Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod
fergineer:
I think that you can at least be pretty confident that the Type Approval from the DoT means that your car was constructed in accordance with UK vehicle regulations and that, for example, fuel lines will not be placed above exhaust pipes so that a clip failure would not allow the former to impinge on the latter with disastrous results. The same would apply to manufacturer type mods where problems might have been observed and corrected. Given the evidence on this forum no such confidence can be placed in UK Military Aircraft as the Airworthiness Authority (ie the MOD) has deliberately and recklessly subverted its own regulations to produce a situation where no type can be assumed to be airworthy. This is not simply a crisis for the Nimrod fleet, though its tragedy has been to be one of the tragic recipients of the consequences of such recklessness. The failure to maintain safety audits across the military fleet means that all our military aircraft suffer compromised airworthiness. The extent varies from critical to minor, but which fleet is which? You may rail against doomsayers such as I, but instead of shooting messengers a more fruitful course of action would be to demand that UK Military Airworthiness Authority be removed forthwith into a separate and independent MAA. Likewise with an MAAIB to replace the inadequate and flawed standards of Military Accident Investigations by BoIs.
Do I know that my car will not fall apart tomorrow........
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Chug,
Very well said. I think that your post sums up the problems and situation very well. No-one has ever said the engineers and crews are working their damndest to put out the very best jet available.
It is upstairs where the problem lies.
Very well said. I think that your post sums up the problems and situation very well. No-one has ever said the engineers and crews are working their damndest to put out the very best jet available.
It is upstairs where the problem lies.
Let’s assume for a minute that a thermocouple has been fitted to the X-feed duct with associated gauge and warning light, said warning light illuminates, indicating a X-feed overheat, what would be the correct action to be carried out by the crew and how do you confirm which side is leaking?
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spanners123:
If you are sitting at the end of the runway, you abort. If you are in flight, you monitor the bomb bay for leaks and get down quickly.
In accordance with the UTI, you change both valves for bay testing.
DV
If you are sitting at the end of the runway, you abort. If you are in flight, you monitor the bomb bay for leaks and get down quickly.
In accordance with the UTI, you change both valves for bay testing.
DV
DV, change both X-feed valves IAW which UTI? You stated earlier that it would be a simple mod to fit the thermocouple, so why a UTI would be issued I’m not too sure. Also, why change both? A ground run would show which one is leaking.
I can see a case for these thermocouples being fitted, just not too convinced about their usefulness.
By the way, no such thing as a simple mod.
I can see a case for these thermocouples being fitted, just not too convinced about their usefulness.
By the way, no such thing as a simple mod.
I dont know if I can articulate this properly, but here goes...
I believe the problem of an apparent lack of airworthiness duty of care has been brought about by several years (or more) of deeper and deeper defence budget diversions towards "the front line".
Diversions that didn't show as defence cuts.
Diversions that probably included transferring funds from "Back-Office" jobs, that top brass didn't see any real value in, to pay towards the direct operating costs of running a war. In the commercial world this would amount to a corporate manslaughter liability.
The new MAOS system uses the titles "Accountable Manager" for Maintenance (Pt 145) and the Operator's Maintenance Management responsibilities (one for Pt M and one for Subpart G - the CAMO).
If what I read here is true - then there is no real regulatory department within the MOD to force the accountable managers to use of funds where it is needed - or to close down a Fleet until the problem is fixed.
Is it possible that the "Accountable Manager" titles will actually mean something to the Top Brass or IPT's if they are HELD Accountable to ensure they take control of their Type Airworthiness and maintenance issues? Not with todays management environment, I feel.
Again, in civvy street these titles are given to people who can actually make the funds move to where they are required - not to some poor "lackey" who's brief is to "get on with it!"
If you want big badges - you've got to prove you're worth the money.
I'm starting to take bets on how long it will be before "Accountable Manager" disappears from MAOS?
Rigga
I believe the problem of an apparent lack of airworthiness duty of care has been brought about by several years (or more) of deeper and deeper defence budget diversions towards "the front line".
Diversions that didn't show as defence cuts.
Diversions that probably included transferring funds from "Back-Office" jobs, that top brass didn't see any real value in, to pay towards the direct operating costs of running a war. In the commercial world this would amount to a corporate manslaughter liability.
The new MAOS system uses the titles "Accountable Manager" for Maintenance (Pt 145) and the Operator's Maintenance Management responsibilities (one for Pt M and one for Subpart G - the CAMO).
If what I read here is true - then there is no real regulatory department within the MOD to force the accountable managers to use of funds where it is needed - or to close down a Fleet until the problem is fixed.
Is it possible that the "Accountable Manager" titles will actually mean something to the Top Brass or IPT's if they are HELD Accountable to ensure they take control of their Type Airworthiness and maintenance issues? Not with todays management environment, I feel.
Again, in civvy street these titles are given to people who can actually make the funds move to where they are required - not to some poor "lackey" who's brief is to "get on with it!"
