RAF future fast jets
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Backward,
I have to come in here (reluctantly) to comment on one or two of the comments going around here.
Quote: 'JFH was, quite rightly focussed on Afghan. They could of course have done less of that in order to be "fully day/night quald" on the carrier, which would have pleased the RN but perhaps not the right thing for defence. A good example of why Maritime/Land agnostic Air power is a good thing!'
I am afraid that this is off beam, in my view. As someone who was involved in setting JFH up, perhaps I may be allowed to offer clarification. JFH was, indeed, in its latter days, 'focussed on Afghan'. But they were so out of necessity and numbers.
JFH was set up to be a fully dual capable sea/land force, exploiting the unique flexibility of a STOVL aircraft. They were required to maintain required numbers of aircraft at specified levels of readiness, including carrier capable. Staying 'day/night qualified on the carrier' was never done to 'please the RN', it was done to maintain a required readiness state.
When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability. That plan never came to fruition, and JFH stayed at three front line units, only one RN heavy. (Many reasons for that, none relevant here). This drastically reduced the numbers of aircraft available to go to sea, and the ability to maintain maritime currency was weakened. Sadly, that weakening was not declared to the politicians or, seriously, to the Navy. The maritime capability was still declared.
Afghan then came along, and the Harrier was needed as it had the best capability from the strips then available in theatre. So JFH was 'focussed' on Afghan, but the ability to maintain shipboard currency once again traded away. And that then turned into a problem - the last embarkation of JFH was marked by a series of significant safety shortcomings.
In the end, in my view, JFH failed because, under RAF leadership, there was insufficient emphasis placed on maintaining its declared dual air/sea capability. This happened because senior airmen simply did not attach any importance to the sea capability.
I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.
Sorry, but as long as a 'Joint' aviation unit is led by the RAF, it will not, in my view, commit the necessary resource to maintaining an effective maritime capability.
As ever, best regards to all those actually doing the job, whatever the location, whatever the uniform.
Engines
I have to come in here (reluctantly) to comment on one or two of the comments going around here.
Quote: 'JFH was, quite rightly focussed on Afghan. They could of course have done less of that in order to be "fully day/night quald" on the carrier, which would have pleased the RN but perhaps not the right thing for defence. A good example of why Maritime/Land agnostic Air power is a good thing!'
I am afraid that this is off beam, in my view. As someone who was involved in setting JFH up, perhaps I may be allowed to offer clarification. JFH was, indeed, in its latter days, 'focussed on Afghan'. But they were so out of necessity and numbers.
JFH was set up to be a fully dual capable sea/land force, exploiting the unique flexibility of a STOVL aircraft. They were required to maintain required numbers of aircraft at specified levels of readiness, including carrier capable. Staying 'day/night qualified on the carrier' was never done to 'please the RN', it was done to maintain a required readiness state.
When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability. That plan never came to fruition, and JFH stayed at three front line units, only one RN heavy. (Many reasons for that, none relevant here). This drastically reduced the numbers of aircraft available to go to sea, and the ability to maintain maritime currency was weakened. Sadly, that weakening was not declared to the politicians or, seriously, to the Navy. The maritime capability was still declared.
Afghan then came along, and the Harrier was needed as it had the best capability from the strips then available in theatre. So JFH was 'focussed' on Afghan, but the ability to maintain shipboard currency once again traded away. And that then turned into a problem - the last embarkation of JFH was marked by a series of significant safety shortcomings.
In the end, in my view, JFH failed because, under RAF leadership, there was insufficient emphasis placed on maintaining its declared dual air/sea capability. This happened because senior airmen simply did not attach any importance to the sea capability.
I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.
Sorry, but as long as a 'Joint' aviation unit is led by the RAF, it will not, in my view, commit the necessary resource to maintaining an effective maritime capability.
As ever, best regards to all those actually doing the job, whatever the location, whatever the uniform.
Engines
Posted a link to the USN NATOPS manual for LSOs in the F35 thread, which appears pertinent to this debate.
www.navyair.com/LSO_NATOPS_Manual.pdf
which pretty much makes GKs point. Joint Force Dave is going to have to spend an awful lot of time embarked one way or the other, whether it's the whole force or just a significant chunk of it.
