RAAF/Army Relations - History

[chippymick]

The RAAF Historian failed to recognise that helicopter technology around 1960 was pretty rudimentary as demonstrated by the types being operated by British forces in Malaysia and US forces in Vietnam in the early 1960s. It would have been folly to venture into anything larger than the Iroquois at that time given the other re-equipment programs in train.[/font]

The RAAF historian was bang on the money
The RAAF made no effort to support the army in the way that the Army wanted and no attempt to rewrite history can change this fundamental fact.

Vietnam involvement for Australia was not on the horizon when the Iroquois were introduced to RAAF service and the US Army was similarly ill-equipped when Iroquois were first deployed to Vietnam.


Absolute tosh. The Army was operational in Vietnam before the first tranche of UH1B were delivered and by the time the last of the UH1B’s were delivered Captain Noel Delahunty had been awarded a Military Cross for performing the world’s first ‘Hot extraction’, by helicopter in April 1964

The USAAF had been operating Hueys in Vietnam since 1962 and DARPA lost their first Huey Gunship in January 1964

WO1 George Chinn who flew on the resupply to D company 6RAR in August 1966 had already been awarded a DCM for his part in a helicopter assault landing in Thua Thien two years earlier, back in April 1964.

That the RAAF were woefully unaware of these developments and the fact that they had to be dragged kicking and screaming to perform the resupply at Long Tan is a shocking indictment of the RAAF’s unwillingness to accept the manner in which the Army required to be supported. A manner in which the Army had been supported in Vietnam since 1962 by US Army, US Marine and RVN Air Force Helicopters. Since 1962.

The RAAF were required to provide a C-47 to support the AATTV commitment way back in 1962. The RAAF didn’t provide it because the RAAF had no interest in what was occurring in Vietnam. The Army instigated an exchange programme from FARELF to the US Forces in Vietnam in 1962. The RAAF could have done likewise but didn’t.

All this is going on before August 1964 when the RAAF Caribou’s arrived in theatre.

By the time that 9 squadron arrived in Vietnam in 1966 they had the gear but no idea. That they had no idea was the RAAF’s own fault


Not mentioned by W/C Sharp was that the Australian Army also had a significant learning curve when they first deployed to Vietnam in 1965 as part of US 173rd Airborne Brigade.

Absolutely true but 1RAR sorted out its operational issues with 173rd Abn in a matter of months not years. As your next anecdote suggests the RAAF had failed to address the Army’s support requirements in 1968 a good two years after the Australian task force commander threatened to send 9 squadron home in ignominy. The RAAF made no effort to support the army in the way that the Army wanted because the RAF made no effort to understand what the Army required or indeed where and how the RAAF might be required to serve.

Vung Tau received multiple rocket attacks because it was a worthwhile target whereas Nui Dat was principally just a concentration of sand-bagged tents and not really worth enemy effort, although that may have differed had an Iroquois squadron been co-located. (Image of 9SQN hangar facilities at Vung Tau airfield to be inserted

Rather than inserting a photo of the hangar facilities at Vung Tau, how about you provide some information on the number of airframes destroyed or damaged during these multiple rocket attacks. A breakdown of RAAF casualties killed and wounded in these terrible attacks on Vung Tau would be illuminating.

Here is an interesting statistic. 1 in 17 RAAF personnel serving in Vietnam was granted a British Award. “Never in the field of human conflict has so much fruit salad been granted to so few”

Remarkably, this fact does not institutionally embarrass the RAAF. The woeful RAAF response to the Task Force’s helicopter needs is unlikely to embarrass them either.

Mick

[Arm out the window]

Inflammatory words, Mick, but if you're really 46 as it says in your details, how would you know? What was your part in this, if any?

Bushranger 71, thanks for the detailed and first-hand info.

[chippymick]

Given the lack of RAAF vision WRT Vietnam any RAAF revisionism should be stomped to death at birth.

The RAAF helos were utterly unprepared for Vietnam and the RAAF have no excuse for it. None.

History matters.

