for a significant loss in capability. It did lead to significant delay and consequent cost escalation.
Once CVF/QEC became the size it is, it might have been more sensible to divorce aircraft choice from type of operation. That stage was probably reached in 2004 when a decision could have been made to go with FA18 or Rafale and get a 5th gen aircraft later. Trouble was, EMALS was seen as very risky at that stage and steam cats as undesirable (manpower heavy, likely to be replaced), so the STOVL comfort blanket looked safer, particularly once JFH formed. On top of all this was the absolute refusal of anyone in MoD to commit to carriers (largely based on the "size" perception, combined with the F35 cost profile), which led to significant cost escalation in the ships through delay.
Only later, as F35B struggled, did F35C start looking more attractive, but still EMALS was "high-risk" until fairly recently. Trouble was, F35C then starts to experience issues, just as EMALS began to deliver. However, EMALS is still likely to offer the best long-term option, particularly when you consider that a successor STOVL aircraft to F35B is highly unlikely (one of the reasons the adaptable CVF design was proposed in the first place).
So here we are, apparently about to make a (wrong imho) decision to follow a blind alley for short-term cost saving reasons. I have been particularly critical of the MoD (but mainly The Great Financial Genius - Cyclops) in terms of the decisions made - or more precisely, the decision to avoid decisions. That vacillation has led to the ship project (though should more precisley be the both ship and aircraft projects) gaining a reputation for being a basket case. I stand by those criticisms, but in fairness, there has been a confluence of competing risks that have been difficult to balance. Doesn't excuse the failure to sh1t or get off the pot, but does illustrate the potential for unsightly skidmarks.
Finally, to echo Engines - whatever happens with F35, getting a STOVL aircraft to sea for what will probably be only the third distict type operationally in fifty years is no mean achievement. That (and the other elements in the wider programme) deserve respect technically, whatever one thinks about the wider programme management.
Once upon a time, there was a Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter, which then turned into a STOVL Strikefighter, which also turned into Joint Affordable Strike Technology. That beast was supposed to replace the A10, AV8B, F16 and (implicitly) the A6. Some thought it would also replace the F14. By virtue of part of it being STOVL it also got the prime position replacing the SHAR (and IT/SP AV8). Today we call that beast F35 A, B and C.
Once upon a time there was also a ship called CVSG(R). Then it became CV(R) and in around about 1998 it became CVF. There is a reason that the (R), became an F and that was the realisation (and endorsement) that the UK didn't need a replacement ASW helicopter carrier with the ability to carry a limited number of f/w aircraft. What it needed was a maritime capability to provide both f/w Fleet Air Defence and deployable strike capability for expeditionary warfare. The requirement for Fleet AD has not gone away (despite the enforced capability holiday on retirement of SHAR) and is complementary to delivery of Strike (one set of support facilities, crew etc). That means a substantially bigger ship than CVS, which led inexorably to CVF. The difference in size between CVS and CVF is partly a consequence of this, but also due to correcting the inherent limitations of the CVS design. However, despite size not being proportional to cost, the difference between CVS and CVF/QEC has been used as a stick to beat the project with on a purely subjective basis for the last 10+ years. Shrinking the design has been looked at, but gave little cost saving for a significant loss in capability. It did lead to significant delay and consequent cost escalation.
Once CVF/QEC became the size it is, it might have been more sensible to divorce aircraft choice from type of operation. That stage was probably reached in 2004 when a decision could have been made to go with FA18 or Rafale and get a 5th gen aircraft later. Trouble was, EMALS was seen as very risky at that stage and steam cats as undesirable (manpower heavy, likely to be replaced), so the STOVL comfort blanket looked safer, particularly once JFH formed. On top of all this was the absolute refusal of anyone in MoD to commit to carriers (largely based on the "size" perception, combined with the F35 cost profile), which led to significant cost escalation in the ships through delay.
Only later, as F35B struggled, did F35C start looking more attractive, but still EMALS was "high-risk" until fairly recently. Trouble was, F35C then starts to experience issues, just as EMALS began to deliver. However, EMALS is still likely to offer the best long-term option, particularly when you consider that a successor STOVL aircraft to F35B is highly unlikely (one of the reasons the adaptable CVF design was proposed in the first place).
