Why no helo transport? Are we condemning our diggers to an easy victimology?
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Most of the Aussie casualties were outside the vehicle when the device activated, while those inside have survived.
I'm not sure whether or not the SAS is presently operating in Afghanistan but one of the limitations on the perspective of our troops in this nasty war might be unfamiliarity with the successes of the SAS in covert helo insertion and safe extraction - during (once again) the lengthy Vietnam conflict.
Apart from the SAS and their corporate memory, few Aust Army wallahs would be familiar with the techniques employed by the SAS and 9 Sqn in Vietnam. That they were highly successful is indisputable but equally true (as 7x7 alluded) is the fact that an Aust Army Aviation instinctive reflex is to automatically reject the RAAF experience as irrelevant. I don't think it is.
Angus and our political masters might be determined to stay the course but remaining lockstep with failure is not an option. I'm with those who see provision of air mobility to the diggers as being an essential part of the solution. Trudging out of bases along well-defined (but sometimes varied) routes is simply to invite getting your butt blown off.... via overt ambush (contact) or ambuscade (mining). We seem to be proving that point quite regularly now. A different approach to forays into contested areas is called for - and quite warranted by recent events. Dare I say "wake up and smell the coffee"?
A successful counter-insurgency campaign is all about wrenching the initiative from the desperadoes and making them acutely aware of their low-tech vulnerability. Right now the obverse is true and has been for quite some time. Choppers aren't just for medevac.
They're for seizing the initiative. But having a medevac helo on station is also a top life-saver - versus calling it in and waiting your turn. A slick is also a medevac machine.
Unpredictability and mobility isn't apparent in our troops' recent casualty figures. I cannot fathom why the Aust Army is turning its back on Air Mobility. Perhaps some ex armoured Cav gecko is in the ascendancy and calling the shots. Maybe he's convinced all and sundry that the Bushmaster's armour-plate is some kind of answer? Who knows? It's all top secret. Death isn't however. It's all over the terrorist web-pages and our evening TV news. It demoralizes our citizens and encourages our opponents. 40 years after Vietnam we seem to have surrendered our technological edge. The question must be "why?" Haven't seen a valid answer in this thread, thus far.
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Not sure if you can access this from England but well worth a look. Foot patrols, IEDs etc.
Four Corners - 05/07/2010: A Careful War - Part 1
Four Corners - 05/07/2010: A Careful War - Part 1
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40 years after Vietnam we seem to have surrendered our technological edge. The question must be "why?" Haven't seen a valid answer in this thread, thus far.
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Most will have heard the shock horror reports in the Australian news over the last 24 hours of the Kalgoorlie/Boulder high school teacher who set his (her?) students the project of designing a terror attack with a view to killing as many innocent Australians as possible. The Oz public have reacted as you might expect them to when drummed up by the tabloid media.
Along similar lines - think Spain and Madrid trains immediately before a national election - I'd be guessing that some very clever people in northern Pakistan (even if they're getting their feet a bit wet at the moment) have come to the (in my mind, the very logical) conclusion that killing one, or ten, or preferably more than ten Australian soldiers is almost guaranteed to have far more political fallout than killing an even larger number of Americans, so they've stepped up ops in the Australian area of operations to bring that about.
Seeing that the Mr Faulkner, the Australian Defence Minister, has announced a parliamentary debate on the Australian commitment to Afghanistan, it would seem that those clever people in Pakistan have already succeeded to some degree.
Hydraulic Palm Tree and others, accepting that this is an open forum, I've read David Kilcullen's (very sensible, I think) book on ops in Afghanistan stressing population-centric operations, and I accept that I don't know one tenth of one percent of what you guys get up to with the modern day kit you have available to you, but I repeat what I think is a well-founded perception as mentioned by Overtalk (= Overtorque. Clever - I get it) - the Army has to accept that there might be a few things that could be learned about helicopter operations from the way the RAAF did things before the takeover. I (and many others) can attest that damn near everyone on the Army side went out of their way to shelve and ignore any such experience as quickly as they could.
The casualties that are occurring now give the perception – and this is one war where perception is almost as important as any other facet of the war (something the enemy, with their very professional use of propaganda, certainly understands) – that the Australian Army is reacting rather than forcing the enemy to react to what they, the Australian Army, force upon them. Continuing the tactics of foot patrols, while fitting exactly within the ‘population-centric’ tactic espoused by Kilcullen, must surely be leavened with a few other tactics – like helo insertion.
But I suppose that might be an easier option if we had our own helicopters that we could put into the theatre - that worked.
Along similar lines - think Spain and Madrid trains immediately before a national election - I'd be guessing that some very clever people in northern Pakistan (even if they're getting their feet a bit wet at the moment) have come to the (in my mind, the very logical) conclusion that killing one, or ten, or preferably more than ten Australian soldiers is almost guaranteed to have far more political fallout than killing an even larger number of Americans, so they've stepped up ops in the Australian area of operations to bring that about.
Seeing that the Mr Faulkner, the Australian Defence Minister, has announced a parliamentary debate on the Australian commitment to Afghanistan, it would seem that those clever people in Pakistan have already succeeded to some degree.
