New military aviation 'body' to set up.
Rigga, your reasonable informed response is in sharp contrast to my hot headed tirade at Colonel Cluster. I hope he will at least take into consideration that my ernest wish, as with us all, is to see UK military airworthiness working again. We should always bear in mind that the reason that it isn't working now is because of deliberate policy initiatives taken at the highest command levels over several decades and that many aircrew have died in accidents involving unairworthy aircraft in that time. I suspect that H-C was prevailed upon to arrive at the "Independent but within the MOD" model for the new MAA. What it does and where it goes is thus subject to the SoS for Defence. He, as with his predecessors, has seen fit to stand firm over the greatest airworthiness scandal of them all, the Chinook HC2 RTS leading to the Mull tragedy that cost 29 lives. Those responsible for that scandal are yet to be brought to account. By starting with a clean sweep of the Military Airworthiness Regulations the MAA will imply, if not openly state, that the old ones were wanting and thus allowed for previous unairworthiness. That would be a lie heaped upon all the other lies that lay scattered around this unseemly saga. Of course the Regs need updating, probably extensively. They always were, for it was ever a process of evolution. What it was not was one of revolution, and if that is to happen I for one will draw my own conclusions.
Chug,
To bring in a new set of regulations to anywhere that has had traditional ways of working for many tens of years is a revolution.
To introduce these new regs into the Mindset of the MOD/RAF is going to take years of dogged education, indoctrination and persuasion to get people to first recognise what is written in front of them instead of what they want to read. Only then will they realise what they should be doing, and start doing it.
Luckily, some members of the RAF are williing to change, and learn new methods. I wonder how many will change their ways moving into the MAA?
I just hope that the temptation to do a gradual change is recognised as a folly. I wonder if the new regs will go ALL the way?
Time will tell, one way or the other.
To bring in a new set of regulations to anywhere that has had traditional ways of working for many tens of years is a revolution.
To introduce these new regs into the Mindset of the MOD/RAF is going to take years of dogged education, indoctrination and persuasion to get people to first recognise what is written in front of them instead of what they want to read. Only then will they realise what they should be doing, and start doing it.
Luckily, some members of the RAF are williing to change, and learn new methods. I wonder how many will change their ways moving into the MAA?
I just hope that the temptation to do a gradual change is recognised as a folly. I wonder if the new regs will go ALL the way?
Time will tell, one way or the other.
I think we need to cut to the quick here. Aviation does not tolerate a dependence on unjustified optimism or wishful thinking. Try it and you will be lucky not to die. Yet here we have the declared plan of not just the RAF but of all UK Military Aviation, in answer to the admitted failure of airworthiness provision, as the adoption of brand new regulations by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority. This after the scandal of the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the Ministry of Defence) having a policy of not enforcing its own regulations over more than twenty years. In that time there have been the following accidents to aircraft that were unairworthy and/or unfit for purpose:
Chinook Mk2 Mull of Kintyre 29 killed
Hercules Iraq 10 killed
Nimrod Afghanistan 14 killed
To that total of 53 deaths could be added the 7 from 2 Sea Kings and 2 from a Tornado that also had airworthiness deficiencies, and likely others as well. Now those aircraft were not unairworthy because of poor regulations. They were unairworthy because the regulations were not enforced by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the MOD) as a matter of policy. Putting aside the fact that such policy would be a criminal act in itself, what possible confidence can one place in the MAA's proposal to resolve this scandal by adopting new regulations when the real problem is that it remains part of that same MOD? The reason that the CAA is independent of the airlines is so that it can do its job objectively, ie to enforce the UK Civil Airworthiness Regulations. The reason that the AAIB is independent of both is so that it can do its job, ie to investigate aircraft accidents. In Military Aviation all three, AOC holder, authority and investigator are one and the same, ie the MOD. When push comes to shove they will fail again, as they did before. We need a revolution I agree, though not in the regulations but in how they are enforced, which must be seperate and independent of the MOD. The MAA is and never will be that while it is part of the MOD no matter how much that is denied. It is a turkey as presently proposed. The same comments apply to the MAAIB, which may well have to criticise the MAA (as the Chinook BoI should have done of the UK Military Aviation Authority (aka the MOD) releasing the HC2 into military service) and yet is to be part of the MAA. In short the Emperor appears to be grossly improperly dressed!