If you want big badges - you've got to prove you're worth the money.
I'm starting to take bets on how long it will be before "Accountable Manager" disappears from MAOS?
Rigga
Last edited by Rigga; 24th Jun 2009 at 20:54. Reason: spellin' - alwaze spellin'
Well the $64,000 question is accountable to who, Rigga? Given testimony here that an RAF 2* ordered his subordinates to disregard the Airworthiness Regulations which they were mandated to uphold, and further to falsely certify that they nonetheless had been upheld, the nature and extent of titles becomes academic. We are back to the old rules that require all ranks to disobey an illegal order. It is to his eternal credit that there is at least one who posts here who did just that. Most didn't.
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DV, the problem with your idea about monitoring the temperature of the closed crossfeed duct is that you are moving into a triple failure condition if the sole reason for a gauge is to avoid a fire.
In no particular order the following failures must occur for there to be a fire on the surface of the closed duct:
1. Hot air leakage into the duct across a crossfeed valve with its dedicated indicator showing SHUT. The leak must therefore be very slight, bordering on insignificant, unless you want to add a 4th failure (defective indicator).
2. Air leakage out of the duct through a failed NRV, loose clamp or simply a hole. There must be flow for the leaked air to raise the temperature of the pipe skin. Yes, this could be a pre-existing fault.
3. There must also be fuel on the pipe.
For the above reason, we do not need a temperature gauge if we want to stop a fire. A hot pipe gets dangerous only when fuel is in contact with it or is very, very close in vapour form.
I am aware that QQ suggested a gauge in their report, because the individual they spoke to about this aspect of their investigation was a flight engineer. He also added that, as an eng, he is interested in everything that can happen in the aircraft and that it would be useful to know if a closed valve had leakage, so that he could report it when he landed. Thats all very well, for the purpose of monitoring one system, but there has to be additional failures before that defect contributes to a fire leading to a crash. We do not mitigate against double or triple failures. We will not use up resources just to provide the air engineer with another "useful" gauge look at.
We maintain the aircraft to the highest standards, thus minimising the risk of single failures and we fly it likewise, thus preparing ourselves for the rare occasion when the single failure gets past maintenance.
XV 230 (and all the other aircraft) had a design flaw that negated the high standards that we operate to, on the ground and in the air. I recommend you and the other critics of the Nimrod examine the cause and contributory factors of that design flaw, rather than question the way we are moving forward now.
Incidentally, a single failed valve could be diagnosed in flight if a temp gauge was fitted and a (defective) point of exit also existed.
Regards
Ed Sett
In no particular order the following failures must occur for there to be a fire on the surface of the closed duct:
1. Hot air leakage into the duct across a crossfeed valve with its dedicated indicator showing SHUT. The leak must therefore be very slight, bordering on insignificant, unless you want to add a 4th failure (defective indicator).
2. Air leakage out of the duct through a failed NRV, loose clamp or simply a hole. There must be flow for the leaked air to raise the temperature of the pipe skin. Yes, this could be a pre-existing fault.
3. There must also be fuel on the pipe.
For the above reason, we do not need a temperature gauge if we want to stop a fire. A hot pipe gets dangerous only when fuel is in contact with it or is very, very close in vapour form.
I am aware that QQ suggested a gauge in their report, because the individual they spoke to about this aspect of their investigation was a flight engineer. He also added that, as an eng, he is interested in everything that can happen in the aircraft and that it would be useful to know if a closed valve had leakage, so that he could report it when he landed. Thats all very well, for the purpose of monitoring one system, but there has to be additional failures before that defect contributes to a fire leading to a crash. We do not mitigate against double or triple failures. We will not use up resources just to provide the air engineer with another "useful" gauge look at.
We maintain the aircraft to the highest standards, thus minimising the risk of single failures and we fly it likewise, thus preparing ourselves for the rare occasion when the single failure gets past maintenance.
XV 230 (and all the other aircraft) had a design flaw that negated the high standards that we operate to, on the ground and in the air. I recommend you and the other critics of the Nimrod examine the cause and contributory factors of that design flaw, rather than question the way we are moving forward now.
Incidentally, a single failed valve could be diagnosed in flight if a temp gauge was fitted and a (defective) point of exit also existed.
Regards
Ed Sett
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Chugalug 2, I completely agree with you regarding the need for a completely separate military airworthiness authority and accident investigation branch. Why should the military be any different from the civilian world in these areas?
To my mind there are several factors in the current military environment that, in combination, are not good for airworthiness, including: massive operational demands, political pressure, severe budget restrictions, a rather over-stretched "can do attitude", the military posting people in and out of key jobs fairly regularly, and peoples' natural desire to do well to get promoted. Add all of these up and to my mind it creates a culture that is potentially vulnerable to airworthiness being compromised, not because of the people involved (the vast majority of whom are good, decent, hard-working and competent), but because there are too many conflicting pressures and demands.