Hydraulic Palm Tree and others, accepting that this is an open forum, I've read David Kilcullen's (very sensible, I think) book on ops in Afghanistan stressing population-centric operations, and I accept that I don't know one tenth of one percent of what you guys get up to with the modern day kit you have available to you, but I repeat what I think is a well-founded perception as mentioned by Overtalk (= Overtorque. Clever - I get it) - the Army has to accept that there might be a few things that could be learned about helicopter operations from the way the RAAF did things before the takeover. I (and many others) can attest that damn near everyone on the Army side went out of their way to shelve and ignore any such experience as quickly as they could.
The casualties that are occurring now give the perception – and this is one war where perception is almost as important as any other facet of the war (something the enemy, with their very professional use of propaganda, certainly understands) – that the Australian Army is reacting rather than forcing the enemy to react to what they, the Australian Army, force upon them. Continuing the tactics of foot patrols, while fitting exactly within the ‘population-centric’ tactic espoused by Kilcullen, must surely be leavened with a few other tactics – like helo insertion.
But I suppose that might be an easier option if we had our own helicopters that we could put into the theatre - that worked.
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From a respected photo-journo
I realise that war correspondents are usually only respected after they're dead, but this particular one (see below) has been in quite a few conflict zones and has the unique ability to see through in-theatre BS. Anyway, for what it's worth, I personally respect his work and I've known him (and followed him) since 98.
-----Original Message-----
From: C
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2010 10:24 AM
To:
Subject: Afghanistan
Gidday TS,
Long time no speak. I am working on XXXXXXX now doing the odd investigative yarn for them and I noticed you'd posted re the helos issue in Afghanistan. I've been over there myself a few weeks back - with the US xxxxxxxx/xx, not the Aussies - and I asked the same questions you asked.
The short answer is that the much vaunted counter-insurgency strategy pushed by Aussie David Kilcullen with General Petraeus is that to win the hearts and minds of the locals you need to engage at a local level and that requires troops on the ground, mixing with the locals and being seen to be patrolling the area. Helos don't cut it.
I have to admit that, after going on numerous patrols with US soldiers, both on foot and in the big MRAVs, to my humble amateur expert eyes, it looks like a forlorn hope that the western alliance nations will ever be able to achieve any kind of turn-around in Afghanistan - certainly not within the short term election cycles and burgeoning deficit priorities of the American and British Governments. Of the several hundred US soldiers we started filming with in May, five are now dead and 31 are now seriously wounded. The attrition levels are shocking. They'd also be far worse were it not for the absolutely miraculous surgical hospitals at Khandahar and Bagram, within a short flight of most conflict areas. Nothing I say detracts from the humbling heroism and moral fibre and raw courage of the soldiers I had the privilege of spending time with.
Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter.
Even then, the Chinooks have to be escorted by two Blackhawks at all times because of the (until recently) undisclosed risk of shoot-downs by Taliban Surface to air missiles we're not meant to talk about. The roads are too dangerous for US patrols during the day.
Particularly so now that the Taliban blew the main bridge from the airport into town and so every patrol currently has to go across the river bed next to the wrecked bridge. When the winter rains come and the river floods, then it will require the big MRAVs to travel on the roads and before it gets really cold I am sure the Taliban will have even more fun. I saw what a standard ammonium nitrate bomb does to an MRAV and it ain't pretty.
The fundamental problem I have mate with this Afghanistan conflict is the mission creep. We went there to kill the people who did 911, after a big diversion in Iraq. But, as you know, they aren't there. The Taliban, however brutal and medieval, is fighting a classic insurgency - with increasing popular support from Pashtun tribespeople - because we invaded a country over which - rightly or wrongly - they had de facto possession and control. Their de jure sovereignty wasn't an issue to host nations like Pakistan either, who keep on cosying up to them through ISI even now.
So why are we killing the Taliban and trying to hold southern Afghanistan? Sure Hekmatyar Gulbuddin and a few other Taliban commanders have crossed over to Al Qaeda, but the awful reality is that we're trying to prop up a totally illegitimate and outrageously corrupt Karzai Government to avoid the return of a theocratic regime that used to support Al Qaeda. IE: We're supporting one bunch of thugs to stop another bunch of thugs from taking over. It's morally bankrupt. It is starting to look to a lot of muslims that we're there to defeat an Islamic regime because it's an islamic regime.
Meanwhile, the real bad guy sit in Quetta directing operations with the sanction and support of the Pakistan military - whom the Pakistani President is too weak to rein in.
That's pretty much what most senior American officers said to me during the long nights. They're wondering why the hell they're there too.
Hope you're well mate.
C
###################################################
----- Original Message -----
From:
To:
Sent: Wed Aug 25 02:44:16 2010
Subject: RE: Afghanistan
Mate
Thought you'd stopped sneaking around war zones checking ID's and gathering footage. But I guess "embedded" is as good as free room and board, even though you're a little limited in your freedoms and reportage.
I think that one of our grand (and most pretentious) pretences for being in SVN was to "win the hearts and minds". But as usual, when it comes down to achieving military objectives, you have to grab them by the balls with the assurance that their hearts and minds will follow. Do anything less and you are rightly perceived as weak. What the tribals do respect is military might and being deftly out-manoeuvred. I've read the Wikipedia entry on Kilcullen and admit that he has impressive credentials in counter-insurgency. But in an operational "boots on the ground" sense, it may be a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. His philosophies are strategic. Concerns about localized vulnerabilities are tactical. Kilcullen may not have his mind actually wrapped around the elusive precepts and concepts involved.... in comparison with the measures for achieving stated political aims. Theorists tend to be dismissive of casualties as being a military "cost" and problem.