Chinook Mk2 Mull of Kintyre 29 killed
Hercules Iraq 10 killed
Nimrod Afghanistan 14 killed
To that total of 53 deaths could be added the 7 from 2 Sea Kings and 2 from a Tornado that also had airworthiness deficiencies, and likely others as well. Now those aircraft were not unairworthy because of poor regulations. They were unairworthy because the regulations were not enforced by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the MOD) as a matter of policy. Putting aside the fact that such policy would be a criminal act in itself, what possible confidence can one place in the MAA's proposal to resolve this scandal by adopting new regulations when the real problem is that it remains part of that same MOD? The reason that the CAA is independent of the airlines is so that it can do its job objectively, ie to enforce the UK Civil Airworthiness Regulations. The reason that the AAIB is independent of both is so that it can do its job, ie to investigate aircraft accidents. In Military Aviation all three, AOC holder, authority and investigator are one and the same, ie the MOD. When push comes to shove they will fail again, as they did before. We need a revolution I agree, though not in the regulations but in how they are enforced, which must be seperate and independent of the MOD. The MAA is and never will be that while it is part of the MOD no matter how much that is denied. It is a turkey as presently proposed. The same comments apply to the MAAIB, which may well have to criticise the MAA (as the Chinook BoI should have done of the UK Military Aviation Authority (aka the MOD) releasing the HC2 into military service) and yet is to be part of the MAA. In short the Emperor appears to be grossly improperly dressed!
Well said Chug.
My take on what is happening is that much hand wringing is going on worrying about re-writing the regulations but MoD may be losing sight of one simple fact – if the existing regulations had been followed the accidents you mentioned, demonstrably, would not have happened. It is a reasonable conclusion, therefore, that these regulations, while somewhat dated and perhaps a little cumbersome and hence costly to implement, are nonetheless robust. (But there is even a Def Stan which tells you how to minimise that effect while still maintaining airworthiness).
So, if they are to be tweaked, fine. I mentioned above that this need had been recognised many years ago (about 1993, certainly no later) but fell foul of the “waste of money” crowd – the non-technical beancounters who have the authority to over-rule engineering requirements and decisions (one of the first things an MAA must address). Even there, the regulations are crystal clear. “Engineering judgement” is paramount. Pity CDP announced in 1996 he didn’t need engineers.
But I think MoD has lost the plot. There are aircraft whose airworthiness must still be maintained. The lowest grade at which one can be granted airworthiness delegation has been raised, as least 2 grades, possibly 3. Many of those (relatively) senior staffs who now find themselves at the bottom of the airworthiness ladder instead of half way up have no experience whatsoever; in fact, many of that grade/rank are not engineers and so cannot be granted delegation. That doesn’t leave very many MoD staff to do the job and I suspect the “system” is frozen, awaiting guidance. Even fewer of that small band will have the slightest clue where to start. With a few exceptions, anyone recruited after about 1990 certainly won’t, because they will have spent their entire career being told “don’t bother doing that, waste of money”. Or DGAS2 & CDP’s 1998 classic (them again) – Functional safety can be ignored. God, I wish the resultant BoIs had been given this evidence; at least Nimrod and C130 would have been prevented. Proof, if any is needed, that rank doesn’t necessarily bring experience, competence, the ability to make a good decision or the balls to stand up and be counted.
