Lightning Down At FAOB
Originally Posted by Rigga
Nige:"A lot of UK based pilots flew for Thunder City. Didn't any of them notice anything out of the ordinary, or check any paperwork at all? "
There is no time line for when things started to go wrong. When these pax/pilots flew things may have been fine or even on the turn.
However, visiting or paying pilots are likely to have been given what they expect - Cockpit Briefs, Flight Plans and manoevers, etc, but may not have been expected to go through the Docs/F700
There is no time line for when things started to go wrong. When these pax/pilots flew things may have been fine or even on the turn.
However, visiting or paying pilots are likely to have been given what they expect - Cockpit Briefs, Flight Plans and manoevers, etc, but may not have been expected to go through the Docs/F700
Last edited by GeeRam; 26th Aug 2012 at 21:28.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Barnsley
Age: 64
Posts: 62
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
RAF Lightning Incidents
I have put a link to a site listing the 80 or so RAF Lightning losses and major incidents during the aircraft time in RAF Service (plus some RSAF Incidents). I am no technical expert, but can read the comments against each incident.
During the 1960s it seems some Pilot error was to blame, due to a new very powerful aircraft coming into service. From the late 60s the problem of loss of control or having had fire warning lights seem prevalent from then until the aircraft left service in 1988. So no matter how good the Techies or how good the Pilots or how good the full logistical and industrial support this aircraft had, it seems to have been a problem child after the late 60s.
Overall it seems technical problems not Pilot error were the main reasons of losses esp after the late 60s
So if TC had dotted all the I’s and crossed all the T’s it was only a matter of time before this incident was going to happen, is it little wonder this aircraft was never flown in UK airspace after it left RAF Service.
To fly this aircraft from 2003 to 2009 with one loss seems to have been very very lucky with a capital L
List of accidents and incidents involving the English Electric Lightning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
During the 1960s it seems some Pilot error was to blame, due to a new very powerful aircraft coming into service. From the late 60s the problem of loss of control or having had fire warning lights seem prevalent from then until the aircraft left service in 1988. So no matter how good the Techies or how good the Pilots or how good the full logistical and industrial support this aircraft had, it seems to have been a problem child after the late 60s.
Overall it seems technical problems not Pilot error were the main reasons of losses esp after the late 60s
So if TC had dotted all the I’s and crossed all the T’s it was only a matter of time before this incident was going to happen, is it little wonder this aircraft was never flown in UK airspace after it left RAF Service.
To fly this aircraft from 2003 to 2009 with one loss seems to have been very very lucky with a capital L
List of accidents and incidents involving the English Electric Lightning - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Last edited by SCAFITE; 27th Aug 2012 at 08:36.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Top floor, b@stards moved me. NO LONGER watchin the circuit
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Such a sad and damning report which we should all contextualise in light of Haddon-Cave and the ongoing drive of the Safety Case here in the UK. It appears the whole of the TC outfit from Mike Head, through to the maintainers and operators were woefully unprepared for the complexity of this aircraft type. Naive or criminal may well be contested in the courts. Who authorised the “extension” of the critical escape system?
Being an ex-Lightning sooty this report made me reflect on “the way it was done back then”. Early 80’s at windy city. The Lightning was the top of the pile and the cream were selected to fly them... most of them being punchy, aggressive, no nonsense types who wanted jets at any cost to fly. The engineers were posted in from any background. With no selection process (someone may wish to correct me on that point), though the technical “Q” courses were good and thorough, you ended up with good, average and not so good maintainers working them. And the aircraft were very difficult and challenging and rewarding to work on. The point is if you followed every procedure to completeness, in a way a court would coldly look at it, nothing would have flown. Full stop. So if you wanted to fit in, get good assessments and progress up the ladder you worked in a certain fashion. If you were smart you learnt the systems in depth so you could make a judgment decision on what could cropped and what had to be carried out 100%. You also quickly worked out which engineering peers and superiors you both trusted and listened too.