In my own long-term dealings with the Middle East mindset, I often found that a smiling dig-in of the heels regularly achieved the desired result - more often than not. Cave in and capitulate and you'd end up catching the fall-out later on. Mission creep is better described as losing sight of the big picture against the backdrop of humanitarian concerns, rapidly mounting friendly casualties, personal involvement, civilian deaths and local internecine strife. Every politician of any persuasion claims that we're justifiably there and there for the long-haul, whilst at the same time clamouring for their military leaders to stipulate an end time for this pain-game. Conquerors never have that "backing out gracefully" problem; peace-seekers always do.
My personal views have varied between bombing them back to the stone age and just hemming them in (Clinton style). His solution was to use Al Qaeda camps as proving grounds for Cruise missiles. I wouldn't disagree with that approach. You can surveil the country and interdict at will and otherwise allow the peoples' hearts and minds to interact with each other in a traditional sense. Who cares if local warlords are at each other's throats - or if the tribes slaughter each other over local issues? Kabul can remain epicentric and isolated and fortress-like and happily ensconced in the seventeenth century. The clan in Kabul may seem corrupt, but that's only by our Western standards (i.e not to exploit an opportunity afforded them by the war would make them appear weak and un-Afghani. They're only doing what's expected of them by their like-minded peers and I'm sure they feel no guilt or shame about that). We have to stop measuring local whacko's by inappropriate yardsticks. Nothing much has changed at the top in Afghanistan since British Imperial or Soviet era epochs (see Soviet war in Afghanistan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
The culture of opportunistic villainy is also embedded.
The country has some extensive mineral wealth but it's not worth the cost of recovery. Yet, notwithstanding corruption, connivance and local conniptions and irregardless of geo-political, military and strategic considerations, while we have troops stationed there with a defined task, we owe it to them to give them the very best chance of survival against the lethal threats. By a factor of 10 to one that's primarily the IED.
Troops on the ground tracking to and from their secure cantonments are very vulnerable to being interdicted by the simplest of explosive devices. The IED is a lazy man's/poor man's minefield. Courtesy of cell-phone technology or a length of phone-cable, you just have to lay it and await local intell on patrols outbound (or if you've no poppy fields to tend, lay in wait). Not sure if the patrolling troops are jamming cell-phone signals, but there are very few effective counters to this undetectable threat except for helo mobility allowing you to become quite unpredictable in your movements and timings. Maybe you could re-read the Pprune thread at this link (tinyurl.com/2amwh8b) for a few contrasting views. See whether there's any coherent argument for or against.
"troops on the ground, mixing with the locals" can still be achieved, but without the very predictable traipsing to and fro from the secure base area.
I'm betting that this traipse is where 95% of our casualties have occurred..... i.e. hub outbound/inbound is quite easy to cover with IED's.
As you say below: " Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter."
If, as you say, the roads are too dangerous for mounted US troops, surely that goes double for the foot-trails into and out of Aussie base-camps? Did you have this precise conversation with Kilcullen and if so, what did he have against chopper support for the reasons given in the Pprune link? (i.e. the points made in TheShadow's and UNCTUOUS posts)? My concern is more for what's happening in the Australian area of interest (Oruzgan, Helmand). The overall problem on a national level (see attached email from Winslow Wheeler, the Director Straus Military Reform Project Center for Defense Information) is quite mind-boggling.
Regards
TS
PS If you've no objection, I'd like to cite all or part of your email in a Pprune post.
###################################################
Hi mate. Can you please not use my name or the ID of the US unit in what you post? I am going back there to reprise what we shot and it might ostracise the increasingly defensive US officers we deal with if they see just how bleak we are about the war. Embedding is not something I would ever do again. No matter what the US claims, the freedom of movement is constrained by the American military's increasing sensitivity to the apparent failure of their mission.
Cheers mate
C
-----Original Message-----
From: C
Sent: Monday, August 23, 2010 10:24 AM
To:
Subject: Afghanistan
Gidday TS,
Long time no speak. I am working on XXXXXXX now doing the odd investigative yarn for them and I noticed you'd posted re the helos issue in Afghanistan. I've been over there myself a few weeks back - with the US xxxxxxxx/xx, not the Aussies - and I asked the same questions you asked.
The short answer is that the much vaunted counter-insurgency strategy pushed by Aussie David Kilcullen with General Petraeus is that to win the hearts and minds of the locals you need to engage at a local level and that requires troops on the ground, mixing with the locals and being seen to be patrolling the area. Helos don't cut it.
I have to admit that, after going on numerous patrols with US soldiers, both on foot and in the big MRAVs, to my humble amateur expert eyes, it looks like a forlorn hope that the western alliance nations will ever be able to achieve any kind of turn-around in Afghanistan - certainly not within the short term election cycles and burgeoning deficit priorities of the American and British Governments. Of the several hundred US soldiers we started filming with in May, five are now dead and 31 are now seriously wounded. The attrition levels are shocking. They'd also be far worse were it not for the absolutely miraculous surgical hospitals at Khandahar and Bagram, within a short flight of most conflict areas. Nothing I say detracts from the humbling heroism and moral fibre and raw courage of the soldiers I had the privilege of spending time with.
Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter.
Even then, the Chinooks have to be escorted by two Blackhawks at all times because of the (until recently) undisclosed risk of shoot-downs by Taliban Surface to air missiles we're not meant to talk about. The roads are too dangerous for US patrols during the day.
Particularly so now that the Taliban blew the main bridge from the airport into town and so every patrol currently has to go across the river bed next to the wrecked bridge. When the winter rains come and the river floods, then it will require the big MRAVs to travel on the roads and before it gets really cold I am sure the Taliban will have even more fun. I saw what a standard ammonium nitrate bomb does to an MRAV and it ain't pretty.
The fundamental problem I have mate with this Afghanistan conflict is the mission creep. We went there to kill the people who did 911, after a big diversion in Iraq. But, as you know, they aren't there. The Taliban, however brutal and medieval, is fighting a classic insurgency - with increasing popular support from Pashtun tribespeople - because we invaded a country over which - rightly or wrongly - they had de facto possession and control. Their de jure sovereignty wasn't an issue to host nations like Pakistan either, who keep on cosying up to them through ISI even now.
So why are we killing the Taliban and trying to hold southern Afghanistan? Sure Hekmatyar Gulbuddin and a few other Taliban commanders have crossed over to Al Qaeda, but the awful reality is that we're trying to prop up a totally illegitimate and outrageously corrupt Karzai Government to avoid the return of a theocratic regime that used to support Al Qaeda. IE: We're supporting one bunch of thugs to stop another bunch of thugs from taking over. It's morally bankrupt. It is starting to look to a lot of muslims that we're there to defeat an Islamic regime because it's an islamic regime.
Meanwhile, the real bad guy sit in Quetta directing operations with the sanction and support of the Pakistan military - whom the Pakistani President is too weak to rein in.
That's pretty much what most senior American officers said to me during the long nights. They're wondering why the hell they're there too.
Hope you're well mate.
C
###################################################
----- Original Message -----
From:
To:
Sent: Wed Aug 25 02:44:16 2010
Subject: RE: Afghanistan
Mate
Thought you'd stopped sneaking around war zones checking ID's and gathering footage. But I guess "embedded" is as good as free room and board, even though you're a little limited in your freedoms and reportage.
I think that one of our grand (and most pretentious) pretences for being in SVN was to "win the hearts and minds". But as usual, when it comes down to achieving military objectives, you have to grab them by the balls with the assurance that their hearts and minds will follow. Do anything less and you are rightly perceived as weak. What the tribals do respect is military might and being deftly out-manoeuvred. I've read the Wikipedia entry on Kilcullen and admit that he has impressive credentials in counter-insurgency. But in an operational "boots on the ground" sense, it may be a case of not seeing the forest for the trees. His philosophies are strategic. Concerns about localized vulnerabilities are tactical. Kilcullen may not have his mind actually wrapped around the elusive precepts and concepts involved.... in comparison with the measures for achieving stated political aims. Theorists tend to be dismissive of casualties as being a military "cost" and problem.
In my own long-term dealings with the Middle East mindset, I often found that a smiling dig-in of the heels regularly achieved the desired result - more often than not. Cave in and capitulate and you'd end up catching the fall-out later on. Mission creep is better described as losing sight of the big picture against the backdrop of humanitarian concerns, rapidly mounting friendly casualties, personal involvement, civilian deaths and local internecine strife. Every politician of any persuasion claims that we're justifiably there and there for the long-haul, whilst at the same time clamouring for their military leaders to stipulate an end time for this pain-game. Conquerors never have that "backing out gracefully" problem; peace-seekers always do.
My personal views have varied between bombing them back to the stone age and just hemming them in (Clinton style). His solution was to use Al Qaeda camps as proving grounds for Cruise missiles. I wouldn't disagree with that approach. You can surveil the country and interdict at will and otherwise allow the peoples' hearts and minds to interact with each other in a traditional sense. Who cares if local warlords are at each other's throats - or if the tribes slaughter each other over local issues? Kabul can remain epicentric and isolated and fortress-like and happily ensconced in the seventeenth century. The clan in Kabul may seem corrupt, but that's only by our Western standards (i.e not to exploit an opportunity afforded them by the war would make them appear weak and un-Afghani. They're only doing what's expected of them by their like-minded peers and I'm sure they feel no guilt or shame about that). We have to stop measuring local whacko's by inappropriate yardsticks. Nothing much has changed at the top in Afghanistan since British Imperial or Soviet era epochs (see Soviet war in Afghanistan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia).
The culture of opportunistic villainy is also embedded.
The country has some extensive mineral wealth but it's not worth the cost of recovery. Yet, notwithstanding corruption, connivance and local conniptions and irregardless of geo-political, military and strategic considerations, while we have troops stationed there with a defined task, we owe it to them to give them the very best chance of survival against the lethal threats. By a factor of 10 to one that's primarily the IED.