Cheers

Mick

[ozbiggles]

Mick up to your emotional rant this had been a tough but fair discussion. Your rant had few (if any) facts attached.
If your allowing what you perceive to be some wrong doing by a few to attack an entire organisation then well good luck too you.
Members of all 3 services have fought for each other and in some cases died for each other. Not too many raafies would say they ever had it tougher than the grunt on the ground.
I'm sorry you feel that way about the Raaf. But without having some strong facts to back up my argument, I would NEVER talk about a whole arm of the defence force as you have. Its called respect I believe.
PS - A quick web search revealed an US Caribou (C-7) was destroyed by a mortar attack at Vung tau. There where probably other attacks there too, sorry to disappoint you. The RAAF Bou that was destroyed in action was at another base by a mortar attack as it was taxing. You would probably suggest they were running away?

[chippymick]

Check your facts.

Caribou destroyed by mortar fire at Vung Tau.

Don't make me laugh cobber.

The facts I've attached are the names the dates and the locations. The stuff that historians rely upon. Kindly do the same.

While you're at it, look at the Caribou loss at A-Ro, tell me who established that particular SF camp and why it is germane to this conversation.

It is no emotional rant. It is cold hard calculus.

RAAF KIA Vietnam = 17 (Mostly 9 Sqn.)

RAAF DFC's Vietnam = 60 (Mostly not to 9 Sqn.)

Do the math, be embarrassed.

The RAAF were never good at helicopters, never had an interest in Vietnam but particularly excelled at being home for tea and medals. This is an undisputable fact.

What you want to with the facts is your business, but make sure they are facts first OK?

Regards

Mick



RAAF

[MTOW]

Sounds like you've been listening rapt to a few too many grizzled old soldiers with an axe to grind on Friday afternoons in the mess, mick.

Bushranger71, (some of us know him as BD), did three tours - that's three years - in SVN. But I see now that he, along with everyone else who wore a blue cap up there, was swanning around in five star hotels (lots of them in Vung Tau at the time) and working strictly Monday to Friday and office hours only.

Give me a break. You give your age as 46 in your profile. Are you sure you didn't mis-key? Maybe you meant 16?

Only someone of that age is so sure he's right and everyone else is wrong.

[eagle 86]

CM,
In May '68 I saw with my own eyes a Yank Caribou that wore a 122 mm rocket round right in the middle of the fuselage where the wings join - it was generally reduced to scrap. The wreck lay 100 yards from the front door of Nine's hangar.
GAGS
E86

[chippymick]

Oh well, it's for him to say.

Specifically he needs to address why the lessons learnt in combat by every other UH1B operator from 1962 onwards were not applied by the RAAF by 1966. Up to and including the work done by DARPA on gunships, armoured seats, etc.

That's four good years for the RAAF to think about it.

He might have a good answer.

I may not know everything, but I have a good temporal sense and I am patient.

Regards

Mick

[chippymick]

Good yarn but......

I'm sure that old mate will get back to me about the numbers of airframes and airman lost in the famous battle of Vung Tau.

History matters, lets not turn it into a giggle.

Regards

Mick

[eagle 86]

CM
The only person turning this into a giggle is you old mate.
GAGS
E86

[Bushranger 71]

Part 3 Comments On Posts #1,#2,#3

By the mid-1970s, the RAAF’s fleet of helicopters had grown to two and a half squadrons of UH-1 Iroquois and a squadron of 12 Boeing CH-47 Chinooks, all designated primarily in Army support roles. However, although helicopters formed a significant force within the RAAF, expertise in helicopter operations tended to become diluted in the RAAF’s broader command structure, with no centralised agency to coordinate the operation of helicopters or develop operational doctrine.

After Vietnam involvement ended, I was posted to the Transport Ops cell at Headquarters Operational Command to provide helicopter expertise. I persuaded my boss and the AOC that helicopters should be hived off into a separate role cell which they agreed, so I got it established for a Wing Commander and a Squadron Leader and became the inaugural HOPS, picking up higher duty allowance. There was then centralised management of helo operations in Australia with regard to Army tasking and capabilities upgrade initiatives ultimately flowed including night vision goggle trials, fighter versus helicopter tactics development (my kids designed the Iroquois camouflage scheme) and progressive upgrading of field deployment capabilities as equipments came available.