How many ex OC’s, Flt Cdrs, duty pilots are reading this and reflecting on pressurising the Sengo/Jengo/Warrant/Rects controller for the jet “yesterday”? Just one illustration. An aircraft still on jacks have final U/C selections carried out when a FLM is despatched to carry out a AF/BF servicing, checking in the U/C bay he managed to select that leg to retract.... both he and the SNCO carrying out the checks were fortunate not to be seriously injured or worse. I don’t say it with any pride but corners were cut to meet the flying requirement.
I wonder what it is like today in the fast jet front line environment? Do the same pressures exist from the same sources? I read Tucumseh’s inputs to the Haddon-Cave with great interest.
Being an ex-Lightning sooty this report made me reflect on “the way it was done back then”. Early 80’s at windy city. The Lightning was the top of the pile and the cream were selected to fly them... most of them being punchy, aggressive, no nonsense types who wanted jets at any cost to fly. The engineers were posted in from any background. With no selection process (someone may wish to correct me on that point), though the technical “Q” courses were good and thorough, you ended up with good, average and not so good maintainers working them. And the aircraft were very difficult and challenging and rewarding to work on. The point is if you followed every procedure to completeness, in a way a court would coldly look at it, nothing would have flown. Full stop. So if you wanted to fit in, get good assessments and progress up the ladder you worked in a certain fashion. If you were smart you learnt the systems in depth so you could make a judgment decision on what could cropped and what had to be carried out 100%. You also quickly worked out which engineering peers and superiors you both trusted and listened too.
How many ex OC’s, Flt Cdrs, duty pilots are reading this and reflecting on pressurising the Sengo/Jengo/Warrant/Rects controller for the jet “yesterday”? Just one illustration. An aircraft still on jacks have final U/C selections carried out when a FLM is despatched to carry out a AF/BF servicing, checking in the U/C bay he managed to select that leg to retract.... both he and the SNCO carrying out the checks were fortunate not to be seriously injured or worse. I don’t say it with any pride but corners were cut to meet the flying requirement.
I wonder what it is like today in the fast jet front line environment? Do the same pressures exist from the same sources? I read Tucumseh’s inputs to the Haddon-Cave with great interest.
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: Cape Town / UK / Europe
Posts: 728
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As an aside, last week's episode of 'When Britain Ruled the Skies' mentioned the complexity of the Lightning's maintenance and the fact that due to the construction it could require 25 manhours to dismantle and reassemble parts to replace or repair a simple component which in itself was a one hour job. One can well imagime that short cuts were taken or items ignored.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: Europe
Posts: 414
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Really good post Hammer, to outsiders everything is black and white, in reality it is shades of grey (Not 50!)
The RAF is making huge improvements to address the issues you highlight post HC. There is a program of Human Factors & Error Management training that ALL personnel should be doing, the concepts are still evolving. Understandably many are suspicious that it is just the latest additional stat and they are wasting their time, others think it is H&S flying prevention or just a new name for Flight Safety. I'll admit some of the current training is disjointed and needs tweaking but it will provide the backbone of a safety culture across the services and it had the ability to address all the issues you mentioned and many more. Many claim it is just common sense but as you point out there are good, average and not so good people in all areas. I'm sure it will take a generation to become engrained in what we do, hopefully it will and more of us get to collect our pensions
The RAF is making huge improvements to address the issues you highlight post HC. There is a program of Human Factors & Error Management training that ALL personnel should be doing, the concepts are still evolving. Understandably many are suspicious that it is just the latest additional stat and they are wasting their time, others think it is H&S flying prevention or just a new name for Flight Safety. I'll admit some of the current training is disjointed and needs tweaking but it will provide the backbone of a safety culture across the services and it had the ability to address all the issues you mentioned and many more. Many claim it is just common sense but as you point out there are good, average and not so good people in all areas. I'm sure it will take a generation to become engrained in what we do, hopefully it will and more of us get to collect our pensions
So, if maintenance corners have to be cut to get a 'flyer', whose fault is it?