Troops on the ground tracking to and from their secure cantonments are very vulnerable to being interdicted by the simplest of explosive devices. The IED is a lazy man's/poor man's minefield. Courtesy of cell-phone technology or a length of phone-cable, you just have to lay it and await local intell on patrols outbound (or if you've no poppy fields to tend, lay in wait). Not sure if the patrolling troops are jamming cell-phone signals, but there are very few effective counters to this undetectable threat except for helo mobility allowing you to become quite unpredictable in your movements and timings. Maybe you could re-read the Pprune thread at this link (tinyurl.com/2amwh8b) for a few contrasting views. See whether there's any coherent argument for or against.
"troops on the ground, mixing with the locals" can still be achieved, but without the very predictable traipsing to and fro from the secure base area.
I'm betting that this traipse is where 95% of our casualties have occurred..... i.e. hub outbound/inbound is quite easy to cover with IED's.
As you say below: " Perhaps the best test of how safe it is to travel in Khandahar province was that, for us to move from Khandahar airfield out to our embed eleven kms out of town, it was only regarded as viable to travel safely by helicopter."
If, as you say, the roads are too dangerous for mounted US troops, surely that goes double for the foot-trails into and out of Aussie base-camps? Did you have this precise conversation with Kilcullen and if so, what did he have against chopper support for the reasons given in the Pprune link? (i.e. the points made in TheShadow's and UNCTUOUS posts)? My concern is more for what's happening in the Australian area of interest (Oruzgan, Helmand). The overall problem on a national level (see attached email from Winslow Wheeler, the Director Straus Military Reform Project Center for Defense Information) is quite mind-boggling.
Regards
TS
PS If you've no objection, I'd like to cite all or part of your email in a Pprune post.
###################################################
Hi mate. Can you please not use my name or the ID of the US unit in what you post? I am going back there to reprise what we shot and it might ostracise the increasingly defensive US officers we deal with if they see just how bleak we are about the war. Embedding is not something I would ever do again. No matter what the US claims, the freedom of movement is constrained by the American military's increasing sensitivity to the apparent failure of their mission.
Cheers mate
C
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David Petraeus' (perhaps poorly named) 'surge' in Iraq, which was to a large degree designed by David Kilcullen, worked well (as much as anything is going to work in the Middle East - it could well unravel before our eyes now that the Iraqi Army and police have taken over from the Americans).
However, why it worked so well is the nub: it worked because the local Iraqi Sunni tribes had become, to a very large degree, disaffected with the Al Qaeda fighters, (many of whom were almost as foreign to them as the Americans). Kilcullen says that what tipped the balance was something prosaic - the locals objected to the foreign Al Qaeda fighters wanting - demanding, in fact - to marry local women. (Marrying into the local communities is a long standing Al Qaeda tactic, but it didn't fit comfortably with the relatively sophisticated Iraqis, who saw it for what it is in many cases - not much more than Muslim 'nice talk' for taking a concubine, who'll be discarded with three claps of the hands when Al Qaeda decide it's time to move on.)
i.e., the 'surge' worked because the Coalition was able to harness this disaffection and the vitally important fact, (exactly the same as with the population of Northern Ireland after 25 years of 'the Troubles'), that the local population was throughly sick of the blood-letting and wanted to avoid the state of almost total anarchy that Iraq was plunging into.
The situation in Afghanistan is utterly different. Most importantly, the local tribesmen aren't yet sick of the war. (Given their history, I doubt they ever will be - see Kilcullen's explanation for how he came to name his book 'The Accidental Guerrilla'.) There's little to no disaffection with the Taliban because the Taliban are largely local or from allied tribes across the Pakistani border that exists only in the minds of Westeners.
Trying to use Kilcullen's 'population-centric' tactics on a population that has fought off outsiders - successfully (a small but important point) - from the days of Alexander the Great who will always see Afghans from Kabul as foreigners (and Westerners as someone who might as well be from another planet) simply isn't ever going to work. They don't want a central government. They want to be left alone - even by any 'outsiders' (i.e., even from the next valley) among the Taliban, but while they have a greater threat to fight, they'll ally themselves with the Taliban against the common foe, and despite how many roads are built into remote valleys (Kilcullen's success story about ops in Afghanistan), I don't believe it will ever change until the local people reach that same place in their heads that the Irish and the Iraqi Sunni tribes reached - i.e., not until their suffering has passed some indefinable point that any student of history will tell you would seem to be still a very long way off for the Afghans.
I hate to say the incredible efforts of our troops in Afghanistan are wasted, but I fear they will be, for the casualty rates (which over nine years, have only just passed what the same Australian Army suffered in one day in Vietnam - Aug 18th 1966, at Long Tan) already seem to be turning the public into questioning why we're there - and as has already been mentioned, this war will be lost in exactly the same way as Vietnam was lost - on the home front and in loss of public support.
Our troops' efforts have not been in vain - they've brought us time. The only real question we should be asking in the forthcoming parliamentary debate is whether their continuing sacrifice is worth the price of buying us more time and whether we, the taxpayers, are willing to pay the very high price in treasure and lives to keep buying more time.
Kilcullen touches on that very point at some length in his book (which I'd highly recommend to anyone who hasn't read it) and recommends that we resist military involvement unless it is absolutely unavoidable.
