Chinook - Still Hitting Back 3 (Merged)
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pulse 1
This then is the fault which accelerated the aircraft from the "60-80Kts" groundspeed observed by Mr Holbrook to 162.8 kts just prior to the flare before impact.
It also prevented the Crew from climbing to Safety altitude and/or turning the aircraft away from the high ground they knew lay ahead. In addition it prevented them from making a distress call or squawking emergency on the transponder.
This continued until just prior to impact when this fault disappeared without trace and enabled the operating pilot to flare the aircraft in a last desperate attempt to avoid disaster.
With all this going on I am surprised that the crew had the spare capacity to select a new waypoint on the SuperTANS computer, an action which required three deliberate acts by the Pilots.
This then is the fault which accelerated the aircraft from the "60-80Kts" groundspeed observed by Mr Holbrook to 162.8 kts just prior to the flare before impact.
It also prevented the Crew from climbing to Safety altitude and/or turning the aircraft away from the high ground they knew lay ahead. In addition it prevented them from making a distress call or squawking emergency on the transponder.
This continued until just prior to impact when this fault disappeared without trace and enabled the operating pilot to flare the aircraft in a last desperate attempt to avoid disaster.
With all this going on I am surprised that the crew had the spare capacity to select a new waypoint on the SuperTANS computer, an action which required three deliberate acts by the Pilots.
Can someone enlighten me as to the real worth of Mr Holbrook’s perception of the a/c speed? I can fully appreciate his evidence concerning weather, visibility, etc must be valuable (although inconclusive, given his sea-level viewpoint) but from what I have read he reluctantly, and only when pressed, benchmarked his speed estimation on that of a few Sea Kings seen flying near Troon. MoD says the typical speed of a Sea King is 100-110 knots, but that is disingenuous (as are most of MoD’s utterances on this subject). I’m no flyer, but any Sea King around those parts must be from Gannet and their activities (in simple terms) would range from a short slow transit toward, for example, Arran (a few miles) to practice ASW, to full speed on a SAR mission. Seems to me that this is a devious MoD device to detract from known facts (failure of airworthiness processes, unserviceability, fault history, etc) which were withheld from the inquisitors. Through no fault of his own, Mr Holbrook was placed in an invidious position, and too much is made of his fleeting view of something that would not ordinarily detract him, and probably only registered in hindsight following the crash. I have a great interest in military a/c, but I don’t stand in my garden watching the Chinooks flying overhead wondering “How high/fast is she going, and in what attitude?” And I wouldn’t expect a court to seek my evidence, never mind accept it as gospel. That’s what ADRs are for (which MoD doesn’t like being reminded of).
The MoD rests its case on three self imposed pillars – legal, technical and airmanship. To satisfy their own criteria for gross negligence, each must have rock solid foundations. The first two have collapsed entirely, and the last rests on quicksand.
The MoD rests its case on three self imposed pillars – legal, technical and airmanship. To satisfy their own criteria for gross negligence, each must have rock solid foundations. The first two have collapsed entirely, and the last rests on quicksand.
cazatou,
You are at it again. Your last post is full of nonsensical implications. You are implying that, if one believes that loose pallet springs possibly contributed to the accident (which I am not qualified to even have an opinion about), one must also accept that Mr Holbrook's estimate of the speed must also be true. That is total nonsense.
If a detached spring did contribute to the accident, according to Sq Ldr Burke it could affect all control functions. Could it not therefore affect their ability to climb or turn? Pretty distracting too I would imagine.
You say that the "fault disappeared without trace". This particular fault did not disappear "without trace". The pallet springs were detached after the accident.
You now imply that the fault occurred, if it actually did, before waypoint change. What justification can you possibly have for assuming that?
"Allowing the pilots to flare the aircraft in a last desperate attempt to avoid disaster" - why do you assume that it was under control at that time? What evidence do you have? Could it not be a co-incidence that it happened to be in that attitude at impact? I seem to remember one expert saying that the rudder position was most unusual and quite difficult to achieve in practise.
If I may say so, your arguments are becoming wilder and more undisciplined by the day. I wonder what your game is.
You are at it again. Your last post is full of nonsensical implications. You are implying that, if one believes that loose pallet springs possibly contributed to the accident (which I am not qualified to even have an opinion about), one must also accept that Mr Holbrook's estimate of the speed must also be true. That is total nonsense.
If a detached spring did contribute to the accident, according to Sq Ldr Burke it could affect all control functions. Could it not therefore affect their ability to climb or turn? Pretty distracting too I would imagine.
You say that the "fault disappeared without trace". This particular fault did not disappear "without trace". The pallet springs were detached after the accident.
You now imply that the fault occurred, if it actually did, before waypoint change. What justification can you possibly have for assuming that?
"Allowing the pilots to flare the aircraft in a last desperate attempt to avoid disaster" - why do you assume that it was under control at that time? What evidence do you have? Could it not be a co-incidence that it happened to be in that attitude at impact? I seem to remember one expert saying that the rudder position was most unusual and quite difficult to achieve in practise.
If I may say so, your arguments are becoming wilder and more undisciplined by the day. I wonder what your game is.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
pulse 1
Do I understand correctly that you agree that they flew directly towards high ground, at high speed and that they impacted that high ground in IMC and it was not their fault.
PS you didn't answer the point about them changing the SuperTANS to the next waypoint.
PPS So you also agree that Mr Holbrook's assessment of the aircrafts speed is suspect.
Do I understand correctly that you agree that they flew directly towards high ground, at high speed and that they impacted that high ground in IMC and it was not their fault.
PS you didn't answer the point about them changing the SuperTANS to the next waypoint.
PPS So you also agree that Mr Holbrook's assessment of the aircrafts speed is suspect.
Last edited by cazatou; 9th Aug 2006 at 21:42.
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: Wiltshire
Posts: 1,360
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Who said THEY were IMC, there is plenty said about the WX but what evidence is there to state 100% and without any shadow of a doubt that they WERE IMC.