Contrary to popular belief, it was the RAAF who drove jointery via Air Support Unit at Williamtown where I served preceding posting to helicopters. The Air Force also conducted Army parachutist and instructor training at Parachute Training Flight and operated Air Movements Training & Development Unit at Richmond. Navy and RAAF also jointly staffed the Australian Joint Anti-Submarine School. All of the small tri-service staff at ASU ultimately served in joint roles in Vietnam.

Work to develop draft Australian joint and combined service doctrine was in train at ASU well before Vietnam involvement but has taken some years since to mature. The Army's attitude to jointery at that time seemed to be: 'Its okay, as long as we are in command', which of course would not be appropriate in all military scenarios. Some of them then thought helicopters in particular should be tied up outside tents, like horses!

Post exercise reports criticised the bureaucratic processes for arranging air support and the remoteness of air headquarters...Too often in the past, the Air Force has been reluctant to grant the level of command the operational situation and the commander’s directives required.

In my experience concerning exercises, the command and control arrangements for RAAF elements involved were figured by the HQOC Joint Warfare Group in accord with joint doctrine and invariably involved assignment of operational control to the Joint Force Commander. As for requesting forms of air support from elements not deployed into exercise environs, the usual bidding/tasking processes applied which have functioned well for decades. The vast air resources that were made available to 1ATF in Vietnam - beyond 9SQN under opcon - were requested via the small ASOC embedded with the ATOC in the 1ATF CP. There were multiple other headquarters commanding these resources, some of them thousands of miles distant, like for B-52s.

Army officers often cite instances where, at the end of a day’s training in the field, RAAF pilots would fly to a motel for the night rather than stay in an Army tent. RAAF claims that such accommodation was necessary to provide ‘mandatory aircrew rest conditions’ were undermined when pilots regularly appeared the next morning suffering the effects of a heavy night out. Moreover, the RAAF’s tendency to support its own requirements (rations, transport, accommodation etc) during deployments may also have antagonised Army opinion and created an impression that RAAF ‘didn’t know how to operate in the field’.

Before creation of a thinly-veiled unified ADF, the Army had multiple smallish units scattered all around the Sydney region in particular. The HQOC HOPS cell worked hand-in-glove with co-located HQ 1 GL Group which was the agency controlling utilisation of helicopter flying hours allocated for Army support and they decided which units would get support. The when bit was decided jointly to make cost-effective use of helo resources which had to be deployed to support Army units all around the nation, in the neighbouring archipelago and sometimes NZ.

When RAAF helos were assigned to support a particular unit, part of the tasking process involved HQ 1GL Group determining whether that unit could accommodate and feed the Air Force elements. Except for larger Army units and formations, the answer was mostly negative. Living accommodation was often limited and the Army rationing system was quite inflexible being rigidly based on numbers on unit strength. Where accommodation and catering was available at larger units/formations, it was generally availed.

Army did not then have the catering flexibility of Air Force and Navy with lesser staffing for that purpose and this also became a problem in some scenarios as feeding for flying elements often had to be at random hours to get the job done, so it was usually simpler to provide a degree of own rationing. As mentioned earlier, Air Force helo elements began enhancing field deployment capabilities post-Vietnam.

As the Service responsible for operating and supporting the aircraft, the RAAF set down most of the detailed specifications for the aircraft, specifying a much higher level of sophistication for the helicopters than the UH-60A Blackhawk then in service with the US Army. However, there were significant shortcomings in the acquisition process, notably in the ordering of spares and the estimation of support costs.

The Air Force wisely saw need for enhancement of some early Blackhawk capabilities which has proven to be necessary over time. The project officer (a close friend) sought very comprehensive spares provisioning but this was denied. If spares have been a problem since AAvn takeover of the helicopters in 1989, then why was this situation not rectified by Army funding; they were/are Blackhawk operators? I guess it reflects the apparent ADF/Defence policy of not progressively enhancing hardware in service to maintain continuous adequate and credible military preparedness!