However, why it worked so well is the nub: it worked because the local Iraqi Sunni tribes had become, to a very large degree, disaffected with the Al Qaeda fighters, (many of whom were almost as foreign to them as the Americans). Kilcullen says that what tipped the balance was something prosaic - the locals objected to the foreign Al Qaeda fighters wanting - demanding, in fact - to marry local women. (Marrying into the local communities is a long standing Al Qaeda tactic, but it didn't fit comfortably with the relatively sophisticated Iraqis, who saw it for what it is in many cases - not much more than Muslim 'nice talk' for taking a concubine, who'll be discarded with three claps of the hands when Al Qaeda decide it's time to move on.)
i.e., the 'surge' worked because the Coalition was able to harness this disaffection and the vitally important fact, (exactly the same as with the population of Northern Ireland after 25 years of 'the Troubles'), that the local population was throughly sick of the blood-letting and wanted to avoid the state of almost total anarchy that Iraq was plunging into.
The situation in Afghanistan is utterly different. Most importantly, the local tribesmen aren't yet sick of the war. (Given their history, I doubt they ever will be - see Kilcullen's explanation for how he came to name his book 'The Accidental Guerrilla'.) There's little to no disaffection with the Taliban because the Taliban are largely local or from allied tribes across the Pakistani border that exists only in the minds of Westeners.
Trying to use Kilcullen's 'population-centric' tactics on a population that has fought off outsiders - successfully (a small but important point) - from the days of Alexander the Great who will always see Afghans from Kabul as foreigners (and Westerners as someone who might as well be from another planet) simply isn't ever going to work. They don't want a central government. They want to be left alone - even by any 'outsiders' (i.e., even from the next valley) among the Taliban, but while they have a greater threat to fight, they'll ally themselves with the Taliban against the common foe, and despite how many roads are built into remote valleys (Kilcullen's success story about ops in Afghanistan), I don't believe it will ever change until the local people reach that same place in their heads that the Irish and the Iraqi Sunni tribes reached - i.e., not until their suffering has passed some indefinable point that any student of history will tell you would seem to be still a very long way off for the Afghans.
I hate to say the incredible efforts of our troops in Afghanistan are wasted, but I fear they will be, for the casualty rates (which over nine years, have only just passed what the same Australian Army suffered in one day in Vietnam - Aug 18th 1966, at Long Tan) already seem to be turning the public into questioning why we're there - and as has already been mentioned, this war will be lost in exactly the same way as Vietnam was lost - on the home front and in loss of public support.
Our troops' efforts have not been in vain - they've brought us time. The only real question we should be asking in the forthcoming parliamentary debate is whether their continuing sacrifice is worth the price of buying us more time and whether we, the taxpayers, are willing to pay the very high price in treasure and lives to keep buying more time.
Kilcullen touches on that very point at some length in his book (which I'd highly recommend to anyone who hasn't read it) and recommends that we resist military involvement unless it is absolutely unavoidable.
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Helping to define a worthless war and a Nation with no Honour whatsoever
Key Karzai Aide in Graft Inquiry Is Linked to C.I.A.
The aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at the
center of a politically sensitive corruption investigation is
being paid by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to
Afghan and American officials.
Mohammed Zia Salehi, the chief of administration for the
National Security Council, appears to have been on the
payroll for many years, according to officials in Kabul and
Washington. It is unclear exactly what Mr. Salehi does in
exchange for his money.
Mr. Salehi's relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep
contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration's
policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously
demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the corruption that
pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very
people suspected of perpetrating it.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/wo...l.html\?emc=na
The aide to President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan at the
center of a politically sensitive corruption investigation is
being paid by the Central Intelligence Agency, according to
Afghan and American officials.
Mohammed Zia Salehi, the chief of administration for the
National Security Council, appears to have been on the
payroll for many years, according to officials in Kabul and
Washington. It is unclear exactly what Mr. Salehi does in
exchange for his money.
Mr. Salehi's relationship with the C.I.A. underscores deep
contradictions at the heart of the Obama administration's
policy in Afghanistan, with American officials simultaneously
demanding that Mr. Karzai root out the corruption that
pervades his government while sometimes subsidizing the very
people suspected of perpetrating it.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/wo...l.html\?emc=na
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Hello All,
A very good friend alerted me to this thread, so herewith some interim response as we are presently in the far north of our land spending some time with my closest friend of 50 plus years, Rex Budd, DFC, who is terminally ill with a short life expectancy horizon. Rex and I served together on Sabres and had a longer association on Iroquois. He did perhaps all of the acceptance flight testing of 16 Hotel model Iroquois purchased via the US Army during Vietnam operations. He later helped me train the initial lot of Bushranger gunship aircrew and on a second tour became 1 of 5 gunship flight commanders.
Tibsy; re your post #9. I either identify myself or use a sole screen name ‘Bushranger 71’ when indulging in forums and only contribute if I feel I can make useful input to dialogue. Herewith some brief feedback to discussion this thread.
For the record, 9SQN RAAF worked in harmony with US Army gunship elements during Vietnam operations and they generally provided good support. The problem was availability due to an inefficient US Army gunship tasking philosophy which is why the Bushranger development project emerged.
Helo combat survivability has proven statistically to be far better than imagined by most, if operated prudently, and escort of utility or MLH platforms is largely unnecessary and wasteful of resources in my view, except of course for some special roles. Like others, I ponder why there has not been much broader use of helos in Afghanistan to negate the IED threat, which by the way were often encountered during Vietnam War operations.
