Aussie MRH-90
Thread Starter
While the MRH90 will eventually have a hook that works, the MH60R will never be a suitable utility aircraft. Another example of schedule and risk being more important than actual capability required.
The MH-60R is a ASW plus surface warfare specialist combat asset the MH-60S is the utility helo.
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We're getting two types. The MH-60R and MRH90...
And yes, as a compromise, the 'S' fitted with removable, modular ASW kit would probably be the better choice for the RAN with its very limited size (and budget), but I understand it has a few shortcomings like its tailwheel being a little long for the restricted decks of some of our ships.
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Bluengreen wrote
"This aircraft was procured with a good external load capability (we thought) - up to 4000Kg on a very smart hook that would measure the load and use this weight to recalculate your performance. Like most helicopters, it is actually incapable of lifting this ultimate weight. All Up Mass - Basic Mass is less than 4000 ! Anyway, as it turns out the hook is a bit too smart - the articulations in roll and pitch (via axles / beams) mean that no only is the hook incompatible with the RAN standard load lifting equipment, it is also moving too much for the airframe strength. Back to the drawing board NHI !"
To me this seems to parallel the tendency to design overly complex solutions to a requirement. Sounds very seductive, but complex, more to maintain, more to go wrong, and hard to get to work, more expensive in the final configuration, and in the end not really necessary.
Maybe I'm using hindsight too judgementally.
"This aircraft was procured with a good external load capability (we thought) - up to 4000Kg on a very smart hook that would measure the load and use this weight to recalculate your performance. Like most helicopters, it is actually incapable of lifting this ultimate weight. All Up Mass - Basic Mass is less than 4000 ! Anyway, as it turns out the hook is a bit too smart - the articulations in roll and pitch (via axles / beams) mean that no only is the hook incompatible with the RAN standard load lifting equipment, it is also moving too much for the airframe strength. Back to the drawing board NHI !"
To me this seems to parallel the tendency to design overly complex solutions to a requirement. Sounds very seductive, but complex, more to maintain, more to go wrong, and hard to get to work, more expensive in the final configuration, and in the end not really necessary.
Maybe I'm using hindsight too judgementally.
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Versatile helo concepts are essential for the small ADF
Some good discussion here and elsewhere on another PPRuNe thread re the MH-60R & S. Perhaps worth reviewing a bit of history re the Australian military helo fleet without digressing too much from the MRH90 theme.
Post-Vietnam, joint Army/RAAF planning determined there would be 3 utility helo squadrons, 1 MLH unit and some Hueycobras (11). Air Force aviators on the Air Board pushed for the very versatile CH-53, but 2 AVMs (an Engineer and EquipO) sided with Army who wanted the CH-47C. A bad mistake as it turned out and had the big Sikorsky been acquired, we might have then progressed to long range search and rescue and submarine support capabilities with C-130 flight refuelling. Army had also pushed for the Hueycobra; but when budgetary pressures emerged downstream, the Air Force rightly decided that the well-proven versatile Iroquois Bushranger concept was adequate for intimate close air support.
Navy subsequently removed the ASW kit from Sea Kings to make them more employable in utility roles; but that of course created a deficiency in dipping sonar capability not fitted to Seahawk, despite proven modular systems being in service elsewhere.
Unquestionably, the Howard/Rudd Force 2030 vision cemented in DWP2009 would never have been affordable and Australia is now facing a decade or so of austerity in defence due foreseeable shrinking government revenue. As General Peter Leahy (whom I respect) indicated yesterday, there is no point in trying to progress the Force 2030 structure – as intended by MinDef Smith for DWP2013 – if there will not be adequate funding available. So; all acquisition planning ought to be frozen pending a comprehensive review of what might be economically achievable.
Because helicopters are inherently versatile and flexible platforms, there is obviously scope for reshaping the ADF HSMP more on versatile concepts than airframes too specialised, like Tiger and MH-60R. Just how much the force structure could be untangled would require open-minded address including what types might be put in storage, if appropriate.
As outlined on the MH-60R thread, there will be differing helo restraint systems on some RAN warships and compatibility of some aircraft types may be an issue, also with hangars. The MRH90 in particular does not seem suited for smallish warship operations including boarding party functions, replenishment, etcetera. The Navy would have been better off acquiring some MH-60S (instead of MH-60R) and upgrading the existing Seahawk fleet as far as practicable toward Sierra standard. That would have enabled wide-ranging flexibility for fitment of modular weapons systems as required and retained capability for essential utility roles at sea.
