The Ground war: your thoughts?
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: I see lights bearing 045
Posts: 103
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Just a few points as people seem to rejoice in putting down the US Forces (whom I have worked with, and rarely found wanting)
Vietnam was a political loss, never military. - read A Better War - or do two years of research as I have - To be published by Random House in spring 2003
US Special Forces have performed more combat operations than anyone other NATO Spec Ops unit since 1945, the vast majority successful
Somalia. There were some dozen highly successful raids, before the disaster of Blackhawk down. The US Rangers and Delta killed about 10 times more than they lost and got CMH's.
The US Airborne are the most experienced Paratroopers in the World. Period. They have performed more Combat operations than anyone else.
The Russians only lost 15,000 in Afghanistan in 10 years! Only 1,500 a year. The vast majority very poorly trained conscripts. Sov. Airborne are very poor quality compared to NATO, as are their SPF troops, - who suffered very few casualties from the Afghans
[ 23 October 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
Vietnam was a political loss, never military. - read A Better War - or do two years of research as I have - To be published by Random House in spring 2003
US Special Forces have performed more combat operations than anyone other NATO Spec Ops unit since 1945, the vast majority successful
Somalia. There were some dozen highly successful raids, before the disaster of Blackhawk down. The US Rangers and Delta killed about 10 times more than they lost and got CMH's.
The US Airborne are the most experienced Paratroopers in the World. Period. They have performed more Combat operations than anyone else.
The Russians only lost 15,000 in Afghanistan in 10 years! Only 1,500 a year. The vast majority very poorly trained conscripts. Sov. Airborne are very poor quality compared to NATO, as are their SPF troops, - who suffered very few casualties from the Afghans
[ 23 October 2001: Message edited by: Low and Slow ]
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 276
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
VFR....just who exactly do you think the mujihadin became? Some joined the Northern Alliance, most joined the Taliban, and quite a few have changed sides each time a town is won or lost.
Rag Heads? poorly equipped and loosely trained as they are, they know the territory and the advantages it gives. They have nothing to loose. They are (misguided thought this is) fighting what they believe to be a devinely instituted war at the very hand of Allah. They did not sign the Geneva convention. They are committed to the utter destruction of the decadent west and the death of all Americans.
Even with the smartest of smart weapons the Serbs still managed to walk away from 3 months of sustained bombing having lost only a small amount of defunct military hardware. For the most part we were bombing carboard cut-outs. Firepower is only as good as the intelligence used to identify targets. Unfortunately the US do not cover themselves in glory when it comes to intelligence and target mis-idents, such as the Red Cross depot it bombed last week.
Since the end of the cold war the CIA have all but wound up its foreign operatives and relies too heavilty on technology to gain intel. Without eyes and ears on the ground it is impossible to gain a clear picture of events. Instead the US has relied on data from other governments which is notoriously unreliable. this is further exacerbated by the actions of the likes of the Belgians who delight in frustrating the process of sharing information (not to mention harbouring terrorists and putting sensitive information in the public domain).
The net result of this over reliance on technology is that the US is all but incapable of fighting a low-tech war on the ground. It should be noted that the Sept 11th attacks were very low-tech in comparison to anyt perceived threat of a nuclear strike from rogue nations that the "Son of Starwars" was supposed to prevent.
I doubt very much whether the US will have anything less than a very hard time, in spite of their apparent operational experience. Neither their doctrine nor their training is geared towards guerilla warfare of this kind.
Rag Heads? poorly equipped and loosely trained as they are, they know the territory and the advantages it gives. They have nothing to loose. They are (misguided thought this is) fighting what they believe to be a devinely instituted war at the very hand of Allah. They did not sign the Geneva convention. They are committed to the utter destruction of the decadent west and the death of all Americans.
Even with the smartest of smart weapons the Serbs still managed to walk away from 3 months of sustained bombing having lost only a small amount of defunct military hardware. For the most part we were bombing carboard cut-outs. Firepower is only as good as the intelligence used to identify targets. Unfortunately the US do not cover themselves in glory when it comes to intelligence and target mis-idents, such as the Red Cross depot it bombed last week.
Since the end of the cold war the CIA have all but wound up its foreign operatives and relies too heavilty on technology to gain intel. Without eyes and ears on the ground it is impossible to gain a clear picture of events. Instead the US has relied on data from other governments which is notoriously unreliable. this is further exacerbated by the actions of the likes of the Belgians who delight in frustrating the process of sharing information (not to mention harbouring terrorists and putting sensitive information in the public domain).
The net result of this over reliance on technology is that the US is all but incapable of fighting a low-tech war on the ground. It should be noted that the Sept 11th attacks were very low-tech in comparison to anyt perceived threat of a nuclear strike from rogue nations that the "Son of Starwars" was supposed to prevent.
