Reports on Red Arrows and Flt Lt Cunningham's death
Fodfather,
I stand corrected at your experience and I might agree that what you say shows a significant improvement in attendance.
However, my experience is that every one of the heavily publicised policies and processes made in high offices, conferences, seminars and the like, are only tested on the shop floor. Only the practises there can make a significant difference to any 'safety culture'.
Rules are only effective if people read them and act on them.
I stand corrected at your experience and I might agree that what you say shows a significant improvement in attendance.
However, my experience is that every one of the heavily publicised policies and processes made in high offices, conferences, seminars and the like, are only tested on the shop floor. Only the practises there can make a significant difference to any 'safety culture'.
Rules are only effective if people read them and act on them.
Rigga, words of wisdom in both your last posts, especially:-
That is where things went wrong and still do. The Regulations need to be regained and enforced. The MAA doesn't do that, instead it rewrites them to suit the MOD's agenda. It will go on doing so until it is free of the MOD yoke.
Your conferences may have been acclaimed successes tff, but that is not the point of Air Safety, which is to avoid avoidable accidents. You can only do that with slow evolution. Instead of that we have seen a pogrom waged against those who were trained and experienced in applying the Regulations, so that both they and the Regulations are but distant memories.
The MAA was founded on this morass, in a state of perpetual revolutionary fervour. It won't work, unless it can be made truly independent and sets about rebuilding outwith the MOD what has been lost within it. Just as importantly all that goes for the MAAIB also. Rather than starting from a Year Zero, both have to reach back to the roots of best practise before the suborning started.
Rules are only effective if people read them and act on them
That is where things went wrong and still do. The Regulations need to be regained and enforced. The MAA doesn't do that, instead it rewrites them to suit the MOD's agenda. It will go on doing so until it is free of the MOD yoke.
Your conferences may have been acclaimed successes tff, but that is not the point of Air Safety, which is to avoid avoidable accidents. You can only do that with slow evolution. Instead of that we have seen a pogrom waged against those who were trained and experienced in applying the Regulations, so that both they and the Regulations are but distant memories.
The MAA was founded on this morass, in a state of perpetual revolutionary fervour. It won't work, unless it can be made truly independent and sets about rebuilding outwith the MOD what has been lost within it. Just as importantly all that goes for the MAAIB also. Rather than starting from a Year Zero, both have to reach back to the roots of best practise before the suborning started.
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Fodfather, I may have attended your Fod conference at Metropole in 99. Recall the marble room. I spent some time as a Safety Manager. At the time we were quite proud of the systems we were introducing to manage hazards (we called them risks at the time!) I think the Engine crowd were ahead of the rest.
Frankly I found the job boring. I was not looking for promotion. I think some of the EAs welcomed my contribution and help. At least a couple are still in contact 14 years later.
I could not wait to get back into a proper job where I made decisions and made things happen. I consider that I embraced safety without the need for the watershed moment and subsequent initiatives. what I saw and did not like was how the resources were thrown at Safety post HC. it became an industry with each IPT having a complete section. What they actually did and the contribution they made to real safety in my experience is questionable. I saw QQ milk the situation to the extreme aided an abetted by the Safety Management Section. I don't think they managed Safety just managed a contract with QQ or others.
I am not suggesting for one minute that the resources were not needed. What I think we all needed was fewer projects such that those with the responsibility could do the job thoroughly which means drawing up the safety argument not delegating it to others. What actually happened was we took our eye off the ball looking to do things cheaper. More for less, RAB became more important than Airworthiness in spite of what the VSOs were saying on every Business Plan and mission statement.
I did learn some lessons from my time in Safety Management. the biggest thing was to get to know how the kit worked and how it could kill those who operated it. without that understanding you fail. I think it may be called Engineering. Those employed in Safety Management posts should be deployed to the real work where they can make a difference.
I think you were spot on Rigga.
Frankly I found the job boring. I was not looking for promotion. I think some of the EAs welcomed my contribution and help. At least a couple are still in contact 14 years later.
I could not wait to get back into a proper job where I made decisions and made things happen. I consider that I embraced safety without the need for the watershed moment and subsequent initiatives. what I saw and did not like was how the resources were thrown at Safety post HC. it became an industry with each IPT having a complete section. What they actually did and the contribution they made to real safety in my experience is questionable. I saw QQ milk the situation to the extreme aided an abetted by the Safety Management Section. I don't think they managed Safety just managed a contract with QQ or others.
I am not suggesting for one minute that the resources were not needed. What I think we all needed was fewer projects such that those with the responsibility could do the job thoroughly which means drawing up the safety argument not delegating it to others. What actually happened was we took our eye off the ball looking to do things cheaper. More for less, RAB became more important than Airworthiness in spite of what the VSOs were saying on every Business Plan and mission statement.
I did learn some lessons from my time in Safety Management. the biggest thing was to get to know how the kit worked and how it could kill those who operated it. without that understanding you fail. I think it may be called Engineering. Those employed in Safety Management posts should be deployed to the real work where they can make a difference.
I think you were spot on Rigga.
to suggest that they have made no attempt to do the right thing is very unfair indeed
What has the MAA done to address the root problem that led to the Nimrod Review, which in turn led to their formation?
Nothing. They deny it even happened.
That being so, everything they do lacks a solid foundation and direction. They may get a few things right, but for entirely the wrong reason.
