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Floods & MRH90

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Old 1st Feb 2011, 14:08
  #61 (permalink)  
 
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Why on earth has the ADF become locked into this ridiculous 'risk management' jargon?
Well it started following the '96 crash and has grown from there. However, the whole ADF aviation community now conducts 'AVRM'. Works well when conducted properly. Appalling waste of time when it becomes a box ticking exercise.

And, why is Army Aviation now operating a Bell 412?
Because it's cheaper to train new loadmasters on a contract 412 than to waste black hawk hours doing the same thing. Once the hueys retired there was no other suitable platform.
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Old 1st Feb 2011, 19:28
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What's the hourly cost of a 412 -v- a 205?

(Not even going to go anywhere near the benefits of keeping how many crews current flying a half dozen very green 205s.)
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 05:33
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The MRH90 really is a heap of ****e...

Added to the list of projects of concern....
Australia adds MRH90 helicopter to Projects of Concern list
By Greg Waldron


The Australian government has added the NH Industries MRH90 transport helicopter to its Projects of Concern list, with the acquisition to undergo a major review this month.
MRH90s on order for both the Australian navy and army are behind schedule, with the maritime version delayed by 12 months and the army's by 18 months, say minister for defence Stephen Smith and minister for defence materiel Jason Clare.
The troubled helicopter programme will now undergo a "high-level comprehensive diagnostic review".
"Delays are due to a series of key issues, including engine failure, transmission oil-cooler fan failures and the poor availability of spares," says the Department of Defence.

and today we have no amphibious capability with Manoora and Kanimbla forced out of service due rust.....Tobruk is also on its last legs [OOS 2012]..

Where are the heads on pikes of the people who make these decisions??
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 05:43
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It HASN'T been added to the list!

It's undergoing a 'gate review', after which it'll either be given the , or it will then go on the list and remedial action will be taken.

Until then, don't believe everything you read!

The helo itself is a ripper, but there are issues with its support and with the speed at which European 'lead' customers are developing their programs, and hence the is flowing downhill to us.
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 07:10
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Dust off those Hueys
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 07:12
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Apologies for thread drift but some crystallization seems warranted. Consider this wisdom from a comprehensive US Army analysis of Vietnam War operations:

The (US) Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a ‘platoon carrier’, different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons whichwe learned in the ‘sizing’ of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.’– Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

The Iroquois was unquestionably the benchmark for battlefield utility helicopters. The Blackhawk which emerged from the UTTAS project created a 'heavy utility helicopter' about doubling all up weight and rotor downwash, increasing technical complexity and multiplying operating costs several fold. The MRH-90 goes a step further and is termed a medium lift helicopter in some propaganda, albeit a light one if some wish; but with the similar significant penalties of the Blackhawk, let alone the outrageous unit cost.

Flight refuellable Blackhawks would have very useful roles to play in Australia's region of military interest for special operations functions, long range submarine support and within our vast area of international responsibility for search and rescue; but alas, the ADF does not have a C-130 air refuelling capability.

The bottom line is that the ADF has sacrificed a true utility helicopter capability and with it the capacity to quickly deploy such air resources by C-130 for military tactical needs, aid to civil powers or whatever. When I discussed this aspect with a civvy in Defence after Iroquois decommissioning was decided, he flippantly responded: 'The MRH-90 will be too expensive to use at the coal-face of combat and we have in mind to buy another light utility helicopter to replace the Iroquois'! Sort of bugger the taxpayer.

Australia could acquire 50 virtually as new Huey II for around $100million or less by having those remaining also put through the Bell Helicopter Modernisation Program. That is probably around the cost of 2 x MRH-90, so why not negotiate a reduction in the 46 aircraft order if it is not measuring up and restore the essential real battlefield utility helo capability?

Taxpayer dollars should be expended on maintaining continuous adequate and credible military preparedness, not on some futuristic notions of unproven downstream capabilities.

Prompt letters to MinDef Stephen Smith are suggested.

Last edited by Bushranger 71; 2nd Feb 2011 at 08:14.
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 08:16
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Because it's cheaper to train new loadmasters on a contract 412 than to waste black hawk hours doing the same thing. Once the hueys retired there was no other suitable platform.
How come the Navy can do aircrewman training with a AS350....bit cheaper than a 412 (or Huey for that matter).
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 09:56
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I might be wrong here but are all the army choppers at MK? Still a little close isn't it? Forecast gusts to 55 knots and Hamo getting gusts to 60Plus knots at the moment.
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 10:14
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on the 7pm news the Army helos were at MK.....