Cat, bearing in mind all your years of flying and all the weird and wonderful WX conditions you must have experianced can you not accept that the perception on those on the ground with regards to height, speed, WX etc rarely aggree with those on the flight deck, and therefore there is some doubt.
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Cat, bearing in mind all your years of flying and all the weird and wonderful WX conditions you must have experianced can you not accept that the perception on those on the ground with regards to height, speed, WX etc rarely aggree with those on the flight deck, and therefore there is some doubt.
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Last edited by Always_broken_in_wilts; 9th Aug 2006 at 22:19.
I am sorry cazatou but your last post makes even less sense than the previous one. Now you're getting wilder by the hour.
With respect to the Supertans, I asked you why you assume that, if anything did go wrong, it couldn't have done so AFTER the waypoint change. Please answer.
With respect to the Supertans, I asked you why you assume that, if anything did go wrong, it couldn't have done so AFTER the waypoint change. Please answer.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Pulse1
.
It is rather you who is “at it again” pursuing a “game” of “… challenging any attempt to fix any basic parameters of this flight ….” as I phrased it in my last post – an appeal to deaf ears again.
.
As to the final “flare” or evasive manoeuvre, you wrote << I seem to remember one expert saying that the rudder position was most unusual and quite difficult to achieve in practise.>>; I also recall this from the transcript of one of the inquiries – and I also recall an experienced Chinook pilot expressing puzzlement at that statement; this has surely been discussed at length before – I gave a couple of references to its being a correct procedure in a large twin rotor to slow down rapidly (yawing broadside to use the large fuselage to brake) and it appeals to one’s common sense – why don’t you canvass the views of several experienced Chinook pilots and post them here? That way, another point of contention could be clearly settled.
.
If you reconstruct the flight from the available data (as Boeing’s Mr. Mitchel did) incorporating the demanded steer to the right after waypoint change and this final flare, you get a remarkably simple picture of the a/c having maintained a cruise speed for most of the trip and a path that had not deviated significantly – any difficulty with control or speed would have had to have miraculously got it back on track and on time! – unless you are saying that any control problem prevented them from doing anything between that right turn demand just after waypoint change and the final 4 seconds when the flare was commenced – let us think about this:
The actual geographical position of waypoint A was right on the coast and the change of waypoint on the SuperTANS was already very close in;
Assuming that they had no control emergency at waypoint change they would surely not have made that subsequent steer demand to the right if they knew how close in they actually were – nevertheless, this leaves a very small window in time for controls to jam and yet release in time for that final flare;
As has been said by others on this thread, this helicopter would have required continuous control input in all axes just to fly it level in the leg up to this point – it was not as though the controls were just left in a trimmed state hands off – and so the odds of a control jam occurring in just this part of the flight are very small.
.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again – the only logical explanation for that steer demand to the right after waypoint change (so close in) was that they were lining up on something – something that misled them as to how close in they were.
.
It is rather you who is “at it again” pursuing a “game” of “… challenging any attempt to fix any basic parameters of this flight ….” as I phrased it in my last post – an appeal to deaf ears again.
.
As to the final “flare” or evasive manoeuvre, you wrote << I seem to remember one expert saying that the rudder position was most unusual and quite difficult to achieve in practise.>>; I also recall this from the transcript of one of the inquiries – and I also recall an experienced Chinook pilot expressing puzzlement at that statement; this has surely been discussed at length before – I gave a couple of references to its being a correct procedure in a large twin rotor to slow down rapidly (yawing broadside to use the large fuselage to brake) and it appeals to one’s common sense – why don’t you canvass the views of several experienced Chinook pilots and post them here? That way, another point of contention could be clearly settled.
.
If you reconstruct the flight from the available data (as Boeing’s Mr. Mitchel did) incorporating the demanded steer to the right after waypoint change and this final flare, you get a remarkably simple picture of the a/c having maintained a cruise speed for most of the trip and a path that had not deviated significantly – any difficulty with control or speed would have had to have miraculously got it back on track and on time! – unless you are saying that any control problem prevented them from doing anything between that right turn demand just after waypoint change and the final 4 seconds when the flare was commenced – let us think about this:
The actual geographical position of waypoint A was right on the coast and the change of waypoint on the SuperTANS was already very close in;
Assuming that they had no control emergency at waypoint change they would surely not have made that subsequent steer demand to the right if they knew how close in they actually were – nevertheless, this leaves a very small window in time for controls to jam and yet release in time for that final flare;
As has been said by others on this thread, this helicopter would have required continuous control input in all axes just to fly it level in the leg up to this point – it was not as though the controls were just left in a trimmed state hands off – and so the odds of a control jam occurring in just this part of the flight are very small.
.
I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again – the only logical explanation for that steer demand to the right after waypoint change (so close in) was that they were lining up on something – something that misled them as to how close in they were.
Join Date: Apr 2005
Location: France 46
Age: 77
Posts: 1,743
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
pulse 1
Of course it could have done, but that then leaves us with an aircraft flying at 160kts + directly at fog enshrouded high ground which it subsequently hit.
What act of folly,in your book, do you have to commit before it becomes negligence?
Of course it could have done, but that then leaves us with an aircraft flying at 160kts + directly at fog enshrouded high ground which it subsequently hit.
What act of folly,in your book, do you have to commit before it becomes negligence?
Walter
Again, while I can’t absolutely discount your theory (on the use of AN/AYD-1 Personal Locator System), for it to be valid would require the AN/ARS-6(V) in the aircraft to have been pre-loaded with the unique crypto ID of the actual AN/PRC-112s borne by the troops on the ground. And unless the Mk2 was already fitted with a broadband UHF homing system (and few a/c were in 94), and the matched antennae feeders could be used by AN/ARS-6(V), then the sudden appearance of two very obvious UHF homing blades on the airframe would be very noticeable. And, to avoid a hefty mod and pretty extensive trials, these pre-existing antennae would have to be already configured such that one was shared with a UHF radio, and the Tx/Rx positioned more or less precisely where the UHF Homer was. This, in addition to the reasons I gave recently, is simply too much to keep hidden all these years. An awful lot of work involving at least four contractors, and in 1993/4 at least seven departments across MoD, must go into such an installation design to reach the stage where one pitches up and plugs ARS-6 in as a role mod.