Among its wide-ranging conclusions, Dibb’s report included the following recommendation: Combat efficiency may be enhanced if ground force tactical helicopters and their crews were operationally part of the Army. The review considers that its recommendation to enhance the helicopter lift capability for the Army provides a suitable opportunity to integrate the helicopter element into the Army structure.

Post #12 adequately explains the flawed helicopter transfer decision 'process' from a CAS perspective. A key question is how did such an unsupported recommendation by Dibb emerge?

I made this relevant statement in post #16: 'When visiting Amberley early 1960s, I was astounded at the openly expressed bitterness of some AAvn personnel (who were being hosted on a RAAF base) at the Air Force having oversight responsibility for their activities - 16ALA Squadron was commanded by a RAAF officer at the time. That core of now retired malcontents have generated much of the anti-Air Force misinformation over the years.'

Australian Army Aviation has long been enamoured by US Army Aviation operating concepts and has directed criticism at the RAAF in this regard since the early 1960s. I believe there was protracted ambitious lobbying by former AAvn entities post-Vietnam toward ultimate helicopter transfer. Consider how Army aviator wings were hung on Army Chiefs of that time who were involved in the helo transfer decision!

However, at the very least, it was likely to have been severely prejudicial to creating an environment of harmonious working relations between the Services. Air Marshal Evans claims that the transfer created an atmosphere of dislike, distrust and disdain between the Services, while the RAAF Historian believes it traumatised some senior levels in the RAAF.

Mid-2004, then Brigadier Tony Fraser kindly invited all former members of 9SQN to attend a Burshranger Gunship Farewell event on (premature) decommissioning of that AAvn capability. Many former 9SQN members expressed intent to attend, until they became aware of some writings on the Fourays website (http://www.fourays.org) which generated outrage, so there was a much diminished Air Force attendance. The offending articles were this one by Wing Commander Martin Sharp, RAF; the Tactical Air Support Group by Owen Eather – Part 3 in particular and some of the content in 'Letters to Chickenhawk'. A consistent thread of anti-RAAF sledging has prevailed on that website for decades and it does no credit to Army Aviation or Army generally and, you have to wonder why the hierarchy have allowed it to endure. The sad part is there have been many valued long-standing friendships evolve between Air Force and Army aviators (Navy too) and they could very easily change uniforms; but the bile projected by the old heretical core of Army Aviation has largely fostered the acrimony highlighted by AM David Evans.

In the event, however, in 1989 the Defence department agreed to a RAAF proposal to discontinue operating Chinooks as an economy measure.

The CH-47C was a technical nightmare and the 11 remaining could not be cost-effectively maintained in sufficient numbers to be a viable force even with the high level of engineering expertise inherent in the RAAF of that time. Army decided the Blackhawk would suffice for logistic support but belatedly appreciated they still needed heavy lift helicopters. The CH-47D is more technically sound and the CH-47F will be better, but it is still a technically complex aircraft and 7 will not be sufficient to maintain an adequate force on line.

One of the problems for a relatively small aviation force like that of the Australian Army is that its aircrew operate in a narrow specialisation. Additionally, a small aviation force is less well placed to absorb fluctuations in the availability of suitably trained personnel. In a larger flying organisation such as the RAAF, aircrew are able to move between roles, which encourages the cross pollination of techniques and knowledge. From the RAAF’s perspective, the loss of helicopter pilots from its pool of aviators reduced some of its flexibility to re-role aircrew, a facility that proved useful during the Vietnam War when there was a rapid expansion in the helicopter fleet. In a force the size of the ADF, there would appear to be benefits in considering personnel with specialist skills, such as aircrew and aircraft technicians, as ADF assets, available for employment across the Services.