My take on what is happening is that much hand wringing is going on worrying about re-writing the regulations but MoD may be losing sight of one simple fact – if the existing regulations had been followed the accidents you mentioned, demonstrably, would not have happened. It is a reasonable conclusion, therefore, that these regulations, while somewhat dated and perhaps a little cumbersome and hence costly to implement, are nonetheless robust. (But there is even a Def Stan which tells you how to minimise that effect while still maintaining airworthiness).
So, if they are to be tweaked, fine. I mentioned above that this need had been recognised many years ago (about 1993, certainly no later) but fell foul of the “waste of money” crowd – the non-technical beancounters who have the authority to over-rule engineering requirements and decisions (one of the first things an MAA must address). Even there, the regulations are crystal clear. “Engineering judgement” is paramount. Pity CDP announced in 1996 he didn’t need engineers.
But I think MoD has lost the plot. There are aircraft whose airworthiness must still be maintained. The lowest grade at which one can be granted airworthiness delegation has been raised, as least 2 grades, possibly 3. Many of those (relatively) senior staffs who now find themselves at the bottom of the airworthiness ladder instead of half way up have no experience whatsoever; in fact, many of that grade/rank are not engineers and so cannot be granted delegation. That doesn’t leave very many MoD staff to do the job and I suspect the “system” is frozen, awaiting guidance. Even fewer of that small band will have the slightest clue where to start. With a few exceptions, anyone recruited after about 1990 certainly won’t, because they will have spent their entire career being told “don’t bother doing that, waste of money”. Or DGAS2 & CDP’s 1998 classic (them again) – Functional safety can be ignored. God, I wish the resultant BoIs had been given this evidence; at least Nimrod and C130 would have been prevented. Proof, if any is needed, that rank doesn’t necessarily bring experience, competence, the ability to make a good decision or the balls to stand up and be counted.
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As an aside to this in reference to the MoD/Contractor thing, several years ago i was working on the ASTOR project during my 1 1/2 years there 8 QA engineers were sacked (me included) all the sackings that I know of was because the said QA guy's brought safety issues to the table, the last guy that I know of that was sacked(GF) was about to publish an audit report stating that at that time Waddington was not in a fit state(Maintenance awarness) to accept the A/C when he notified the then QA manager of his findings and intentions it was subsequently discovered that he had some 'adult' pics on his computer this was also the way of getting rid of another 3 engineers (and I was also one of those).
Also 2 guy's sacked(DM & PC) for bringing a huge safety issue to management table in that there was an A/C being refuelled in the hangar with doors closed no fire cover no spill trays and the other 3 A/C also in there (the other was in greenville) subsequently when HSE became involved also Airbus(who owned the hangar) the 2 engineers were cleared of anything wrong and the tribunal subsequently queried why they were not there to give evidence on being advised why AB were none to pleased.
Also 2 guy's sacked(DM & PC) for bringing a huge safety issue to management table in that there was an A/C being refuelled in the hangar with doors closed no fire cover no spill trays and the other 3 A/C also in there (the other was in greenville) subsequently when HSE became involved also Airbus(who owned the hangar) the 2 engineers were cleared of anything wrong and the tribunal subsequently queried why they were not there to give evidence on being advised why AB were none to pleased.
matkat:
It's not an aside at all matkat, but central to how a once proud Flight Safety system has been brought to its knees. I suspect that your story is typical of the experiences of many hundreds, maybe thousands of others. Whether they were directly persecuted for trying to act professionally or simply learned the lesson from such experiences of others, the net result was what was intended: that people stopped enforcing safety but gave lip service to it being complied with, or simply left out of despair and disgust. What was not foreseen by those who presided over this scandal is that forums like this would testify to such actions. What was also not foreseen was that an 800 year old institution, Her Majesty's Coroners, would give the lie to the MOD's assurances that its aircraft were airworthy and safe. The cat is out of the bag now. There is evidence available for this scandal to be properly investigated, whether it be within the military family or without. Time then that it was, for until the Armed Forces face up to it, no amount of sign-writing or new organisational charts will make it go away.