I doubt very much whether the US will have anything less than a very hard time, in spite of their apparent operational experience. Neither their doctrine nor their training is geared towards guerilla warfare of this kind.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: New Jersey, USA
Posts: 54
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Kbf1,
I have to disagree, You doubt the warfighting capabilities of US spec forces? I have spent many years with these guys and alot of what they do is hardly "high tech" actually most of it is decidedly low-tech. The difference here is they have the High tech "high ground" if needed, also the supply chain going to the Taliban is not the equivilent of what the Vietcong had or the Muhajadin, its probably non-existent. This fact alone will have a huge effect on the outcome...the problem I see is after these criminals are gone, can we stop the next generation? and don't say it can't be done. The Germans and Japanese seem to enjoy the fruits of freedom and they were as bitter enemies as one could imagine.
I have to disagree, You doubt the warfighting capabilities of US spec forces? I have spent many years with these guys and alot of what they do is hardly "high tech" actually most of it is decidedly low-tech. The difference here is they have the High tech "high ground" if needed, also the supply chain going to the Taliban is not the equivilent of what the Vietcong had or the Muhajadin, its probably non-existent. This fact alone will have a huge effect on the outcome...the problem I see is after these criminals are gone, can we stop the next generation? and don't say it can't be done. The Germans and Japanese seem to enjoy the fruits of freedom and they were as bitter enemies as one could imagine.
VFR,
KBF did you the courtesy of responding carefully to your half-literate and ill-punctuated nonsense.
Shifting alliances and a tradition of inter-communal warfare means that the Taliban you despise are much the same, man for man, as any other Afghan fighter. You and I may not like them. You don't understand them, but I'd suggest that Taliban fighters are ill-equipped, ill-disciplined, but pretty effective guerrilla fighters. Under-estimate them as much as you want.
That's quite enough of my time wasted, so as a 'Bleeding Heart' 'jerk' who 'sounds like Belgium' (?) I'm now just going to resort to abuse, I'm afraid.
Pygmy!
KBF did you the courtesy of responding carefully to your half-literate and ill-punctuated nonsense.
Shifting alliances and a tradition of inter-communal warfare means that the Taliban you despise are much the same, man for man, as any other Afghan fighter. You and I may not like them. You don't understand them, but I'd suggest that Taliban fighters are ill-equipped, ill-disciplined, but pretty effective guerrilla fighters. Under-estimate them as much as you want.
That's quite enough of my time wasted, so as a 'Bleeding Heart' 'jerk' who 'sounds like Belgium' (?) I'm now just going to resort to abuse, I'm afraid.
Pygmy!
Join Date: Jan 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 276
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Roc, in terms of skills and drills US special forces are as good as any. My issue is more with the intelligence gathering operations, or more specifically the lack of them, undertaken by the USA.
Since the decline of the former Soviet Union the US has all but eradicated the use of field agents relying instead on spy satellites and second hand information from "friendly" governments. Part of the reason OB-L managed to launch the attacks in the first place was because of a lack of field intel.
The Gulf War was the first "push-button" war of modern warfare fought with systems developped in the late 80's. Most of those systems were as yet untried in a post-vietnam theatre and were reasonably successful. As a consequence the doctrines that were experimented with during the Gulf war, at least with the US, depended on the total air superiority in-theatre. It is worth noting that during the Gulf when it was assumed that air superiority was gained the element of command and control of air resources was abrogated from central planning not just to sqn commanders, but to individual pilots who were cleared to pick off and attack targets at will. The net result was an attack by A10 pilots on lines of Staffordshire Regiment Warrior armoured vehicles. When you read Gen de la Billiere's account of his command of British forces during the Gulf he talk explicitly of the approach he made to Gen Walt Boomer to establish the cause of the incident Gen Boomer went catatonic with rage blaming the Staffs for being in the wrong place even though they were well inside British lines and limits of exploitation. In fact, they were exactly where they should have been during that stage of the advance. The issue here is that the intelligence used to identify targets on the ground was out of date before it reached those on the front line with the relevant analysis. It is also worth noting that the US had fewer liaison officers serving alongside British forces as the British had attached to US forces. It is my opinion that more liaison officers (intel on the ground) attached to 1 UK Div may have prevented the mis-ident.
If we are to stand any chance of being successful in whatever mission (still undefined, but that is a seperate issue) is undertaken intelligence needs to come from the ground, not spy satellites and planes at FL450. For a good example of the what and why of field intel I suggest a book called "The Operators" by James Rennie which describes the activities of 14 Int in NI. In an environment as inhospitable as Afghanistan there are a million and one places to hide. If ground forces are to flush out OB-L they will need intel from intel on the ground from operatives who have infiltrated Al-Quaeda with inside knowledge. As it is the CIA cannot find Pashtuk speakers to translate information they have gained since Sept 11th, let alone train, insert, and work sleepers.
