Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod
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Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod
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As I have said elsewhere, this man is not clever. I seriously suspect the subtleties of a safety case, or indeed an airworthiness argument in general, are beyond him. Unfortunately for the families involved, he doesn't realise this, so he'll continue to use his own words instead of taking the counsel that's available to him.
Sun
Sun
Ainsworth repeatedly said defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
Ain't it funny how MoD quote QinetiQ when it suits them but totally reject their advice when it doesn't comply with the political imperative? Example - Boscombe's recommendation that Chinook Mk2 be grounded.
Jobsworth is a non-entity. He is also a fool, witnessed by him placing in writing that he supports rulings that the airworthiness regs can be ignored. But the people in MoD who advise him to say this are dangerous fools - which is much worse.
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Bob Ainsworth should remember the words of Richard M. Nixon, who said shortly before being exposed over Watergate "I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter who is involved."
He may find himself being forced to eat his own words when he reads out the findings of the Haddon-Cave review to Parliament in October.
He may find himself being forced to eat his own words when he reads out the findings of the Haddon-Cave review to Parliament in October.
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It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.
the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
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anita gofradump
Are you saying Jimmy Jones is unable to quote from a report and are you also saying that a permanent heat sensor with real time display of the temperatures of the cross-feed duct has been fitted to all Nimrods then.
Or has your head been buried in the sand for too long ?
Are you saying Jimmy Jones is unable to quote from a report and are you also saying that a permanent heat sensor with real time display of the temperatures of the cross-feed duct has been fitted to all Nimrods then.
Or has your head been buried in the sand for too long ?
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Read this very carefully TD, and do your best not to twist my words....
My head is far from buried and I will not be baited by you into a childlike, online slagging match.
Not everyone is trying to do you an injustice Mr Knight, in fact, some of us are actually more behind your final objective than you think.
It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:
Quote:
the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.
Quote:
the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.
Not everyone is trying to do you an injustice Mr Knight, in fact, some of us are actually more behind your final objective than you think.
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anita gofradump
Like TD I am not sure what can be "dated and useless" about quoting from a QineiQ document, dated Feb 2009. If we put to one side Bob Ainsworth and all the people under him who have mislead families and MPs regarding Nimrod safety, we are left with advice that unaccepteble risks still exist. What is suggested is that whilst the x-feed ducting is selected "closed" and the indications show "closesd" there is no guarantee that the temp of the x-feed is below auto-ignition. How many Flight Engs know that? And what is wrong with suggesting constant monitoring? If shut-off valves "leak" in flight, and temperatures rise, there is no way crews will know of this with the current set up.
If anyone has a copy of the report can they post the important sections?
DV
Like TD I am not sure what can be "dated and useless" about quoting from a QineiQ document, dated Feb 2009. If we put to one side Bob Ainsworth and all the people under him who have mislead families and MPs regarding Nimrod safety, we are left with advice that unaccepteble risks still exist. What is suggested is that whilst the x-feed ducting is selected "closed" and the indications show "closesd" there is no guarantee that the temp of the x-feed is below auto-ignition. How many Flight Engs know that? And what is wrong with suggesting constant monitoring? If shut-off valves "leak" in flight, and temperatures rise, there is no way crews will know of this with the current set up.
If anyone has a copy of the report can they post the important sections?
DV
Reminder of Jobsworth's CV
From his own ePolitix website:
Wikipedia adds:
His rock-solid Defence pedigree stretches all the way back to 2007.
Now, what was the question..?
I was born and raised in the constituency that I represent. I was educated at Foxford Comprehensive School, Coventry Library Service and the University of Life.
Worked for Jaguar Cars in Coventry and held various offices in the trade union and Labour movement including Shop Steward, Secretary of Joint Shop Steward Committee, Sheet Metal Workers Union Branch President and Constituency Labour Party Chairman.
Coventry City Councillor between 1984 – 1992 during which time he held the positions of Deputy Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Elected to Parliament in 1992 and served on the Environment Select Committee. He was appointed a Whip in 1995.
