BAE Systems & MRA4
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With regards to Posts 60 & 61.
The first is from a point of knowledge.
The second is rant, as ever; knows all about everything (crewroom, that is), and opines over matters of which he has no real knowledge (eg RAF Club, BAES, MoD Procedures etc). P**ck! A man that knows all about nothing. Looks forward to his retirement, and total severance from the RAF (aside from the pension). A SNCO with a huge chip. A Mess bore.
No doubt I'll receive a charming , and well-sarcasticly scripted re-buff. To which I will respond in advance. F-off.
Sorry, but I needed to.
The first is from a point of knowledge.
The second is rant, as ever; knows all about everything (crewroom, that is), and opines over matters of which he has no real knowledge (eg RAF Club, BAES, MoD Procedures etc). P**ck! A man that knows all about nothing. Looks forward to his retirement, and total severance from the RAF (aside from the pension). A SNCO with a huge chip. A Mess bore.
No doubt I'll receive a charming , and well-sarcasticly scripted re-buff. To which I will respond in advance. F-off.
Sorry, but I needed to.
Last edited by jindabyne; 4th Sep 2011 at 20:12.
The C17 is/was a lease agreement and is/was dominated by Boeing's methods of maintenance and maintenance management - not the RAF's (I believe this is still so) And very productive it has been too. It should be held as an example of how the RAF's ancient and traditional methods can be replaced by something that works - and, many would say, works very well indeed.
Another project to look at is the US Army's Lakota Helicopter Project where 300+ helicopters were bought "Off The Shelf" from BBK/Eurocopter.
Even if there are misgivings about how the EC145 variant performs the reason they were purchased was to be able to flood any "Homeland" (how I dislike that word!) incidents with usable cheap ANG/Reserve Service helicopters that can do a job of work. That purchase was not about replacing the Huey but supplying a lot of helicopters from already produced commercial stock.
That purchase is proof that the military dont need everything made especially for them, and that some things are already useful tools - even without modification.
I know of many other operators who have put much, much more mods onto their EC145 aircraft - and I'm not talking about leather seats and ashtrays.
Another project to look at is the US Army's Lakota Helicopter Project where 300+ helicopters were bought "Off The Shelf" from BBK/Eurocopter.
Even if there are misgivings about how the EC145 variant performs the reason they were purchased was to be able to flood any "Homeland" (how I dislike that word!) incidents with usable cheap ANG/Reserve Service helicopters that can do a job of work. That purchase was not about replacing the Huey but supplying a lot of helicopters from already produced commercial stock.
That purchase is proof that the military dont need everything made especially for them, and that some things are already useful tools - even without modification.
I know of many other operators who have put much, much more mods onto their EC145 aircraft - and I'm not talking about leather seats and ashtrays.
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Jin,
No you won't Sir, way to polite for that but if you could point out the flaw in my thought process
LJ and Downsizer I happily concede to those items which highlights the lack of detail in my post and overall knowledge, but I suspect you knew where I was coming from
No you won't Sir, way to polite for that but if you could point out the flaw in my thought process
LJ and Downsizer I happily concede to those items which highlights the lack of detail in my post and overall knowledge, but I suspect you knew where I was coming from
Last edited by Seldomfitforpurpose; 4th Sep 2011 at 20:36.
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The main thing that went wrong with the MRA4 project was the expectations set in the 1995 Bid. MoD stressed to BAe that this was an open competition, and that the best performance coupled with the lowest cost would win. A couple of significant programmes, the Merlin helicopter and the Hercules upgrade C-130J, had already gone to American companies and BAe senior management thought that the loss of the competition to an American company would seal the company’s fate. Thus the Company treated RMPA as a must-win competition. MoD had set a budget of approximately £2bn and this conditioned BAe’s cost estimating for the originally proposed MR2 refurbishment programme (to be followed up with an MPA version of the FLA now A400.) In retrospect it is obvious that the extra cost put in for rewinging and re-engining was insufficient (an extra 25% at most) and the programme timescale was more or less unchanged from that pertaining to the originally proposed MR2 refurbishment programme. In short MoD asked for a golden apple and the company offered them one: a situation now described as “a conspiracy of optimism”. Certainly all those on the programme sweated blood to achieve the programme, but it was mission impossible from the start and merely a question of time how long the conspiracy would last.
The outturn costs stand comparison with those for the P-8 Poseidon given on the US GAO website. P-8 costs are estimated as $7.35bn (£4.9bn) and $202m (£134m) per aircraft, which makes $9.2bn (£6bn) for a nine aircraft fleet. £4bn for Nimrod MRA4 is cheap by comparison, particularly when you consider that one MRA4 is as operationally capable as two P-8s. I suggest therefore that MRA4 would have been excellent value for money. Not to be forgotten, however, is the fact that it was subsidised by the ever generous shareholders of BAE Systems through several write-offs.