So here we are, apparently about to make a (wrong imho) decision to follow a blind alley for short-term cost saving reasons. I have been particularly critical of the MoD (but mainly The Great Financial Genius - Cyclops) in terms of the decisions made - or more precisely, the decision to avoid decisions. That vacillation has led to the ship project (though should more precisley be the both ship and aircraft projects) gaining a reputation for being a basket case. I stand by those criticisms, but in fairness, there has been a confluence of competing risks that have been difficult to balance. Doesn't excuse the failure to sh1t or get off the pot, but does illustrate the potential for unsightly skidmarks.
Finally, to echo Engines - whatever happens with F35, getting a STOVL aircraft to sea for what will probably be only the third distict type operationally in fifty years is no mean achievement. That (and the other elements in the wider programme) deserve respect technically, whatever one thinks about the wider programme management.
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After three or four failed programmes (ATF, NATF, A-12, F-22)
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Finally, to echo Engines - whatever happens with F35, getting a STOVL aircraft to sea for what will probably be only the third distict type operationally in fifty years is no mean achievement. That (and the other elements in the wider programme) deserve respect technically, whatever one thinks about the wider programme management.
Having said that, I also truely admire what people achieved, technologically speaking, with programs like Concorde or even earlier the Hughes flying boat.
That doesn't mean they where good ideas to begin with, for their intended use they where pretty much either useless or overly complicated and expensive.
Because it is the only available option for the US , the JSF program will be a commercial succes and I'm sure most military organizations will make it work and use it as the powerful weapon it must be.
But at what cost?
I'm not only referring to the dollar/pound cost, but also the inevitable loss of possible manufacturers (most notably over here, in Europe) that are able to build new fighters independently, the loss of quantity of fighters just to add a very debatable increase in quality, the loss of sufficient amount of flying time because of excessive flighthour cost ,eg; just look at the latest intentions made public by Norway to decrease the number of allocated flying hours for the JSF (and numbers ordered BTW).
Last but not least, and it comes back as an issue time and time again, 1 type of fighter that has to do all the work for different services in a different role is a bad idea, it is a recurring trap the military and the politicians seem to step in every single time.
It adds needless complexity in the beginning of its carreer and makes it very hard in the future to both upgrade without loosing most of its commonality with the rest of its users.
As a Belgian I have become convinced that we will also go for this LM adventure solely because the Dutch are involved so deeply and we are effectively building up 1 common military between Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands ( see comments of Hans Hillen and P de Crem ).
We'll be glad to have 68 planes to divide between the 3 of us reducing us ever further into an ever more insignificant force, a(n even bigger) joke in the NATO alliance.
The budget is still big, compared with other poorer nations, but nonetheless under severe strain and will remain so for some years to come, programs like the JSF are the last thing we need now, they undermine our ability to field sufficient numbers of both well trained troops equipped with weapons in sufficient numbers.
last but not least,
Just look at the last 20-30 years and what this whole stealth saga has done to the biggest and most powerful military in the world , the F117, B2, F22, complex combatships and others , are all technological marvels by themselves but both operationally and/or financially complete nightmares ,all used in heavily reduced numbers and very challenging to upgrade to newer standards later in their carreers.
¨[end of another useless rant]
kbrockman 
No matter how good the F22 and F35 are as individual platforms, they can't defeat the basic law that you can't be in two places at once. I really hope the planners and operational analysts have done their sums right because I have a nagging feeling that a medium-sized force of 'legacy' aircraft, without much care for losses, could embarrass us.
No matter how good the F22 and F35 are as individual platforms, they can't defeat the basic law that you can't be in two places at once. I really hope the planners and operational analysts have done their sums right because I have a nagging feeling that a medium-sized force of 'legacy' aircraft, without much care for losses, could embarrass us.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
ISD has slipped from 2012/3 (and I attended the first programme briefs) to around 16/17.
---------------------------------
In the meantime.....
US Navy Looks For New Jet, On Top Of Its Trillion-Dollar Model
On Friday, the US Navy quietly released a “market survey” asking the big defence contractors for their “candidate[s]” for “strike fighter aircraft” in the decades to come. Which is a little weird, considering the Pentagon is currently spending a trillion dollars on just such an aircraft: the troubled Joint Strike Fighter.
