Chinook - Hit Back Here
Guest
Posts: n/a
Aye
I did think of framing a reply when K52 wrote about his days hauling alfalfa from Firq up to Saiq - if he'd flown an approach at 5500 feet he'd have stoofed in 800 ft below the ridge. But probably not have been found grossly negligent post-mortem (Saiq was always 6300 ft, even on the out of date charts he and I used to have to use). However, that would have trivialised the whole issue and distracted everyone from the main point, so I won't mention it.
Oh, b*gger...
I did think of framing a reply when K52 wrote about his days hauling alfalfa from Firq up to Saiq - if he'd flown an approach at 5500 feet he'd have stoofed in 800 ft below the ridge. But probably not have been found grossly negligent post-mortem (Saiq was always 6300 ft, even on the out of date charts he and I used to have to use). However, that would have trivialised the whole issue and distracted everyone from the main point, so I won't mention it.
Oh, b*gger...
Guest
Posts: n/a
The dedication and efforts of friend family and collegues of the deceased aircrew to clear their names deserves commendation.
As an observer and having read the thread I venture the following opinion. I am not involved nor have the expertise to venture amongst the obviously qualified, but having read what would seem to be concerned and qualified opinion for and against, I would say this.
I would venture that the SO's had a predisposition in the final verdict by virtue of their own involvementin the introduction into service of equipment that by all accounts had some doubts about it's ability to perform safely. They would appear to have disregarded the findings of not only the BOI but also a civil legal opinion.
I think that very reasoned and obviously professionaly expert arguments in favour of that final verdict have been offered on this thread, however, 'no axe to grind' is not correct in that collation of and an offering of FS opinion was made at the initial hearing. That this opinion is still held does not neccesarily make it correct or complete. Doubt was expressed both by the BOI and at least one of the SO's however fleetingly. and it would seem that the final verdict does not itself pass the qualifying limits demanded by the service concerned.
As an ex senior serviceman, a pilot and citizen of the UK, I have myself been on the recieving end of a reply to the only letter I had been moved to write to the PM in defence of the Paras, by a flunky who had not even had the grace to read the letter.
The said regiment shortly after being castigated for their efforts in Ireland were sent in short order to Kosovo and Sierra Leone.
Loayalty by servicemen and women to Queen Country and the Government deserves loyalty in return. The very least is an impartial re-examination of the facts where serious doubts have been raised by previous verdicts not some fobbing off and run around by a goverment who it appears is far more interested in politicaly correct race and sexual orientation questions, not that they are more or less important but somehow seem to domininate. The services somehow end up on the bottom of the list until of course they are required for a job. Then of course it's ' our brave lads and lasses.
[This message has been edited by Paterbrat (edited 20 April 2001).]
As an observer and having read the thread I venture the following opinion. I am not involved nor have the expertise to venture amongst the obviously qualified, but having read what would seem to be concerned and qualified opinion for and against, I would say this.
I would venture that the SO's had a predisposition in the final verdict by virtue of their own involvementin the introduction into service of equipment that by all accounts had some doubts about it's ability to perform safely. They would appear to have disregarded the findings of not only the BOI but also a civil legal opinion.
I think that very reasoned and obviously professionaly expert arguments in favour of that final verdict have been offered on this thread, however, 'no axe to grind' is not correct in that collation of and an offering of FS opinion was made at the initial hearing. That this opinion is still held does not neccesarily make it correct or complete. Doubt was expressed both by the BOI and at least one of the SO's however fleetingly. and it would seem that the final verdict does not itself pass the qualifying limits demanded by the service concerned.
As an ex senior serviceman, a pilot and citizen of the UK, I have myself been on the recieving end of a reply to the only letter I had been moved to write to the PM in defence of the Paras, by a flunky who had not even had the grace to read the letter.
The said regiment shortly after being castigated for their efforts in Ireland were sent in short order to Kosovo and Sierra Leone.
Loayalty by servicemen and women to Queen Country and the Government deserves loyalty in return. The very least is an impartial re-examination of the facts where serious doubts have been raised by previous verdicts not some fobbing off and run around by a goverment who it appears is far more interested in politicaly correct race and sexual orientation questions, not that they are more or less important but somehow seem to domininate. The services somehow end up on the bottom of the list until of course they are required for a job. Then of course it's ' our brave lads and lasses.