The US haven't had a training carrier since Forrestal briefly did the role in the early 90s, but they do manage to get the non-embarked squadrons aboard the 2nd/3rd fleet carriers with some sort of frequency. BPLT does make a good point about changing mindset - it's a no-brainer the practicing carrier-landings should be a given when ashore for all JFD and as the preferred method of recovery. But so are other things to do with the embarked role, not just deck procedures etc.
Those who see Carrier Strike as a GR4 role, just delivered from a ship need to have a fundamental wake-up call. The requirement to provide air defence over maritime forces, which is emphatically NOT just defending the carrier, has not gone away. That means they are going to have to be qualified in OCA/DCA as well as Strike, as per the USN F14 (as was) and F18 communities.
One possible way forward and probably the best use of QEC (and Charles de Gaulle) for that matter, is to provide the ability to "replace" a US CVN in the deployment cycle, which ties in with the demand for Europe to pull its weight and with the US desire to shift effort to the 5th and 7th Fleet AOR. In essence, the European ships tie in with the US work-up cycle, which might also allow access to US decks when our ships are in upkeep.
Engines' post just emphasises the need for a mindset change. JFD may well replace some or all of the capability that GR4 currently delivers, but it is going to have to do it in a very different way and deliver other capabilities concurrently. The RN head-shed also need to (re)learn the lesson that the Foo's are not something that can just look after themselves - they need supporting, such that AOC 3Gp (as was) does not default to light blue after a token FAA opener, nor that capability is declared available, when clearly it is not.
www.navyair.com/LSO_NATOPS_Manual.pdf
which pretty much makes GKs point. Joint Force Dave is going to have to spend an awful lot of time embarked one way or the other, whether it's the whole force or just a significant chunk of it.
The US haven't had a training carrier since Forrestal briefly did the role in the early 90s, but they do manage to get the non-embarked squadrons aboard the 2nd/3rd fleet carriers with some sort of frequency. BPLT does make a good point about changing mindset - it's a no-brainer the practicing carrier-landings should be a given when ashore for all JFD and as the preferred method of recovery. But so are other things to do with the embarked role, not just deck procedures etc.
Those who see Carrier Strike as a GR4 role, just delivered from a ship need to have a fundamental wake-up call. The requirement to provide air defence over maritime forces, which is emphatically NOT just defending the carrier, has not gone away. That means they are going to have to be qualified in OCA/DCA as well as Strike, as per the USN F14 (as was) and F18 communities.
One possible way forward and probably the best use of QEC (and Charles de Gaulle) for that matter, is to provide the ability to "replace" a US CVN in the deployment cycle, which ties in with the demand for Europe to pull its weight and with the US desire to shift effort to the 5th and 7th Fleet AOR. In essence, the European ships tie in with the US work-up cycle, which might also allow access to US decks when our ships are in upkeep.
Engines' post just emphasises the need for a mindset change. JFD may well replace some or all of the capability that GR4 currently delivers, but it is going to have to do it in a very different way and deliver other capabilities concurrently. The RN head-shed also need to (re)learn the lesson that the Foo's are not something that can just look after themselves - they need supporting, such that AOC 3Gp (as was) does not default to light blue after a token FAA opener, nor that capability is declared available, when clearly it is not.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 30th Jan 2012 at 10:26. Reason: Hadn't seen Engines post
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Guys,
NAB hits this one right on the head. The issue is what the F-35 is being bought for, and who is going to own it to do that role.
Let's just remember that this whole programme started as the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA), for the RN. It then became FJCA (Future Joint Combat Aircraft), before mutating into JCA. It has always been linked 'at the hip' with the endorsed UK policy to deliver a Carrier Strike capability - from the carrier.
What's now happening (and very understandable) is the realisation that the F-35C offers the only real way for the RAF to achieve a GR4 replacement. And the (unsaid) realisation that Typhoon is not that replacement.