- The manufacturer, for failing to design an easy-to-maintain airframe?
- The engineering authority, for making the official procedures unnecessarily long and complex?
- The procurement organisation, for failing to procure enough aircraft to have a sufficient number of 'flyers' at any one time?
- The manning organisation, for failing to provide enough technicians to complete the long and complex maintenance procedures?
- (Or perhaps for providing too many aircrew?)
- The logistics organisation, for failing to supply spares in a timely fashion?
- The technicians, for not being able to carry out the official procedures at a suitable pace?
- The tasking authority, for requiring aircrew to fly more hours than might be strictly necessary?
- Or the aircrew, for wanting to fly more hours than are actually needed?
Originally Posted by Rigga
...so you agree with me then, Ram.
Originally Posted by Rigga
...and I'm not aware of the well-known documentary.
From his posts on another forum at the time, I beleive a well known ex-RAF Lightning pilot flew the BBC cameraman on the same sortie in the other TC T.5 (ex-XS452)
I would dearly love to be proved incorrect on that fact tbh.
Last edited by GeeRam; 27th Aug 2012 at 10:41.
I spent the last 20 years of my career at Brough supporting Flight Systems on the in service Hawk fleet worldwide. One of the most common customer queries was 'Can we defer the scheduled service on X for Y flying hours or Z weeks because there's an exercise on or another aircraft is down for spares or there is a VIP flypast or whatever.' Usually there was no supporting evidence to back up the request so we invariably asked the customer to provide the service history since new or the last Major, so we could assess where the aircraft stood in the schedule. Quite often the response came back we need an answer tomorrow, Eng records are closed till next week, its only 20 hours, surely you can agree to that etc. We would then respond again, as diplomatically as possible that if the customer thought it such a trivial issue they could use their own engineering authority to underwrite the extension but we had to have some data on which to make a judgement. Almost inevitably we finally got the data and usually the previous history was quite sensible and provided the required extension was small, say 5 or 10% we would agree, perhaps subject to certain specific inspections or tests, depending on the particular circumstances.
However occasionally some really surprising servicing history would come back. Some customers who did relatively little flying would go years past the calendar backstop dates for servicing or component lives. One customer in particular had never done any of the more significant scheduled maintenance and just kept repeating Primaries and Primary Stars ad infinitum. Its not just small commercial operators who cut corners in their operation.
The Lightning accident was a good example of the Swiss cheese analogy to flight safety. Aircraft are designed to be as safe as practicable, subject to all the specified qualification, test, inspection, maintenance and operational procedures being put in place and adhered to. This particular South African cheese seems to have been absolutely riddled with holes and it is not surprising that they eventually all lined up.
I had never met Dave Stock but I had spoken to him on a number of occasions to discuss issues he had experienced while flight testing Hawk Mk 120 aircraft for Denel. He did not come across as being the sort of person who would take a cavalier attitude to flight safety so I was particularly suprised and saddened to hear of his death.
I can remember sitting in a conference room with my boss many years ago, waiting for our MoD visitors to arrive for a meeting. It was the day after the Challenger space shuttle disaster. My boss was an excellent engineer but not normally one for making deep philosophical statements. On that occasion he did. He said if you choose to ride on a big powerful horse then you have to accept that one day it will throw you off and you will get hurt. The analogy was very similar to one earlier in this thread comparing the Lightning to a pussy cat. Unfortunately a lot of people don't seem to realise that if you mistreat an animal for long enough it really will turn on you and bite. Perhaps its because many of these people have so little direct contact with the animal itself and have never seen the consequences first hand.
However occasionally some really surprising servicing history would come back. Some customers who did relatively little flying would go years past the calendar backstop dates for servicing or component lives. One customer in particular had never done any of the more significant scheduled maintenance and just kept repeating Primaries and Primary Stars ad infinitum. Its not just small commercial operators who cut corners in their operation.