In terms of the programme I'm sure things could have been done quicker (perhaps saving 3 years) but 15 years from contract to service is not unusual these days. Certainly it is better than Eurofighter Typhoon (a vastly simpler aircraft) and, let’s face it, better than what the USN has achieved with MMA/P-8. It should not be forgotten that the USN initiated its P-3 replacement programme (P-7) in 1989 and cancelled it due to cost overrun in 1990. Thus with the P-8 not yet in service and still with a number of hurdles to get over, the USN has waited even longer than the RAF to replace its cold war MPAs.
Ultimately the BAE Systems Team produced a world-beating product at a non-unreasonable price and in the sort of timescale one might have expected. I feel desperately sad for the consequent redundancies in the RAF for those who were waiting to operate MRA4, but it should not be forgotten that BAE have suffered 2500 job losses so far as a result of SDSR with undoubtedly more still to come. Cancellation at the time it came with the programme cost spent and the aircraft almost ready was completely illogical particularly with the SDSRs clear statement of the importance of ISTAR capability and MRA4 being the most flexible ISTAR platform the MoD would have ever had. Unfortunately MRA4 finally fell victim to the need for a big political gesture and inter-service rivalry where each service protected its own "toys" and allowed the "orphan" platforms to go hang, ie the naval platforms operated by the RAF such as MRA4 and Harrier and the Army platform operated by the RAF, ie Sentinel.
Eminence Gris
The outturn costs stand comparison with those for the P-8 Poseidon given on the US GAO website. P-8 costs are estimated as $7.35bn (£4.9bn) and $202m (£134m) per aircraft, which makes $9.2bn (£6bn) for a nine aircraft fleet. £4bn for Nimrod MRA4 is cheap by comparison, particularly when you consider that one MRA4 is as operationally capable as two P-8s. I suggest therefore that MRA4 would have been excellent value for money. Not to be forgotten, however, is the fact that it was subsidised by the ever generous shareholders of BAE Systems through several write-offs.
In terms of the programme I'm sure things could have been done quicker (perhaps saving 3 years) but 15 years from contract to service is not unusual these days. Certainly it is better than Eurofighter Typhoon (a vastly simpler aircraft) and, let’s face it, better than what the USN has achieved with MMA/P-8. It should not be forgotten that the USN initiated its P-3 replacement programme (P-7) in 1989 and cancelled it due to cost overrun in 1990. Thus with the P-8 not yet in service and still with a number of hurdles to get over, the USN has waited even longer than the RAF to replace its cold war MPAs.
Ultimately the BAE Systems Team produced a world-beating product at a non-unreasonable price and in the sort of timescale one might have expected. I feel desperately sad for the consequent redundancies in the RAF for those who were waiting to operate MRA4, but it should not be forgotten that BAE have suffered 2500 job losses so far as a result of SDSR with undoubtedly more still to come. Cancellation at the time it came with the programme cost spent and the aircraft almost ready was completely illogical particularly with the SDSRs clear statement of the importance of ISTAR capability and MRA4 being the most flexible ISTAR platform the MoD would have ever had. Unfortunately MRA4 finally fell victim to the need for a big political gesture and inter-service rivalry where each service protected its own "toys" and allowed the "orphan" platforms to go hang, ie the naval platforms operated by the RAF such as MRA4 and Harrier and the Army platform operated by the RAF, ie Sentinel.
Eminence Gris
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in other words the only equipment we get that works, is that which has already had the developmental risk aspects handled by someone else.
i.e. off-the-shelf purchases of items which have been developed elsewhere.
I find it interesting that all the recent purchases of mine/IED resisitant vehicles for Afghanistan have been effectively "off the shelf" overseas designs (though some were assembled in the UK). BAE / Vickers didn't get a look in
i.e. off-the-shelf purchases of items which have been developed elsewhere.
I find it interesting that all the recent purchases of mine/IED resisitant vehicles for Afghanistan have been effectively "off the shelf" overseas designs (though some were assembled in the UK). BAE / Vickers didn't get a look in
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Seldom
Seems like you're making everyone as happy as you are.
I can understand you being pissed off, but most contracts for large machinery, civil engineering projects, ships, oil rigs et al tend to overrun - especially if the customer makes changes.
I have intimate knowledge of this happening on one particular project concerning the RAF and BAES, the goal posts moved quite a bit and even when the project was ready for delivery, much of the hold up was caused by different parts of MOD/RAF not getting their 'i' dotted and 't' crossed.
Sad fact of life. Simply, it's not ALL anyone's fault. It's just life. Using non-professionals to negotiate contracts is not sensible or efficient - that is the RAF's responsibility pure and simple.
Redundancy is a part of modern life. I've been redundant 3 times and it's OK, there is life afterwards. All the anger in the world won't make a jot of difference.