Sorry mate, it’s technically feasible but in my opinion extremely unlikely. Taken with categorical assurances from people who were there (Aldergrove) that ZD576 wasn’t AYD-1 enabled, I think you have to accept there are easier ways to discredit the verdict. The difficult thing is persuading the MoD to be honourable in the face of factual evidence.
Again, while I can’t absolutely discount your theory (on the use of AN/AYD-1 Personal Locator System), for it to be valid would require the AN/ARS-6(V) in the aircraft to have been pre-loaded with the unique crypto ID of the actual AN/PRC-112s borne by the troops on the ground. And unless the Mk2 was already fitted with a broadband UHF homing system (and few a/c were in 94), and the matched antennae feeders could be used by AN/ARS-6(V), then the sudden appearance of two very obvious UHF homing blades on the airframe would be very noticeable. And, to avoid a hefty mod and pretty extensive trials, these pre-existing antennae would have to be already configured such that one was shared with a UHF radio, and the Tx/Rx positioned more or less precisely where the UHF Homer was. This, in addition to the reasons I gave recently, is simply too much to keep hidden all these years. An awful lot of work involving at least four contractors, and in 1993/4 at least seven departments across MoD, must go into such an installation design to reach the stage where one pitches up and plugs ARS-6 in as a role mod.
Sorry mate, it’s technically feasible but in my opinion extremely unlikely. Taken with categorical assurances from people who were there (Aldergrove) that ZD576 wasn’t AYD-1 enabled, I think you have to accept there are easier ways to discredit the verdict. The difficult thing is persuading the MoD to be honourable in the face of factual evidence.
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: Wiltshire
Posts: 1,360
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have asked Wally on several occasions to give a credible explanation as to how the kit needed to support his conspiricy theory actually got fitted to the aircraft. He has refused on almost every occasion, apart from one " it's a simple plug and play fix" offering to give me an answer because there simply is'nt one. He will without a shadow of a doubt ignore this further request for an explanation and continue to blindly spout this tosh
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
tecumse
You wrote:
<<Again, while I can’t absolutely discount your theory (on the use of AN/AYD-1 Personal Locator System), for it to be valid would require the AN/ARS-6(V) in the aircraft to have been pre-loaded with the unique crypto ID of the actual AN/PRC-112s borne by the troops on the ground.>>
Are you sure that you are not getting confused with more modern systems? – and perhaps, for the system of the vintage we are referring to, confusing the ground equipment having a unique code that identifies it with needing to know that code to interact with it at all?
Your interpretation of how this system worked would have rendered it just about useless – I think that you will find on further inquiry that any contemporary PRC112 operating in DME mode within range would have been detected although the caller ID may not have been recognized! – you would still have got accurate range and approximate bearing – which would have cropped up automatically as just another waypoint on the a/c’s nav display.
Regarding voice communication – again, think 1994 – the system allowed AM voice communication (not, presumably, encrypted) – this went through the intercom system (just plugged in somewhere handy I suppose) and, say, if a pilot had selected UHF guard on his intercom, he would have been able to communicate with the person on the ground through the ARS6 unit without having to do any other switching etc – and wasn’t the handling pilot’s intercom in just such a position for which there is no other clear explanation? UHF wouldn’t have been the frequency of choice for a distress call at their altitude in that location, would it?
.
The rest of your description of the system, the work involved in fitting the onboard equipment, is a surprise – are you familiar with the fit for the Bosnian conflict period (1995)? – these sets of equipment were delivered “palletized” for the easy transfer between the RAF’s HC2 Chinooks – I understood that this implied the (small) uhf antennas must have been on the same module/ pallete – how else could they have been transferred “easily”? Perhaps you could find out the configuration for that period and clear this up? – it could hardly be a great state secret by now with new technical advances. I thought I had sent you the relevant information I had some time ago. The sales pitch from the manufacturer (in the public domain) implied a largely self contained system with simple interfaces as one option/ variant to the deluxe tailored fit – still giving approximate bearing as well as range – this is at odds with your description of the work involved. Please check out the following extract from manufacturers blurb that puts it rather succinctly:
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
VARIANTS/UPGRADES
The AN/ARS-6(V) can operate as a stand-alone system that can be installed on any aircraft with connections limited to aircraft power and the voice intercom system. It can also be installed as a data bus system using ARINC 429 or MIL-STD-1553 bus controllers and displays that support an integrated cockpit design.
When PLS is installed as a data bus system, range and steering data can be automatically transferred to the onboard navigation system. This sets the survivor's position as a "way-point."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>.
Spelling it out, if the 47D that the HC2 was based upon had that bus and a slot for plugging into that bus in the nav racks the stand alone variant ARS6 would be very much a “plug in” – I am sure that the manufacturer would give you all the technical detail that you ask for – don’t be shy – and you would of course already have confirmed the bus in the HC2 before writing your last post, wouldn’t you?
.
You wrote:
<<Taken with categorical assurances from people who were there (Aldergrove) that ZD576 wasn’t AYD-1 enabled,>>
I don’t understand “AYD enabled” – in my understanding of the system, it was fitted or it was not, the basic architecture of the HC2 Chinook was the same as the 47D in this area and the on board equipment was designed to interface simply with the 47D – that is, there should not have been any preparation required to fit the module. Again, when you come back with a convincing description of the 1995 fit, I may well be corrected.
Do you mean that you have had these assurances from the ground crew who actually did the work on the nav racks just before that final flight? – this would be excellent stuff – if they swore that such a module was not fitted, great, end of story. I am surprised, though, if it was they whom you were referring to – the work that they did (without paperwork) seems to be only vaguely understood – one would have thought that they would have been brought to the inquiries to testify as to what exactly in detail that they did bearing in mind that they had worked on the nav equipment just before a flight that flew into a mountain.