Transfer of all Air Force helo assets to Army Aviation (3 utility squadrons and a flying training component plus an MLH squadron) effectively gutted the surge capacity of the RAAF. A downstream consequence was the strike/fighter force suffered serious under-manning of pilots which was only offset because the RNZAF and RAN terminated their fixed-wing offensive air roles thus shedding pilots. The overall capability of the ADF and Australia's military capacity/credibility was substantially diminished by the helicopter transfer decision and 26 years of helicopter operating experience was forfeited including 5.5 years of invaluable combat experience for which there is no substitute.

The ADF is now somewhat an amorphous mass and the strong loyalties that once developed in the individual armed forces and were essential to esprit-de-corps have perhaps faded. Shuffling of aircrew and maintenance personnel among the 3 Services as W/C Sharp suggests is perhaps impracticable; but the question does now arise whether maintaining 3 air arms within a virtually unified small ADF is cost-effective?

In the harsh Australian conditions, Blackhawks suffered a significant number of technical problems, including airframe cracking and higher than expected component usage. This led to an inadequate inventory of spare parts, some of which required long-lead times for delivery, resulting in prolonged aircraft down times for maintenance.

AAvn became infatuated with so-called 'nap-of-the-earth' low level flying and kept stub wings and drop-tanks fitted to the Blackhawk against RAAF advice. That is what caused the airframe cracking and consequent diminished aircraft availability.

Blackhawk Tragedy. In June 1996 two Army Blackhawks collided during a night training exercise involving the SAS, resulting in the death of 18 soldiers. In addition to the immediate causes of the accident, a Board of Inquiry also identified a number of systemic and equipment issues as contributory factors. In a statement on the accident, the Minister for Defence chose to highlight a lack of flying experience among Blackhawk pilots as a ‘major contributory cause’, although this was identified as only one of 26 contributory causes by the Board.

The RAAF had developed very sound helo formation flying procedures and also conducted comprehensive trialling of night vision goggles, but the lessons learned in this regard were not absorbed by AAvn. CO 5SQN gave evidence to the Army Court of Inquiry, but it was not embraced in proceedings to my knowledge. More recent accidents/incidents also reflect lack of respect for the helicopter operating expertise developed by the Air Force.

That is enough from me re posts #1,#2,#3. I will plug a few images into my posts this thread which some might find interesting, including a beaut one of the USAF Caribou that got knocked over near the 9/35SQN hangar. Might be a day or 2 delay there while I arm wrestle with my computer.

Some have raised my background so just to summarise that for clarification. Flew mainly transport and fighter aircraft preceding Iroquois helicopters. An 11 month tour with 9SQN in Vietnam beginning toward the end of the Tet Offensive 1968 followed by 2 short tours in 1969 and 1971. 4,360 sorties, 211 SAS patrol insertions/extractions and involved in 50 enemy engagements. Bushranger gunship project officer. TFAC Rep at Nui Dat for 2 plus months. Served at RAAF Air Support Unit developing joint service doctrine. Established the Helicopter Operations Cell at RAAF HQOC. CO 9SQN 1976/77. Worked in Defair Canberra preceding early retirement late in 1978.

Just one response to post #21 by chippiemick.

Mate; I am across the history of early helicopter development and particularly the Iroquois. I meant to convey that 'Vietnam involvement for RAAF helicopters was not on the horizon when the Iroquois was introduced to RAAF service'. The Iroquois was as you say first introduced in Vietnam 1962 and my mention of around 1960 related to helicopter types that were operating preceding Iroquois introduction.

To all forum contributors. I baled out of visiting PPRuNe early 2009 because I felt it had become too adversarial and the value of worthwhile discussion was being clouded if not lost. A very good friend recently encouraged me to participate in the last couple of threads.

There is enough in posts on this thread alone to demonstrate how misinformation and sledging over decades has materially damaged the image of professional military units and an Air Force with a hugely comprehensive proud history in combat dating back to 1921. Please give that some thought.

