F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
Hempy, don't be mean.
Fox3 - That's been the idea for a while. Marine IOC is a joke. M=1.2/40000 feet, two AMRAAMs tops, no Rover and no gun. It can do an F-117-like fixed-target mission but that's totally not what Marine air does. And one squadron at most (aircraft built since 2013 can't run 2B). For the time being, too, it seems to be sucking down a lot of effort (aircraft mods and flight test - and presumably this latest S/W patch won't work on Block 3).
It's not that other aircraft have not had limited IOCs, but most were at least on a path that led directly to FOC or at least a robust interim capability.
Orca - Right, this does seem something rather basic to be working on at this stage. The question is where the problem occurs (also whether it is A-A or A-G or both). If the individual fusion engine on each aircraft is coming up with a fuzzy target location (after combining different sensors with different accuracy in az-el and range, and different scan rates) then sharing across four ships means everyone sees four targets. You could, I suppose, put in a S/W patch that plays eeny-meeny-miny-mo and picks one of them. Rather far from ideal, however.
Another issue (in A-A) is that the main sensors will be passive EW and radar. There's no IRST except a function in EOTS, which has a restricted look-up angle and is not the same thing as Pirate or Skyward-G. When fitted, IRST has a big contribution to fusion because of its az-el accuracy and speed.
Fox3 - That's been the idea for a while. Marine IOC is a joke. M=1.2/40000 feet, two AMRAAMs tops, no Rover and no gun. It can do an F-117-like fixed-target mission but that's totally not what Marine air does. And one squadron at most (aircraft built since 2013 can't run 2B). For the time being, too, it seems to be sucking down a lot of effort (aircraft mods and flight test - and presumably this latest S/W patch won't work on Block 3).
It's not that other aircraft have not had limited IOCs, but most were at least on a path that led directly to FOC or at least a robust interim capability.
Orca - Right, this does seem something rather basic to be working on at this stage. The question is where the problem occurs (also whether it is A-A or A-G or both). If the individual fusion engine on each aircraft is coming up with a fuzzy target location (after combining different sensors with different accuracy in az-el and range, and different scan rates) then sharing across four ships means everyone sees four targets. You could, I suppose, put in a S/W patch that plays eeny-meeny-miny-mo and picks one of them. Rather far from ideal, however.
Another issue (in A-A) is that the main sensors will be passive EW and radar. There's no IRST except a function in EOTS, which has a restricted look-up angle and is not the same thing as Pirate or Skyward-G. When fitted, IRST has a big contribution to fusion because of its az-el accuracy and speed.
Last edited by LowObservable; 25th Mar 2015 at 14:02.
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Bulkheads, bulkheads...a kingdom for the bulkheads.
Meanwhile, Bogdan also says he is worried about the integrity of the F-35B’s aluminium 496 bulkhead, which bears critical structural loads where the trailing edge of the wing attaches to the aft fuselage. In 2004, programme officials reduced the weight of the F-35B by about 1,360kg (3,000lb). Those changes included switching the bulkhead material from titanium to lighter-weight aluminium.
The lighter bulkhead has since proved susceptible to structural cracking, requiring a series of “patches” all over the 496 bulkhead. There are now so many patches that programme officials are concerned it may be necessary to redesign the bulkhead for production aircraft, Bogdan says.
The lighter bulkhead has since proved susceptible to structural cracking, requiring a series of “patches” all over the 496 bulkhead. There are now so many patches that programme officials are concerned it may be necessary to redesign the bulkhead for production aircraft, Bogdan says.
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F-35 Cancelled, then what?
I've been away for a couple of months doing other things. If the attached has been shown before then please forgive me. My US mate thinks that it is probably kosher.
Not Ready for Prime Time
Not Ready for Prime Time
Thank you for the link, Turtle. The report confirms a lot of what we've been seeing for some time. My thought at the end was, "Which senior officer is going to have the balls to say it's not up to the task when told to declare a combat ready force?"
The DOT&E report is one thing and there are undoubtedly still issues to resolve with the aircraft.
Not sure the POGO site could be described as entirely objective though........
Not sure the POGO site could be described as entirely objective though........
Apart from some predictions, I had trouble working out which bits weren't true. I don't suppose the Project Office and Government press releases are exactly "on the nail". Maybe there is a world somewhere between the two.