.
Anyway, I hope you are not mistaken because I thought that you had the relevant technical background to clear this up. If you are correct then this line of inquiry is indeed finished and I would be grateful for that – I am pursuing this as a matter of obligation rather than self gratification.
You wrote:
<<Again, while I can’t absolutely discount your theory (on the use of AN/AYD-1 Personal Locator System), for it to be valid would require the AN/ARS-6(V) in the aircraft to have been pre-loaded with the unique crypto ID of the actual AN/PRC-112s borne by the troops on the ground.>>
Are you sure that you are not getting confused with more modern systems? – and perhaps, for the system of the vintage we are referring to, confusing the ground equipment having a unique code that identifies it with needing to know that code to interact with it at all?
Your interpretation of how this system worked would have rendered it just about useless – I think that you will find on further inquiry that any contemporary PRC112 operating in DME mode within range would have been detected although the caller ID may not have been recognized! – you would still have got accurate range and approximate bearing – which would have cropped up automatically as just another waypoint on the a/c’s nav display.
Regarding voice communication – again, think 1994 – the system allowed AM voice communication (not, presumably, encrypted) – this went through the intercom system (just plugged in somewhere handy I suppose) and, say, if a pilot had selected UHF guard on his intercom, he would have been able to communicate with the person on the ground through the ARS6 unit without having to do any other switching etc – and wasn’t the handling pilot’s intercom in just such a position for which there is no other clear explanation? UHF wouldn’t have been the frequency of choice for a distress call at their altitude in that location, would it?
.
The rest of your description of the system, the work involved in fitting the onboard equipment, is a surprise – are you familiar with the fit for the Bosnian conflict period (1995)? – these sets of equipment were delivered “palletized” for the easy transfer between the RAF’s HC2 Chinooks – I understood that this implied the (small) uhf antennas must have been on the same module/ pallete – how else could they have been transferred “easily”? Perhaps you could find out the configuration for that period and clear this up? – it could hardly be a great state secret by now with new technical advances. I thought I had sent you the relevant information I had some time ago. The sales pitch from the manufacturer (in the public domain) implied a largely self contained system with simple interfaces as one option/ variant to the deluxe tailored fit – still giving approximate bearing as well as range – this is at odds with your description of the work involved. Please check out the following extract from manufacturers blurb that puts it rather succinctly:
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
VARIANTS/UPGRADES
The AN/ARS-6(V) can operate as a stand-alone system that can be installed on any aircraft with connections limited to aircraft power and the voice intercom system. It can also be installed as a data bus system using ARINC 429 or MIL-STD-1553 bus controllers and displays that support an integrated cockpit design.
When PLS is installed as a data bus system, range and steering data can be automatically transferred to the onboard navigation system. This sets the survivor's position as a "way-point."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>.
Spelling it out, if the 47D that the HC2 was based upon had that bus and a slot for plugging into that bus in the nav racks the stand alone variant ARS6 would be very much a “plug in” – I am sure that the manufacturer would give you all the technical detail that you ask for – don’t be shy – and you would of course already have confirmed the bus in the HC2 before writing your last post, wouldn’t you?
.
You wrote:
<<Taken with categorical assurances from people who were there (Aldergrove) that ZD576 wasn’t AYD-1 enabled,>>
I don’t understand “AYD enabled” – in my understanding of the system, it was fitted or it was not, the basic architecture of the HC2 Chinook was the same as the 47D in this area and the on board equipment was designed to interface simply with the 47D – that is, there should not have been any preparation required to fit the module. Again, when you come back with a convincing description of the 1995 fit, I may well be corrected.
Do you mean that you have had these assurances from the ground crew who actually did the work on the nav racks just before that final flight? – this would be excellent stuff – if they swore that such a module was not fitted, great, end of story. I am surprised, though, if it was they whom you were referring to – the work that they did (without paperwork) seems to be only vaguely understood – one would have thought that they would have been brought to the inquiries to testify as to what exactly in detail that they did bearing in mind that they had worked on the nav equipment just before a flight that flew into a mountain.
.
Anyway, I hope you are not mistaken because I thought that you had the relevant technical background to clear this up. If you are correct then this line of inquiry is indeed finished and I would be grateful for that – I am pursuing this as a matter of obligation rather than self gratification.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ABIW
I think I have explained as best I can on numerous occasions how I think it may have been fitted – and as I do not indeed know exactly how for sure, it is only suggestion and an appeal for anyone who may be able to determine this to come forward.
.
The evidence that such a system was fitted is simply that everything that is known or that can be reasonably assumed from the available data suggests that they were heading for a particular point closer in than they needed to go, in those conditions, to simply turn up the coast on their ferry flight;
in such conditions, where the hazard can be seen but its detail obscured such that it is difficult to judge visually one’s distance off, there is only one system that a helo pilot will trust more than his visual judgment, more than the SuperTANS, more than his dead reckoning, to allow him to approach closely yet keep him a small safe distance from the murk (to keep him in the clear/ to prevent him entering it) – and that is a DME system of some sort (ask helo pilots – esp North Sea helo pilots);
as at their altitude the MAC beacon was not LOS the only possible candidate remains the PRC112 system;
such a system gives an approximate azimuth bearing (+/- 4deg) which seems the only feasible explanation for that RIGHT steer demand just after waypoint change (already very close in);
ZD576 was the first RAF HC2 that could have a go of this system and US personnel trained, experienced, and equipped with the ground equipment were stationed at Mac – some of those in the team would no doubt have been able to have been convinced of the worth of such an opportune demo;
The ground equipment only had to be ½ a mile or so further inland, up the hill from where it was supposed to be and everything is explained.
.