[Like This - Do That]

Originally Posted by Bushranger 71

Transfer of all Air Force helo assets to Army Aviation (3 utility squadrons and a flying training component plus an MLH squadron) effectively gutted the surge capacity of the RAAF. A downstream consequence was the strike/fighter force suffered serious under-manning of pilots which was only offset because the RNZAF and RAN terminated their fixed-wing offensive air roles thus shedding pilots. The overall capability of the ADF and Australia's military capacity/credibility was substantially diminished by the helicopter transfer decision and 26 years of helicopter operating experience was forfeited including 5.5 years of invaluable combat experience for which there is no substitute.

The ADF is now somewhat an amorphous mass and the strong loyalties that once developed in the individual armed forces and were essential to esprit-de-corps have perhaps faded. Shuffling of aircrew and maintenance personnel among the 3 Services as W/C Sharp suggests is perhaps impracticable; but the question does now arise whether maintaining 3 air arms within a virtually unified small ADF is cost-effective?

Bushranger you may have hit the nail on the head with that last question; is there any reason why aircrew of any service shouldn't be trained to a standard and to a TMP that makes them eligible for any surge as / when needed? That's IF there is a surge capacity requirement.

More re your point about "surge capacity" .... I wonder if AAAvn 'owning' the ADF's RW lift aircrew makes them exempt from being redeployed according to Ronnie's needs & wants? Sounds a bit like a conspiracy theory

Perhaps accidently Army has found a way of always having those assets at Army's beck and call and not at Ronnie's? And before anyone says anything I'll qualify that - perhaps it should be "having those assets at Army's beck and call apart from mismanagement, cockups, unservicability, inappropriate TTPs, etc".

For what it's worth I believe in a purple future for the roles that would benefit. However I don't advocate the Canadian solution. So I ask again - are there any reasons why tasking can't now be done in a joint establishment and aircrews allocated across and from all 3 services, not just for this role but for others as well? Isn't there a potential benefit from having aircrew at 4 SQN (for example) who are RAAC ROBC with regimental experience pre-wings and COAC qualified? Having a Ronnie knuck flying ARH? In fact wouldn't it be beneficial for Army to open up slots on COAC for RAAF aircrew (or has that already been done)?

I'm not directly involved in this particular debate but I do feel the cold shoulder of petty inter-service squabbling from time to time. I could blame Ronnie or Pussers but it wouldn't get me very far - so what's the point?

[Bushranger 71]

Hi Like This - Do That, re your #32.

The Australian military (not ADF until 1974) was only able to get functional with helicopters in a very short timescale because they had surge capacity, especially the RAAF. Back then, there were enough units to justify 3 flying training schools so there were a lot of flying instructor qualified people and always a fair number of new pilots flowing into the system. I am reasonably in touch with serving senior rankers who say the RAAF is now always short of pilots and I hear similarly from Navy sources.

I do not like being a prophet of doom, but the world really is facing a tough decade at least which will inevitably impact on defence spending and it may not be too long before all 3 Australian Services might be asked: 'Which roles and units do you want to shed?' So, I foresee a shrinking ADF that might force a whole lot of new thinking in multiple respects, but I do not profess to have any answers.

[Bushranger 71]

Sure Megan; when I get some illustrative images inserted in previous posts.

[Arm out the window]

Like this - do that, one issue with cross-service pilot swapping is the differing training standards in use.

If everyone did a common course, it'd be easy, but as you're probably aware, Army pilots have trained differently to RAAF and RAN for a long time.
Seeing as there's been a bit of acrimony displayed already on the thread, may I point out that I'm not suggesting this makes anyone personally better than anyone else!

However, I think experience has shown that training everyone up to a wings standard that includes fast-ish TOT high-low nav etc. makes it possible to maintain that kind of surge capability we've been talking about, which has been used to good effect both ways in RAAF history (ie jet people to helicopters and vice versa). Many Army-trained pilots no doubt could perform just as well as RAAF / RAN ones, but they haven't been through the same mill and that makes it tricky when you look at slotting people into different roles.

Incidentally, this is why I don't really like the ideas mooted now and then about pre-wings streaming in RAAF pilots courses - I reckon we are too small an outfit to not maintain the flexibility provided by the system as it stands.