The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role. it's being bought to deliver the UK's Carrier Strike capability. There's nothing (given the right sized fleet, and the right commitment from its owners) to stop it doing both - a properly shared RAF/RN F-35C fleet would, in my view, be a great deal for the UK. Unfortunately an all RAF owned F-35C fleet would, again my view, be used as a GR4 replacement, and the carrier capability would be stillborn.
I'd like to think that all our service chiefs recognise the political direction they have been given and are going to get on and deliver the required capabilities, including Carrier Strike. Sadly, I don't believe that the RAF do. Doesn't make them bad people, nor stupid - just wrong.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
NAB hits this one right on the head. The issue is what the F-35 is being bought for, and who is going to own it to do that role.
Let's just remember that this whole programme started as the Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA), for the RN. It then became FJCA (Future Joint Combat Aircraft), before mutating into JCA. It has always been linked 'at the hip' with the endorsed UK policy to deliver a Carrier Strike capability - from the carrier.
What's now happening (and very understandable) is the realisation that the F-35C offers the only real way for the RAF to achieve a GR4 replacement. And the (unsaid) realisation that Typhoon is not that replacement.
The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role. it's being bought to deliver the UK's Carrier Strike capability. There's nothing (given the right sized fleet, and the right commitment from its owners) to stop it doing both - a properly shared RAF/RN F-35C fleet would, in my view, be a great deal for the UK. Unfortunately an all RAF owned F-35C fleet would, again my view, be used as a GR4 replacement, and the carrier capability would be stillborn.
I'd like to think that all our service chiefs recognise the political direction they have been given and are going to get on and deliver the required capabilities, including Carrier Strike. Sadly, I don't believe that the RAF do. Doesn't make them bad people, nor stupid - just wrong.
Best Regards as ever
Engines
I think it stretching credibility to believe we'll end up with any more than 2 (maybe 3 at the very most) F-35C squadrons across the whole of Defence. Therefore we'd better get some damn good sims, because it will be nigh on impossible to maintain training and proficiency in OCA, DCA, SEAD, AI, EW, CAS and carrier ops simultaneously with such a small footprint. If you have a near-permanently embarked air wing, maintenance of any semblance of harmony (even using the RN definition) once you have factored in other essential training would require a fleet-wide aircrew-to-aircraft ratio that exceeds current norms. Therefore we would actually have to do training in the simulator without being required to 'consolidate' it in the aircraft afterwards, as happens in most current FJ roles. 12.5 hours per month just isn't going to happen in that situation, either - so somebody high up is going to have to accept sim hours as 'real' hours for currency puposes...
Engines,
"The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role."
Yes it is. There have been numerous statements over the past few years that the future RAF fast jet fleet will be a combination of Typhoon and F-35. In the days of the JCA being the F-35B there was serious talk at ministerial level of a wing of 2 squadrons of F-35 type aircraft IN ADDITION TO THE JOINT FORCE LIGHTNING with a unit establishment of 9 ac each and a dedicated OCU to serve as the manned fast jet element of the GR4 replacement.
There is a widely held assumption that the UK buy of F-35 will only be around 30 to 40. This is not backed up by any statements of force levels post 2020 for the Joint Force Lightning OR the GR4 replacement.
There is little likelyhood of the F-35 being ordered in quantity in the next few years, but one of the many advantages of the F-35 is it's anticipated production run with the USAF committing to a very large quantity in the most recent DOD review, and consequently there is no NEED to buy the thing now, we can order it when the defence budget is less squeezed and there is a need for the Carrier based AND GR4 replacement fleet.
While there is absolutely no possibility of a one for one replacement of the GR4 fleet, I think that there is a very strong likelyhood of at least an additional two squadrons in addition to the Joint Force Lightning force flown by the FAA and RAF.
"The F-35C is not being bought to do the RAF's GR4 role."
Yes it is. There have been numerous statements over the past few years that the future RAF fast jet fleet will be a combination of Typhoon and F-35. In the days of the JCA being the F-35B there was serious talk at ministerial level of a wing of 2 squadrons of F-35 type aircraft IN ADDITION TO THE JOINT FORCE LIGHTNING with a unit establishment of 9 ac each and a dedicated OCU to serve as the manned fast jet element of the GR4 replacement.