[This message has been edited by Paterbrat (edited 20 April 2001).]
Guest
Posts: n/a
"K52,
I was not in the RAF but served my time in the Army. We were always taught that the best form of defence was attack.
Having read your postings on this thread, it would appear that you attack everything that is written. Why is this? I
believe that you are on the side of the MoD and that there is a hidden agenda to your motives? If there is not, please
explain why. Can you say that you know exactly what happened without any doubt whatsoever? I don’t believe
anyone can. I have used Crab Air (that is what we called the RAF -being an ex-yomper), and hold them in high regard.
You should show some loyalty to your fallen comrades, as opposed to burying them with unfounded guilt."
I was not in the RAF but served my time in the Army. We were always taught that the best form of defence was attack.
Having read your postings on this thread, it would appear that you attack everything that is written. Why is this? I
believe that you are on the side of the MoD and that there is a hidden agenda to your motives? If there is not, please
explain why. Can you say that you know exactly what happened without any doubt whatsoever? I don’t believe
anyone can. I have used Crab Air (that is what we called the RAF -being an ex-yomper), and hold them in high regard.
You should show some loyalty to your fallen comrades, as opposed to burying them with unfounded guilt."
Guest
Posts: n/a
You may all be aware that the Lords Liaison Committee is trying to stop Lord Chalfont's efforts to have a Select Committee look into this matter. The link to their report is as follows:
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldliaisn/67/6702.htm#a1
Strange how they say that the matter would take too long to investigate. How come the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry managed to do the whole lot (including interviewing all witnesses)in just four weeks??
The Public Accounts Committee has also issued a second report on this matter. When I find it on the web I'll post the link here.
House of Lords next debate is on 30th April. Updates as and when.
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200001/ldselect/ldliaisn/67/6702.htm#a1
Strange how they say that the matter would take too long to investigate. How come the Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry managed to do the whole lot (including interviewing all witnesses)in just four weeks??
The Public Accounts Committee has also issued a second report on this matter. When I find it on the web I'll post the link here.
House of Lords next debate is on 30th April. Updates as and when.
Regards all
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
This mornings Sunday Times:
Leak casts new doubt on Chinook crash verdict
Jonathon Carr-Brown
MINISTERS may have misled parliament over the weight of evidence used to blame two RAF pilots for the 1994 Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre that killed 25 of Britain's most senior intelligence officers and all four crew members.
A leaked report by a government agency has now revealed doubts over official explanations of the crash.
Defence ministers have consistently told MPs that the pilots were found guilty of gross negligence by an RAF board of inquiry on the basis of an Air Accident Investigation Branch technical report, flight path simulations by the helicopter's maker, Boeing, and a separate simulation by the government's Defence Research Agency (DRA), said to back up the Boeing findings.
On the basis of this evidence and navigation data, the RAF inquiry found that the pilots crashed because they were flying too low in thick fog and were unable to execute a steep climb to avoid cliffs.
Defenders of the pilots have always claimed there has never been enough evidence to reach this conclusion and that the RAF had broken its own strict standards of proof. Now Computer Weekly has obtained a copy of the previously unpublished DRA report - used by ministers to justify the RAF board's conclusions - and discovered that its findings are not fully in line with the claims made by Boeing.
The maker of the helicopter stated that its simulation indicated that the steep climb caused the crash; the DRA report says that this hypothesis is technically possible but describes it as a "doubtful" explanation of what happened. Current and former defence ministers have consistently suggested that the DRA report was part of evidence backing up the board of inquiry's decision.
There is no suggestion that ministers knowingly misled, parliament, but campaigners including David Davis, the Conservative chairman of the public accounts committee (PAC), believe that the Ministry of Defence's actions since the crash have suggested a "disregard for the parliamentary process which is unacceptable".
Since the RAF board's findings, a Scottish civil judge and the public accounts committee have both found its conclusions to be unsafe.
Leak casts new doubt on Chinook crash verdict
Jonathon Carr-Brown
MINISTERS may have misled parliament over the weight of evidence used to blame two RAF pilots for the 1994 Chinook helicopter crash on the Mull of Kintyre that killed 25 of Britain's most senior intelligence officers and all four crew members.
