Backward,
I have to come in here (reluctantly) to comment on one or two of the comments going around here.
Quote: 'JFH was, quite rightly focussed on Afghan. They could of course have done less of that in order to be "fully day/night quald" on the carrier, which would have pleased the RN but perhaps not the right thing for defence. A good example of why Maritime/Land agnostic Air power is a good thing!'
I am afraid that this is off beam, in my view. As someone who was involved in setting JFH up, perhaps I may be allowed to offer clarification. JFH was, indeed, in its latter days, 'focussed on Afghan'. But they were so out of necessity and numbers.
JFH was set up to be a fully dual capable sea/land force, exploiting the unique flexibility of a STOVL aircraft. They were required to maintain required numbers of aircraft at specified levels of readiness, including carrier capable. Staying 'day/night qualified on the carrier' was never done to 'please the RN', it was done to maintain a required readiness state.
When the RAF took the decision to retire the SHAR, the plan to re-brigade into four front line units was taken so as to be able to maintain that dual air/land capability, two RAF heavy, two RN heavy, with the RN heavy units maintaining embarked capability. That plan never came to fruition, and JFH stayed at three front line units, only one RN heavy. (Many reasons for that, none relevant here). This drastically reduced the numbers of aircraft available to go to sea, and the ability to maintain maritime currency was weakened. Sadly, that weakening was not declared to the politicians or, seriously, to the Navy. The maritime capability was still declared.
Afghan then came along, and the Harrier was needed as it had the best capability from the strips then available in theatre. So JFH was 'focussed' on Afghan, but the ability to maintain shipboard currency once again traded away. And that then turned into a problem - the last embarkation of JFH was marked by a series of significant safety shortcomings.
In the end, in my view, JFH failed because, under RAF leadership, there was insufficient emphasis placed on maintaining its declared dual air/sea capability. This happened because senior airmen simply did not attach any importance to the sea capability.
I don't think that RAF airmen, senior or junior, are bad people, or stupid, or 'worse' than RN aviators. I've said, and say again, that the RAF is chock full of highly professional people. However, it's a fact that, as a service, they are basically uninterested in flying from ships. It's not surprising, and even understandable, viewed through the lens of independent 'Air Power' that seeks to make its case as an alternative to 'conventional' land and sea power.
Sorry, but as long as a 'Joint' aviation unit is led by the RAF, it will not, in my view, commit the necessary resource to maintaining an effective maritime capability.
As ever, best regards to all those actually doing the job, whatever the location, whatever the uniform.
Engines