There is a widely held assumption that the UK buy of F-35 will only be around 30 to 40. This is not backed up by any statements of force levels post 2020 for the Joint Force Lightning OR the GR4 replacement.
There is little likelyhood of the F-35 being ordered in quantity in the next few years, but one of the many advantages of the F-35 is it's anticipated production run with the USAF committing to a very large quantity in the most recent DOD review, and consequently there is no NEED to buy the thing now, we can order it when the defence budget is less squeezed and there is a need for the Carrier based AND GR4 replacement fleet.
While there is absolutely no possibility of a one for one replacement of the GR4 fleet, I think that there is a very strong likelyhood of at least an additional two squadrons in addition to the Joint Force Lightning force flown by the FAA and RAF.
F35 may be being considered to replace GR4, the point Engines & I are making is that the original requirement (which has not gone away) is for the FCBA, embarked air to provide carrier strike, which means the ability to do OCA/DCA and Strike.
The assumption that only 30-40 frames will be bought will inexorably lead to a stillborn JFD of whatever colour. If 60-odd Harrier GR frames could only support 18FE@R (admittedly with the GR7, 7a, 9, 9a fleets within fleets issue), then 30-40 would be lucky to support a dozen FE@R in total, which isn't going to be worth having (for anything!).
However, what should be the absolute priority soon ought to be the generation of a sustainable FE@R requirement for both the CS and GR4 capabilities. There is too much talk of this or that number being the final and definitive answer, ignoring the fact that FE@R is a number that can change upwards as well as downwards, when there is an open production line outside the current financial horizon..
The assumption that only 30-40 frames will be bought will inexorably lead to a stillborn JFD of whatever colour. If 60-odd Harrier GR frames could only support 18FE@R (admittedly with the GR7, 7a, 9, 9a fleets within fleets issue), then 30-40 would be lucky to support a dozen FE@R in total, which isn't going to be worth having (for anything!).
However, what should be the absolute priority soon ought to be the generation of a sustainable FE@R requirement for both the CS and GR4 capabilities. There is too much talk of this or that number being the final and definitive answer, ignoring the fact that FE@R is a number that can change upwards as well as downwards, when there is an open production line outside the current financial horizon..
I suspect that Engines and NaB are both right here, and that the original (and still formal according to MoUs) goal of 138 UK F-35s was calculated on replacing GR4 as well as equipping two carriers for strike and air. I'm sure the basic idea was that all the aircraft would be Bs belonging to JFD, but I suspect that there was some RAF hankering for a small contingent of As or Cs.
The two big problems facing that plan at present are, first, the acquisition and operating cost of the F-35, which is kicking the 138-aircraft goal far into the deep weeds (and making it the problem for a very future government), and deferring until Gawd-knows-when the point at which both a single robust CV wing and a land-based strike capability can be supported.
Second are the delays to F-35C IOC with the USN, raising the empty-deck nightmare since the only way for the RN to operate is to shadow the USN. (Dog in the night-time: where is the UK going to get a CV trainer? Same place as the Aeronavale.)
I would also submit that there will be no interim solutions. Letting the camel's nose inside the tent is one thing, but Rhinos' noses have big pointy things on them, which make them even harder to dislodge.
The two big problems facing that plan at present are, first, the acquisition and operating cost of the F-35, which is kicking the 138-aircraft goal far into the deep weeds (and making it the problem for a very future government), and deferring until Gawd-knows-when the point at which both a single robust CV wing and a land-based strike capability can be supported.
Second are the delays to F-35C IOC with the USN, raising the empty-deck nightmare since the only way for the RN to operate is to shadow the USN. (Dog in the night-time: where is the UK going to get a CV trainer? Same place as the Aeronavale.)
I would also submit that there will be no interim solutions. Letting the camel's nose inside the tent is one thing, but Rhinos' noses have big pointy things on them, which make them even harder to dislodge.
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goal of 138 UK F-35s was calculated on replacing GR4 as well as equipping two carriers for strike and air.
As far as JSF workups and embarkations go I am sure we will follow the USN lead, including working up at FALLON etc so that the RN CAG can co-operate off the US CVNs in theatre.