There was a strong political motive for them to be stopped from getting to their meeting – strong enough, I would suggest, for the possibility of them being set up this way to be at least explored thoroughly. If any of you have something that may confirm the use of this system but are holding back (apart from Off Sec Act, etc) because you think you are just covering up a test that went horribly wrong – think again, you could be preventing something much more serious coming to light, something that is worth putting personal considerations aside for.
I think I have explained as best I can on numerous occasions how I think it may have been fitted – and as I do not indeed know exactly how for sure, it is only suggestion and an appeal for anyone who may be able to determine this to come forward.
.
The evidence that such a system was fitted is simply that everything that is known or that can be reasonably assumed from the available data suggests that they were heading for a particular point closer in than they needed to go, in those conditions, to simply turn up the coast on their ferry flight;
in such conditions, where the hazard can be seen but its detail obscured such that it is difficult to judge visually one’s distance off, there is only one system that a helo pilot will trust more than his visual judgment, more than the SuperTANS, more than his dead reckoning, to allow him to approach closely yet keep him a small safe distance from the murk (to keep him in the clear/ to prevent him entering it) – and that is a DME system of some sort (ask helo pilots – esp North Sea helo pilots);
as at their altitude the MAC beacon was not LOS the only possible candidate remains the PRC112 system;
such a system gives an approximate azimuth bearing (+/- 4deg) which seems the only feasible explanation for that RIGHT steer demand just after waypoint change (already very close in);
ZD576 was the first RAF HC2 that could have a go of this system and US personnel trained, experienced, and equipped with the ground equipment were stationed at Mac – some of those in the team would no doubt have been able to have been convinced of the worth of such an opportune demo;
The ground equipment only had to be ½ a mile or so further inland, up the hill from where it was supposed to be and everything is explained.
.
There was a strong political motive for them to be stopped from getting to their meeting – strong enough, I would suggest, for the possibility of them being set up this way to be at least explored thoroughly. If any of you have something that may confirm the use of this system but are holding back (apart from Off Sec Act, etc) because you think you are just covering up a test that went horribly wrong – think again, you could be preventing something much more serious coming to light, something that is worth putting personal considerations aside for.
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: Wiltshire
Posts: 1,360
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"I think I have explained as best I can on numerous occasions how I think it may have been fitted"
Could you just run it by me again then as I missed your explanation as to how this kit was fitted without anyone in the engineering chain, command chain or family and friends of the deceased chain ever mentioning it or even hinting about it over the last 12 years, go on please tell me how it got fitted
You have had countless folks, all eminently more informed than yourself tell you IT WAS NOT FITTED yet still you will not accept it, even when tucumseh explains the hurdles that would have needed to be jumped to get it fitted you still won't accept it
IMHO you really ought to consider seeking help
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Could you just run it by me again then as I missed your explanation as to how this kit was fitted without anyone in the engineering chain, command chain or family and friends of the deceased chain ever mentioning it or even hinting about it over the last 12 years, go on please tell me how it got fitted
You have had countless folks, all eminently more informed than yourself tell you IT WAS NOT FITTED yet still you will not accept it, even when tucumseh explains the hurdles that would have needed to be jumped to get it fitted you still won't accept it
IMHO you really ought to consider seeking help
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Last edited by Always_broken_in_wilts; 11th Aug 2006 at 00:23.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ABIW
So you are saying that when the system WAS fitted in 1995 this would have been known by all and sundry – yet no one comes forward to describe it.
Perhaps you can find out and tell us all what was involved in the fit (in 1995) – or are you going to deny that it was fitted by then?
.
tecumse
Perhaps a little more explanation of the system may help explain the point you made regarding the sets requiring the same code – briefly from memory:
In a personnel recovery scenario in hostile territory, the PRC112 is dormant until interrogated by the a/c’s ARS6;
So that the en cannot get the personnel’s equipment to transpond to a similar signal giving away the personnel’s position, the PRC112 only responds to a pulse which is coded appropriately for a friendly a/c;
Conversely, the return pulse from the PRC112 contains an identifying code for that particular set so that the a/c can have some confidence that they are approaching the right people and further confidence is obtained by talking to them through the system via the intercom;
For the system to be practical when working with other NATO units – eg in an op area when asked to retrieve another friendly’s downed pilot – the commonality of the code for a large block of sets is required;
Presumably this code would be changed en masse when thought necessary;
I doubt that, at an early time in its introduction into service, the system would have had different code from, say, the Americans.
So you are saying that when the system WAS fitted in 1995 this would have been known by all and sundry – yet no one comes forward to describe it.
Perhaps you can find out and tell us all what was involved in the fit (in 1995) – or are you going to deny that it was fitted by then?
.
tecumse
Perhaps a little more explanation of the system may help explain the point you made regarding the sets requiring the same code – briefly from memory:
In a personnel recovery scenario in hostile territory, the PRC112 is dormant until interrogated by the a/c’s ARS6;
So that the en cannot get the personnel’s equipment to transpond to a similar signal giving away the personnel’s position, the PRC112 only responds to a pulse which is coded appropriately for a friendly a/c;
Conversely, the return pulse from the PRC112 contains an identifying code for that particular set so that the a/c can have some confidence that they are approaching the right people and further confidence is obtained by talking to them through the system via the intercom;
For the system to be practical when working with other NATO units – eg in an op area when asked to retrieve another friendly’s downed pilot – the commonality of the code for a large block of sets is required;
Presumably this code would be changed en masse when thought necessary;
I doubt that, at an early time in its introduction into service, the system would have had different code from, say, the Americans.
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: Wiltshire
Posts: 1,360
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Walter,
I am not interested in 1995 what I am asking you directly is how the equipment was fitted to the ZD576 for that fateful day.
So one more time but with a little more emphasis
Could you just run it by me again then as I missed your explanation as to how this kit was fitted to ZD576 for that last journey without anyone in the engineering chain, command chain or family and friends of the deceased chain ever mentioning it or even hinting about it over the last 12 years, go on please tell me how it got fitted
You have had countless folks, all eminently more informed than yourself tell you IT WAS NOT FITTED TO ZD576 yet you still will not accept it, even when tucumseh explains the hurdles that would have needed to be jumped to get it fitted to ZD576 for it's last flight you still won't accept it.
