Typhoon - Bargain at 75% over budget.
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Probably the people who are having their pension cut.
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Wowsers. The work on the full ground attack capability will not be complete until 2018!!
If true, then on the plus side, this must surely secure some of the Tornado GR force from being stood down.
If true, then on the plus side, this must surely secure some of the Tornado GR force from being stood down.
Two sides the story.
I’ll give you one guess what the reaction in MoD is when you’re building up your costs and ask;
1. For 30% contingency because political machinations on a multi-national programme are going to delay the programme.
2. To be allowed to assume internal MoD dependencies will not deliver on their obligations.
3. For the 16% stock Contingency that the rules still say you should get, but don’t.
No politically motivated approvals committee is going to admit the first happens. The second would be an admission of poor leadership. The third is down to the regulations not being implemented properly for 20 years. Three simple reasons why any such report should include the Programme Managers’ right of reply, verified by independent (non-MoD) auditors.
What is the MoD’s primary tool for “learning from experience”? Post Project Evaluations. Here’s a recommendation from one PPE, dated August 2000;
There is another recommendation, that the airworthiness regulations be implemented. And another suggesting MoD should employ sufficient staffs who understand how to maintain safety and airworthiness. All were formally rejected by the Chief of Defence Procurement. No apologies for raising that subject. It is all interrelated.
I’ll give you one guess what the reaction in MoD is when you’re building up your costs and ask;
1. For 30% contingency because political machinations on a multi-national programme are going to delay the programme.
2. To be allowed to assume internal MoD dependencies will not deliver on their obligations.
3. For the 16% stock Contingency that the rules still say you should get, but don’t.
No politically motivated approvals committee is going to admit the first happens. The second would be an admission of poor leadership. The third is down to the regulations not being implemented properly for 20 years. Three simple reasons why any such report should include the Programme Managers’ right of reply, verified by independent (non-MoD) auditors.
What is the MoD’s primary tool for “learning from experience”? Post Project Evaluations. Here’s a recommendation from one PPE, dated August 2000;
The re-establishment of a department whose function it is to make Materiel and Financial Provision. The disbanding of these departments in 1987 has led to much criticism from auditors over cost escalation. However, while a programme may be over budget, it does not necessarily exceed a fair and reasonable cost for the actual requirement when the latter is eventually established. If the Customer has not stated his requirement correctly, it cannot be costed correctly.
There is another recommendation, that the airworthiness regulations be implemented. And another suggesting MoD should employ sufficient staffs who understand how to maintain safety and airworthiness. All were formally rejected by the Chief of Defence Procurement. No apologies for raising that subject. It is all interrelated.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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And anyone who has spent a fair bit of time in the UK and would like to think that the UK still stands for something.
'Bout time someone in the UK told their pollies that the UK has about as much clout nowadays as Italy from where I sit.
'Bout time someone in the UK told their pollies that the UK has about as much clout nowadays as Italy from where I sit.
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Why is this a surprise?
If governments (principally Germany) delay a project for over 10 years and then Nations buy almost half of the originally contracted numbers of aircraft, unit cost WILL rise.
I'm just relieved that its only a 75% increase. If we get platforms into service on time and incorporate proper batch control with planned upgrades, rather than unplanned obsolescence programmes, we may get better. If we continue with international programmes we should expect delays and cost rises. F35 will be no different I'm afraid.
If governments (principally Germany) delay a project for over 10 years and then Nations buy almost half of the originally contracted numbers of aircraft, unit cost WILL rise.
I'm just relieved that its only a 75% increase. If we get platforms into service on time and incorporate proper batch control with planned upgrades, rather than unplanned obsolescence programmes, we may get better. If we continue with international programmes we should expect delays and cost rises. F35 will be no different I'm afraid.
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Wonder what the real story is:
"The number of planes ordered has been reduced, but the bill for development and production has risen by 20% to £20.2bn."
If you reduce production numbers, you would expect an increase in unit cost because development costs remain the same, regardless of the number of copies you make. Reducing production numbers is not free either as it depends on when you reduce the numbers (have the long lead items already been ordered) and standard contracts include profit loss recovery for reductions in orders.
Other than that, the 20% increase should be contained within the risk budget. Its possible to spin this to say the aircraft was brought in on budget.
"The number of planes ordered has been reduced, but the bill for development and production has risen by 20% to £20.2bn."
If you reduce production numbers, you would expect an increase in unit cost because development costs remain the same, regardless of the number of copies you make. Reducing production numbers is not free either as it depends on when you reduce the numbers (have the long lead items already been ordered) and standard contracts include profit loss recovery for reductions in orders.
Other than that, the 20% increase should be contained within the risk budget. Its possible to spin this to say the aircraft was brought in on budget.
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Typhoon costs...