A leaked report by a government agency has now revealed doubts over official explanations of the crash.
Defence ministers have consistently told MPs that the pilots were found guilty of gross negligence by an RAF board of inquiry on the basis of an Air Accident Investigation Branch technical report, flight path simulations by the helicopter's maker, Boeing, and a separate simulation by the government's Defence Research Agency (DRA), said to back up the Boeing findings.
On the basis of this evidence and navigation data, the RAF inquiry found that the pilots crashed because they were flying too low in thick fog and were unable to execute a steep climb to avoid cliffs.
Defenders of the pilots have always claimed there has never been enough evidence to reach this conclusion and that the RAF had broken its own strict standards of proof. Now Computer Weekly has obtained a copy of the previously unpublished DRA report - used by ministers to justify the RAF board's conclusions - and discovered that its findings are not fully in line with the claims made by Boeing.
The maker of the helicopter stated that its simulation indicated that the steep climb caused the crash; the DRA report says that this hypothesis is technically possible but describes it as a "doubtful" explanation of what happened. Current and former defence ministers have consistently suggested that the DRA report was part of evidence backing up the board of inquiry's decision.
There is no suggestion that ministers knowingly misled, parliament, but campaigners including David Davis, the Conservative chairman of the public accounts committee (PAC), believe that the Ministry of Defence's actions since the crash have suggested a "disregard for the parliamentary process which is unacceptable".
Since the RAF board's findings, a Scottish civil judge and the public accounts committee have both found its conclusions to be unsafe.
Guest
Posts: n/a
As a civilian observer to this thread, and being very connected with flying Helios, I feel that the RAF/MOD has shot its self in the foot, by putting the blame for this accident on to the shoulders of the pilots, the Sunday Times today the 22nd of April, would seek to indicate the MOD has agreed with Boeing's information, this stinks of a cover up, to hide something more fundemental, Ie hardware problems! If the man from the desert is interested in the truth , then he should be digging with a JCB through what must now be availble, But me thinks he is only really after the coin!
Guest
Posts: n/a
Yet another resounding AYE.
Shy: just a minor point, it was DERA who allegedly discontinued the trial, not RAF Handling Squadron. The latter are a lodger unit at Boscombe and are concerned only with FRC and Aircrew Manuals, although one or two of the serving aircrew and ROs are tp qualified.
Back to the important bit. On the subject of hasty introduction to service of the Mk 2, in whatever guise (presumabaly a raft of Service Deviations rather than a Military Aircraft Release) it would appear highly unusual for it to get to a squadron without some form of official Differences Training. From what I have read about the case, having moved out of the Service envrinonment some time before this unhappy event, this training was not given. The RAF was, in my day, a haven of 'you can't do it if you haven't done it before' itis. Even in the pre-JAR civil world at the time of the accident, our company ops manual would have required formal Diffs trg in a similar situation,when less fundamantal changes had been made to aircraft systems: eg change of RNAV kit in the AS332. So: Duty of Care by The System?
A rubbish overturning of the Board's findings. AYE, AYE and AYE again.
Shy: just a minor point, it was DERA who allegedly discontinued the trial, not RAF Handling Squadron. The latter are a lodger unit at Boscombe and are concerned only with FRC and Aircrew Manuals, although one or two of the serving aircrew and ROs are tp qualified.
Back to the important bit. On the subject of hasty introduction to service of the Mk 2, in whatever guise (presumabaly a raft of Service Deviations rather than a Military Aircraft Release) it would appear highly unusual for it to get to a squadron without some form of official Differences Training. From what I have read about the case, having moved out of the Service envrinonment some time before this unhappy event, this training was not given. The RAF was, in my day, a haven of 'you can't do it if you haven't done it before' itis. Even in the pre-JAR civil world at the time of the accident, our company ops manual would have required formal Diffs trg in a similar situation,when less fundamantal changes had been made to aircraft systems: eg change of RNAV kit in the AS332. So: Duty of Care by The System?
A rubbish overturning of the Board's findings. AYE, AYE and AYE again.