I think the thing that makes it all seem a dubious is the fact that claims are being made about a project that is already being measured against such massively altered benchmarks. We've seen this done before, haven't we? I dislike the dishonesty of such politics.
Time for some better news. Where's Spaz to shine a lovely light and tell us all is well and that F-35 is nearly as good as the A-4?
I think the thing that makes it all seem a dubious is the fact that claims are being made about a project that is already being measured against such massively altered benchmarks. We've seen this done before, haven't we? I dislike the dishonesty of such politics.
Time for some better news. Where's Spaz to shine a lovely light and tell us all is well and that F-35 is nearly as good as the A-4?
Since Block 2B is the first block to have any claimed combat capability, that IOC—if and when it is declared—will be lacking required 2B “operationally-relevant … performance” combat capabilities, according to the DOT&E report. Those capabilities and their flight tests are now deferred to later Blocks 3i and 3F, which introduce an all-new computer but will not have “Full Operational Capability” (FOC). The first FOC system will be Block 4, currently scheduled to be declared fully capable in 2022—assuming no further schedule slips in the intervening seven years.
Won't the QE Class be in mid life refit by then!!?
LJ
Won't the QE Class be in mid life refit by then!!?
LJ
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Where's Spaz to shine a lovely light and tell us all is well and that F-35 is nearly as good as the A-4?
N-a-B - I would second the comment that POGO, overall, has been a better source of information over the years than LM or the program office.
The fusion issue remains a bit murky. Apparently the "patch" that allows four aircraft to share targets involves Link 16, which works but isn't very stealthy, to say the least.
The Marines are also falling back on the "it's much better than what we have now", which is not a huge deal, considering that they have AV-8Bs (1970s-80s with no core avionics upgrade that I can think of) and falling-to-bits F/A-18 Classics. They used the same line for decades comparing the V-22 with the CH-46.
One general observation: when the Marines and the AF talk up the wonders of the F-35's situational awareness and sensor fusion, consider that almost all their aircraft today (the F-22 is the exception) have early-80s, first-gen-glass cockpits. Aside from the F-22 the only U.S. type that has some degree of fusion is the Super Hornet, and guess which service is the least excited about the F-35...
The fusion issue remains a bit murky. Apparently the "patch" that allows four aircraft to share targets involves Link 16, which works but isn't very stealthy, to say the least.
The Marines are also falling back on the "it's much better than what we have now", which is not a huge deal, considering that they have AV-8Bs (1970s-80s with no core avionics upgrade that I can think of) and falling-to-bits F/A-18 Classics. They used the same line for decades comparing the V-22 with the CH-46.
One general observation: when the Marines and the AF talk up the wonders of the F-35's situational awareness and sensor fusion, consider that almost all their aircraft today (the F-22 is the exception) have early-80s, first-gen-glass cockpits. Aside from the F-22 the only U.S. type that has some degree of fusion is the Super Hornet, and guess which service is the least excited about the F-35...
LO, the Marine Hornets are mostly C/D's.
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It appears that the US House of Representatives have come up with an overall spending budget for the first time in years. For the Defense sector, they are going to increase spending but are putting that increase in a special fund to cover costs of overseas military spending, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, etc. There appears to be no increase in spending for acquisition of new aircraft beyond that of the sequester spending. This budget will need to be reconciled with the US Senate budget.