MANPADs and all other forms of missilery have significant logistic/maintenance penalties and particularly power packs for the assortment of such weaponry that was reputedly splashed around Afghanistan over years. Some aircraft losses prove that the threat exists, but whether it should be viewed as a substantial deterrent to helo ops is debatable.
Thinking strategically; western nations largely fail to absorb the lessons of diplomacy and war-fighting and have historically trampled centuries old systems of government and cultures. Marching into countries as occupiers alienates the majority of the population and of course fosters insurgency which is almost impossible to counter militarily. Securing and holding territory requires massive military resources and would mostly be economically unsustainable. As for patrolling from garrisons; that strategy allows the enemy the initiative. Civil aid projects to win hearts and minds might give politicians and some in the military warm fuzzy feelings but cannot be done on a scale sufficient to bring a population onside, as has been proven in multiple conflicts.
So; I see Afghanistan as yet another imprudent military intervention by western powers and happenings in that part of the world are more relevant to Russia and China than NATO and other ISAF participants. So-called terrorist training can be conducted anywhere in the world and denting the Taliban infrastructure will be meaningless in that regard. Better to get out of there and rehabilitate military forces which have become degraded through sustained involvement and will inevitably become further diminished due to worldwide economic considerations.
We have about 2,500 kilometres of driving ahead to wobble our way back home via numerous watering holes which will take another week and I will then make some more detailed responses.
A very good friend alerted me to this thread, so herewith some interim response as we are presently in the far north of our land spending some time with my closest friend of 50 plus years, Rex Budd, DFC, who is terminally ill with a short life expectancy horizon. Rex and I served together on Sabres and had a longer association on Iroquois. He did perhaps all of the acceptance flight testing of 16 Hotel model Iroquois purchased via the US Army during Vietnam operations. He later helped me train the initial lot of Bushranger gunship aircrew and on a second tour became 1 of 5 gunship flight commanders.
Tibsy; re your post #9. I either identify myself or use a sole screen name ‘Bushranger 71’ when indulging in forums and only contribute if I feel I can make useful input to dialogue. Herewith some brief feedback to discussion this thread.
For the record, 9SQN RAAF worked in harmony with US Army gunship elements during Vietnam operations and they generally provided good support. The problem was availability due to an inefficient US Army gunship tasking philosophy which is why the Bushranger development project emerged.
Helo combat survivability has proven statistically to be far better than imagined by most, if operated prudently, and escort of utility or MLH platforms is largely unnecessary and wasteful of resources in my view, except of course for some special roles. Like others, I ponder why there has not been much broader use of helos in Afghanistan to negate the IED threat, which by the way were often encountered during Vietnam War operations.
MANPADs and all other forms of missilery have significant logistic/maintenance penalties and particularly power packs for the assortment of such weaponry that was reputedly splashed around Afghanistan over years. Some aircraft losses prove that the threat exists, but whether it should be viewed as a substantial deterrent to helo ops is debatable.
Thinking strategically; western nations largely fail to absorb the lessons of diplomacy and war-fighting and have historically trampled centuries old systems of government and cultures. Marching into countries as occupiers alienates the majority of the population and of course fosters insurgency which is almost impossible to counter militarily. Securing and holding territory requires massive military resources and would mostly be economically unsustainable. As for patrolling from garrisons; that strategy allows the enemy the initiative. Civil aid projects to win hearts and minds might give politicians and some in the military warm fuzzy feelings but cannot be done on a scale sufficient to bring a population onside, as has been proven in multiple conflicts.
So; I see Afghanistan as yet another imprudent military intervention by western powers and happenings in that part of the world are more relevant to Russia and China than NATO and other ISAF participants. So-called terrorist training can be conducted anywhere in the world and denting the Taliban infrastructure will be meaningless in that regard. Better to get out of there and rehabilitate military forces which have become degraded through sustained involvement and will inevitably become further diminished due to worldwide economic considerations.
We have about 2,500 kilometres of driving ahead to wobble our way back home via numerous watering holes which will take another week and I will then make some more detailed responses.
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MANPADs and all other forms of missilery have significant logistic/maintenance penalties and particularly power packs for the assortment of such weaponry that was reputedly splashed around Afghanistan over years. .
I recall being told in Northern Ireland that the IRA would not bé able to get a SAM7 launch because of battery problems, then a 2-ship was engaged in Fermanagh.
Some aircraft losses prove that the threat exists, but whether it should be viewed as a substantial deterrent to helo ops is debatable
HPT
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Hello HPT; re your post #31.
So somebody got shot at! That’s what happens in war-fighting.
I hope you are not saying that it is acceptable to lose ground-pounders in combat but not an Army Aviation aircraft and aircrew! Warrior spirit was once the fundamental core of the Profession-of-Arms and if you want to do the job of supporting the guys on the ground effectively, then you have to be prepared to be directly involved in the fighting, which of course involves risks and some possible loss of aircraft and personnel.
Considering the theme of this thread, should we blame our politicians and military chiefs, due to their implied fear of aviation casualties, for the absence of adequate integral helo support for Australian elements in Afghanistan; or does the capability not exist within Army Aviation to provide the resources?