The stealthy F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is supposed to one day make up 90 per cent or more of America’s combat aviation power. But the program has been hit with all kinds of expensive technical glitches and delays. So the Navy has long hedged against the giant JSF bet by buying more of its beloved F/A-18 Super Hornet; that way, the Navy can keep flying modern fighters, even if the JSFs slip. With this “market survey”, the Navy appears to be making a second hedge: a Son of the Super Hornet — one that would come online after the F/A-18s are retired in the 2030s — just in case the JSF flames out entirely.
“That’s absolutely not the right interpretation,” says Capt Frank Morley, the Navy’s program manager for the Super Hornet and its cousin, the EA-18 jamming Growler. But if the Son of the Super Hornet isn’t a hedge against the JSF becoming too expensive for the cash-strapped military, then the aircraft carrier decks of the future may be stocked with redundant planes.
After the Super Hornets retire, the Navy wants “a multi-role strike capability” that can fly from a carrier, according to the “market survey” that the Navy released Friday. Some of its primary missions: “air warfare (AW), strike warfare (STW), surface warfare (SUW) and close air support (CAS)”.
And that sounds suspiciously like the role that the Navy’s version of the JSF is supposed to play. That plane, already the most expensive weapons program in the history of mankind, is in serious budget trouble. In addition to newly discovered design flaws, the Government Accountability Office last month found additional problems with its software and safety systems. The military wants the F-35 to ultimately replace nearly every tactical fixed-wing aircraft the Navy, Marines and Air Force fly, but the admiral in charge of the program has backed off the 2018 estimate for when the plane is expected to enter the air fleet.
So the Navy has bought more Super Hornets as delays plague the JSF. At the Navy’s annual Sea Air Space convention, Morley self-congratulated by noting that the Super Hornet is “on time, on cost, and on schedule.”
But the Son of the Super Hornet, the Navy’s survey swears, isn’t supposed to be a backup in case the JSF fails. Instead, it will be a “complementary … asset to the F-35C and an unmanned persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) vehicle with precision strike capability.” In other words, it’ll fly in a carrier air wing alongside the JSF and the Navy’s future carrier-based drone, currently known as the X-47B.
But if so, that raises a question of redundancy. Both the JSF and the post-Super Hornet plane would be performing very similar manned strike missions. (Although the survey doesn’t suggest the post-Super Hornet will need to be stealthy, a central asset of the JSF.)
Morley strongly denies that the Son of the Super Hornet poses a threat to the JSF or will replicate its missions. “We are an all-F-18 fleet today,” Morley tells Danger Room. “In that 2020-2030 time frame, those decades, we intend to be a Super Hornet-JSF fleet. And then those Super Hornets are going to be ageing out, those earlier ones, and we need to be a JSF-and-something-else fleet.”..........
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The last paragraph of that article is the only accurate part.
The rest is a journo trying to create a false impression by distorting and outright falsifying the situation... as well as calling a senior Naval Officer a liar.
The reality is that ONLY the legacy Hornets (F/A-18A/B/C/D) are to be replaced by F-35C... the Super Hornets were ALWAYS to be operated beside F-35C, NOT replaced by them!
The original plan was to replace the F/A-18E/F/G much later with UCAVs ONLY.
This proposal for yet another manned carrier strike-fighter seems to be for a less "cutting-edge" aircraft.... to fill out the numbers that UCAVs were supposed to have filled all on their own.
So much for that "The F-35 is the last manned fighter we will buy" hype the DOD was spouting before 2010!
The real headline and story should have been "Navy loses confidence in Unmanned Combat Drones, seeks manned substitute!".
The rest is a journo trying to create a false impression by distorting and outright falsifying the situation... as well as calling a senior Naval Officer a liar.
The reality is that ONLY the legacy Hornets (F/A-18A/B/C/D) are to be replaced by F-35C... the Super Hornets were ALWAYS to be operated beside F-35C, NOT replaced by them!
The original plan was to replace the F/A-18E/F/G much later with UCAVs ONLY.
This proposal for yet another manned carrier strike-fighter seems to be for a less "cutting-edge" aircraft.... to fill out the numbers that UCAVs were supposed to have filled all on their own.
So much for that "The F-35 is the last manned fighter we will buy" hype the DOD was spouting before 2010!