Buried in the POGO article was a link to this from a guest respondent:
Buried in the POGO article was a link to this from a guest respondent:
Submitted by Another Guest (from Australia) at: March 25, 2015
Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF, wrote a 24 page article in Air and Space Power Journal, "The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung". He has got a good point why the F-35 must be cancelled now. The F-35 is based on a belief that radar low observability will remain effective against future air defence threats. Although true for the F-117 against Iraq’s Kari system in 1991, stealthiness is unlikely to remain so against an adversary that has two decades to prepare for US stealth fighters, which have much higher infrared, visual, and emitter signatures than did the F-117. Outside China and Russia, no massive threat from an advanced integrated air defence system exists. Moreover, China is a poor example of a threat to cite if someone is trying to justify a short-ranged fighter with limited payload flown from island bases within range of overwhelming missile attack. Losses of US aircraft have mainly been helicopters since the Vietnam war and fixed wing losses were not shot down. Only Russia and China can pose the kind of anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment that justifies a massive investment in stealth. These facts make the risk calculation involved with prioritising stealth over performance, range, and weapons loadout inherently suspect—and the F-35 might well be the first modern fighter to have substantially less performance than its predecessors. Col Michael W. Pietrucha's Proposal. • Maintain a limited number of F-35As (those already purchased) as a replacement for the capabilities lost upon retirement of the F-117; (To me the limited number of F-35As need to be sent to AMARC and to be recycled) • Create a modernised Tactical Air Force fleet consisting of a high-low mix of modernised F-15 and F-16 legacy fighters, light attack aircraft, and multi-purpose jet trainer / attack aircraft; • Recover some “sunk cost” of the F-35 program by using advanced systems to modernise older fighters, in effect fielding fifth-generation systems in fourth-generation airframes; • Restore the Air Force’s SEAD/EW (Suppression of Enemy Air. Defences - Electronic warfare) fighters and crews; • Expand the service’s global reach capabilities by providing deployable Tactical Air Force assets that can operate from short, rough airstrips on a logistical shoestring • Increase the number of absorbable cockpits to the point where the Air Force can augment the inventory of fighter/attack aviators to meet requirements; • Invest in affordable, exportable “light combat aircraft” derived from Air Education and Training Command’s T-X program; • Allow the Air Guard to maintain its position as the operational reserve and “relief valve” for experienced fighter/attack aviators while recapitalizing its portion of the CAF; and • Build a Tactical Air Force that can meet the nation’s demands for air-power capabilities even in the face of increasing fuel costs and decreasing budget.
Col Michael W. Pietrucha, USAF, wrote a 24 page article in Air and Space Power Journal, "The Comanche and the Albatross: About Our Neck Was Hung". He has got a good point why the F-35 must be cancelled now. The F-35 is based on a belief that radar low observability will remain effective against future air defence threats. Although true for the F-117 against Iraq’s Kari system in 1991, stealthiness is unlikely to remain so against an adversary that has two decades to prepare for US stealth fighters, which have much higher infrared, visual, and emitter signatures than did the F-117. Outside China and Russia, no massive threat from an advanced integrated air defence system exists. Moreover, China is a poor example of a threat to cite if someone is trying to justify a short-ranged fighter with limited payload flown from island bases within range of overwhelming missile attack. Losses of US aircraft have mainly been helicopters since the Vietnam war and fixed wing losses were not shot down. Only Russia and China can pose the kind of anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment that justifies a massive investment in stealth. These facts make the risk calculation involved with prioritising stealth over performance, range, and weapons loadout inherently suspect—and the F-35 might well be the first modern fighter to have substantially less performance than its predecessors. Col Michael W. Pietrucha's Proposal. • Maintain a limited number of F-35As (those already purchased) as a replacement for the capabilities lost upon retirement of the F-117; (To me the limited number of F-35As need to be sent to AMARC and to be recycled) • Create a modernised Tactical Air Force fleet consisting of a high-low mix of modernised F-15 and F-16 legacy fighters, light attack aircraft, and multi-purpose jet trainer / attack aircraft; • Recover some “sunk cost” of the F-35 program by using advanced systems to modernise older fighters, in effect fielding fifth-generation systems in fourth-generation airframes; • Restore the Air Force’s SEAD/EW (Suppression of Enemy Air. Defences - Electronic warfare) fighters and crews; • Expand the service’s global reach capabilities by providing deployable Tactical Air Force assets that can operate from short, rough airstrips on a logistical shoestring • Increase the number of absorbable cockpits to the point where the Air Force can augment the inventory of fighter/attack aviators to meet requirements; • Invest in affordable, exportable “light combat aircraft” derived from Air Education and Training Command’s T-X program; • Allow the Air Guard to maintain its position as the operational reserve and “relief valve” for experienced fighter/attack aviators while recapitalizing its portion of the CAF; and • Build a Tactical Air Force that can meet the nation’s demands for air-power capabilities even in the face of increasing fuel costs and decreasing budget.
Outbreak of common sense.
"Burn him, he's a witch!"
p.s. My money (and the polls) is on the next Canadian Government being minority Liberal, in which case the Super Hornet is most likely to be selected as Canada's next fighter.
"Burn him, he's a witch!"
p.s. My money (and the polls) is on the next Canadian Government being minority Liberal, in which case the Super Hornet is most likely to be selected as Canada's next fighter.