I have made it as clear as possible now that I would like you to explain to me how the equipment you need to support your theory was fitted to ZD576 for it last flight
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
I am not interested in 1995 what I am asking you directly is how the equipment was fitted to the ZD576 for that fateful day.
So one more time but with a little more emphasis
Could you just run it by me again then as I missed your explanation as to how this kit was fitted to ZD576 for that last journey without anyone in the engineering chain, command chain or family and friends of the deceased chain ever mentioning it or even hinting about it over the last 12 years, go on please tell me how it got fitted
You have had countless folks, all eminently more informed than yourself tell you IT WAS NOT FITTED TO ZD576 yet you still will not accept it, even when tucumseh explains the hurdles that would have needed to be jumped to get it fitted to ZD576 for it's last flight you still won't accept it.
I have made it as clear as possible now that I would like you to explain to me how the equipment you need to support your theory was fitted to ZD576 for it last flight
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Walter
To keep things simple, I tried to avoid technical detail. You describe the system accurately, although it is unclear if the MoD had PRC-112s with embedded GPS in 1994. Or if the variant capable of auto-entry of waypoints existed then. We have probably read the same material. Additionally, last month a Government/MoD publication carried a quite detailed article on ARS-6/PRC-112 (in the context of GPS jamming/spoofing, explaining why DME was retained in AYD-1) which led the reader to believe the UK had the system. I received this in the post at home, so one assumes its open source.
For our purposes, the important thing is the voice comms, antennae and the level of installation design, trials and acceptance work which would be necessary. If the MoD wanted to install such a system, the first questions would be (a) Do we have the real estate? (b) Is there an existing UHF Homer? (c) If so, does it share one of its antennae with a UHF radio?
The first is obvious – you need physical space to host the ARS-6; Tx/Rx, Control Display Unit, Remote Display Unit, Antenna Switching Unit and the Homing Pair of Antennae with their phase-matched feeders. And, on the ground, the TS-4360 Test Set to aid maintenance.
The second and third determine the complexity of the installation design and trials. This is the area requiring input from a host of MoD and Industry sources, which I think would be difficult to hide.
A palletised solution sounds simple, and indeed is from the maintainers point of view. They have a pallet, they follow (hopefully) simple (hopefully) instructions, and in short order the a/c has a different capability/role. But, a lot of work goes into simplifying such an installation. The pallet in this case would only hold the Tx/Rx and ASU and would, I suggest, be pretty adjacent to the (hard mounted) external antennae. But where are the CDU and RDU? They must be in the cockpit or cabin, being operated by aircrew. They are not standalone in the laptop sense – they need to be hard-wired to the ARS-6 Tx/Rx and a/c intercom (and perhaps a data bus if one exists). If they were hand held (and they are not designed to be) there would have had to be some serious thought, trials and approvals behind the safety implications of wander leads.
You mention 243MHz. The system operates across 225-300MHz (3000 channels in 25kHz steps). This is the whole point – it is an advance over a simplistic, non-LPD UHF Guard system, and why new antennae are required. I don’t know what other frequency band you are referring to but a VHF homing system needs substantially larger antennae, usually mounted either side of the cockpit area. Similarly, so would a PRC-112 VHF equivalent.
Walter, I am not saying your theory is impossible. I know you understand the way the system works. I am trying to articulate the relative complexity of process and procedure required to procure, install, use and maintain ANY such kit. To achieve this in 1993, the aircraft and equipment project offices in PE (and perhaps AML) would be involved, over a sustained period of time. SY, due to crypto. Won’t go further here, except to say this is not one guy in an office. DOR(Air) and RAFSC would have to demonstrate a requirement to secure funding. Again, not just one office. In industry, the aircraft DA (Boeing) and equipment DAs (ARS-6, PRC-112, Intercom, Radio) would be involved. Boscombe Down. RAF units. Publications to be amended. Aircraft to be fitted “for but not with”. And so on. The point I and others are making is that it would be very obvious to anyone concerned with Mk2 that such a system was fitted; and the paper trail voluminous. Yes, one can hide or destroy, but we have been assured by more than one Ppruner who was stationed at Aldergrove that the kit wasn’t there. I think you have to accept their word.
The reason I don’t dismiss your theory entirely is because some of the above process and procedure can be circumvented by the SEM route. But, and this is a point I’ve made often, the inherent risks and resultant problems caused by MoD’s use (abuse) of SEMs are well known, and wholly related to their equally well known failures regarding airworthiness. In my opinion, this last is already beyond all doubt on ZD576, whereas your theory is just that – a theory. That is why I think this thread should concentrate on known facts which can undermine the MoD’s position, with theories discussed elsewhere.
Regards
To keep things simple, I tried to avoid technical detail. You describe the system accurately, although it is unclear if the MoD had PRC-112s with embedded GPS in 1994. Or if the variant capable of auto-entry of waypoints existed then. We have probably read the same material. Additionally, last month a Government/MoD publication carried a quite detailed article on ARS-6/PRC-112 (in the context of GPS jamming/spoofing, explaining why DME was retained in AYD-1) which led the reader to believe the UK had the system. I received this in the post at home, so one assumes its open source.
For our purposes, the important thing is the voice comms, antennae and the level of installation design, trials and acceptance work which would be necessary. If the MoD wanted to install such a system, the first questions would be (a) Do we have the real estate? (b) Is there an existing UHF Homer? (c) If so, does it share one of its antennae with a UHF radio?
The first is obvious – you need physical space to host the ARS-6; Tx/Rx, Control Display Unit, Remote Display Unit, Antenna Switching Unit and the Homing Pair of Antennae with their phase-matched feeders. And, on the ground, the TS-4360 Test Set to aid maintenance.
The second and third determine the complexity of the installation design and trials. This is the area requiring input from a host of MoD and Industry sources, which I think would be difficult to hide.