I guess with Rocky still getting over its traumas they figured this was far enough south...
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Old 2nd Feb 2011, 12:56
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Huey II or no Huey II, Cairns airport closed at 10am today, so no C130 deployable aircraft could make it there in the back. An aircraft with uber range eg: S70-A9, MRH-90 and a rotor head that can handle turbulence eg: S70-A9, MRH90 can self deploy and carry a useful load.

End of the day the ADF is doing the best it can. All of the staff in AAAvn are doing the best that they can under the regulations and resources that the coal face receives.

Spending more money on another type, with different cockpit configuration, different engine, different flight limitations etc, etc will take a new training course, more staff, more spares, more logistics etc, etc and not offer any real battlefield capability. The "Cheap" cost of a less capable helicopter soon adds up when you go beyond just the ticket price.

Eurocopter is not to blame, the ADF signed the contracts. Maybe some letters to Minister Smith about the ADF's amateurism in contracts would not go astray either. I would be surprised if the spare parts numbers for Hueys, Kiowas, Caribous, Hercules etc were so scant, maybe if the ADF held such small spares for those aircraft then questions would have been asked in their service lives about availability?

Godspeed to the crews heading north for Cyclone Yasi relief. You have our support. I hope that the noise complainers in those areas don't complain when you are rescuing people. Fly Safe and Good Luck.
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Old 3rd Feb 2011, 03:05
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Hello Doors Off.

The initial post this thread queried whether the MRH-90 had been used for flood relief operations and if not, why not? The discussion has unsurprisingly drifted toward the adequacies or otherwise of some helicopter types and, in a broad sense, the continuing decline in ADF response capabilities.

I did not intend to imply that any helos would be better deployed by tactical airlift for flood relief support – that would only be worthwhile if ferry time was much too long for a timely response. But we do live in a vast land and requirements will emerge for airlift of helos over long distances for military and/or other national commitment tasking. This capability also proved essential for operations throughout the regional archipelago from the early 1960s onwards. My point is Australia's defence planners and Army Aviation in particular have foolishly cast asunder an invaluable response capability for military requirements and (secondary) aid to civil powers in our region.

Methinks the politicians and defence fraternity are largely in a state of denial regarding the continuing decay of ADF capabilities and military credibility generated by collective incompetence concerning flawed hardware acquisitions resulting in multiple serious capability gaps. Orienting defence planning toward a mythical Force 2030 structure is just asinine as maintaining continuous adequate military preparedness should be the aim.

Consider this statement on 01Feb11 by Minister for Defence Stephen Smith: 'I have the highest regard for Dr Gumley, as I have the highest regard for the Secretary of Defence, as I have the highest regard for the Chief of the Defence Force and the Service Chiefs. We're dealing here with an institutional problem that the institution of Defence itself has to grapple with and come to terms with. In the past there has been too much of an attitude or a culture that, irrespective of the cost, irrespective of the outcome, a Defence project was somehow immune from rigour.'

And this bit from Minister for Defence Material Jason Clare re the MRH-90: 'It's a very important project and part of the rigour that we need to maintain here is to make sure that defence at the highest levels, in this case the deputy CEO of the DMO will chair what we call a gate review or a high level defence review, with the assistance of independent experts, to provide advice to us on what are the necessary steps for government and for defence and for the companies responsible to make sure that this project is fully implemented as quickly as possible.'

Seems an awful lot like a group think 'love-in' to me and I agree with my long-standing naval aviator friend TBM-Legend that there should be some 'heads on pikes'. But that will not happen in the military as the contract appointments for CDF and all of the Service Chiefs expire mid-2011.

Regarding the somewhat unproven MRH-90. There seems unwillingness among defence agencies to advise specific unit costing for this helicopter and also performance information. Maybe some of the Oakey fraternity might be willing to provide aircraft unit cost, ISA +20C IGE and OGE altitude capabilities at max operating gross weight, plus hourly operating cost! If that information is made available, then we might have an interesting debate (on another thread?) regarding the adequacy of this helo for regional operations compared with others being replaced.