Guest
Posts: n/a
I've managed to find the whole of the Minutes of the Lords Liaison Committee debate where they are trying to pull a fast one. It also includes a link to the reply by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee.
Here it is in full:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery...67/67moe01.htm
Regards all.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Here it is in full:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery...67/67moe01.htm
Regards all.
Brian
"Justice has no expiry date" - John Cook
Guest
Posts: n/a
Firstly, an apology to those who have e-mailed me. We went to France for a few days and when we got back I found 3 e-mails from my ISP telling me that they were sorry that I could no longer send e-mails since their software update had screwed the system, but they are trying to fix it!! (All right – they didn’t exactly use that phrase). I will reply once I get the facility back.
I regret that once again we appear to have a rehash of the misconceptions and myths that surround this tragic accident. The misconception over the role of RAF Handling Squadron has already been addressed but the misconception that the AOC 1 Gp and CinC STC “overruled” the BOI remains.
A BOI is the responsibility of the relevant Group AOC (or AOC DAU’s) and it is the AOC who convenes a Board to investigate on HIS behalf. If the AOC is not satisfied with the findings of the Board then he may reconvene it to reconsider certain aspects or he may reconvene it with a new President to investigate afresh. He may even convene a completely new Board. AOC 1 Gp did none of these things: he accepted the findings of the Board as to the events leading up to the accident, but did not accept their assessment of Human Failings.
The mantra of “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” has featured heavily in these pages; generally along the lines of “it is up to them to provide proof that none of these potential failures occurred otherwise there is doubt”. In my view it is the person who is charged, under the rules laid down by Act of Parliament, with the formal investigation into the cause(s) of an accident who is the person who has the grave responsibility of deciding whether there is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”. That person is the Convening Officer: the doubt, or otherwise, must be in his mind.
The Convening Officer having come to his decision, the BOI was reviewed by the CinC. It is not unknown for the CinC’s view to differ from the view of the AOC. In this case they were in agreement and the BOI (because of, I suspect, the Political and Media interest in the case) was then reviewed by CAS. No change was made to the findings of the Convening Officer.
Thus we find that the AOC (2 Star), CinC (4 Star) and the Professional Head of the Royal Air Force (CAS) all had “ absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as to the cause of the accident. In reaching their respective opinions they had a wealth of expertise and experience amongst their respective Staffs to help and advise them. My own part in that process was miniscule; I had only been in post for 3 weeks and, as the AOC well knew, had no helicopter experience.
THE MYTHS
These run & run. The Test Pilots did NOT refuse to fly the HC2; preplanned maintenance was brought forward whilst they were awaiting further data on icing trials so that, once the data was available, the trials could proceed without interruption.
“This aircraft had suffered unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance.” The BOI found, having access to ALL the maintenance documentation of the aircraft since its return from update, “All the reported GPS faults were confirmed as definite faults and were rectified successfully. None of the faults were consistent with the satellite tracking difficulties reported with the aircraft on 2 Jun 94.” The BOI also found that ”GPS satellite information was accurate during the period prior to the accident.” The question has to be asked, however, why was no Aircraft Maintenance Sheet raised by the Captain over the problems encountered during the morning sortie?
“There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence.” There was no conflicting evidence at the time of the BOI. The confliction arose when one witness changed his account at the FAI over a year later by which time the BOI was in the public domain.
------
“The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground.” Not my words – the words of OC RAF Odiham, an experienced helicopter pilot and current Chinook Operator. The AOC, also an experienced helicopter pilot and previously a Chinook operator, agreed and stated “it was flying at high speed, well below Safety Altitude in cloud --- in direct contravention of the rules for flight under either Visual Flight Rules or Instrument Flight Rules.
Why the crew were operating in the way they were was, and remains, a matter for conjecture; particularly because there was no evidence whatsoever of any technical malfunction. The fact remains that they should not have been operating in those weather conditions at that height and speed.
I regret that once again we appear to have a rehash of the misconceptions and myths that surround this tragic accident. The misconception over the role of RAF Handling Squadron has already been addressed but the misconception that the AOC 1 Gp and CinC STC “overruled” the BOI remains.