Any mention of the percentage value of these cost over-runs caused by other customer delays: German, Italian, Spanish?
What about the value of embodied modifications since ISD/IOC, or whatever the current terminology is?
As has been written many times on these pages:
COST OF EVERYTHING - VALUE OF NOTHING
As an aside, I understand the value of embodied modifications on Tornado GR1/IDS in the five years following entry into service exceeded the original "cost" of the original, as delivered, aircraft.
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pull the other leg
Hardly any defence project is ever delivered on time and on budget
1. the people who spec the job have no responsibilty for controling costs - if we made promotion /civil service gongs dependent on that we'd get some progress
2. the people building things have no incentive to cut costs - we never build even the planned number never mind sell to anyone else so there is no upside
3. there is constant project creep = lets just add this gizzmo or that widget
4. the plug is rarely plugged until far too much £££ has been spent
The answer is to buy more of what we have already, buy off the shelf with NO "nice to have" add-ons and chain the peopel responsible to the job until it delivers - or not in which case they get fired
Hardly any defence project is ever delivered on time and on budget
1. the people who spec the job have no responsibilty for controling costs - if we made promotion /civil service gongs dependent on that we'd get some progress
2. the people building things have no incentive to cut costs - we never build even the planned number never mind sell to anyone else so there is no upside
3. there is constant project creep = lets just add this gizzmo or that widget
4. the plug is rarely plugged until far too much £££ has been spent
The answer is to buy more of what we have already, buy off the shelf with NO "nice to have" add-ons and chain the peopel responsible to the job until it delivers - or not in which case they get fired
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Wonder what the real story is:
Management of the Typhoon Project
Far better than distorted press headlines
Or some distorted PPrune headlines for that matter
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We send well intentioned people, people who you would not normally trust go buy a pint of milk, whose only qualifications are often a degree in Under Water Basket Weaving and a few weeks at the College of Knowledge to do battle with the Corporate Machine and then we show surprise when we get financially raped.
37 years in, no chip on either shoulder, happy as Larry with who and what I am, this is nothing more than a simple observation from someone who has watched it happen with depressing regularity.
Officer Cadre vs Corporate Machine............sadly there will only ever be one winner.
37 years in, no chip on either shoulder, happy as Larry with who and what I am, this is nothing more than a simple observation from someone who has watched it happen with depressing regularity.
Officer Cadre vs Corporate Machine............sadly there will only ever be one winner.
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HH
Was that the approach taken for T5?
SRENNAPS
Reading the report is a sensible approach. If you look at it it still appears to be a self inflicted injury. Despite Tornado there is still not clear understanding of the difficulties associated with multi-national projects. An old adage is "the time taken for a project will be the multiple of the estimate and the number of partners, while the costs will be the a multiple of the original estimate and the square of the number of partners". Much of the cost overrun was due to poor assumptions about the ability of the nations involved to sort out workshare and requirements, whilst the project marching army costs and obsolesence had to be dealt with.
Was that the approach taken for T5?
SRENNAPS
Reading the report is a sensible approach. If you look at it it still appears to be a self inflicted injury. Despite Tornado there is still not clear understanding of the difficulties associated with multi-national projects. An old adage is "the time taken for a project will be the multiple of the estimate and the number of partners, while the costs will be the a multiple of the original estimate and the square of the number of partners". Much of the cost overrun was due to poor assumptions about the ability of the nations involved to sort out workshare and requirements, whilst the project marching army costs and obsolesence had to be dealt with.
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engineer(retard)
I totally agree with you.
I spent a few years on the Project from 1988 involved with the EuroJet down at an engine company near Sadley Broke.
A few of more cynical of us (all SNCOs) predicted then, what we see now……….nobody listened. The attitude was that it was a new project being introduced, using new methods and new processes……..nothing could go wrong. It would all be better this time. We did not even have to have a “lessons learnt from Tornado”. True story, although I am sure that few people would admit to that now.
And so the world will carry on making those same mistakes.
If you look at it it still appears to be a self inflicted injury. Despite Tornado there is still not clear understanding of the difficulties associated with multi-national projects. An old adage is "the time taken for a project will be the multiple of the estimate and the number of partners, while the costs will be the a multiple of the original estimate and the square of the number of partners". Much of the cost overrun was due to poor assumptions about the ability of the nations involved to sort out workshare and requirements, whilst the project marching army costs and obsolesence had to be dealt with.
I spent a few years on the Project from 1988 involved with the EuroJet down at an engine company near Sadley Broke.
A few of more cynical of us (all SNCOs) predicted then, what we see now……….nobody listened. The attitude was that it was a new project being introduced, using new methods and new processes……..nothing could go wrong. It would all be better this time. We did not even have to have a “lessons learnt from Tornado”. True story, although I am sure that few people would admit to that now.
And so the world will carry on making those same mistakes.