Post-Vietnam, joint Army/RAAF planning determined there would be 3 utility helo squadrons, 1 MLH unit and some Hueycobras (11). Air Force aviators on the Air Board pushed for the very versatile CH-53, but 2 AVMs (an Engineer and EquipO) sided with Army who wanted the CH-47C. A bad mistake as it turned out and had the big Sikorsky been acquired, we might have then progressed to long range search and rescue and submarine support capabilities with C-130 flight refuelling. Army had also pushed for the Hueycobra; but when budgetary pressures emerged downstream, the Air Force rightly decided that the well-proven versatile Iroquois Bushranger concept was adequate for intimate close air support.
Navy subsequently removed the ASW kit from Sea Kings to make them more employable in utility roles; but that of course created a deficiency in dipping sonar capability not fitted to Seahawk, despite proven modular systems being in service elsewhere.
Unquestionably, the Howard/Rudd Force 2030 vision cemented in DWP2009 would never have been affordable and Australia is now facing a decade or so of austerity in defence due foreseeable shrinking government revenue. As General Peter Leahy (whom I respect) indicated yesterday, there is no point in trying to progress the Force 2030 structure – as intended by MinDef Smith for DWP2013 – if there will not be adequate funding available. So; all acquisition planning ought to be frozen pending a comprehensive review of what might be economically achievable.
Because helicopters are inherently versatile and flexible platforms, there is obviously scope for reshaping the ADF HSMP more on versatile concepts than airframes too specialised, like Tiger and MH-60R. Just how much the force structure could be untangled would require open-minded address including what types might be put in storage, if appropriate.
As outlined on the MH-60R thread, there will be differing helo restraint systems on some RAN warships and compatibility of some aircraft types may be an issue, also with hangars. The MRH90 in particular does not seem suited for smallish warship operations including boarding party functions, replenishment, etcetera. The Navy would have been better off acquiring some MH-60S (instead of MH-60R) and upgrading the existing Seahawk fleet as far as practicable toward Sierra standard. That would have enabled wide-ranging flexibility for fitment of modular weapons systems as required and retained capability for essential utility roles at sea.
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Refurbished S-70B-2s?
"Now that the Romeo is coming another option would be to strip out the existing S-70B's a la Sea Kings and use them as "hacks"..."
The major schedule driver for replacement of the S-70B-2 under Project Air 9000 Phase 8 was the obsolescence of the CORE avionics systems - much of the heart of the S-70B-2 is unsustainable today, let alone in a couple of years time. A major upgrade would be required, and this is not cost effective.
Project Air 9000 was intended to rationalise the helicopter types operated by the ADF. The ADF fleet was to be based, where possible, on a single type (or family). CH47 and the basic trainer were "outriders", as arguably is the attack helicopter, but all utility and ASW aircraft were to be the same type. In practical terms today this really means a Hawk-based solution or a NH90-based solution. This was the competition.
For good or not, a decision was made to go MRH90 over Blackhawk for Air 9000 Phase 2 (Additional Trooplift Helicopters), and this was extended to Phase 4 and 6 (Blackhawk and Sea King replacement), in line with the Air 9000 concept. Where it has now gone pear-shaped is in selecting a Hawk-based aircraft for Phase 8 - an aircraft which is undoubtedly a great ASW aircraft but has ZERO utility capability - the capability which the RAN requires EVERY DAY. This decision was made based purely on a ZERO appetite for risk and a belief that the Romeo will come n on schedule (not an unreasonable belief).
The NH90 (NATO Frigate Helicopter version) offered a very good ASW platform whilst retaining a superior utility capability. It was more expensive per unit, somewhat more risky wrt schedule, but would have given the RAN the capability it needs (ASW and Utility) and maintained the commonality of type with NH90 (Tactical Trooplift Helicopter version) aka MRH90.
With the Romeo the RAN has compromised capability in order to avoid any more "embarrassing" schedule blowouts on a helicopter project - if I was the Navy dude in DMO making these calls, and I had been burnt by Seasprite, I would understand this position.