The real headline and story should have been "Navy loses confidence in Unmanned Combat Drones, seeks manned substitute!".
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LOA,
Thanks for picking me up on that - I included the F-22 as a 'failed' programme not on capability grounds (it's an awesome technical exercise) but on affordability and sustainability.
F-22, in my personal view, stands alongside the Typhoon as an example of what I consider to be the last of the 'gold plated dinosaur' combat aircraft projects. These were characterised by going for performance at just about any price, massive programme delays (if anyone thinks F-35 is late, try an analysis of the F-22 timelines) and simply eye-watering cost. The result is a programme that was cut from 1,000 aircraft to 138, and became unaffordable even for the USAF at the height of the Bush spending bulge.
Another characteristic of these programmes was a tendency to home in on one single role (in both cases AD) and make a series of decisions that reduced the aircraft's ability to undertake other roles.
The end result is programmes that consume huge proportions of national defence budgets (Typhoon is a really good example) to deliver just one capability. These were never affordable in any real sense - the world economic crisis has just exposed the problem, not caused it. And that is why I think, in the final analysis, the F-22 'failed' - it's just not a sustainable model.
F-35 is different because if is aiming to cover multiple roles with a common basic airframe and (more importantly) common avionics fit. It was also held down to a single engined single seat solution - cost driven. As I've often said, these decisions can (and in free society, must) be questioned - but in my view, the wider analysis by the DoD back in the 90s was right.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
Thanks for picking me up on that - I included the F-22 as a 'failed' programme not on capability grounds (it's an awesome technical exercise) but on affordability and sustainability.
F-22, in my personal view, stands alongside the Typhoon as an example of what I consider to be the last of the 'gold plated dinosaur' combat aircraft projects. These were characterised by going for performance at just about any price, massive programme delays (if anyone thinks F-35 is late, try an analysis of the F-22 timelines) and simply eye-watering cost. The result is a programme that was cut from 1,000 aircraft to 138, and became unaffordable even for the USAF at the height of the Bush spending bulge.
Another characteristic of these programmes was a tendency to home in on one single role (in both cases AD) and make a series of decisions that reduced the aircraft's ability to undertake other roles.
The end result is programmes that consume huge proportions of national defence budgets (Typhoon is a really good example) to deliver just one capability. These were never affordable in any real sense - the world economic crisis has just exposed the problem, not caused it. And that is why I think, in the final analysis, the F-22 'failed' - it's just not a sustainable model.
F-35 is different because if is aiming to cover multiple roles with a common basic airframe and (more importantly) common avionics fit. It was also held down to a single engined single seat solution - cost driven. As I've often said, these decisions can (and in free society, must) be questioned - but in my view, the wider analysis by the DoD back in the 90s was right.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
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I really enjoy reading the F-35 threads, sensible questions have ALWAYS been answered in a polite, constructive manner and by people who know what they are saying and always manage to keep their cool when answering even the most silly of questions.
A very big THANK YOU
I am sure the F-35B is a very nice aircraft but is it the right choice?
Is the Typhoon allegedly the best aircraft of its type outside of the USA
Is the Challenger tank possibly the best tank in the World?
Is the type 45 destroyer possibly the best warship of its size?
It is quite right and proper to give our military the best of equipment IF we intend being a nation that wants to be a force on the World stage but I just do not think a carrier with a single type of fixed wing capability is good enough, will it be as good as the Chinese, Indian or possibly the Russians when their carrier comes out of refit?
Stealth is obviously good, but if we lack that ability namely the F-35C, then how good is the F-18 Growler? In Libya this aircraft allowed the RAF to safely go where they needed to go to deploy their weapons, could we not perhaps develop EW as opposed to stealth?
The F-35C carrier gives us options, the F-35B is surely a cul-de-sac with no options and no future after the B either gets chopped or ends its career as the last STOVL aircraft. Would the F-35B ever land on the deck of a ship that has not been deemed suitable to accept this unique aircraft? It is no lightweight Harrier that had a far lighter footprint, it is an amazing aircraft that is far heavier and as such might not be welcomed on an untried untested deck? (question, NOT a statement)
I am in the corner that predicts more back pedalling, more U-turns and more shrinkage.
