Reports on Red Arrows and Flt Lt Cunningham's death
 

The inquest, in Lincoln, heard that Flt Lt Cunningham had completed ground safety checks when the ejector seat of his Hawk jet was deployed.

The main parachute did not deploy and the pilot did not become separated from his seat during the incident, the hearing was told. He landed on the ground still strapped into his seat.

An ambulance was called and Flt Lt Cunningham was taken to Lincoln County Hospital where he was confirmed dead in the A&E at 12.14pm.

A full investigation into how the ejector seat deployed is being carried out and further tests are being done, the inquest heard.

A post-mortem examination gave the cause of death as multiple injuries due to a fall from height following ejection from an aircraft. Toxicology tests were negative.

Det Supt Shaun West said Lincolnshire Police were preparing a file for the coroner to look into two critical questions:why the ejector seat activated; and why the parachute mechanism did not work.

Full article: Red Arrows pilot 'killed when parachute failed' - Telegraph

Red Arrows - ejection report.
 

Right .... these 2 threads are now merged and it would be really nice if people stuck to the topic at hand.

Martin Baker Press Release
 

Hope I don't get into trouble with this:

From the Martin Baker website:

RAF Red Arrows Incident on 8th November 2011

On 8th November, there was a fatal accident involving the Red Arrows Hawk aircraft XX177 following the ejection of a Mk10B seat.

We have had the opportunity to examine the seat and, while not wishing to pre-empt the outcome of the investigation currently underway, are satisfied that neither a mechanical nor a design fault were to blame for the fatality.

We welcome the opportunity to assist the Lincolnshire Police and the Military Air Accident Investigation Board in identifying the causes of this tragic accident

In the meantime, our thoughts and prayers are with the family and friends of Flight Lieutenant Sean Cunningham who lost his life in this accident.


See here:


Martin Baker - Press Release

You would imagine that MB would not be releasing that kind of info into the public domain until all public and MoD enquiries were complete.

Maybe this thread could go on hold until next week for the family and friends sake?

On the contrary, it seems pre-empting the outcome of the investigation is exactly the intention. Even then, the selective use of words suggests hedging of bets... Electrical fault? Related systems fault? Etc, etc. So basically it claims a lot and says little. I wouldn't draw any conclusions from this.

I don't think you need to draw any "conclusions" from it, but doubt it is anything other than basically correct and informative, particularly if you were, say, a non-UK Mk10 operator.

The CAA MPD was far more revealing in technical detail, and told a story in it's own right.

Ummmm, where do you draw that from? Unsure of any of the Seat/Canopy system/operation that has anything to do with Electrics :rolleyes:

NoD

There is, but it goes the other way to the IFF. And the gas pipes are a one way system, so the IFF won't fire the seat, if you see what I mean.

Do remember that this seat has been flown for (easily) hundreds of thousands of hours and saved MANY lives - I think I have over 2000 hrs in it. This is a very unusual incident and I think we'll have to wait for a finding.

I would say that this, and other associated threads, have brought forth a HUGE amount of knowledge about the Mk10B, so thank you all. But, we haven't come up with any answers. Let the investigations do their work now.

Why is everyone on here always so reticent to discuss possible outcomes to incidents or accidents? This is a RUMOUR network after all. My heart and thoughts go out to Flt Lt Cunninghams family, but life does go on and the discussion that occurs here is usually thought provoking, relevant and interesting. What is discussed here is not the results of an official enquiry (which the MAAIB will post sometime next decade......), but is an unofficial way for 'experts' to speculate - and there's nowt wrong wi that!

So I say, let the people talk!

Just my 2 pence worth.......

No one has mentioned pins..

Apparently safety checks were done and he was strapped to the seat.

I'll pre-empt this by saying I know bugger all about bang seats but it was my understanding that once the seat leaves it's rail the deployment of drogues/parachutes and seat separation etc. is all automated and "foolproof".

If that is the case then how could MB claim there's no failure in the seat? Reports seem to say there was no seat separation or drogue/parachute deployment. I can understand how they might be able to "get away" with saying it's not a fault of the seat that fired the it but after it's off the rail surely it's all MB...

AA,

Without wishing to speculate too much also, you mention that the process is automated but this process does rely on all the pins being removed, chutes being packed correctly and a host of other human interventions prior to and during the use of the seat. This is not to say that I think anyone at the Reds is at fault but the MB statement almost asks you to draw that conclusion!

Not sat on the 10B, do they include removal of the pins? Or does that come later (ORA)? IMHO, with the parachute failing to deploy, it raises the prospect that the pins were still in.



So are they suggesting command activated? What about servicing - could a mistake during servicing affect the plumbing enough to lead to inadvertant activation?