With an aviator CinC and soon to be 1SL/CinC perhaps the RN may get more robust on this issue.
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Reaper equivalent on CVS
As a small aside, now that we have got Dave C sorted, seen as most on going AirOps are Reaper dominated, is there a plan for a navalised Reaper of some sort to operate from the deck?
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Gentlemen,
Bismark is absolutely, deadly, right on, bang on the target here. The FCBA/FJCA/JCA numbers were all built around equipping and sustaining the two CVFs. There was never a 'GR4 replacement' line in those numbers.
Now we are down to one carrier, and now that we are a few years down the line, yes, looking at F-35C as a GR4 replacement makes eminent sense, but not at the expense of the main and original justification - Carrier Strike. Of course, i would not expect the RAF to share that view.
PrOOne raises an interesting point when he puts the idea of 'two more squadrons in addition to the 'Joint Force Lightning flown by RAF and FAA'? Surely, what he means is 'two more squadrons for Joint Force Lightning'? Or does he mean (as I suspect) 'two RAF squadrons, not shared with the RN'? Following his logic, would the best result not be Lightnings (As?) for the RAF and Cs for the RN? Why 'Joint Force'?
Zerva - navalised Reaper - not a hope for the prop driven version - it's basically a powered heavy glider, not a carrier aircraft unless you give the whole deck over to it. General Atomics are pushing a 'navalised' version of their new Reaper, but the airframe looks wrong for deck ops. Early days yet, though.
The dog that REALLY hasn't barked yet in this thread - future RAF fast jets - has to be RAF UCAVs. I'm surprised at the level of attention being given to X-47 (a long way off as a usable capability) for naval use compared with the undoubted potential for a UCAV replacement for GR4. If they are the way forward, leave the RN to do manned stuff from the deck, and get the RAF UCAV'd up as the GR4s retire. Any comments on that one?
Best Regards as ever to those out there in the dark doing it for real
Engines
Bismark is absolutely, deadly, right on, bang on the target here. The FCBA/FJCA/JCA numbers were all built around equipping and sustaining the two CVFs. There was never a 'GR4 replacement' line in those numbers.
Now we are down to one carrier, and now that we are a few years down the line, yes, looking at F-35C as a GR4 replacement makes eminent sense, but not at the expense of the main and original justification - Carrier Strike. Of course, i would not expect the RAF to share that view.
PrOOne raises an interesting point when he puts the idea of 'two more squadrons in addition to the 'Joint Force Lightning flown by RAF and FAA'? Surely, what he means is 'two more squadrons for Joint Force Lightning'? Or does he mean (as I suspect) 'two RAF squadrons, not shared with the RN'? Following his logic, would the best result not be Lightnings (As?) for the RAF and Cs for the RN? Why 'Joint Force'?
Zerva - navalised Reaper - not a hope for the prop driven version - it's basically a powered heavy glider, not a carrier aircraft unless you give the whole deck over to it. General Atomics are pushing a 'navalised' version of their new Reaper, but the airframe looks wrong for deck ops. Early days yet, though.
The dog that REALLY hasn't barked yet in this thread - future RAF fast jets - has to be RAF UCAVs. I'm surprised at the level of attention being given to X-47 (a long way off as a usable capability) for naval use compared with the undoubted potential for a UCAV replacement for GR4. If they are the way forward, leave the RN to do manned stuff from the deck, and get the RAF UCAV'd up as the GR4s retire. Any comments on that one?
Best Regards as ever to those out there in the dark doing it for real
Engines
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The planned (wished for?) sensor fit for F-35, with the look-anywhere-and-see helmet would be an ideal sensor suite for a UCAV to enable visual identification for those RoE ops - together with an 'n' strong flight crew to monitor the rest of the sensor suite back at the operating base.
The would be some inevitable delay / lag with routing the signal via satellite, however this must be being overcome currently.
The would be some inevitable delay / lag with routing the signal via satellite, however this must be being overcome currently.
The replacement for the GR4 has remained a foggy issue since the FOAS requirement was abandoned. I don't fully recall, but I think it was so about the same time that the last Government ordered 138 F35Bs.