As an aside to this in reference to the MoD/Contractor thing...
matkat
You describe perfectly the situation in London (92-96) and AbbeyWood (96-date).
Raising such issues is a disciplinary offence. The current Min(AF), Bill Rammell (Lab. Majority 99) confirmed he is content with this as recently as January this year.
A good QAR is worth his weight in gold.
You describe perfectly the situation in London (92-96) and AbbeyWood (96-date).
Raising such issues is a disciplinary offence. The current Min(AF), Bill Rammell (Lab. Majority 99) confirmed he is content with this as recently as January this year.
A good QAR is worth his weight in gold.
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Gentlemen, thank you both for your kind and encouraging words, I can not really add to what I have already written only to say that I think that my collegues and myself tried to do our utmost to uphold safety and airworthiness values and paid the price for it, I know that one of the people that I have gave initials for has read what I put down and concurs, I will try and get him to put this in writting here, also if I was ever approached in regards to my allegations I would be more than willing to back them up as i know that several of the aforementioned people would. The use of 'adult' pictures to discredit some of the fired personnel was something that became ridiculous as they were always found after an issue was discovered. Just as you know none of us had any recourse here as we were all contractors at Raytheon and the reason for dismissal was always that the affected person was surplus to requirements.
I have no problem in writting this because I know that the Airbus report would still be available and with the 2 subsequently dismissed engineers names on it vindicating their actions along with airbus concern over their immediate dismissals.
After the terminations several of the people(not me) discovered that they had had their SC clearance revoked due to this and found it extremly difficult to have new ones due to comments made by the sponsor.
Rigga, FYI it was Myself and one other that was involved in writting both the MAOS and the first Mil part 145.
I have no problem in writting this because I know that the Airbus report would still be available and with the 2 subsequently dismissed engineers names on it vindicating their actions along with airbus concern over their immediate dismissals.
After the terminations several of the people(not me) discovered that they had had their SC clearance revoked due to this and found it extremly difficult to have new ones due to comments made by the sponsor.
Rigga, FYI it was Myself and one other that was involved in writting both the MAOS and the first Mil part 145.
"QAR"? - I'm not familiar with that one.
Matkat,
Nice to contact someone who wrote the MAOS regs. I haven't seen the first ones so I don't know what that was like. From what you write I assume you didn't write 145 issue 2?
Whilst I can see they were written based on assumptions that other regs from "the Set" would follow (Mil Part 66 - still not issued), there are some large gaps in MAOS compared to EASA Regs and I've alway assumed these were due to cherry-picking instructions?
To counter the gaps in MAOS, some items were actually "left in" that I'd have thought would have been removed, such as the references to (CAAIPS CAP562 Lft 11-21) Safety Critical System Maintenance (I'll assume your already familiar with ETOPS configuration rules) that the average guy in the RAF won't have a clue about. Why wasn't this very specific paragraph removed? Did the Regulator think it meant Independant Checks? - If so, they were wildly wrong!
Using an F731 instead of a "MOD" Form One is another big loss - again, I assume there was the assumption from on high that the 731 could do the same thing (and I don't believe it does)
Did anyone in "industry" advise on the regs before issue? - Don't tell me a manufacturer did - what do they know of maintenance...
I would have to go through 145 again to get more questions on what drove some decisions to cut out some of the other pertinent articles.
I don't aim this at you personally - I'd just like to know what went on to get to that status. PM if you prefer.
Regards
Rigga
Matkat,
Nice to contact someone who wrote the MAOS regs. I haven't seen the first ones so I don't know what that was like. From what you write I assume you didn't write 145 issue 2?
Whilst I can see they were written based on assumptions that other regs from "the Set" would follow (Mil Part 66 - still not issued), there are some large gaps in MAOS compared to EASA Regs and I've alway assumed these were due to cherry-picking instructions?