:(

Here is one for you. Is it possible to activate the seat firing mechanism with the pins in IF the seat firing sear directly under the pin is jolted, say catching on an item of clothing? From tin can days (not 10b seat), i remember a check under the seat to make sure a connection was made. If this connection were pulled for whatever reason, would the seat fire?

I dont mean to hijack the thread, i am interested for personal reasons whether other areas of the seat could cause a firing with the pins in is all.

MK10 Operation
 

Now my experience is the MK10 on Tornado.

But

What if the Static rod to the Drogue was not connected / reset correctly / or pinned to the anchor on the main gun correctly?

From my recollection, there would be no drouge deployment and as the inflated drogues withdraw it, no main para deployment regardless of Barostat operation to release harness and open scissor shackle.




Ultimately this is a tragic situation for all that are connected to it. The loss reminds us all the fragility of life but please also remember, there are some engineers in the equation as well. Those who installed and inspected the installation of that seat, I would imagine will be inconsolable. From my experience, Plumbers take immense pride and care with seat work; I know I did and the professional let alone the emotional hurt those guys will currently be experiencing will be unimaginable by most.


As for how / why the Seat was initiated I think only the board with all the facts have a chance to determine.

Are we aware of any BoI reports on this or the previous crash?

Buccaneer at Paris Air Show
 

Formertonkaplum,

I cannot now remember what Mk of seat it was in the RAF's Buccaneer, but I was the (very) junior engineering member of the BoI which investigated the loss of 12 Sqn Buccaneer XN 978 at the run-in to the Paris Air Show in Jun 1971, and during his very low level ejection the pilot was lucky enough to survive the circumstances you postulate ie the static rod to the drogue gun had become disconnected and the drogue had not fired - everything else worked, and he went into the fireball with a partially deploying main chute and the seat still attached, via the unfired drogue gun, to the top of the canopy. The fireball kicked him back into the air and gave him the main chute (albeit with the chute and his flying clothing somewhat singed if I recall correctly) and he was then injured in the ribs as the seat came back across the canopy and hit him just before he landed on the edge of the fireball. His navigator ejected at low level successfully and normally. As you might imagine there was a great deal of interest from MB and the Command ejection seat specialists (I was an electrical specialist so not too much help) but if I remember correctly this was then the only seat installation where the pin attaching the drogue gun static line was mounted fore and aft rather than transversely, and I believe the installation was then modified. There were other seat issues as well eg it had been signed as being installed to the incorrect SP (the right one was, if I remember correctly still in course of issue) but these were not seen as directly relevavant to the instalation problem.

Somewhat ironically the same pilot had had his navigator eject on the runway at Karup some 3 weeks earlier, and he told the Paris BoI that when he went back after that incident to check the aircraft for safety he found this pin missing on his (unused) seat. At the time he had thought this was a special RDAF safety precaution (although it actually left the installation in a more dangerous condition) but it did bear out the fact that we were happy that he had indeed checked the pin was there on XN 978 before flight.

Whether any of this has any relevance to the main purpose of this thread, other than to confirm there have been incidents and accidents where the drogue gun has not worked "as advertised" I would not know - others with more knowledge may care to comment.

To complete this story though the second luckiest man on the planet was the gendarme who helped carry the pilot's seat into the guarded crash site through thick scrub and tree branches (they crashed in woodland near Compiegne) with the static rod dangling down and a live drogue gun pointing at his stomach. The drogue gun was still live when we got there the next day.

The rumours that although neither the pilot nor the navigator had planned on landing in France they returned witha bottle and 200 on the casevac Hercules later on the afternoon of the crash were to the best of my knowledge true - aircrew are obviously very good at making the best of the bad job!

Finally we had to do the BoI twice as the AOC did not like some thinly veiled critiscim in the BoI's findings of the pressure he had applied to the crew to do better - apparently the day before the Victor had appeaerd at the Show with the Lightning plugged in and the Buccaneer "chasing" the hose, and the pilot had commented to the BoI about this pressure. We had new aircrew on the second BoI, and I got a second visit to Paris! It does show though that comments on other threads concerning the need for an independence of the military investigation system from the chain of command are not without foundation - at least at that time anyway!

JB,

Buccanneer was Mk 6.

My last 6 months in the RAF were spent as the president of a BoI. The AOC didn't like our initial findings and spent 45 minutes screaming at me down the phone, telling what findings he wanted me to come up with. I'm pleased to say that I stood my ground. But it may have been harder for others - perhaps those with more of a flickering career caption than I - not to be swayed.

[cynical hat] Independant? I think not. Especially if there is likely to be any criticism of the convening officer of his mates. [/cynical hat]