Enough breath expended.
I can understand you being pissed off, but most contracts for large machinery, civil engineering projects, ships, oil rigs et al tend to overrun - especially if the customer makes changes.
I have intimate knowledge of this happening on one particular project concerning the RAF and BAES, the goal posts moved quite a bit and even when the project was ready for delivery, much of the hold up was caused by different parts of MOD/RAF not getting their 'i' dotted and 't' crossed.
Sad fact of life. Simply, it's not ALL anyone's fault. It's just life. Using non-professionals to negotiate contracts is not sensible or efficient - that is the RAF's responsibility pure and simple.
Redundancy is a part of modern life. I've been redundant 3 times and it's OK, there is life afterwards. All the anger in the world won't make a jot of difference.
Enough breath expended.
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Eng,
I am not pissed off, in fact I could not be happier with my lot, seriously I am as happy as a sand boy and I am not being made redundant
If you go back and read my post you will see we are singing from the same song sheet. Industry has it share if we are apportioning blame but the military is completely feckin inept when it comes to buying stuff hence it almost always goes pete tong
I am not pissed off, in fact I could not be happier with my lot, seriously I am as happy as a sand boy and I am not being made redundant
If you go back and read my post you will see we are singing from the same song sheet. Industry has it share if we are apportioning blame but the military is completely feckin inept when it comes to buying stuff hence it almost always goes pete tong
Dengue Dude
Don't forget double full-stops. An IPT "Management Board" (17 staff, only 2 of them my senior and most non-technical) delayed approval for a high priority job for AFG for 6 weeks because I'd put a double full-stop at the end of a sentence in my technical spec. 
That's 17 staff, out of a 39-strong IPT, MoD could do without.
(SFFP - I still delivered ahead of schedule (12 months +), under cost (by over 300%) and to a far better spec, because I'd ignored the "Management Board" and already conducted final trials on what the User actually needed, not what the URD said. Their eventual approval to enter development was as meaningless as their little self centered "Board").
much of the hold up was caused by different parts of MOD/RAF not getting their 'i' dotted and 't' crossed.
That's 17 staff, out of a 39-strong IPT, MoD could do without.(SFFP - I still delivered ahead of schedule (12 months +), under cost (by over 300%) and to a far better spec, because I'd ignored the "Management Board" and already conducted final trials on what the User actually needed, not what the URD said. Their eventual approval to enter development was as meaningless as their little self centered "Board").
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Seldom
Where appropriate, please accept apologies.
I suppose the point I was trying to make is each 'side' has its unfair share of incompetents (for diverse reasons).
It's as frustrating 'this' side as it is from the other. As Tucumseh says, you achieve DESPITE bloody committees, not because of them.
Enough said.
Either way, best of luck to those made redundant, it truly isn't the end of the world, there's a whole world out there that wants self-motivated, intelligent individuals, so you can be intimidated by them too just like the rest of us
I suppose the point I was trying to make is each 'side' has its unfair share of incompetents (for diverse reasons).
It's as frustrating 'this' side as it is from the other. As Tucumseh says, you achieve DESPITE bloody committees, not because of them.
Enough said.
Either way, best of luck to those made redundant, it truly isn't the end of the world, there's a whole world out there that wants self-motivated, intelligent individuals, so you can be intimidated by them too just like the rest of us
2 sides to the problem
Firstly a confession - I worked, as an employee for a company supplying equipment to the MRA4 flight simulators - yes, there was a very nice building at Kinloss fully populated with 2 full-flight sims (motion sims for the cockpit), 2 FTD cockpit simulators (same as full-flights without the motion) and 2 rear-crew simulators and a bunch of PTT and other kit. These were all accepted and in full service at the time of program cancellation. All are now scrapped.
The problem was two-sided.
1) The MOD was unable to write a spec worth a bean. You might as well said we need some simulators to train the crew, once you've built them we'll tell you what is or isn't any good.
2) The contractors (everyone from BAE down) were desperate to win the contracts, so promised the moon... for next to a penny. And then charged whatever enormous number they could for any change order the MOD was backed into a corner to put in writing.
As far as we (the engineering team involved in developing the sims) could tell the entire program was run the same way.
At the time of cancellation I was personally involved in a quotation to update a part of these same simulators that had seen only acceptance crew through the doors, to the tune of $1-2M for a system that had only been operational for 3 years and was ALREADY obsolete. This update would have replaced the original system with something costing twice as much, to do the same job. This is a very tiny slice of the what was happening across the board.
-GY
The problem was two-sided.
1) The MOD was unable to write a spec worth a bean. You might as well said we need some simulators to train the crew, once you've built them we'll tell you what is or isn't any good.
2) The contractors (everyone from BAE down) were desperate to win the contracts, so promised the moon... for next to a penny. And then charged whatever enormous number they could for any change order the MOD was backed into a corner to put in writing.