See this link for an interesting read: Australian Government, Department of Defence - Stephen Smith MP . Considering the problems emerging with the Air Warfare Destroyer project, it is a bit hard to have confidence regarding the 2 aircraft carriers (LPDs) to be largely fitted out in Australia.

Last edited by Bushranger 71; 3rd Feb 2011 at 19:09.
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Old 6th Feb 2011, 12:26
  #72 (permalink)  
 
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I recall there was a planned Light Utility Helicopter project, it is still on? (something like A109s, Huey or EC-135/145s)

The US Army and National Guard recently bought a buttload of EC-145s for non-combat duties (replaced UH-1s).
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Old 12th Feb 2011, 20:49
  #73 (permalink)  
 
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I received a couple of private messages in reaction to my post number 31 on this thread which caused me to troll through some very old notes I'd written almost 25 years ago about my time flying Hueys (on a Commodore Amiga, then the cutting edge of computer technology!!!). I knew there were a couple of flood stories in there. Here's one, as I said, written quite some years ago.

The media today have made much of the fortitude displayed by Queenslanders in the recent disasters. You'll see from my comments that we had a similar reaction to some of the farmers of northern NSW who we worked with back in '74.

You'll also see how quickly (imagined) high drama can descend into farce.



IT WAS NEVER LIKE THIS FOR JOHN WAYNE

Disaster Relief is one of the few times the general public actually sees their Defence Dollar at work. These Disaster Relief trips are almost always to the country areas, although the Brisbane floods in the early seventies were the exception, where the RAAF choppers and the Army worked right in a major city.

The very unusual circumstances of a flood or bushfire bring out the very best - and the very worst - in people. People who have lost literally everything are often to be found working untiringly to help others. I saw a couple of cases in the floods of 1971 and ’74 where farmers whose property and homestead were under water, and whose stock were drowned or starving in their thousands, just worked at the State Emergency Service from dawn to dusk, helping others where they could.
The spirit of these country people left this city slicker in awe. Homesteads are usually surrounded by levee banks in the flood prone areas. These banks usually protect the homestead from the floods, but if the floods are particularly high, they are ‘banked’, and the homestead is flooded. Some graziers and their families would simply move up into their ceiling along with what furniture they could carry. They would lift a couple of panels of corrugated iron on their homestead roof for ventilation and light, and sally forth daily to tend what stock they could reach.

One such family caused me particular embarrassment one day in 1974. We would be airborne at first light - around 5.00 am - and would fly right up to last light every day at the flood peak, and the number of beers we were promised after a rescue but were too exhausted to redeem that night still causes me some distress to this day when it’s my buy!

At the end of a very long day we were flying past a homestead where we saw the pitiful sight of the house flooded up to the door lintels, a roof panel torn up, and the farmer and his family frantically waving to us. Taking the scene in in an instant, we surmised that the levee had recently been breached, and the family was in dire straits. We were short of fuel and last light was fast approaching, but we could not leave these people in such a terrible situation.

The problem was that the homestead was your typical farmstead: three sides of the house were inaccessible to us because of silos and outbuildings. The only side where we could even approach the main farmhouse was at the front, and that had high tension power lines right across its front. But this was an emergency, this was John Wayne stuff, these people had to be rescued, and minimum fuel and last light were both approaching. (God protect the innocent from young men - like myself in this instance - stretching the rules in a rescue situation.)

The only way around the problem was to come to the hover some twenty metres out from the power lines, descend until the landing skids were in the water, and hover taxi forward very slowly in under the power lines, the fast-spinning main rotor only feet under the drooping wires. Thoughts of the mountain of paperwork that would descend upon me if the rotor clipped the power lines were not far from my mind, but these people appeared to be badly in need of help, stuck in the roof of their flooded home.

The man of the house climbed out onto the roof, dived into the water, and bravely struck out through the whipping spray of the rotor wash towards the chopper. The Crewman hauled him aboard. Still holding a very exacting hover under the power lines, I waited for the rest of the family to make the plunge and swim out to the chopper. But Mum and the kids were making no attempt to move. Instead, they sat there grinning and waving to us, no doubt glad that rescue was at hand, thought I. But how to make them swim over? Perhaps they couldn’t swim? We didn’t have a lifeline.

