Nimrod AEW radar operators needed!!

[smujsmith]

I was/am one of the few lucky? holders of a Q-ANEW-A and was one of the 6 who did the first Nimrod AEW ground crew course. It consisted of a standard Nimrod course at Kinloss, followed by a Nimrod course at BAe Woodford, followed by a "differences" course again at BAe Woodford. A posting to Waddington ensued and a short term of employment ensued before my re deployment to the mighty transport base in Wiltshire. If the OP needs to get a story or two from the flying side I recommend contacting a certain S/Ldr "Jethro" Tull, if you can. He told me this story ( remember he told me this because he was trying to explain to mere ground crew the problems they were having with the radar, and doubted my ability to understand):

It was decided that Nimrod AEW would fly off with the E3A AWACS, as an attempt was made to set a "current" standard the still operational Shackleton AEW was to take part as well. Off they all go out over the North Sea trying to find a boat (a particular boat). Shackleton calls in on frequency, "boat located on radar, just behind the island at 3 miles".

E3A " roger, island noted and looking".

Nimrod AEW " What Island ? "

Say no more !

[5aday]

I worked for Marconi Elliot (MEASL) as part of the AEW Trials Team based in Woodford in the six portacabins on the airfield side of Flight Sheds.
The initial aeroplane we had was Comet 4 XW626, and in my time we
had DB1, 2, and 3 which were ex squadron aeroplanes being modified in New Assembly on the other side of Woodford aerodrome.
At the time I flew as part of the Trials team (5)with an Aerospace flight deck(3)
a couple of BAe technicians and a couple of radiation monitoring staff (4 max -because of seats) At that time we mainly used RAE Bedford for co-operating airborne targets and the RN Fast Training Boats out of Portland though the former (Bedford) used to close at 17:00 and we occasionally had to night stop their crew at Woodford if our trials were delayed and went into the late afternoon.
It wasn't all doom and gloom though there were plenty of people continually knocking the AEW from day 1.
The unions at Woodford didn't help things in the beginning of the project as Woodford operated a closed shop at the time and Marconi was none union.
All so long ago now.

[Wensleydale]

Nimrod AEW " What Island ? "

Nimrod AEW displayed no map data at its consoles whatsoever (a lack of processing power - also an ex-Shackleton flight-deck wing commander said it was not needed as the Shackleton did not have a computer map). Only processed track data was displayed - neither was basic radar data available to the crew (The track symbol possessed a little graphic that showed if radar data was involved in determining track position). Therefore, the operator had to have full confidence in the tracks that were displayed - yeah, right. A rudimentary map was available by attaching a perspex engraved map over the PPI using Blu-Tac and the picture slewed underneath to match a computer generated reference point. Changing range scales was not a quick or easy process! It is not difficult to understand why the island was not seen by the Nimrod crew (although stationary objects such as oil riggs and land masses produced tracks that flitted across the screen at 47 Kts - these blamed by GEC on road traffic. The tracks produced by land would normally swamp the system and cause the computer to crash within a few seconds - this is why Nimrod could not point the radar beam towards any coastline while within a range of 120 nmi and the crew had to use significantly large radar blanking sectors. 47 kt oil riggs continued to be a problem as they resembled slow moving helicopters).

[servodyne]

Wensleydale,
I was on the test team from the start, it wasn't just the back end that had problems! I remember passing paper messages to the Nav because the AMRICS (comms) had ground to a halt!

[Wensleydale]

I remember passing paper messages to the Nav because the AMRICS (comms) had
ground to a halt.

AMRICS (Automatic Mission Radio and Intercomm Communications System ISTR - or was it "Airborne") was not that bad when I was with the JTU (I qualified as Op1 Comms just before the decision to can and so used it quite a bit). The problem with AMRICS was that you could not monitor more than one tactical intercom net without joining them all together! It was also very easy to run out of radios given that any operator could grab one without telling other crew members leading to loss of priority comms.

It would have been a comms nightmare had we gone down the Nimrod route (especially for us deaf ex-shack bods).

This was typical of the Nimrod AEW concept.... the mission system was packed with automatic features that were immature at the time, inflexible, and often did not work correctly (or in a timely manner). The result was that the operators very quickly lost confidence in the entire mission system. Meanwhile, the E-3, that used additional manpower on the aircraft rather than underpowered computers, possessed a much more satisfactory mature and usable system. The E-3 still has several automatic systems on board, but the human (when trained) system was much more accurate and therefore tactically astute. I often used the analagy of the longbow and the crossbow. Scientists/arms manufacturers love the crossbow with its fancy pulleys and levers and theoretical greater hitting power - however when you were up to your a*se in charging French cavalry then the simpler longbow was a much more effective weapons system.