A palletised solution sounds simple, and indeed is from the maintainers point of view. They have a pallet, they follow (hopefully) simple (hopefully) instructions, and in short order the a/c has a different capability/role. But, a lot of work goes into simplifying such an installation. The pallet in this case would only hold the Tx/Rx and ASU and would, I suggest, be pretty adjacent to the (hard mounted) external antennae. But where are the CDU and RDU? They must be in the cockpit or cabin, being operated by aircrew. They are not standalone in the laptop sense – they need to be hard-wired to the ARS-6 Tx/Rx and a/c intercom (and perhaps a data bus if one exists). If they were hand held (and they are not designed to be) there would have had to be some serious thought, trials and approvals behind the safety implications of wander leads.
You mention 243MHz. The system operates across 225-300MHz (3000 channels in 25kHz steps). This is the whole point – it is an advance over a simplistic, non-LPD UHF Guard system, and why new antennae are required. I don’t know what other frequency band you are referring to but a VHF homing system needs substantially larger antennae, usually mounted either side of the cockpit area. Similarly, so would a PRC-112 VHF equivalent.
Walter, I am not saying your theory is impossible. I know you understand the way the system works. I am trying to articulate the relative complexity of process and procedure required to procure, install, use and maintain ANY such kit. To achieve this in 1993, the aircraft and equipment project offices in PE (and perhaps AML) would be involved, over a sustained period of time. SY, due to crypto. Won’t go further here, except to say this is not one guy in an office. DOR(Air) and RAFSC would have to demonstrate a requirement to secure funding. Again, not just one office. In industry, the aircraft DA (Boeing) and equipment DAs (ARS-6, PRC-112, Intercom, Radio) would be involved. Boscombe Down. RAF units. Publications to be amended. Aircraft to be fitted “for but not with”. And so on. The point I and others are making is that it would be very obvious to anyone concerned with Mk2 that such a system was fitted; and the paper trail voluminous. Yes, one can hide or destroy, but we have been assured by more than one Ppruner who was stationed at Aldergrove that the kit wasn’t there. I think you have to accept their word.
The reason I don’t dismiss your theory entirely is because some of the above process and procedure can be circumvented by the SEM route. But, and this is a point I’ve made often, the inherent risks and resultant problems caused by MoD’s use (abuse) of SEMs are well known, and wholly related to their equally well known failures regarding airworthiness. In my opinion, this last is already beyond all doubt on ZD576, whereas your theory is just that – a theory. That is why I think this thread should concentrate on known facts which can undermine the MoD’s position, with theories discussed elsewhere.
Regards
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Perth, Western Australia
Posts: 786
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Tecumse
I don’t understand why you appear to be so confused over this system – I will collate the info I have and send it to you via PM when I have time later this week – perhaps when we agree we have a full understanding of this system we can enlighten the other readers rather than confuse them as is no doubt happening now (I hope that this was not your intention - as others have done in regard to so many aspects of this flight such as local weather, flight plan, etc etc etc).
Just a few points now off the top of my head:
Have you found out what bus was used in HC2 Chinooks?;
Are you intending to find out details of the fit in HC2s in 1995?;
47Ds upon which the HC2 was based were designed to accommodate this very system (check their specs) – are you saying that the RAF would have had this capability removed for the HC2 only to have to go through the process you describe to get them in by 1995?;
The 1994 contemporary PRC112 (the ground equipment) did not have embedded GPS – you are confused with the later variants – it was a communicator which could transpond as a UHF DME so that a/c equipped with ARS6 interrogator could home in for rescue/ extraction – later models could transmit GPS cords;
The azimuth homing function was only very approximate (+/- 4deg) – that’s all you’d need to compliment the accurate range – the tiny UHF antenna would not need to have great lateral separation and, while performance with them mounted externally would obviously give them optimum performance, the stand alone unit within the fuselage gives adequate performance for modest range low level personnel location (ie typical helo application);
As I thought I had explained before, the ARS6 literally plugs into an intercom socket; to talk to the person on the ground with a PRC112, the pilot selects the appropriate intercom channel and his communication is through the ARS6’s UHF system – there is no interface to any other UHF a/c radio required.
That’ll have to do for now – some positive, considered feedback would be much appreciated.
.
ABIW
I suggest you read my recent posts properly – I came here for that specific information.
I don’t understand why you appear to be so confused over this system – I will collate the info I have and send it to you via PM when I have time later this week – perhaps when we agree we have a full understanding of this system we can enlighten the other readers rather than confuse them as is no doubt happening now (I hope that this was not your intention - as others have done in regard to so many aspects of this flight such as local weather, flight plan, etc etc etc).
Just a few points now off the top of my head:
Have you found out what bus was used in HC2 Chinooks?;
Are you intending to find out details of the fit in HC2s in 1995?;
47Ds upon which the HC2 was based were designed to accommodate this very system (check their specs) – are you saying that the RAF would have had this capability removed for the HC2 only to have to go through the process you describe to get them in by 1995?;
The 1994 contemporary PRC112 (the ground equipment) did not have embedded GPS – you are confused with the later variants – it was a communicator which could transpond as a UHF DME so that a/c equipped with ARS6 interrogator could home in for rescue/ extraction – later models could transmit GPS cords;
The azimuth homing function was only very approximate (+/- 4deg) – that’s all you’d need to compliment the accurate range – the tiny UHF antenna would not need to have great lateral separation and, while performance with them mounted externally would obviously give them optimum performance, the stand alone unit within the fuselage gives adequate performance for modest range low level personnel location (ie typical helo application);
As I thought I had explained before, the ARS6 literally plugs into an intercom socket; to talk to the person on the ground with a PRC112, the pilot selects the appropriate intercom channel and his communication is through the ARS6’s UHF system – there is no interface to any other UHF a/c radio required.
That’ll have to do for now – some positive, considered feedback would be much appreciated.
.