To counter the gaps in MAOS, some items were actually "left in" that I'd have thought would have been removed, such as the references to (CAAIPS CAP562 Lft 11-21) Safety Critical System Maintenance (I'll assume your already familiar with ETOPS configuration rules) that the average guy in the RAF won't have a clue about. Why wasn't this very specific paragraph removed? Did the Regulator think it meant Independant Checks? - If so, they were wildly wrong!
Using an F731 instead of a "MOD" Form One is another big loss - again, I assume there was the assumption from on high that the 731 could do the same thing (and I don't believe it does)
Did anyone in "industry" advise on the regs before issue? - Don't tell me a manufacturer did - what do they know of maintenance...
I would have to go through 145 again to get more questions on what drove some decisions to cut out some of the other pertinent articles.
I don't aim this at you personally - I'd just like to know what went on to get to that status. PM if you prefer.
Regards
Rigga
"QAR"? - I'm not familiar with that one.
I think MoD got rid of them all by the mid-90s (at least on my projects) following various rulings that unnecessary regulations covering the likes of Critical Design Reviews, Configuration Audits, Safety Cases and the like can be completely ignored. Waste of money you see.
I understand what you're saying Rigga, but I think MoD would be wise to concentrate on the practical application of existing robust regs; especially those concerned with maintaining airworthiness. You can largely trust an aircraft manufacturer to deliver an airworthy aircraft but he, and his sub-contractors, will not maintain it unless MoD know what they are talking about and contract (and pay for) the right thing. They don't, despite it being mandated by the Secretary of State.
In all my years I never came across anyone at the various higher policy committees who understood that detail. Completely toppled if you asked them something basic, like what is the relationship between the a Functional Audit, the CDR and the Safety Case. It is that lack of understanding and the fact it permeated throughout the ranks because we stopped implementing the regs, that is at the root of MoD's current problems; not the regulations themselves. That is, for 20 years people have risen through that system who have no idea whatsoever how to maintain airworthiness. It became a career ending discipline. In fact, in 1991 one senior officer gathered his troops (whose sole job was maintaining airworthiness) in the St Giles Court cinema and announced they were the "rump end of MoD(PE)" because their knowledge and experience were no longer required. They were told to find other jobs, their section was being disbanded forthwith. An absolute dick of a man, but so typical of the ethos that remains to this day.
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Guy's thanks for the PMs and I have replied. Rigga I did forget to mention in your PM reply that I am surprised that the MoD Form 1 was not implemented because it was certainly something that I had thought was done and accepted so obviously I have no idea why such a basic issue should be shelved the reasoning behind the proposed adoption of the form one was that the area of operations of the ASTOR would allow commercial spares to be used on it and in this respect it was engines that were of concern so it may well be by failing to adopt the form then they have again shot themselves in the foot.
Rigga, as an ex-driver airframe I share the same ignorance of what you, tucumseh and matkat are discussing here with many others of my ilk. But then perhaps that gives me a better view of the woods that all the pretty trees that you are now planting will be part of. As tuc says, the problem is not the regs, it is their enforcement. That was grossly and deliberately compromised by diktat from the very top of the MOD. While the MAA is part of the same MOD then it cannot be independent, and just as importantly be seen to be independent, of such malevolence again. It is rather as though the Ministry of Transport (or whatever its name is this week) were found to have been the cause of numerous accidents and deaths due to a policy of saving money by switching off all the traffic lights and leaving potholes to just get bigger and bigger (OK, very far fetched that one I must admit!) and the solution proposed being a vast revision of the highway code to lower the accident rate. The solution is to force the MoT to do its job properly. The same goes for the MOD and can only be effected from outside it. Your pretty mansion is I'm afraid being built on quicksand.
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"Airworthiness" & international projects
With all this reorganisation and associated discussions about improvements, I found the references to EASA leading me down a slightly different line, so apologies for any incipient thread drift.