For those that criticise the development of this latest aircraft, I ask this question... How can any private company possibly afford to develop a modern military aircraft without financial support from the relevant government. It is not rocket science to predict there will be problems and these issues will cost both time and money to rectify but can we ask private companies to be the sole funder of this procurement? (question)
A very big THANK YOU
I am sure the F-35B is a very nice aircraft but is it the right choice?
Is the Typhoon allegedly the best aircraft of its type outside of the USA
Is the Challenger tank possibly the best tank in the World?
Is the type 45 destroyer possibly the best warship of its size?
It is quite right and proper to give our military the best of equipment IF we intend being a nation that wants to be a force on the World stage but I just do not think a carrier with a single type of fixed wing capability is good enough, will it be as good as the Chinese, Indian or possibly the Russians when their carrier comes out of refit?
Stealth is obviously good, but if we lack that ability namely the F-35C, then how good is the F-18 Growler? In Libya this aircraft allowed the RAF to safely go where they needed to go to deploy their weapons, could we not perhaps develop EW as opposed to stealth?
The F-35C carrier gives us options, the F-35B is surely a cul-de-sac with no options and no future after the B either gets chopped or ends its career as the last STOVL aircraft. Would the F-35B ever land on the deck of a ship that has not been deemed suitable to accept this unique aircraft? It is no lightweight Harrier that had a far lighter footprint, it is an amazing aircraft that is far heavier and as such might not be welcomed on an untried untested deck? (question, NOT a statement)
I am in the corner that predicts more back pedalling, more U-turns and more shrinkage.
For those that criticise the development of this latest aircraft, I ask this question... How can any private company possibly afford to develop a modern military aircraft without financial support from the relevant government. It is not rocket science to predict there will be problems and these issues will cost both time and money to rectify but can we ask private companies to be the sole funder of this procurement? (question)
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I think that GreenKnight's comments raise another set of questions for the MoD.
If the F-35 was ony ever to replace the legacy Hornets, and have the Rhino work alongside them - then surely the Top Trumps inspired equation of
F-35 > Super Hornet
therefore the conclusion thatmit should be the only game in town is rendered a bit farcical.
So some FAA squadrons of E/F/G F-18s would not be quite as obselete or outdated as some would have us grockles believe.
If the F-35 was ony ever to replace the legacy Hornets, and have the Rhino work alongside them - then surely the Top Trumps inspired equation of
F-35 > Super Hornet
therefore the conclusion thatmit should be the only game in town is rendered a bit farcical.
So some FAA squadrons of E/F/G F-18s would not be quite as obselete or outdated as some would have us grockles believe.
Good comments as always.
There is a strong presumption in DC that the F-35B will survive because the Marines will not let it perish. But personally I sense a disturbance in the Force: the new and next generation flag ranks in the CV are seeing their future capability and affordability being sacrificed to the ambitions of Marine air. Basically, through the 2020s, the Navy gets 25 CV jets per year, which is not the historic replacement rate, but spends far more on TacAir acquisition than today because of the B.
The floating of F/A-XX - at the Navy League show this week - is not an accident. "Oh by the way, we're taking the first step in procuring a hot new fighter jet" is a tasty goat to dangle in front of the reptiles, and the Navy flags are smart enough to know it. Note also that Boeing briefed UltraBug for the first time in DC.
GK - I don't think unmanned CV has gone away. But for the moment it's being reoriented to persistence rather than the J-UCAS mission.
As for Lewis Page - even a broken clock is right twice a day.
Engines - Where are you getting 2016-17 ISD? The SAR says that no IOC will be announced until next year, and is specific that IOT&E will not complete until 2019. For a program of this size to try to declare IOC before IOT&E is complete (and reports out) would be a nightmare.
There is a strong presumption in DC that the F-35B will survive because the Marines will not let it perish. But personally I sense a disturbance in the Force: the new and next generation flag ranks in the CV are seeing their future capability and affordability being sacrificed to the ambitions of Marine air. Basically, through the 2020s, the Navy gets 25 CV jets per year, which is not the historic replacement rate, but spends far more on TacAir acquisition than today because of the B.
The floating of F/A-XX - at the Navy League show this week - is not an accident. "Oh by the way, we're taking the first step in procuring a hot new fighter jet" is a tasty goat to dangle in front of the reptiles, and the Navy flags are smart enough to know it. Note also that Boeing briefed UltraBug for the first time in DC.
