The Generals Must Share the Blame
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Thread Starter
The Generals Must Share the Blame
The Spectator: The generals must share the blame
.......In the end, it is the politicians who make the decisions on whether to deploy troops overseas. Nevertheless, senior officers have a duty not only to ensure that troops are used in sensible ways, but also to ensure that they are used for sensible purposes, and to tell the politicians what those would and would not be. Alas, Britain’s military leaders have failed to restrain the Labour government from its strategic follies.
Bureaucratic interests explain why. In the late 1980s the British armed forces were orientated almost entirely towards the Soviet threat. The collapse of communism left them without a raison d’ętre. It would have been easy for the Labour government to make major cuts in military spending. It did not. Rather than destroying Britain’s military, the Labour party saved it. The 1997 strategic defence review provided a new mission — expeditionary warfare to be a ‘force for good’ around the world.
We live in a remarkably peaceful era. There is no direct military threat to the United Kingdom, and the magnitude of global conflict has declined by 60 per cent in two decades. Nonetheless, the top brass have embraced the new purpose with zeal. Their existence depends on it.
All these factors together mean that the armed forces are institutionally averse to recognising a fundamental truth — that the problems they have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan derive not from a lack of resources but from the very nature of the missions themselves. Recognising this would mean admitting that expeditionary warfare is not a good idea, and admitting that would cast the whole defence budget into doubt. Blaming Mr Brown provides a convenient way out of this impasse.
In 1997, the Labour government gave the country a new strategic direction. It has not worked out well. If, as expected, the Conservatives take power next year, they will inherit and complete the latest defence review. In the process, future defence ministers, including possibly General Dannatt, need to do more than merely juggle resources. They need to re-examine fundamental strategic assumptions. The stab-in-the-back myth stands in the way. It maintains the pretence that the basic direction was all right, and merely the implementation went wrong, so that all can be solved with the application of additional funds. While this story may serve some narrow bureaucratic interests, it does the people of Britain no service at all.
.......In the end, it is the politicians who make the decisions on whether to deploy troops overseas. Nevertheless, senior officers have a duty not only to ensure that troops are used in sensible ways, but also to ensure that they are used for sensible purposes, and to tell the politicians what those would and would not be. Alas, Britain’s military leaders have failed to restrain the Labour government from its strategic follies.
Bureaucratic interests explain why. In the late 1980s the British armed forces were orientated almost entirely towards the Soviet threat. The collapse of communism left them without a raison d’ętre. It would have been easy for the Labour government to make major cuts in military spending. It did not. Rather than destroying Britain’s military, the Labour party saved it. The 1997 strategic defence review provided a new mission — expeditionary warfare to be a ‘force for good’ around the world.
We live in a remarkably peaceful era. There is no direct military threat to the United Kingdom, and the magnitude of global conflict has declined by 60 per cent in two decades. Nonetheless, the top brass have embraced the new purpose with zeal. Their existence depends on it.
All these factors together mean that the armed forces are institutionally averse to recognising a fundamental truth — that the problems they have faced in Iraq and Afghanistan derive not from a lack of resources but from the very nature of the missions themselves. Recognising this would mean admitting that expeditionary warfare is not a good idea, and admitting that would cast the whole defence budget into doubt. Blaming Mr Brown provides a convenient way out of this impasse.
In 1997, the Labour government gave the country a new strategic direction. It has not worked out well. If, as expected, the Conservatives take power next year, they will inherit and complete the latest defence review. In the process, future defence ministers, including possibly General Dannatt, need to do more than merely juggle resources. They need to re-examine fundamental strategic assumptions. The stab-in-the-back myth stands in the way. It maintains the pretence that the basic direction was all right, and merely the implementation went wrong, so that all can be solved with the application of additional funds. While this story may serve some narrow bureaucratic interests, it does the people of Britain no service at all.
Join Date: Aug 2009
Location: Aylesbury
Age: 58
Posts: 378
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Interesting article and a case to answer...
The full article does make interesting reading. This particular passage caught my eye....
"One of the more galling sounds of the past two years has been that of Americans smugly observing that the British have been slow to learn the lessons of modern counter-insurgency. The criticism has been especially hard to bear because it is true. Many of the British army’s problems have been of its own making. As one officer participant has eloquently put it, the decision in 2006 ‘to scatter small groups of soldiers across the north of Helmand, in isolation, in an intelligence vacuum and with complete disregard for the most basic tenets of counter-insurgency was, quite simply, a gross military blunder’. And even if it is true that this decision was the result of ‘political pressure’ from London, it was the responsibility of the generals to resist such pressure and to insist that the troops be used sensibly. In the second world war, General Alan Brooke would argue all night with Churchill when he thought that the Prime Minister was making absurd military judgments. This does not seem to happen any more."