The A400M, for instance, is set for initial certification under EASA rules, with military certification to follow - I gather this is a bit of a problem in itself.
How were programmes like Tornado and Typhoon managed from the certification angle? Did/does each participant's Defence Ministry do its own thing independently, or is there a system already set up to avoid duplication and time-wasting? (Not to mention imports from the US ...).
And, what systems are in force in various other European countries that the UK MoD might usefully apply to this new set-up they're organising?
( PS. I do realise that initial certification is one thing, more or less external to, for example the RAF, and that keeping the product properly "fit for purpose" is another, "internal" thing - the one leading on (ideally!) to the other).
The A400M, for instance, is set for initial certification under EASA rules, with military certification to follow - I gather this is a bit of a problem in itself.
How were programmes like Tornado and Typhoon managed from the certification angle? Did/does each participant's Defence Ministry do its own thing independently, or is there a system already set up to avoid duplication and time-wasting? (Not to mention imports from the US ...).
And, what systems are in force in various other European countries that the UK MoD might usefully apply to this new set-up they're organising?
( PS. I do realise that initial certification is one thing, more or less external to, for example the RAF, and that keeping the product properly "fit for purpose" is another, "internal" thing - the one leading on (ideally!) to the other).
After a bit of Googling some time ago for "Military Airworthiness" I found the EU Defence Agency (EDA) (I didn't know it existed) who had already held an EU-wide Military Airworthiness Seminar to discuss the bringing together of said issue. The EDA calls it MAWA (Military AirWorthiness Authority) The UK was a key attendant state.
If the UK's plight is anything to go by, european unity in this matter may take some time.
Using the EASA model: If it took the original 12 willing states, and heavily driven by political pressures and multiple Type Certification costs, more than 10 years to develop and consent to a single regulation, just think how long a bunch of self-inflating military authorities will take to get to a single Title, let alone a whole regulation.
We can but live in hope.
Added Bit -
Forgot to mention that the Italians make a clear distinction between "Airworthiness" and "Mission Capability" that I don't think the UK military makes...
I also believe the UK military don't currently make the differences clear between "Airworthiness" and "Continued Airworthiness"?
Please correct me if I am wrong.
If the UK's plight is anything to go by, european unity in this matter may take some time.
Using the EASA model: If it took the original 12 willing states, and heavily driven by political pressures and multiple Type Certification costs, more than 10 years to develop and consent to a single regulation, just think how long a bunch of self-inflating military authorities will take to get to a single Title, let alone a whole regulation.
We can but live in hope.
Added Bit -
Forgot to mention that the Italians make a clear distinction between "Airworthiness" and "Mission Capability" that I don't think the UK military makes...
I also believe the UK military don't currently make the differences clear between "Airworthiness" and "Continued Airworthiness"?
Please correct me if I am wrong.
Last edited by Rigga; 20th Mar 2010 at 23:43. Reason: Added bit -
Forgot to mention that the Italians make a clear distinction between "Airworthiness" and "Mission Capability" that I don't think the UK military makes...
I also believe the UK military don't currently make the differences clear between "Airworthiness" and "Continued Airworthiness"?
I also believe the UK military don't currently make the differences clear between "Airworthiness" and "Continued Airworthiness"?
JSP553 (Military Airworthiness Regulations) differentiates, in separate chapters, between attaining airworthiness and maintaining airworthiness. They are two entirely separate disciplines, carried out by different people in MoD. As I said earlier, the former need "only" be called up in the initial production contract and it will largely happen (as long as non-eng types keep their hands off and don't over-rule or waive legal requirements, which is one of the main problems MoD has). A simplification, but nevertheless valid.