The major schedule driver for replacement of the S-70B-2 under Project Air 9000 Phase 8 was the obsolescence of the CORE avionics systems - much of the heart of the S-70B-2 is unsustainable today, let alone in a couple of years time. A major upgrade would be required, and this is not cost effective.
Project Air 9000 was intended to rationalise the helicopter types operated by the ADF. The ADF fleet was to be based, where possible, on a single type (or family). CH47 and the basic trainer were "outriders", as arguably is the attack helicopter, but all utility and ASW aircraft were to be the same type. In practical terms today this really means a Hawk-based solution or a NH90-based solution. This was the competition.
For good or not, a decision was made to go MRH90 over Blackhawk for Air 9000 Phase 2 (Additional Trooplift Helicopters), and this was extended to Phase 4 and 6 (Blackhawk and Sea King replacement), in line with the Air 9000 concept. Where it has now gone pear-shaped is in selecting a Hawk-based aircraft for Phase 8 - an aircraft which is undoubtedly a great ASW aircraft but has ZERO utility capability - the capability which the RAN requires EVERY DAY. This decision was made based purely on a ZERO appetite for risk and a belief that the Romeo will come n on schedule (not an unreasonable belief).
The NH90 (NATO Frigate Helicopter version) offered a very good ASW platform whilst retaining a superior utility capability. It was more expensive per unit, somewhat more risky wrt schedule, but would have given the RAN the capability it needs (ASW and Utility) and maintained the commonality of type with NH90 (Tactical Trooplift Helicopter version) aka MRH90.
With the Romeo the RAN has compromised capability in order to avoid any more "embarrassing" schedule blowouts on a helicopter project - if I was the Navy dude in DMO making these calls, and I had been burnt by Seasprite, I would understand this position.
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Romeo vs Sierra
The Sierra tailwheel (similar to Blackhawk) is problematic for operations from frigate size vessels - it will limit the ship motion envelope that can be accepted. The USN operates these aircraft from larger (i.e. more stable) ships.
Modular ASW systems sound good in theory, but they are always a compromise, and they never just "slip in and slip out" - plugs break, mounting feet get burred etc. Ask anyone who worked with the RAN S-70B-2s about pulling ASW gear in and out - not always a simple task.
What is needed is an aircraft which can do both ASW and utility.....wouldn't that be a great thing.......
Modular ASW systems sound good in theory, but they are always a compromise, and they never just "slip in and slip out" - plugs break, mounting feet get burred etc. Ask anyone who worked with the RAN S-70B-2s about pulling ASW gear in and out - not always a simple task.
What is needed is an aircraft which can do both ASW and utility.....wouldn't that be a great thing.......
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What is needed is an aircraft which can do both ASW and utility.....wouldn't that be a great thing.......
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Modular aircraft systems
Hi BluenGreen.
The RAN was removing/reinstalling gear in Sea Kings and Seahawks that was designed to remain permanently installed.
A huge range of modular systems is available worldwide for adaptation to many platforms. Consider the UH-60L DAP for example.
When we reconfigured the XM-21 weapon system for adaptation to Iroquois UH-1H airframes as required, it took us some months of searching in the US to find suitable cannon plugs, but we eventually acquired them.
The small ADF sure does need more versatility in its platforms and that only takes some outside the square thinking.
The RAN was removing/reinstalling gear in Sea Kings and Seahawks that was designed to remain permanently installed.
A huge range of modular systems is available worldwide for adaptation to many platforms. Consider the UH-60L DAP for example.
When we reconfigured the XM-21 weapon system for adaptation to Iroquois UH-1H airframes as required, it took us some months of searching in the US to find suitable cannon plugs, but we eventually acquired them.
The small ADF sure does need more versatility in its platforms and that only takes some outside the square thinking.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 10th Aug 2012 at 00:18.
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MRH90 and Ships
The MRH90 fits into the hangars on the ANZACs, albeit encroaching on the margins around the aircraft (the S-70B-2 also encroached margins on the FFGs, but nobody worried about that for 20 odd years and it didn't prove to be an issue). Against much opposition a trial was conducted, the results were (unfortunately for many detractors) successful, and kept fairly quiet. Not quite sure of the Air Warfare Destroyers, but it may well fit there also. Won't fit in the FFGs.
Merlins are much, much bigger.
Merlins are much, much bigger.