The Lightning accident was a good example of the Swiss cheese analogy to flight safety. Aircraft are designed to be as safe as practicable, subject to all the specified qualification, test, inspection, maintenance and operational procedures being put in place and adhered to. This particular South African cheese seems to have been absolutely riddled with holes and it is not surprising that they eventually all lined up.
I had never met Dave Stock but I had spoken to him on a number of occasions to discuss issues he had experienced while flight testing Hawk Mk 120 aircraft for Denel. He did not come across as being the sort of person who would take a cavalier attitude to flight safety so I was particularly suprised and saddened to hear of his death.
I can remember sitting in a conference room with my boss many years ago, waiting for our MoD visitors to arrive for a meeting. It was the day after the Challenger space shuttle disaster. My boss was an excellent engineer but not normally one for making deep philosophical statements. On that occasion he did. He said if you choose to ride on a big powerful horse then you have to accept that one day it will throw you off and you will get hurt. The analogy was very similar to one earlier in this thread comparing the Lightning to a pussy cat. Unfortunately a lot of people don't seem to realise that if you mistreat an animal for long enough it really will turn on you and bite. Perhaps its because many of these people have so little direct contact with the animal itself and have never seen the consequences first hand.
It was Episode 3 of the BBC series 'Wonders of the Universe' hosted by Dr.Brian Cox. He was filmed taking a flight in the T.5 (ex-XS451) flown by Mike Beachy Head doing a rotation take-off and climb to 50k+ to view the 'edge of space'.
You might be thinking of Professor Iain Stewart who flew with Dave Stock in the second episode of his BBC series 'Earth the Power of the Planet', entitled 'Atmosphere'.
You might be thinking of Professor Iain Stewart who flew with Dave Stock in the second episode of his BBC series 'Earth the Power of the Planet', entitled 'Atmosphere'.
Hammer said:"The engineers were posted in from any background. With no selection process (someone may wish to correct me on that point), though the technical “Q” courses were good and thorough, you ended up with good, average and not so good maintainers working them."
During the early 80s I had been in for 5+ years working as a Mechanic on Whirlwinds - Line, Minors and Majors. I learned a lot and became confident in my job. After my fitters course I was posted to Honkingdown and to Buccaneers. This was a bit of a culture change for me - I couldnt go on the Airtests, for one thing!
Buccs were grounded at the time - so we were drilling and polishing holes for some time.
After some months I got my Airframe Course and sat in a class for some weeks - probably three weeks - I cant remember now. I left there with less than 35 sheets of notes. Then, in the near "heights" of the Cold War, I believe, courses were just to tick boxes, not really to impart good or relevant knowledge to new guys, just to enable them to open panels and look inside with a bit of a clue as to what they saw. Don't get me wrong - I really enjoyed working on and with Buccs...but, in hindsight, the courses were cr@p!
Maybe later courses improved? - I did five type courses and found the Tornado F3 one lacking too (but that's me, I suppose). Luckily I didn't stay long with them.
Most times it's not up to the engineers what levels of aircraft course they get - they just make do with what they get - and then get experience as best they can.
During the early 80s I had been in for 5+ years working as a Mechanic on Whirlwinds - Line, Minors and Majors. I learned a lot and became confident in my job. After my fitters course I was posted to Honkingdown and to Buccaneers. This was a bit of a culture change for me - I couldnt go on the Airtests, for one thing!
Buccs were grounded at the time - so we were drilling and polishing holes for some time.
After some months I got my Airframe Course and sat in a class for some weeks - probably three weeks - I cant remember now. I left there with less than 35 sheets of notes. Then, in the near "heights" of the Cold War, I believe, courses were just to tick boxes, not really to impart good or relevant knowledge to new guys, just to enable them to open panels and look inside with a bit of a clue as to what they saw. Don't get me wrong - I really enjoyed working on and with Buccs...but, in hindsight, the courses were cr@p!