I think pr00ne's comments are perhaps closest to the mark, as well as the least despairing on here, the mooted figure of either; 30, 40 or 50 is a number which current financial circumstances can comfortably allow planning for, it's not necessarily, nor even intended to be, the final purchase. Indeed, its not even a settled order. But I imagine that, subject to improved economic circumstances and a recognised need which the government of the day can be brought to appreciate, there'll be some more F35s purchased on top and the possible addition of Taranis, not to mention the full deployment of Typhoon, given time.
FB
I think pr00ne's comments are perhaps closest to the mark, as well as the least despairing on here, the mooted figure of either; 30, 40 or 50 is a number which current financial circumstances can comfortably allow planning for, it's not necessarily, nor even intended to be, the final purchase. Indeed, its not even a settled order. But I imagine that, subject to improved economic circumstances and a recognised need which the government of the day can be brought to appreciate, there'll be some more F35s purchased on top and the possible addition of Taranis, not to mention the full deployment of Typhoon, given time.
FB
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Engines:
“I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.”
After JFH returned from Afghan it was well on its way to recovering the embarked role – only the savings measure stopped it. AURIGA, the last embarked full exercise, was with 1(F) Sqn on deck.
As for the “Independent Air Power” argument, you are living in the past. That was Trenchard’s argument. The argument now is that the environmental expertise can only be vested and protected by a specialist Service. If the RN took the embarked aircraft; there is a strong possibility that they would trade away JSF for a cheaper option in order to save the Carrier Programme and consign us to the second division for ever (militarily and industrially).
And for those suggesting that we buy this very costly capability merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota, they will see it taken as a savings measure very quickly. We need to find a new way of operating that makes one ship do. We cannot copy the US model.
“I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.”
After JFH returned from Afghan it was well on its way to recovering the embarked role – only the savings measure stopped it. AURIGA, the last embarked full exercise, was with 1(F) Sqn on deck.
As for the “Independent Air Power” argument, you are living in the past. That was Trenchard’s argument. The argument now is that the environmental expertise can only be vested and protected by a specialist Service. If the RN took the embarked aircraft; there is a strong possibility that they would trade away JSF for a cheaper option in order to save the Carrier Programme and consign us to the second division for ever (militarily and industrially).
And for those suggesting that we buy this very costly capability merely to take our time in the US CV deployment rota, they will see it taken as a savings measure very quickly. We need to find a new way of operating that makes one ship do. We cannot copy the US model.
Capt PUG Wash,
I think you are spot on with the 'consign us to the second division' comment if we binned JSF. However, I would suggest that as a military, we can no longer afford to have first division capabilities across the board.
Within a constrained resource limit, we are going to have to realise that our previous aspirations to have night one capabilities against a tier one opponent are unaffordable, certainly in every area of our orbat.
Clearly, the economics of JSF are complex, and I don't pretend to understand the true value to the UK economy of each £ spent on the programme, but perhaps the aircraft is (or soon will become) just too damn expensive.
I think you are spot on with the 'consign us to the second division' comment if we binned JSF. However, I would suggest that as a military, we can no longer afford to have first division capabilities across the board.
Within a constrained resource limit, we are going to have to realise that our previous aspirations to have night one capabilities against a tier one opponent are unaffordable, certainly in every area of our orbat.
Clearly, the economics of JSF are complex, and I don't pretend to understand the true value to the UK economy of each £ spent on the programme, but perhaps the aircraft is (or soon will become) just too damn expensive.
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PUG,
A valiant attempt to plea for the RAF but it doesn't wash. The senior RAF use the "Trenchard " word whenever they can - as recent studies/camppaigns attest. It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH (OK it did literally) it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.
The RN seniors may demonstrate a certain ambivalence towards the FAA but there is little evidence from the past that they would allow the capability, if owned, to wither on the vine. The reason is that for all thier "envy" of the FAA they know that it delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.
The above is not intended to be anti-RAF banter but a real attempt to stop comments that the FAA are somehow inferior to this "superior" being called the RAF. If the RAF is superior the studies would say so and the AAC and FAA would die an instant death.