Derogatory comment does you no credit. Operating techniques and tactics are of course the province of commanders in the field; but they should all be cognizant of lessons learned from previous conflicts to minimize hardware losses and casualties. Military history is replete with failures to heed past lessons of war-fighting.
I recall being told in Northern Ireland that the IRA would not bé able to get a SAM7 launch because of battery problems, then a 2-ship was engaged in Fermanagh.
You may be correct, but the political/strategic fallout of a Australian helo being shot down is unacceptable, whatever might have caused it.
Considering the theme of this thread, should we blame our politicians and military chiefs, due to their implied fear of aviation casualties, for the absence of adequate integral helo support for Australian elements in Afghanistan; or does the capability not exist within Army Aviation to provide the resources?
For that reason, leave the tactics to the in theatre crews who are privy to the intelligence and knowledge of their individual platforms systems......if you want to be an armchair pundit, perhaps stick to AFL or footy!
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So somebody got shot at! That’s what happens in war-fighting.
I hope you are not saying that it is acceptable to lose ground-pounders in combat but not an Army Aviation aircraft and aircrew!
Considering the theme of this thread, should we blame our politicians and military chiefs, due to their implied fear of aviation casualties, for the absence of adequate integral helo support for Australian elements in Afghanistan; or does the capability not exist within Army Aviation to provide the resources?
Operating techniques and tactics are of course the province of commanders in the field; but they should all be cognizant of lessons learned from previous conflicts to minimize hardware losses and casualties. Military history is replete with failures to heed past lessons of war-fighting.
HPT
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I have been told the HGV of the sky Wocka is solely on Medivac now, why?
it seems strange when we here in the UK dont hear that from official noise's
PeterR-B
it seems strange when we here in the UK dont hear that from official noise's
PeterR-B
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Army - The Soldiers Newspaper : September 2nd 2010, Page 1 - Defence Newspapers | The Soldiers Army
Page 24 at the top, training for anything in particular?
Page 24 at the top, training for anything in particular?
Thats because its not official and whoever told you that lied. Medivac is just one of the many roles that Chinook does very well on Ops.
Ive been following this thread for days now and as a military helo pilot am insulted that people on here genuinely believe that we do our rather dangerous jobs day in, day out with little or no regards for how it was done in the past.
Our tactics are robust and well suited to the very complicated intelligence picture that we deal with daily and (for obvious reasons) you are not privy to - this why you don't see multiple casualty helo incidents on the TV every week.
As has been said before, best leave the tactics (note tactics, not strategy) to the guys on the coal face who have been doing this for a number of years now.
Ive been following this thread for days now and as a military helo pilot am insulted that people on here genuinely believe that we do our rather dangerous jobs day in, day out with little or no regards for how it was done in the past.
Our tactics are robust and well suited to the very complicated intelligence picture that we deal with daily and (for obvious reasons) you are not privy to - this why you don't see multiple casualty helo incidents on the TV every week.
As has been said before, best leave the tactics (note tactics, not strategy) to the guys on the coal face who have been doing this for a number of years now.
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Hot and High Operations Training
Hi D79; re your post #35.
This seems like a long overdue very good step forward. A few decades back, RAAF helo aircrew conducted frequent training for high DA ops in PNG and in NZ which was invaluable for appreciating the performance limitations of platforms.
It will be very interesting to see how MRH90 and Tiger shape up in this regard. Anecdotal aviation media suggests Tiger is limited to about 250 rounds of cannon ammunition and 18 x 70mm rockets when operating around 6,000 feet altitude in Afghanistan.
This seems like a long overdue very good step forward. A few decades back, RAAF helo aircrew conducted frequent training for high DA ops in PNG and in NZ which was invaluable for appreciating the performance limitations of platforms.
It will be very interesting to see how MRH90 and Tiger shape up in this regard. Anecdotal aviation media suggests Tiger is limited to about 250 rounds of cannon ammunition and 18 x 70mm rockets when operating around 6,000 feet altitude in Afghanistan.
HDA training
Its not a step anywhere. AAAvn aircrew have been conducting annual training in PNG since we were operating the Souix. HDA training is a key competancy.
As for MRH-90 and ARH performance at altitude I'll leave to the uninformed to comment on.
As for MRH-90 and ARH performance at altitude I'll leave to the uninformed to comment on.
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Seen flying around Kabaul may/june this year - a Tiger
. French i think as it was escorting what looked like a super puma? Just not sure whether our guys a ready yet to deploy, in time perhaps....
. French i think as it was escorting what looked like a super puma? Just not sure whether our guys a ready yet to deploy, in time perhaps....
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DARPA Works to Develop A Flying Humvee For U.S. Troops
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working to develop a "flying Humvee" that could be piloted by troops with about the same amount of training it takes to drive an armored truck.
Full Story
Cheap... yep
Door gunner... yep
Down low so you can smell the enemy... yep.
Checks all BR71's boxes... the Aussie Army ought to buy 100 or so.
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is working to develop a "flying Humvee" that could be piloted by troops with about the same amount of training it takes to drive an armored truck.
Full Story
Cheap... yep
Door gunner... yep
Down low so you can smell the enemy... yep.
Checks all BR71's boxes... the Aussie Army ought to buy 100 or so.