Could this or other similar cases, possibly be one of the reasons why we have had some notable high profile commissions being resigned?
I've already been on record as lamenting a lack of leadership at * level and above... It seems I may not be alone.
"One of the more galling sounds of the past two years has been that of Americans smugly observing that the British have been slow to learn the lessons of modern counter-insurgency. The criticism has been especially hard to bear because it is true. Many of the British army’s problems have been of its own making. As one officer participant has eloquently put it, the decision in 2006 ‘to scatter small groups of soldiers across the north of Helmand, in isolation, in an intelligence vacuum and with complete disregard for the most basic tenets of counter-insurgency was, quite simply, a gross military blunder’. And even if it is true that this decision was the result of ‘political pressure’ from London, it was the responsibility of the generals to resist such pressure and to insist that the troops be used sensibly. In the second world war, General Alan Brooke would argue all night with Churchill when he thought that the Prime Minister was making absurd military judgments. This does not seem to happen any more."
Could this or other similar cases, possibly be one of the reasons why we have had some notable high profile commissions being resigned?
I've already been on record as lamenting a lack of leadership at * level and above... It seems I may not be alone.
Join Date: Dec 1999
Location: Berks, UK
Posts: 51
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Maybe I'm being naive, and this is a genuine question, but how do we know the senior officers have not been arguing with the politicians all night?? How do we know the politicians have simply not been overruling the generals? Its not like the generals are allowed to or likely to speak out about it! Well not until Dannatt anyway...
Join Date: Nov 2004
Location: Wattashame
Posts: 136
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Chain of Command
It is right and propper that Generals argue thier point when the need dictates. But let us not forget; we the military (regardless of rank) serve the Queen and her Government. Not the other way round!
How often do we argue with our boss?
How often do we argue with our boss?
Join Date: Aug 2006
Location: firmly on dry land
Age: 81
Posts: 1,541
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Today our politicians have many aims and objectives and the calls on our premier will be many and varied. I doubt that CDS would be able to get the PM's attention all night.
Join Date: May 2009
Location: China (CGO)
Age: 75
Posts: 164
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gosh Folks
You really oughta read and digest some Col von Clausewitz.
For the few who may not know him, he was just a lowly staff officer -- but no general who had him on his staff ever lost a battle.
Anyhow, this guy is on a par with Sun Tzu Wu.
And he invented Catch 23 before Catch 22 ever got invented.
Essentially, he schematically paragraphs out what to do on a battlefield in every possible scenario, e.g. you're uphill fighting downhill or vice versa. Then he lays down the rules any sensible infantry officer should apply -- but at the end of lists of scenarios he has his Catch 23: "However, in the case of genius (leadership), ignore all of the above."
He never became a general because to rise that high, you seem to have to become sharp at office politics and Col. von Clausewtiz was perhaps too Prussian a professional soldier to stoop to that.
Generals are products of a bureaucratic apparatus.
Most anywhere except in revolutionary armies, which are inceasingly rare nowadays.
If anyone sees this as slandering any particularly high-profile celebrity general, I apologize forthwith.
Think it through anyhow.
For the few who may not know him, he was just a lowly staff officer -- but no general who had him on his staff ever lost a battle.
Anyhow, this guy is on a par with Sun Tzu Wu.
And he invented Catch 23 before Catch 22 ever got invented.
Essentially, he schematically paragraphs out what to do on a battlefield in every possible scenario, e.g. you're uphill fighting downhill or vice versa. Then he lays down the rules any sensible infantry officer should apply -- but at the end of lists of scenarios he has his Catch 23: "However, in the case of genius (leadership), ignore all of the above."
He never became a general because to rise that high, you seem to have to become sharp at office politics and Col. von Clausewtiz was perhaps too Prussian a professional soldier to stoop to that.
Generals are products of a bureaucratic apparatus.
Most anywhere except in revolutionary armies, which are inceasingly rare nowadays.
If anyone sees this as slandering any particularly high-profile celebrity general, I apologize forthwith.
Think it through anyhow.
AB:
If you included the word "All" to the beginning of your quote, AB, I would be tempted to add; "but Air Marshals are more so than others".
Generals are products of a bureaucratic apparatus.
Join Date: May 2006
Location: 2 m South of Radstock VRP
Posts: 2,042
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Correct me if I’m wrong but isn’t the fundamental flaw in HERRICK the lack of a clear, unambiguous Objective? From that follows a lack of clear Strategy. Strategy is predominantly Political.