In Government he has been; Lord Commissioner of HM Treasury 1997-2001 (Government Whip), Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions January 2001- June 2001, Home Office Minister with responsibility for Drugs and organised Crime 2001 – June 2003, Government Deputy Chief Whip 2003-2007, when he was appointed to the position of Minister for the Armed Forces at the MOD. In 2009 Bob was appointed as Secretary of State for Defence.
Worked for Jaguar Cars in Coventry and held various offices in the trade union and Labour movement including Shop Steward, Secretary of Joint Shop Steward Committee, Sheet Metal Workers Union Branch President and Constituency Labour Party Chairman.
Coventry City Councillor between 1984 – 1992 during which time he held the positions of Deputy Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Elected to Parliament in 1992 and served on the Environment Select Committee. He was appointed a Whip in 1995.
In Government he has been; Lord Commissioner of HM Treasury 1997-2001 (Government Whip), Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions January 2001- June 2001, Home Office Minister with responsibility for Drugs and organised Crime 2001 – June 2003, Government Deputy Chief Whip 2003-2007, when he was appointed to the position of Minister for the Armed Forces at the MOD. In 2009 Bob was appointed as Secretary of State for Defence.
During 1982 and 1983, he was a candidate member of the International Marxist Group, but he was never a full member of that organisation.
Ainsworth is one of the 98 MPs who voted to keep their expense details secret. In 2007-8, he claimed the maximum permissible amount of £23,083 for second-home allowances, making him the joint highest claimant. He has been criticized for alleged excessive claims for repairs to his second home.
Ainsworth is one of the 98 MPs who voted to keep their expense details secret. In 2007-8, he claimed the maximum permissible amount of £23,083 for second-home allowances, making him the joint highest claimant. He has been criticized for alleged excessive claims for repairs to his second home.
Now, what was the question..?
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I doubt he could even answer a question on international marxism, well we're all marxists now eh Bob?
YouTube - International Marxist Group
tw**s.....
YouTube - International Marxist Group
tw**s.....
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EDSett100;
Where are you?
You have read these reports, what are you telling your Flt Engs?
DV
Where are you?
You have read these reports, what are you telling your Flt Engs?
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 22nd Jun 2009 at 06:28.
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You are entitled to your opinion, but fact would show you to be far from correct.
(A1 G1 Z1, in the green and free from H1N1, at this juncture)
You, however, are still an internet troll, laying bait for poor souls to take the bite. Your 20.51 post shows this to be true.
(A1 G1 Z1, in the green and free from H1N1, at this juncture)
You, however, are still an internet troll, laying bait for poor souls to take the bite. Your 20.51 post shows this to be true.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
You may have a long wait if you are looking for a politician with Defence or Duty of Care credentials. As avoidable and tragically predictable as all this is, you will find that the Rt honourable Member for Coventry North East has only 2 objectives;
1. Get re-elected.
2. Try to avoid any payouts for MoD Liability.
Of those, 1 is clearly the prime directive for Bob. He is the original empty vessel, so don't look for any kind of justice or integrity here. As for the role of Qinetiq, is that the highly regarded bit, whose recommendations are sometimes embarrassing and uncomfortable, or is that the "sell your granny to the natives as long as it makes a profit bit? Hard to be sure with the bipolar nature of that very political organisation, no wonder the Government uses them at its convenience.
Sadly, there is no real news here, just more abrogation of responsibility and dereliction of duty by politicians and senior officers. Will the last Senior Officer in the Armed Forces with a set of balls please stand up?
1. Get re-elected.
2. Try to avoid any payouts for MoD Liability.
Of those, 1 is clearly the prime directive for Bob. He is the original empty vessel, so don't look for any kind of justice or integrity here. As for the role of Qinetiq, is that the highly regarded bit, whose recommendations are sometimes embarrassing and uncomfortable, or is that the "sell your granny to the natives as long as it makes a profit bit? Hard to be sure with the bipolar nature of that very political organisation, no wonder the Government uses them at its convenience.
Sadly, there is no real news here, just more abrogation of responsibility and dereliction of duty by politicians and senior officers. Will the last Senior Officer in the Armed Forces with a set of balls please stand up?