GK - I don't think unmanned CV has gone away. But for the moment it's being reoriented to persistence rather than the J-UCAS mission.
As for Lewis Page - even a broken clock is right twice a day.
Engines - Where are you getting 2016-17 ISD? The SAR says that no IOC will be announced until next year, and is specific that IOT&E will not complete until 2019. For a program of this size to try to declare IOC before IOT&E is complete (and reports out) would be a nightmare.
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LO,
Good spot on the IOC, and you are absolutely right on the SAR content. However, in the UK, the ability to declare 'IOC' is FAR more flexible than that allowed to the US customers, where the fully independent OT&E setup calls the shots to a large extent. (Remember 'Case White' for Typhoon?)
If the UK wanted to achieve an earlier 'political' IOC for F-35B in a land based role with some form of 'undeclared' deck capability, I have no doubt that they could do that.
That said, your point is well made. I'd agree that a 'proper' IOC looks to be around 2019.
Best regards
Engines
Good spot on the IOC, and you are absolutely right on the SAR content. However, in the UK, the ability to declare 'IOC' is FAR more flexible than that allowed to the US customers, where the fully independent OT&E setup calls the shots to a large extent. (Remember 'Case White' for Typhoon?)
If the UK wanted to achieve an earlier 'political' IOC for F-35B in a land based role with some form of 'undeclared' deck capability, I have no doubt that they could do that.
That said, your point is well made. I'd agree that a 'proper' IOC looks to be around 2019.
Best regards
Engines
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One assumes that in the 18 months since David Cameron and CAS both went on record as saying that the C model was more capable that an amount of money has been spent 'de-VSTOL-ing' the QECV design and CV-ing it.
I am also going to assume that there would be a cost associated with putting it all back to where it was 18 months ago, or at least making it look like it would do now had that decision not been made and taken.
So there really can't be a 'spend nothing' option here. To march on the bearing will cost the ludicrous figures (still drops in oceans compared to some projects) we have all become familiar with (and sceptical of) but has to be cheaper in the long term. To re-brigade back to VSTOL will not only mean Cameron saying he was wrong, that SDSR was wrong, that Labour was right etc etc. It will also mean that his government has delayed UK Maritime Strike and made it more expensive for no good reason.
We've all heard 1.7 Billion or similar or the upgrade, does anyone have a figure as to how much a down grade will now cost?
I am also going to assume that there would be a cost associated with putting it all back to where it was 18 months ago, or at least making it look like it would do now had that decision not been made and taken.
So there really can't be a 'spend nothing' option here. To march on the bearing will cost the ludicrous figures (still drops in oceans compared to some projects) we have all become familiar with (and sceptical of) but has to be cheaper in the long term. To re-brigade back to VSTOL will not only mean Cameron saying he was wrong, that SDSR was wrong, that Labour was right etc etc. It will also mean that his government has delayed UK Maritime Strike and made it more expensive for no good reason.
We've all heard 1.7 Billion or similar or the upgrade, does anyone have a figure as to how much a down grade will now cost?
Orca - The UK has signed a contract for the EMALS and AAG hardware, and since the US Navy has ordered the hardware for CVN-79, they're probably in no rush to buy it back from us. So presumably there is some cancellation liability.
Not sure we have signed for the hardware, probably more like an MoU at this stage.
Orca - I doubt very much whether any significant sum has been spent on de-STOVL-ing either QE or PoW. What will have been done is a lot of initial scoping studies, with manhour totals in the tens of thousands, hundred at the outside. Cost incurred £5-10M tops.
However, that kind of reinforces the point that the £1.8Bn "conversion" cost is some sort of fantasy. I'll say it again until my head drops off - if the hardware is £500M (which it is), then £1.3Bn in manpower rates now would allow you to build Illustrious in her entirety thirty years ago! They (and I don't think it's BAES here) are making it up, but as it suits some agendas, that's the number.
Clunk.....
Orca - I doubt very much whether any significant sum has been spent on de-STOVL-ing either QE or PoW. What will have been done is a lot of initial scoping studies, with manhour totals in the tens of thousands, hundred at the outside. Cost incurred £5-10M tops.