Maybe later courses improved? - I did five type courses and found the Tornado F3 one lacking too (but that's me, I suppose). Luckily I didn't stay long with them.
Most times it's not up to the engineers what levels of aircraft course they get - they just make do with what they get - and then get experience as best they can.
Thought police antagonist
Join Date: Jul 2003
Location: Where I always have been...firmly in the real world
Posts: 1,372
Received 118 Likes
on
85 Posts
The power of marketing.
Read the paragraph above the pic of the Bucc.
Fifty Thousand Feet Per Minute | Features | Lusso - British Luxury Lifestyle Magazine
Read the paragraph above the pic of the Bucc.
Fifty Thousand Feet Per Minute | Features | Lusso - British Luxury Lifestyle Magazine
Join Date: Apr 2007
Location: Away from home Rat
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Absolutely damming of all management involved in Thunder City and the holes in the regulators systems who allowed them to operate with an AOC for so long without questioning the practices.. We would all like to see Buccs, Jags and other types flying in this country like the Vulcan, but the costs would be similar to the Vulcan, OEMs would have to be on board and the operator wouldn't be able to fly fee paying pax. Thats after if the CAA reckon the aircraft is safe enough to even be considered for a PtF. The Lightning isn't and believe it or not, the Jag was worse..
No one seems to ask why he didn't use the emergency canopy jett between the seats or indeed just open the canopy on the left hand side ??
In the report the appendix by the Crash Lab suggested that the ejection handle was pulled which worked partially resulting in the canopy being dislodged on one side only and this jammed the manual release mechanism.
In the report the appendix by the Crash Lab suggested that the ejection handle was pulled which worked partially resulting in the canopy being dislodged on one side only and this jammed the manual release mechanism.
Gamekeeper
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: South East
Age: 61
Posts: 215
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just recently published on an African based website.....
Last week the SA CAA released a report on the crash of Thunder City Lightning ZU-BEX 14 November 2009.
Thunder City Rejects SACAA report.
Thunder City was not aware that the SACAA aircraft accident report had been issued, thus we have not had the time to study it in detail; nor were we afforded the opportunity to comment prior to its release, nor were any senior members of Thunder City staff interviewed or statements taken. Our initial findings, after a cursory read, leave us in no doubt that this report is seriously flawed and smacks of a witch hunt.
Even at a superficial level, while the report appears to be thorough, we have found blatant falsehoods, errors, illogical conclusions as well as glaring omissions. Therefore, once we have studied this report in depth, we will pursue all options open to us to ensure that a true and balanced conclusion is reached.
As it stands, is a scandalous and libellous work that at the outset seeks to apportion blame while claiming not to.
It is our intention to embark on a further independent investigation with suitably qualified experts and to present such findings when complete. In the interim Thunder City will seek a court injunction to have this report withdrawn.
Thunder City Management
PFR
Last week the SA CAA released a report on the crash of Thunder City Lightning ZU-BEX 14 November 2009.
Thunder City Rejects SACAA report.
Thunder City was not aware that the SACAA aircraft accident report had been issued, thus we have not had the time to study it in detail; nor were we afforded the opportunity to comment prior to its release, nor were any senior members of Thunder City staff interviewed or statements taken. Our initial findings, after a cursory read, leave us in no doubt that this report is seriously flawed and smacks of a witch hunt.
Even at a superficial level, while the report appears to be thorough, we have found blatant falsehoods, errors, illogical conclusions as well as glaring omissions. Therefore, once we have studied this report in depth, we will pursue all options open to us to ensure that a true and balanced conclusion is reached.
As it stands, is a scandalous and libellous work that at the outset seeks to apportion blame while claiming not to.
It is our intention to embark on a further independent investigation with suitably qualified experts and to present such findings when complete. In the interim Thunder City will seek a court injunction to have this report withdrawn.
Thunder City Management
PFR