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Fox,
I sincerely hope you win your bet and the Super Hornet is selected, keeping the Boeing production line open. The USN will need more E/Fs given the F-35 state of affairs. I was in the aerospace business starting in 1961, retiring in 2000, but then doing some consulting work. Other than the F-111 fiasco (McNamara's Folly), there has never been another military program botched as badly as this F-35 program, involving nearly every facet of airplane in total, doing so at unbelievable expense to taxpayers and other defense programs. I do like Col. Pietrucha's solutions. Then, there is that famous song with the line "Know When To Hold Em and Know When To Fold Em".
I sincerely hope you win your bet and the Super Hornet is selected, keeping the Boeing production line open. The USN will need more E/Fs given the F-35 state of affairs. I was in the aerospace business starting in 1961, retiring in 2000, but then doing some consulting work. Other than the F-111 fiasco (McNamara's Folly), there has never been another military program botched as badly as this F-35 program, involving nearly every facet of airplane in total, doing so at unbelievable expense to taxpayers and other defense programs. I do like Col. Pietrucha's solutions. Then, there is that famous song with the line "Know When To Hold Em and Know When To Fold Em".
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Late Friday afternoon, less than a week after Defense Secretary Leon Panetta issued dire warnings about the pending defense cuts, the Pentagon announced that it had grounded its next generation F-35 fighter because of engine problems. This was the second time in two months the plane has been taken out of service.
Friday afternoon is Washington’s preferred time to release bad news and hope reporters, already thinking about the weekends, will turn a blind eye. But after this latest failure, the problems with the F-35 are simply too numerous to ignore.
Equally impossible to ignore is the $1.5 trillion price tag for one of the biggest failures in Pentagon history. $1.5 trillion is the cost of operating the air craft for 55 years, an amount that has been consistently increased as the program drags on. It’s the most expensive weapons system the Pentagon has ever commissioned. And as problems mount, there are growing concerns that the F-35 will never fly a combat mission.
“This was a huge mistake. We were warned about it in the 1990s by some prescient people. Those people were ignored,” said Winslow Wheeler, a long-time Congressional staffer who now is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project. “We’re living the consequences of the bad, fundamental design of the airplane and bad, fundamental design of the acquisition plan.”
PROBLEMS FROM THE START
The Pentagon commissioned the F-35 during the Clinton presidency. Lockheed Martin was chosen as the manufacturer.
Right now, each branch of the military has their own planes, meaning that numerous contracts existed with different contractors. Lockheed was expected to lower the cost of air defense by creating redundancies between the branches. It was ordered to produce three different versions of the F-35: the Marine version could take off and land vertically; the Navy version would be designed to take off from air craft carriers; and the Air Force version would take off from traditional runways. The Pentagon ordered nearly 2,500 planes for $382 billion, or fifty percent more than the original cost.
As the price soared, the Pentagon in 2010 deemed the program “too big to fail.” Yet it continues to fall short. Recent engine troubles are just the latest in a series of mechanical failures. A pilot was killed when oxygen to the cabin was cut off. The aircraft are running too hot, limiting their ability to operate in warm environments.
The original delivery date was supposed to be 2010. Then it was delayed until 2012. Now, it’s not expected to be in service until 2019.
But when they are put into active use, they have multiple tactical problems. They don’t have a long range, so they need to be close to the field of battle. They lack the weapons systems to adequately support ground forces. And they’re at a disadvantage in a dogfight because of limited turning capability.
Even if the planes were perfectly functional, they were built for a different era. The United States has unsurpassed global air superiority. If the F-35 order is filled, DOD will have 15 times as many planes as China. The F-35 was designed to fight a war between large military powers, not ones against insurgents in Mali.
NO POLITICAL OVERSIGHT
As failures have mounted, numerous lawmakers have slammed the Pentagon and Lockheed for their failure to deliver. Sen. John McCain, R-Az., in 2011 said “We cannot afford aircraft that doubles or triples the estimated cost.” Claire McCaskill, the Democratic Senator from Missouri, told Pentagon leaders that she “need[s] to know whose fault this is.” Yet the program continues to be funded.
In response to lawmaker complaints, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates restructured the program and fired its manager. Current Secretary Leon Panetta has also called for improvements to the program, and has said the delays are unacceptable.