However, that kind of reinforces the point that the £1.8Bn "conversion" cost is some sort of fantasy. I'll say it again until my head drops off - if the hardware is £500M (which it is), then £1.3Bn in manpower rates now would allow you to build Illustrious in her entirety thirty years ago! They (and I don't think it's BAES here) are making it up, but as it suits some agendas, that's the number.
Clunk.....
Do a Hover - it avoids G
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Chaps
The team that briefed Cameron the weekend before the SDSR announcement and got him to change to the B were I am sure very convincing and professional. It was probably one of the best briefs that the PM has ever had.
It made the point that because the C had more range and payload than the B it "had more capability" and was therefore what the UK needed.
That was rather debatable. Yes the C has more payload and radius but it does not have the operating site flexibility of the B afloat or onshore. It needs more complicated ships and even they cannot operate for recovery in some sea states or visibilities. (How may helos fail to get aboard due motion and vis?) Plus of course there is also the CV skill aspects. You don't even need a PPL to be able to land a B vertically (thanks VAAC).
By any real objective analysis to say the C has more capability than the B is not totally true. It has different capabilities and one could argue the B is better suited to the things that the UK might wish to do.
Having said all that I don't think the B is really what the UK needs.
Supersonics and stealth come at a very large cost which the likes of the US, Russia and China might think value for money. But the UK?
Surely the UK needs lower costs plus REAL reliability and a proper number of aircraft? A Harrier III which would do .95 on the deck in the air to air config and only needed replenishment (not maintenance) for say 10 hours, with modest exhaust velocities and temps (because it did not have a supersonic capability) and VAAC no skill FBW handling would be a very useful piece of kit.
But there you go - real men do not bid for subsonic aircraft even though they are only going to use them in the tactical not strategic sense. For this you can blame internal service politics, inter-service ditto and personal agendas. Very sad.
The team that briefed Cameron the weekend before the SDSR announcement and got him to change to the B were I am sure very convincing and professional. It was probably one of the best briefs that the PM has ever had.
It made the point that because the C had more range and payload than the B it "had more capability" and was therefore what the UK needed.
That was rather debatable. Yes the C has more payload and radius but it does not have the operating site flexibility of the B afloat or onshore. It needs more complicated ships and even they cannot operate for recovery in some sea states or visibilities. (How may helos fail to get aboard due motion and vis?) Plus of course there is also the CV skill aspects. You don't even need a PPL to be able to land a B vertically (thanks VAAC).
By any real objective analysis to say the C has more capability than the B is not totally true. It has different capabilities and one could argue the B is better suited to the things that the UK might wish to do.
Having said all that I don't think the B is really what the UK needs.
Supersonics and stealth come at a very large cost which the likes of the US, Russia and China might think value for money. But the UK?
Surely the UK needs lower costs plus REAL reliability and a proper number of aircraft? A Harrier III which would do .95 on the deck in the air to air config and only needed replenishment (not maintenance) for say 10 hours, with modest exhaust velocities and temps (because it did not have a supersonic capability) and VAAC no skill FBW handling would be a very useful piece of kit.
But there you go - real men do not bid for subsonic aircraft even though they are only going to use them in the tactical not strategic sense. For this you can blame internal service politics, inter-service ditto and personal agendas. Very sad.
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John (or anybody else who knows about this),
Just a question as you seem to be the man to ask this.
I know it is a pointless question but I'm just asking out of my personal
technological interest.
Would the F32 conceived by Boeing have been a better platform for the VTOL variant?
I was just wondering about this because it seemed a lot simpler, more straightforward.
Because it had a harrier type set of swingnozzles (no extra liftfan) a centrally placed engine (good weight balance/ CoG) and a substantially lower empty weight combined with a lot of place to store fuel in that massive one piece deltawing, it seems that it would have been a better choice for the B (and maybe also C) version , no?
Just a question as you seem to be the man to ask this.
I know it is a pointless question but I'm just asking out of my personal
technological interest.
Would the F32 conceived by Boeing have been a better platform for the VTOL variant?
I was just wondering about this because it seemed a lot simpler, more straightforward.
Because it had a harrier type set of swingnozzles (no extra liftfan) a centrally placed engine (good weight balance/ CoG) and a substantially lower empty weight combined with a lot of place to store fuel in that massive one piece deltawing, it seems that it would have been a better choice for the B (and maybe also C) version , no?