Two sides the story.
I’ll give you one guess what the reaction in MoD is when you’re building up your costs and ask;
1. For 30% contingency because political machinations on a multi-national programme are going to delay the programme.
2. To be allowed to assume internal MoD dependencies will not deliver on their obligations.
3. For the 16% stock Contingency that the rules still say you should get, but don’t.
No politically motivated approvals committee is going to admit the first happens. The second would be an admission of poor leadership. The third is down to the regulations not being implemented properly for 20 years. Three simple reasons why any such report should include the Programme Managers’ right of reply, verified by independent (non-MoD) auditors.
What is the MoD’s primary tool for “learning from experience”? Post Project Evaluations. Here’s a recommendation from one PPE, dated August 2000;
The re-establishment of a department whose function it is to make Materiel and Financial Provision. The disbanding of these departments in 1987 has led to much criticism from auditors over cost escalation. However, while a programme may be over budget, it does not necessarily exceed a fair and reasonable cost for the actual requirement when the latter is eventually established. If the Customer has not stated his requirement correctly, it cannot be costed correctly.
There is another recommendation, that the airworthiness regulations be implemented. And another suggesting MoD should employ sufficient staffs who understand how to maintain safety and airworthiness. All were formally rejected by the Chief of Defence Procurement. No apologies for raising that subject. It is all interrelated.