Maintaining airworthiness is a far more hands-on discipline requiring many engineers with previous practical experience, not a piece of paper which says they've been to college for 3 years, but don't know one end of a spanner from the other. The job requires informed and accurate decision making on a daily basis, which is beyond most present-day MoD "project managers". It also requires strong leadership to fight this corner, because the beancounters see it as an intangible as the money doesn’t result in kit on the shelf. This is the part that MoD deliberately compromised from 1991, by chopping funding and getting rid of said experienced staffs. This is what most of the Haddon-Cave report is aimed at, although he doesn't spell it out like this; assuming, wrongly, that most in MoD will understand him.
Rigga:
I'm intrigued by your preoccupation with various European Regulations and their terminology, Rigga. I might simply reply "Words, dear boy, words!", but that would be both glib and rude, so I won't. What I would say is that the most important thing about Regulations, be they European, Italian or Serbo-Croat, is that they be properly enforced! Tuc makes the point far better than I, but I repeat that the challenge that the MAA faces is to enforce the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations, be they existing, amended, or brand spankingly glitteringly new. That requires experienced expertise that it glaringly lacks and complete independence of those that it will enforce them on which it patently hasn't. Failing that I cannot think of a more appropriate simile than the classic rearranging of the Titanic's Promenade Deck's Deck-Chairs to describe the present oh so British and oh so pointless exercise in futility. The MAA's job is not to produce reams and reams of bumf, it is to save lives. If it fails then more lives will be needlessly lost in avoidable accidents that are not avoided. Now these are grave and damning charges. Is there anyone who feels confident enough with the proposed MAA who is prepared to refute them? At least on the Mull thread we have our own in house group of MOD apologists/supporters who argue con, hopelessly in my book, but then I would say that wouldn't I? Here there is just silence; eerie, worrying, troubling, silence.....
I also believe the UK military don't currently make the differences clear between "Airworthiness" and "Continued Airworthiness"?
theprior:
Thank you for your post tp, whether or not it be in response to mine. The issue of course is what the "it" is to which you refer above. If it is the establishing of an MAA, then I am in full agreement with you. If it is the establishing of an MAA along the lines proposed by H-C, then there is where we go our separate ways I fear. You rightly say that there is a dearth of trained engineers over the last two decades and that is bad enough, but there must surely be a complete lack of them experienced in the proper enforcement of the UK Military Airworthiness Regulations as that has not happened for even longer. Given that was due to a deliberate policy of suborning the Regulations at the highest levels, military, civilian and political, within the MOD then the MAA provides no assurance that the same cannot happen again, no matter how good its head might be. It is not fair to him, to those who serve him, to those who will fly in the aircraft that he is responsible for, or even the wretched tax payer who has to pay for it all. The only way that the MAA can hope to work as intended is if it be sistered with the CAA, ie with those experienced in supervising a regulatory regime, and thus kept separate and independent of the MOD. I know there are many obstacles in the way of that, but it allows for the baby to grow unmolested by those who would otherwise harm it. This isn't only a job for those who know their stuff but for those who are determined to do their stuff come what may. If that "what" be senior to those within the MAA, then it needs to lie outside of such reach. With successive SoS's, let alone whole formations of Air Marshals, standing by the infamous Mull finding by Air Marshals Wratton and Day, such "what" goes to the very top of the MOD. Enforcement is the key here. It can only be guaranteed if the MAA lies without the MOD.
Let us hope at least that we can keep this tentative ball in play here. This site is for professional aviators, this forum for those of a military persuasion. If something as crucial as the proper enforcement of regulations providing for the very airworthiness of our aircraft does not involve everyone who claims to be a professional then the beancounters were right. Scrub the lot and hope for the best. Just don't offer to take me along for a ride!
However, it is the right thing to do.
Let us hope at least that we can keep this tentative ball in play here. This site is for professional aviators, this forum for those of a military persuasion. If something as crucial as the proper enforcement of regulations providing for the very airworthiness of our aircraft does not involve everyone who claims to be a professional then the beancounters were right. Scrub the lot and hope for the best. Just don't offer to take me along for a ride!