ABIW
I suggest you read my recent posts properly – I came here for that specific information.
Join Date: Feb 2002
Location: Wiltshire
Posts: 1,360
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Walter,
"ABIW
I suggest you read my recent posts properly – I came here for that specific information."
Good grief Walter you have been given the answer on numerous occasions.
Please tell me which part of "the equipment needed to support your conspiracy theory was not fitted to ZD576 at the time of the accident" you are unable to understand
If you go back through the many pages of this thread you will find countless referances from well informed people telling you exactly this but you are still unable to accept it.
I have asked you directly to tell me how you think this equipment was fitted to the A/C and you are simply unable to give a credible response which, in the light of your persistence with this ludicrous claim has made you look extremly foolish and will be the reason so many emminent posters here have simply pressed their ignore button with regards to you.
You and tecumseh can continue to debate till the cows come home the working parts of a whole feast of avionic equipment but we both know you will never be able to answer the very simple question I have posed.
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
"ABIW
I suggest you read my recent posts properly – I came here for that specific information."
Good grief Walter you have been given the answer on numerous occasions.
Please tell me which part of "the equipment needed to support your conspiracy theory was not fitted to ZD576 at the time of the accident" you are unable to understand
If you go back through the many pages of this thread you will find countless referances from well informed people telling you exactly this but you are still unable to accept it.
I have asked you directly to tell me how you think this equipment was fitted to the A/C and you are simply unable to give a credible response which, in the light of your persistence with this ludicrous claim has made you look extremly foolish and will be the reason so many emminent posters here have simply pressed their ignore button with regards to you.
You and tecumseh can continue to debate till the cows come home the working parts of a whole feast of avionic equipment but we both know you will never be able to answer the very simple question I have posed.
all spelling mistakes are "df" alcohol induced
Walter
I’m sorry, but I wasn’t debating the functionality of the AYD-1 system. It is academic as you have been assured it was not fitted. I did refer to part of the functionality to illustrate the hoops one must jump through to install/use/support/maintain ANY such system. My aim was to re-enforce the statements of others.
I was particularly taken with your;
“ARS6 literally plugs into an intercom socket; to talk to the person on the ground with a PRC112, the pilot selects the appropriate intercom channel and his communication is through the ARS6’s UHF system”.
I know of no radio / homing system that operates by simply plugging into an “intercom socket”. Or any intercom with such a socket which provides the necessary power, control and interlocks through a single interface. And I certainly wouldn’t trust the performance of a UHF Homer with antennae mounted on an internal pallet, with “line of sight” through various bulkheads, seats, superstructure etc. Too many negatives.
If you want to pursue this separately, why not make a FOI request? Ask MoD for;
a. The Aircraft Specification for the Mk2, at an issue reflecting the ARS-6 fit. It MUST exist, as Part 5 contains a statement of the performance of the aircraft and its equipment, and is used to assess acceptability for Service use. It makes a clear distinction between guaranteed performance parameters and those which are estimates, and is used as a basis for MAR (CAR) recommendations.
b. (or alternatively) Appendix A to the Aircraft Specification (Schedule of Equipment) which MUST list all equipment, including source of supply, fit category and type. Appendix A is ESSENTIAL for development and production specifications.
c. Minutes of the Appendix A Acceptance Meeting. Can’t imagine no-one commenting on ARS-6.
d. The ARS-6 Radio Installation Memorandum.
All are pre-requisites to achieving airworthiness. If its in the Appendix A, there MUST be an audit trail back through, for example, Form 59, Forms 100A for every single black box, functional and physical configuration audits etc etc etc. If you find any anomalies, or omissions, then I’m sure many on this forum would be interested as this would provide (further) evidence of a poor airworthiness audit trail on equipment we KNOW was fitted. You never know, there may not even be an Aircraft Specification!! Or an Appendix A. Or RIMs for every piece of avionics. Now wouldn’t that be something!
Best wishes
I’m sorry, but I wasn’t debating the functionality of the AYD-1 system. It is academic as you have been assured it was not fitted. I did refer to part of the functionality to illustrate the hoops one must jump through to install/use/support/maintain ANY such system. My aim was to re-enforce the statements of others.
I was particularly taken with your;
“ARS6 literally plugs into an intercom socket; to talk to the person on the ground with a PRC112, the pilot selects the appropriate intercom channel and his communication is through the ARS6’s UHF system”.
I know of no radio / homing system that operates by simply plugging into an “intercom socket”. Or any intercom with such a socket which provides the necessary power, control and interlocks through a single interface. And I certainly wouldn’t trust the performance of a UHF Homer with antennae mounted on an internal pallet, with “line of sight” through various bulkheads, seats, superstructure etc. Too many negatives.
If you want to pursue this separately, why not make a FOI request? Ask MoD for;
a. The Aircraft Specification for the Mk2, at an issue reflecting the ARS-6 fit. It MUST exist, as Part 5 contains a statement of the performance of the aircraft and its equipment, and is used to assess acceptability for Service use. It makes a clear distinction between guaranteed performance parameters and those which are estimates, and is used as a basis for MAR (CAR) recommendations.
b. (or alternatively) Appendix A to the Aircraft Specification (Schedule of Equipment) which MUST list all equipment, including source of supply, fit category and type. Appendix A is ESSENTIAL for development and production specifications.
c. Minutes of the Appendix A Acceptance Meeting. Can’t imagine no-one commenting on ARS-6.
d. The ARS-6 Radio Installation Memorandum.
All are pre-requisites to achieving airworthiness. If its in the Appendix A, there MUST be an audit trail back through, for example, Form 59, Forms 100A for every single black box, functional and physical configuration audits etc etc etc. If you find any anomalies, or omissions, then I’m sure many on this forum would be interested as this would provide (further) evidence of a poor airworthiness audit trail on equipment we KNOW was fitted. You never know, there may not even be an Aircraft Specification!! Or an Appendix A. Or RIMs for every piece of avionics. Now wouldn’t that be something!
Best wishes