As far as we (the engineering team involved in developing the sims) could tell the entire program was run the same way.
At the time of cancellation I was personally involved in a quotation to update a part of these same simulators that had seen only acceptance crew through the doors, to the tune of $1-2M for a system that had only been operational for 3 years and was ALREADY obsolete. This update would have replaced the original system with something costing twice as much, to do the same job. This is a very tiny slice of the what was happening across the board.
-GY
The MOD was unable to write a spec worth a bean. You might as well said we need some simulators to train the crew, once you've built them we'll tell you what is or isn't any good.
I can't speak for what the RMPA office was told to do, but the policy of that MoD(PE) Director General (2 Star) was that project managers were NOT to contract anyone to write specs for simulators or trainers. If you didn't have anyone in the team to do it, tough. On my programme, at the same time, no-one had a scoobie (including myself), so I "contracted" Boscombe to hire recently retired aircrew as consultants, and bury the cost in "materiel". When the Director sought reassurance I was not contracting anyone to specify the trainer, I just said yes. If I'd have followed his instructions, the aircraft fleet would still be parked in a hangar somewhere - not unlike Chinook Mk3 (same 2 Star).
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Another project to look at is the US Army's Lakota Helicopter Project where 300+ helicopters were bought "Off The Shelf" from BBK/Eurocopter.
They had a lot of problems with these at first as no US military helicopter previously had air conditioning fitted, so USA PLC ommited it from the Lakota even though the manufacturer advised against it, then suffered a lot of avionics failures due to overheating..
read
UH-72A Lakota Overheating Problem
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When I started working on the project I was assured that it would have first flight in 4 months, it never flew in the 2 years I was with BAe.
Around the same time an aerodynamics engineer was asking, whether the aircraft would possibly land with the torpedoes still in the bomb bay, as this was important due to the C of G problems (it was too far aft). There were many engineers running around with their hair on fire, figuring out how much fuel to pump around the tanks to maintain an adequate C of G under all conditions, all seemingly due to the necessary positioning of the new wings and engines, which with a new fuselage would have ideally been positioned further aft.
The heavy flying controls, the inadequate autopilot, it all seemed to lurch from one crisis to another, although I was assured these things were just part of the trials and tribulations of building aircraft.
I spent many happy hours on the Nimrod, or being taken places by them, but to say I was concerned about the issues, and how they were handled would be an understatement.
Around the same time an aerodynamics engineer was asking, whether the aircraft would possibly land with the torpedoes still in the bomb bay, as this was important due to the C of G problems (it was too far aft). There were many engineers running around with their hair on fire, figuring out how much fuel to pump around the tanks to maintain an adequate C of G under all conditions, all seemingly due to the necessary positioning of the new wings and engines, which with a new fuselage would have ideally been positioned further aft.
The heavy flying controls, the inadequate autopilot, it all seemed to lurch from one crisis to another, although I was assured these things were just part of the trials and tribulations of building aircraft.
I spent many happy hours on the Nimrod, or being taken places by them, but to say I was concerned about the issues, and how they were handled would be an understatement.
NutLoose:
"Rigga,
They had a lot of problems with these at first as no US military helicopter previously had air conditioning fitted, so USA PLC ommited it from the Lakota even though the manufacturer advised against it, then suffered a lot of avionics failures due to overheating.."
Yep. I know. One of my Type Ratings is BK117-C2 (or EC145). And I don't work for military helicopter operators.
To fly one of these in a hot place is quite unbearable - sitting under all that "glass" isn't good in hot climes. We were quite surprised the US Army didn't order the AirCon as standard? The AirCon was a bit of a bugger getting used to at first but it was worth the effort of getting it. And at least one instrument was prone to overheat/seizing well before the spams got them (from my course notes!)
"Rigga,
They had a lot of problems with these at first as no US military helicopter previously had air conditioning fitted, so USA PLC ommited it from the Lakota even though the manufacturer advised against it, then suffered a lot of avionics failures due to overheating.."
Yep. I know. One of my Type Ratings is BK117-C2 (or EC145). And I don't work for military helicopter operators.
To fly one of these in a hot place is quite unbearable - sitting under all that "glass" isn't good in hot climes. We were quite surprised the US Army didn't order the AirCon as standard? The AirCon was a bit of a bugger getting used to at first but it was worth the effort of getting it. And at least one instrument was prone to overheat/seizing well before the spams got them (from my course notes!)
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Originally Posted by Small Spinner
this was important due to the C of G problems (it was too far aft).
. Mind you, that might have needed Shackleton fins to be resurrected.
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Here sadly is another tail heavy one if you like Nimrods do not look.
Nimrod R1 XW665 - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums
if you like Nimrods do not look.Nimrod R1 XW665 - Key Publishing Ltd Aviation Forums