Anyway, that's a bit off track - perhaps chippymick can chip in with some comments.

[Neptunus Rex]

Arm Out of the Window

In summary, I think WGCDR Sharp has produced a paper containing some relevant points, but he's often off track and appears to have been working from pre-conceived ideas and hearsay rather than developing a clear picture from strong evidence.

Perhaps he did it to avoid being posted to Staff College on the staff!

[Super 64]

It does not matter what service they are from (Army or RAAF), it is the attitude that is displayed.

Yes RAAF aircrew back in the 9SQN days did a sterling job of supporting the troops on the ground, but that attitude, like greens and SLRs, is loooooong gone.

The current day Air Farce has been in the great peace for far too long and have forgotten why they even exist. TO SUPPORT THE TROOPS ON THE GROUND!!!

Ask any USAF C130 or HH60 pilot what their job is and there is no bulls**t about 'Air and Space Power'

Our RAAF people need to re-evaluate their 'vision' and appreciate that they are there to SUPPORT the troops, not only Mon to Fri, or on an ad-hoc or when it suits 'their training requirements' basis.

When the Air Farce ceases to put C130 pilots on JTAC courses, purely to make up the RAAF numbers, instead of giving up that spot to an Army person who will actually utilise the qualification in combat, maybe then their overall lack of warfighting culture can begin to change.

Like this, Do that: You must be kidding, RAAF on COAC!! It is for starters a Combat Officers course, RAAF being a support service does not qualify (maybe LOIC or LOAC is more appropriate). Secondly I have yet to see an RAAF officer (even the senior ones) who understand, little own how to employ the IMAP.

Although it is not entirely the current serving RAAF personnel's fault. It has been years in the making, the insidious nature of being at peace for too long. Soon they actually forget what it was like to fly in combat or even in a high threat theatre (AFG is not a genuinely high threat theatre for RAAF aircrew). It all becomes too easy to turn down the early morning flight because the couple in the adjacent hotel room were 'too loud' all last night. Instead of thinking if I don't make this flight the guys who have been doing the hard yards will miss out on 24 or 48 hours of their ROCL. Yes crew rest is important, but do the guys driving Bush Masters blacked out on goggles through a mine strewn country get 8 hours uninterrupted rest, not likely. Because they are at war and they know this.

Unfortunately the AAAvn was also setting down this dangerous path, they have now seen what it is to be involved in fighting up close, and how much their support is truly needed and appreciated by the guys on the ground.

I wait with baited breath to see how our shiny brand new Air Farce jets are employed in the near future, because if there was ever a perfect theatre for them to be employed, this is it.

Rant over!

S64

[Captain Sand Dune]

Yawn............
Mate, a VERY senior RAAF officer recently told me he would love to send a detatchment of Super Hornets to AFG. However as you know (don't you?) it is our political masters who decide what capability is deployed.

[Super 64]

CSD,

As you know, wanting to do the job and actually being able to do it, are two very different things.

I truly hope they do go, so the guys no longer have to rely on foreign CAS, and the RAAF can start to rebuild their long lost combat experience.

I apologise that you found my rant so boring, too close to the bone perhaps?

S64

[Like This - Do That]

It is for starters a Combat Officers course, RAAF being a support service does not qualify (maybe LOIC or LOAC is more appropriate). Secondly I have yet to see an RAAF officer (even the senior ones) who understand, little own how to employ the IMAP.

I would include the effects of close air support to fit into a BOS .... and it ain't the CSS BOS. But you've (inadvertently perhaps) made the point I want to make as well: is it time that for any given effect - no matter who supplies the effect - the provider gets the same or equivalent training.

Why not? We do it for JTACs, 9mm SLP users, PMV drivers, RAAF & RAN aircrew (to 'wings' standard) - so why not?

So why not send some Ronnie knuckleheads on a COAC? Why not start training AAAvn aircrew to wings at 2 FTS? OK OK OK money's involved, it has to come out of someone's budget, but what other VALID reasons would there be? Smal defence force - I would argue that the more of this we do the better.