A valiant attempt to plea for the RAF but it doesn't wash. The senior RAF use the "Trenchard " word whenever they can - as recent studies/camppaigns attest. It wasn't the last savings measure that killed off a viable JFH (OK it did literally) it was the vindictive one before it which was aimed solely at removing the RN from the force by making the numbers unviable....the ploy didn't work.
The RN seniors may demonstrate a certain ambivalence towards the FAA but there is little evidence from the past that they would allow the capability, if owned, to wither on the vine. The reason is that for all thier "envy" of the FAA they know that it delivers in spades and far more efficiently than the RAF - fact. Every study in the recent past (5 - 10 years) has demonstrated that the RN runs "air" more efficiently and to higher safety standards than the RAF. The most recent study by the MAA has shown that the FAA understand and treat safety and risk better than either the RAF or AAC.
The above is not intended to be anti-RAF banter but a real attempt to stop comments that the FAA are somehow inferior to this "superior" being called the RAF. If the RAF is superior the studies would say so and the AAC and FAA would die an instant death.
Cap'n wrote ''If the RN took the embarked aircraft; there is a strong possibility that they would trade away JSF for a cheaper option in order to save the Carrier Programme and consign us to the second division for ever (militarily and industrially)''
conversely, without meaningful carrier strike, could we really be said to be first division?
'first division' means, to me at least, the ability to give a good slapping to anyone (bar the US) anywhere in the world at a time of our choosing and without relying on basing rights courtesy of whichever local tin-pots we've bribed with overseas aid and jump-leads.
however brilliant F-35 may be, if it can only give us, in extremis, slapping rights over western Europe and north-west Africa, then we aint first division.
i would argue that in divisional terms, CVF with 36 F/A-18F's with Storm Shadow ALCM, Meteor BVRAAM, EPavewayIV, ALARM, Harpoon, and a slack handful of E-2D's supported by half a dozen SSN with TLAM is more top trumps than 100 utterly brilliant F-35's whose range is only as good as the 'front-loaded commision' deal that we've struck with whatever dodgy dictator who owns the runways we need.
conversely, without meaningful carrier strike, could we really be said to be first division?
'first division' means, to me at least, the ability to give a good slapping to anyone (bar the US) anywhere in the world at a time of our choosing and without relying on basing rights courtesy of whichever local tin-pots we've bribed with overseas aid and jump-leads.
however brilliant F-35 may be, if it can only give us, in extremis, slapping rights over western Europe and north-west Africa, then we aint first division.
i would argue that in divisional terms, CVF with 36 F/A-18F's with Storm Shadow ALCM, Meteor BVRAAM, EPavewayIV, ALARM, Harpoon, and a slack handful of E-2D's supported by half a dozen SSN with TLAM is more top trumps than 100 utterly brilliant F-35's whose range is only as good as the 'front-loaded commision' deal that we've struck with whatever dodgy dictator who owns the runways we need.
Cokecan,
Admittedly the present suggested figure of F35s can change at any moment, and I would expect up rather than down otherwise there'd be no point in proceeding with it, but how confident are we that we'll get as many as 100? ....eventually??
FB
Admittedly the present suggested figure of F35s can change at any moment, and I would expect up rather than down otherwise there'd be no point in proceeding with it, but how confident are we that we'll get as many as 100? ....eventually??
FB
FB, i'm not. i think its cost is going to be so eye-watering that the BG will order less than 30 and keep them for 'special occasions'. which means that there'll be **** all flying hours, and then a spate of accidents whenever they get wheeled out.
i just do not believe we can afford the F-35 package - the airframes in sufficient numbers (what? 200 airframes to give a land based strike force, a CVF based force, attrition replacements and training aircraft?) and all the enabling capabilities - the ELINT, Tankers, AWACS, and the CVF (and all support that it needs) to make having F-35 justifable.
having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.
i just do not believe we can afford the F-35 package - the airframes in sufficient numbers (what? 200 airframes to give a land based strike force, a CVF based force, attrition replacements and training aircraft?) and all the enabling capabilities - the ELINT, Tankers, AWACS, and the CVF (and all support that it needs) to make having F-35 justifable.
having a sharp spearhead is useless if the shaft is rotten.