The dripping farmer grabbed for the spare headset, and I backed out from under the power lines while we sorted this out. I wasn’t staying in under those power lines while we discussed getting the family out.

The farmer reached for the transmit button on his headset like he’d been using one for years. “They’re over there!” he shouted, pointing to the north. (God, not more people to be rescued!)

“Who?” called the Crewman.

“Me cattle,” answered the farmer, brandishing a pair of wire cutters in his gnarled hand.

“Your WHAT?” I replied.

“Me cattle,” he repeated, smiling as though he hadn’t a worry in the world.

With a fuel gauge bouncing around the absolute minimum, and a sky ever darkening, there was no time for further discussion: “Out,” I ordered.

The farmer happily stuffed his wire cutters into his hip pocket, handed the headset to the Crewman, and jumped overboard, striking out for his home - and we were all made feel a little foolish as our brave ‘John Wayne’ rescue attempt was turned into something approaching a farce.

We flew on to Walgett, landing well after dark, and watching the fuel gauge very closely as we approached the field.

We discovered that evening that the farmer had seen the choppers flying to and fro, and got a message out to see if one of the small Army choppers could take him over the river to allow him to move some of his cattle to higher ground. (The Army choppers were doing this when possible.) On seeing our chopper passing, he assumed that his message had got through, so they waved to us to show us where they were.

I was not able to explain to the farmer why we were so short with him. He probably to this day tells all and sundry that those RAAF blokes are a bloody rude lot. How he intended to get the job done and get back to his farm in the dark is another mystery to me, but I’m sure he’d have coped without thinking twice about it.

As far as I know, the family stayed up in their roof until the waters receded, when they moved downstairs, dried out, and continued with their lives. The spirit of these people is just amazing.

On the other hand, I saw men with political ambitions unashamedly misuse the RAAF and SES assets to curry favour with the ‘right’ people. This was the cause of some ill feeling between the RAAF crews and these opportunists. Through friends who lived in the region, I made a point of following the career of one of the worst offenders in this area. He went on to become a very important man in one of the political parties - and there’s only one - in the region, obviously reaping his rewards from all those ‘right’ people he had helped during those times.
I'm sure I'm not the only one who'd love to read some of the stories from the AAAvn crews involved in the recent dramas.
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Old 13th Feb 2011, 04:09
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Hi 0497; re your post #73. Australian DoD apparently had a so-called 'light utility' replacement helicopter in mind when it was decided to shed the Iroquois, that seemingly being just another facet of the unjustifiable Project Air 9000 ADF helicopter rationalisation strategy which has proven to be a hugely costly farce.

According to Wikipedia, early decade unit cost of EC135 and EC145 was upwards of $4million and $5million respectively. Why go down that track when a modernised Huey II with larger capacity, outstanding hot and high performance and low operating cost is acquirable for around $2million?

An 'who cares' attitude re what it costs to buy and operate military helicopters seems deeply embedded in Australian DoD and ADF psyche. In the recent words of MinDef Stephen Smith:
'...We're dealing here with an institutional problem that the institution of Defence itself has to grapple with and come to terms with. In the past there has been too much of an attitude or a culture that, irrespective of the cost, irrespective of the outcome, a Defence project was somehow immune from rigour.'

Last edited by Bushranger 71; 13th Feb 2011 at 05:27.
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Old 13th Feb 2011, 05:24
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Another anecdote from the 1974 floods

Further to Wiley's post #74.

One of the 9SQN crews from Amberley came across a marooned 'truckie' sitting on the cab of his near submerged prime mover so recovered him by rescue hoist.


They were about to depart the scene of action when he leaned across to the crewman and said: 'Would you mind if we take my wife too; she's down there in the cab.'
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Old 13th Feb 2011, 05:33
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US Army are doing well with UH-72A [EC145 mod] as their 'utility' helicopter. Probably to simple for us to buy them as our utility helo. We'll spend millions trying to reinvent the wheel and f%&k it up... at great cost..
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Old 13th Feb 2011, 22:56
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Even though there is no active ADF project for a Utility helo...yet, look for a push by Army for the winning Phase 7 helo to have commonality to or be able to be used as a LUH for when Phase 9 becomes active...
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