The respective Chiefs of Staff have command of the Tactical, which is limited by force numbers, equipment capability, availability and supply logistics. Prof Robinson seems not to believe in the “can do “spirit to the point of, if you haven’t got the means, don’t start the job. I can’t think of a single campaign over the last 100 years where the “means” were certainties.
Clearly, it his opinion for which the Government will, no doubt, be grateful.
The respective Chiefs of Staff have command of the Tactical, which is limited by force numbers, equipment capability, availability and supply logistics. Prof Robinson seems not to believe in the “can do “spirit to the point of, if you haven’t got the means, don’t start the job. I can’t think of a single campaign over the last 100 years where the “means” were certainties.
Clearly, it his opinion for which the Government will, no doubt, be grateful.
It's abundantly clear that the Labour government does not place the armed forces, or the actions in which they engage them, on a high level of priority. One only has to look at how the have messed about with the position of Minister of Defence to see that - the absolute low point being making it a job share with the Scottish job. Brown pays lip service to the military, but he doesn't really care about the forces.
Therefore, whatever their grand talk about a new defence paradigm, they have singularly failed to back it up with real committment. The "drip drip " of soldiers into Afghanistan reinforces this piecemeal approach to strategy, despite numerous senior officers continually asking for more.
More often than not, military actions are won by overwhelming force. This government's approach to military strategy is driven by short-sighted budgetary and political considerations. Ergo, it's currently doomed to fail, and the failure will be entirely political.
Therefore, whatever their grand talk about a new defence paradigm, they have singularly failed to back it up with real committment. The "drip drip " of soldiers into Afghanistan reinforces this piecemeal approach to strategy, despite numerous senior officers continually asking for more.
More often than not, military actions are won by overwhelming force. This government's approach to military strategy is driven by short-sighted budgetary and political considerations. Ergo, it's currently doomed to fail, and the failure will be entirely political.
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: 45 yards from a tropical beach
Posts: 1,103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Winning
When 'Monty' took over in North Africa, he would not commit until his demands for troop reinforcement had been met. When Douglas Bader was a Squadron Commander he put his career on the line by grounding his squadron until his engineers had the requisite spares to keep his squadron's aircraft serviceable. To paraphrase Monty's words:
"If you cannot win, do not engage!"
"If you cannot win, do not engage!"
Join Date: Dec 2004
Location: england
Posts: 143
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
How many Generals etc have been sacked..?
Begs the Question doesn't it ! With all the "..we asked for this months ago...and still not enough " how many force commanders have been sacked ? Answer none. Reason : lack of backbone whilst in the job/too close to pension/too close to being snapped up by large military supplier...it has always been very clear to me that the further up the command chain people travel the lack of spine they have. If it takes junior officers to stand up and say the things everyone is thinking perhaps there should be a wholesale change in the way we do Command structure.
I wonder how many commanders in the field have been read the riot act by their superiors whilst the same superiors have been all to willing to pass the buck.
And before the "serve queen and country Brigade" get up and shout about servitude we should look back at WWI and realise how the commanders of that campaign wasted that generation because of the inability to say no.
5d2d
I wonder how many commanders in the field have been read the riot act by their superiors whilst the same superiors have been all to willing to pass the buck.
And before the "serve queen and country Brigade" get up and shout about servitude we should look back at WWI and realise how the commanders of that campaign wasted that generation because of the inability to say no.
5d2d
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: 45 yards from a tropical beach
Posts: 1,103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Caution
Absolutely right mate.
When I was attending the Junior Officers' Staff School, back in the days of the Cold War, our instructor (a Wing Commander) was asked about wartime leadership. His reply was a classic:
"In a peace-time Air Force, the cautious man gets promoted, but don't quote me!"
When I was attending the Junior Officers' Staff School, back in the days of the Cold War, our instructor (a Wing Commander) was asked about wartime leadership. His reply was a classic:
"In a peace-time Air Force, the cautious man gets promoted, but don't quote me!"
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Muscat, Oman
Posts: 604
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Quote "the magnitude of global conflict has declined by 60 per cent in two decades"
I don't remember this many casualties from NI and the Falklands combined! Thank goodness for global peace. Tw*t!
I don't remember this many casualties from NI and the Falklands combined! Thank goodness for global peace. Tw*t!
Red On, Green On
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Between the woods and the water
Age: 24
Posts: 6,487
Likes: 0
Received 2 Likes
on
2 Posts
(a Wing Commander) was asked about wartime leadership said "In a peace-time Air Force, the cautious man gets promoted, but don't quote me!"