Chug & Tuc,
The reason for my 'preoccupation' with civil regs and terminlology is because in my 24 years in the Mob I never had to look for military airworthiness regulations or even to know what the APs (didn't have intranet computers then) were for those regs.
I, like very many of your groundcrew, only require the rules of how to complete paperwork and comply with instructions in the shape of APs, MODs, SIs, STIs, SEMs, etc. (Kept in the dark and fed on...) . IMO this lack of knowledge at the shop floor doesn't help the RAF at all.
However, I got my CAA Engineer Licences in 1989, while still in the RAF, but due to pension traps stayed in for quite some time, getting involved in local air ambulances, air shows and flying clubs, and even some visiting aircraft work, learning the CAA and JAA rules and regs as needed.
When I left the RAF, in was my CIVIL experiences and knowledge that helped me go straight into Civil Airline QA where I learned in great detail about Continued Airworthiness (CtAW).
I have been employed for more than 12 years conducting C of A's, imports, exports, new aircraft deliveries and even the odd disposal of unwanted aircraft, and involving a wide a variety of customers and airworthiness authorities, often using different terminology.
My 'preoccupation' is due to my lack of military airworthiness terminology and my need to attempt some translation.
I am sure we all strive to achieve the same things - its just that we all call those things different names.
P.S.
Totally agree with Chug on regulatory enforcement - at ALL levels. But, even in the RAF, trying to get the buy-in from protectionist user-unit managers will be a struggle!
The reason for my 'preoccupation' with civil regs and terminlology is because in my 24 years in the Mob I never had to look for military airworthiness regulations or even to know what the APs (didn't have intranet computers then) were for those regs.
I, like very many of your groundcrew, only require the rules of how to complete paperwork and comply with instructions in the shape of APs, MODs, SIs, STIs, SEMs, etc. (Kept in the dark and fed on...) . IMO this lack of knowledge at the shop floor doesn't help the RAF at all.
However, I got my CAA Engineer Licences in 1989, while still in the RAF, but due to pension traps stayed in for quite some time, getting involved in local air ambulances, air shows and flying clubs, and even some visiting aircraft work, learning the CAA and JAA rules and regs as needed.
When I left the RAF, in was my CIVIL experiences and knowledge that helped me go straight into Civil Airline QA where I learned in great detail about Continued Airworthiness (CtAW).
I have been employed for more than 12 years conducting C of A's, imports, exports, new aircraft deliveries and even the odd disposal of unwanted aircraft, and involving a wide a variety of customers and airworthiness authorities, often using different terminology.
My 'preoccupation' is due to my lack of military airworthiness terminology and my need to attempt some translation.
I am sure we all strive to achieve the same things - its just that we all call those things different names.
P.S.
Totally agree with Chug on regulatory enforcement - at ALL levels. But, even in the RAF, trying to get the buy-in from protectionist user-unit managers will be a struggle!
Last edited by Rigga; 21st Mar 2010 at 20:30. Reason: P.S.
Rigga, as the one who used the word "preoccupation" in such an accusatory manner, my apologies. I had misread your interest in the MAA, wrongly supposing it to be more than simply academic. I hope you will understand that in being provocative I was merely trying to get a response from you as to the big problem, that being the enforcement of the regulations. This you have now confirmed and I thank you for that. If it is of any consolation, it is clear to me that your knowledge of such regulations, be they civilian or military, is far more extensive than mine. It is not only groundcrew that are not instructed in such matters, for I do not remember ever being taught about airworthiness as a pilot. Like you, my preoccupation (see, I have them as well!) was with serviceability. Even later as a Sqn FSO I processed MOR's not knowing that they reflected airworthiness problems for the most part, rather than mere serviceability ones. I quite agree that the MAA needs to ensure that the good word be fed to all concerned with aircraft operation from the very outset of training. Unfortunately we have all learned about airworthiness now for the very worst reason, its abandonment by the UK Military Airworthiness Authority (aka the MOD) and the terrible toll in lives that has caused.