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DV you asked for anyone to post key pages of the report if they had it. I am not going to post the entire report. It would take far too much work I'm afraid. There are only two references to ALARP in the final report in February this year and both are reported in the article. But this is the executive summary.
Executive Summary
This report presents the results of an assessment of the Nimrod MR2 hot air components and has been developed using zonal analysis, examination of supporting document sets and a physical inspection of the aircraft's hot air components. ln addition, briefings from Suitably Qualified Expert Personnel (SQEPs) at RAF Kinloss were used to improve understanding of the Nimrod's operational and maintenance activities. These SQEPs were also utilised as a resource to answer technical queries as they arose throughout the course of the zonal analysis. Additionally, expert advice was sought from industry to underpin conclusions reached regarding the physical construction and operation of hot air system components.
During the analysis, due consideration was given to the risk mitigation actions already put in place by the IPT. It should be noted that, throughout this report, the term "risk" is used in its broadest sense, and is in no way indicative of any statistical or quantitative risk analysis being performed (as per Section 1.7). As there is no defined hot air "system" for Nimrod and, consequently, no quantitative safety target, this analysis is of a purely qualitative and subjective nature. Furthermore, due to the lack of any safety target, no statement can or has been made as to whether the hot air system risks identified in this report have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable( ALARP) in line with the requirements of JSP 553.
Overall, the analysis of the Nimrod hot air components has resulted in 18 zonal observations and 12 recommendations for the Nimrod IPT. These observations and recommendations are provided in Sections 8.2 and 10 of this report.
The observations made during the review were mainly related to hot air ducting, its insulation and its proximity, and interaction with, other aircraft structures, services and components. This interaction can be separated into two categories:
1. A potential failure of the duct and,/or its insulation causing an escape of hot gas, which adversely effects another aircraft structure, system or component.
2. A potential condition where a combustible fluid finds a migratory route to a section of hot air duct, which then acts as a source of auto-ignition.
Currently, there is insufficient information available regarding the hot air ducting and its insulation to draw any demonstrable conclusion on the overall level of risk being carried. Any such conclusion will not be possible until information on the damage limits, tolerances, performance, temperature attenuation, and any damage effects on these parameters, becomes available.
This report presents the results of an assessment of the Nimrod MR2 hot air components and has been developed using zonal analysis, examination of supporting document sets and a physical inspection of the aircraft's hot air components. ln addition, briefings from Suitably Qualified Expert Personnel (SQEPs) at RAF Kinloss were used to improve understanding of the Nimrod's operational and maintenance activities. These SQEPs were also utilised as a resource to answer technical queries as they arose throughout the course of the zonal analysis. Additionally, expert advice was sought from industry to underpin conclusions reached regarding the physical construction and operation of hot air system components.
During the analysis, due consideration was given to the risk mitigation actions already put in place by the IPT. It should be noted that, throughout this report, the term "risk" is used in its broadest sense, and is in no way indicative of any statistical or quantitative risk analysis being performed (as per Section 1.7). As there is no defined hot air "system" for Nimrod and, consequently, no quantitative safety target, this analysis is of a purely qualitative and subjective nature. Furthermore, due to the lack of any safety target, no statement can or has been made as to whether the hot air system risks identified in this report have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable( ALARP) in line with the requirements of JSP 553.
Overall, the analysis of the Nimrod hot air components has resulted in 18 zonal observations and 12 recommendations for the Nimrod IPT. These observations and recommendations are provided in Sections 8.2 and 10 of this report.
The observations made during the review were mainly related to hot air ducting, its insulation and its proximity, and interaction with, other aircraft structures, services and components. This interaction can be separated into two categories:
1. A potential failure of the duct and,/or its insulation causing an escape of hot gas, which adversely effects another aircraft structure, system or component.
2. A potential condition where a combustible fluid finds a migratory route to a section of hot air duct, which then acts as a source of auto-ignition.
Currently, there is insufficient information available regarding the hot air ducting and its insulation to draw any demonstrable conclusion on the overall level of risk being carried. Any such conclusion will not be possible until information on the damage limits, tolerances, performance, temperature attenuation, and any damage effects on these parameters, becomes available.