As it is the bombing raids have managed to destroy a village, a Red Cross station, and a mosque in the past 3 weeks. The only thing I doubt are the reported 1000 civilian deaths that the Taliban are reporting.
I would also be less concerned with the logistics chain of the Taliban. The main logistic effort is not with the infil stage of any operation, but the in-theatre support and the exfil which take up to 70% of the logistic main effort in support of any operation. This, of course, is assuming you know where OB-L is.
The fact is that the Pentagon have already voiced surprise that the Taliban are putting up a fight that they never expected. It seems that the Pentagon may have under-estimated the resiliance of the Taliban. Perhaps the estimate of Taliban morale and the main effort required to achieve the objective would be better made with more effective field intelligence?
Best of look to the 1000 Booties going onto the carriers tomorrow.
[ 25 October 2001: Message edited by: kbf1 ]
Since the decline of the former Soviet Union the US has all but eradicated the use of field agents relying instead on spy satellites and second hand information from "friendly" governments. Part of the reason OB-L managed to launch the attacks in the first place was because of a lack of field intel.
The Gulf War was the first "push-button" war of modern warfare fought with systems developped in the late 80's. Most of those systems were as yet untried in a post-vietnam theatre and were reasonably successful. As a consequence the doctrines that were experimented with during the Gulf war, at least with the US, depended on the total air superiority in-theatre. It is worth noting that during the Gulf when it was assumed that air superiority was gained the element of command and control of air resources was abrogated from central planning not just to sqn commanders, but to individual pilots who were cleared to pick off and attack targets at will. The net result was an attack by A10 pilots on lines of Staffordshire Regiment Warrior armoured vehicles. When you read Gen de la Billiere's account of his command of British forces during the Gulf he talk explicitly of the approach he made to Gen Walt Boomer to establish the cause of the incident Gen Boomer went catatonic with rage blaming the Staffs for being in the wrong place even though they were well inside British lines and limits of exploitation. In fact, they were exactly where they should have been during that stage of the advance. The issue here is that the intelligence used to identify targets on the ground was out of date before it reached those on the front line with the relevant analysis. It is also worth noting that the US had fewer liaison officers serving alongside British forces as the British had attached to US forces. It is my opinion that more liaison officers (intel on the ground) attached to 1 UK Div may have prevented the mis-ident.
If we are to stand any chance of being successful in whatever mission (still undefined, but that is a seperate issue) is undertaken intelligence needs to come from the ground, not spy satellites and planes at FL450. For a good example of the what and why of field intel I suggest a book called "The Operators" by James Rennie which describes the activities of 14 Int in NI. In an environment as inhospitable as Afghanistan there are a million and one places to hide. If ground forces are to flush out OB-L they will need intel from intel on the ground from operatives who have infiltrated Al-Quaeda with inside knowledge. As it is the CIA cannot find Pashtuk speakers to translate information they have gained since Sept 11th, let alone train, insert, and work sleepers.
As it is the bombing raids have managed to destroy a village, a Red Cross station, and a mosque in the past 3 weeks. The only thing I doubt are the reported 1000 civilian deaths that the Taliban are reporting.
I would also be less concerned with the logistics chain of the Taliban. The main logistic effort is not with the infil stage of any operation, but the in-theatre support and the exfil which take up to 70% of the logistic main effort in support of any operation. This, of course, is assuming you know where OB-L is.
The fact is that the Pentagon have already voiced surprise that the Taliban are putting up a fight that they never expected. It seems that the Pentagon may have under-estimated the resiliance of the Taliban. Perhaps the estimate of Taliban morale and the main effort required to achieve the objective would be better made with more effective field intelligence?
Best of look to the 1000 Booties going onto the carriers tomorrow.
[ 25 October 2001: Message edited by: kbf1 ]
Join Date: May 2001
Location: Newcastle/UK
Posts: 1,476
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I have to say where the Americans and the Brits are falling down this time is the PR.
Different spokesmen every night, contradicting each other, compared to the way information and the press were handled during the Gulf War this is pathetic.
We come across as indecisive fumbling and apologetic,that may or may not reflect reality, but if no hard information is given to the press in real time those bastards will just invent it.
It takes a couple of days to admit that a helicopter has crashed accidently and meanwhile the press are lapping up what the Taliban are claiming.
They need to get there act together, we are begining to look stupid.
Different spokesmen every night, contradicting each other, compared to the way information and the press were handled during the Gulf War this is pathetic.
We come across as indecisive fumbling and apologetic,that may or may not reflect reality, but if no hard information is given to the press in real time those bastards will just invent it.
It takes a couple of days to admit that a helicopter has crashed accidently and meanwhile the press are lapping up what the Taliban are claiming.
They need to get there act together, we are begining to look stupid.