A BOI is the responsibility of the relevant Group AOC (or AOC DAU’s) and it is the AOC who convenes a Board to investigate on HIS behalf. If the AOC is not satisfied with the findings of the Board then he may reconvene it to reconsider certain aspects or he may reconvene it with a new President to investigate afresh. He may even convene a completely new Board. AOC 1 Gp did none of these things: he accepted the findings of the Board as to the events leading up to the accident, but did not accept their assessment of Human Failings.
The mantra of “absolutely no doubt whatsoever” has featured heavily in these pages; generally along the lines of “it is up to them to provide proof that none of these potential failures occurred otherwise there is doubt”. In my view it is the person who is charged, under the rules laid down by Act of Parliament, with the formal investigation into the cause(s) of an accident who is the person who has the grave responsibility of deciding whether there is “absolutely no doubt whatsoever”. That person is the Convening Officer: the doubt, or otherwise, must be in his mind.
The Convening Officer having come to his decision, the BOI was reviewed by the CinC. It is not unknown for the CinC’s view to differ from the view of the AOC. In this case they were in agreement and the BOI (because of, I suspect, the Political and Media interest in the case) was then reviewed by CAS. No change was made to the findings of the Convening Officer.
Thus we find that the AOC (2 Star), CinC (4 Star) and the Professional Head of the Royal Air Force (CAS) all had “ absolutely no doubt whatsoever” as to the cause of the accident. In reaching their respective opinions they had a wealth of expertise and experience amongst their respective Staffs to help and advise them. My own part in that process was miniscule; I had only been in post for 3 weeks and, as the AOC well knew, had no helicopter experience.
THE MYTHS
These run & run. The Test Pilots did NOT refuse to fly the HC2; preplanned maintenance was brought forward whilst they were awaiting further data on icing trials so that, once the data was available, the trials could proceed without interruption.
“This aircraft had suffered unexplained inaccuracies in the GPS navigation system, which could have been of great significance.” The BOI found, having access to ALL the maintenance documentation of the aircraft since its return from update, “All the reported GPS faults were confirmed as definite faults and were rectified successfully. None of the faults were consistent with the satellite tracking difficulties reported with the aircraft on 2 Jun 94.” The BOI also found that ”GPS satellite information was accurate during the period prior to the accident.” The question has to be asked, however, why was no Aircraft Maintenance Sheet raised by the Captain over the problems encountered during the morning sortie?
“There has been much speculation over the actual cloud and visibility at the time of the accident because there was conflicting evidence.” There was no conflicting evidence at the time of the BOI. The confliction arose when one witness changed his account at the FAI over a year later by which time the BOI was in the public domain.
------
“The root cause of this accident is that the crew while operating in poor weather and close to high ground flew the aircraft into the ground.” Not my words – the words of OC RAF Odiham, an experienced helicopter pilot and current Chinook Operator. The AOC, also an experienced helicopter pilot and previously a Chinook operator, agreed and stated “it was flying at high speed, well below Safety Altitude in cloud --- in direct contravention of the rules for flight under either Visual Flight Rules or Instrument Flight Rules.
Why the crew were operating in the way they were was, and remains, a matter for conjecture; particularly because there was no evidence whatsoever of any technical malfunction. The fact remains that they should not have been operating in those weather conditions at that height and speed.
Guest
Posts: n/a
K52:
I generally choose my words carefully, so you will see that I merely state,without using emotive words, that the trial appears to have been discontinued by DERA.
Thank you for the reminder of QRs regarding the convening of the BoI.
I note that you do not contest my suggestion that introduction to service of this Mark of the Chinook was...unusual. Given that this will have had the authority of the Convening Officer, his impartiality is automatically impugned.
QED.
(Edited for spelling of 'Note'!!)
[This message has been edited by Multp (edited 23 April 2001).]
I generally choose my words carefully, so you will see that I merely state,without using emotive words, that the trial appears to have been discontinued by DERA.
Thank you for the reminder of QRs regarding the convening of the BoI.
I note that you do not contest my suggestion that introduction to service of this Mark of the Chinook was...unusual. Given that this will have had the authority of the Convening Officer, his impartiality is automatically impugned.
QED.
(Edited for spelling of 'Note'!!)
[This message has been edited by Multp (edited 23 April 2001).]