But according to Wheeler, lawmakers on Capitol Hill and officials at the Pentagon refuse to acknowledge that they might be throwing money at a program that has not, and might not ever, produce a usable aircraft.
“It’s certainly not too big to fail. It already has failed,” he said. “Cancelling this thing and proceeding with a properly conceived aircraft would be cheaper and better.”
David Francis
Friday afternoon is Washington’s preferred time to release bad news and hope reporters, already thinking about the weekends, will turn a blind eye. But after this latest failure, the problems with the F-35 are simply too numerous to ignore.
Equally impossible to ignore is the $1.5 trillion price tag for one of the biggest failures in Pentagon history. $1.5 trillion is the cost of operating the air craft for 55 years, an amount that has been consistently increased as the program drags on. It’s the most expensive weapons system the Pentagon has ever commissioned. And as problems mount, there are growing concerns that the F-35 will never fly a combat mission.
“This was a huge mistake. We were warned about it in the 1990s by some prescient people. Those people were ignored,” said Winslow Wheeler, a long-time Congressional staffer who now is the director of the Straus Military Reform Project. “We’re living the consequences of the bad, fundamental design of the airplane and bad, fundamental design of the acquisition plan.”
PROBLEMS FROM THE START
The Pentagon commissioned the F-35 during the Clinton presidency. Lockheed Martin was chosen as the manufacturer.
Right now, each branch of the military has their own planes, meaning that numerous contracts existed with different contractors. Lockheed was expected to lower the cost of air defense by creating redundancies between the branches. It was ordered to produce three different versions of the F-35: the Marine version could take off and land vertically; the Navy version would be designed to take off from air craft carriers; and the Air Force version would take off from traditional runways. The Pentagon ordered nearly 2,500 planes for $382 billion, or fifty percent more than the original cost.
As the price soared, the Pentagon in 2010 deemed the program “too big to fail.” Yet it continues to fall short. Recent engine troubles are just the latest in a series of mechanical failures. A pilot was killed when oxygen to the cabin was cut off. The aircraft are running too hot, limiting their ability to operate in warm environments.
The original delivery date was supposed to be 2010. Then it was delayed until 2012. Now, it’s not expected to be in service until 2019.
But when they are put into active use, they have multiple tactical problems. They don’t have a long range, so they need to be close to the field of battle. They lack the weapons systems to adequately support ground forces. And they’re at a disadvantage in a dogfight because of limited turning capability.
Even if the planes were perfectly functional, they were built for a different era. The United States has unsurpassed global air superiority. If the F-35 order is filled, DOD will have 15 times as many planes as China. The F-35 was designed to fight a war between large military powers, not ones against insurgents in Mali.
NO POLITICAL OVERSIGHT
As failures have mounted, numerous lawmakers have slammed the Pentagon and Lockheed for their failure to deliver. Sen. John McCain, R-Az., in 2011 said “We cannot afford aircraft that doubles or triples the estimated cost.” Claire McCaskill, the Democratic Senator from Missouri, told Pentagon leaders that she “need[s] to know whose fault this is.” Yet the program continues to be funded.
In response to lawmaker complaints, former Defense Secretary Robert Gates restructured the program and fired its manager. Current Secretary Leon Panetta has also called for improvements to the program, and has said the delays are unacceptable.
But according to Wheeler, lawmakers on Capitol Hill and officials at the Pentagon refuse to acknowledge that they might be throwing money at a program that has not, and might not ever, produce a usable aircraft.
“It’s certainly not too big to fail. It already has failed,” he said. “Cancelling this thing and proceeding with a properly conceived aircraft would be cheaper and better.”
David Francis
NL - forgive me, but is that posted as a reminder of the article?
I only ask, since those new to the debate won't necessarily realise it appeared two years ago (NB reference to Panetta as SECDEF)... It first appeared here, and the Liveleak page appears to have run it without any clues that the piece is old.
I only ask, since those new to the debate won't necessarily realise it appeared two years ago (NB reference to Panetta as SECDEF)... It first appeared here, and the Liveleak page appears to have run it without any clues that the piece is old.
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Forgive me Archimedes, I went on the date of the article at the bottom, unaware it was regurgitated info.
Added: 1 day ago Occurred On: Mar-30-2015