Separating out airworthiness responsibility from the "service providers" (i.e. the IPTs) and the end users (front line units) would provide less opportunity for airworthiness to be compromised IMHO.
To my mind there are several factors in the current military environment that, in combination, are not good for airworthiness, including: massive operational demands, political pressure, severe budget restrictions, a rather over-stretched "can do attitude", the military posting people in and out of key jobs fairly regularly, and peoples' natural desire to do well to get promoted. Add all of these up and to my mind it creates a culture that is potentially vulnerable to airworthiness being compromised, not because of the people involved (the vast majority of whom are good, decent, hard-working and competent), but because there are too many conflicting pressures and demands.
Separating out airworthiness responsibility from the "service providers" (i.e. the IPTs) and the end users (front line units) would provide less opportunity for airworthiness to be compromised IMHO.
Cornish Stormrider and Weekend Flyer,
Thank you both for your support. This is not some arcane discussion about angels on the heads of aerial pins, it is basic bottom line stuff about the foundations of our profession. Given that this is a site dedicated to professional aviators I find it surprising and rather sad that the running, both pro and con, is left to so few. To pick up Weekend Flyer's point, supposing that following "rationalisation" Civil Airworthiness provision was handed over to "substantial" AOC holders together with Accident Investigation. Thus the BA777 accident at LHR would have been investigated by BA. Perhaps the fleet manager would have acted as president. Sound man/woman I'm sure but would anyone here put money on the exemplary AAIB work being emulated under such a limited and partial arrangement? As ever self regulation does not work, either in the civilian or the military worlds.
Thank you both for your support. This is not some arcane discussion about angels on the heads of aerial pins, it is basic bottom line stuff about the foundations of our profession. Given that this is a site dedicated to professional aviators I find it surprising and rather sad that the running, both pro and con, is left to so few. To pick up Weekend Flyer's point, supposing that following "rationalisation" Civil Airworthiness provision was handed over to "substantial" AOC holders together with Accident Investigation. Thus the BA777 accident at LHR would have been investigated by BA. Perhaps the fleet manager would have acted as president. Sound man/woman I'm sure but would anyone here put money on the exemplary AAIB work being emulated under such a limited and partial arrangement? As ever self regulation does not work, either in the civilian or the military worlds.
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Today in Parliament (25th June 2009)
Angus Robertson (Moray)(SNP);
It has emerged that the now Defence Secretary told me and families of the 14 men who died aboard RAF Nimrod XV230 that the aircraft had been made safe despite being warned it was impossible to be sure this was true. We were repeatedly told that the defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite "no statement can, or has been made" to this effect.
Can we have a debate in government time to learn which version is correct?
DV
It has emerged that the now Defence Secretary told me and families of the 14 men who died aboard RAF Nimrod XV230 that the aircraft had been made safe despite being warned it was impossible to be sure this was true. We were repeatedly told that the defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite "no statement can, or has been made" to this effect.
Can we have a debate in government time to learn which version is correct?
DV
Why no temp probe? I think EdSett has covered the multiple failure issue above - seems a reasonable explanation as to why there isn't a case for fitting one. Sounds logical to conclude the risk probabilities are just too low - and if you are spending money, its better spent elsewhere on higher risks to the aircraft. Does this argument make sense to those calling for one to be fitted? If not, why not?
Also...
...these are the same regs I take it that failed to prevent Audi from selling 1000s of cars which killed at least 5 people before they were all recalled for safety related modifications (Audi TT, circa 2000). There appears a blind belief that only military airworthiness is bad, everything else good. Why such a bitter blinkered view - couldn't get promoted?
Also...
I think that you can at least be pretty confident that the Type Approval from the DoT means that your car was constructed in accordance with UK vehicle regulations and that, for example, fuel lines will not be placed above exhaust pipes so that a clip failure would not allow the former to impinge on the latter with disastrous results.
JFZ90, no Regulatory Authority can prevent accidents happening or indeed poor designs slipping through the net. The point is of course to reduce them to a minimum. How many people die because of badly designed and built cars, given the millions that are built each year and the people (like me) who are then free to exhibit their lack of driving skills with them? It is especially important that when such an accident does happen that immediate and effective action is taken to prevent the next one due to the same fault. That requires an objective and professional Accident Investigation and strong regulatory enforcement of the required corrective action. Think of the Manchester 737 abandon T/O due to No.1 engine fire. Terrible loss of life due to the aircraft stopping cross wind with the fire then working its way into the cabin. The corrective action was profound and far ranging; new drills, smoke hoods, floor track lighting, fire retardant seating, etc. A lot of expense for all operators and no alternative. Then consider the RAF's accident investigation and preventative action in this case. I would suggest that it was not effective nor objective, indeed the Coroners Service seems to have been a more effective conduit for what was wrong (it was unairworthy) and what should be done (grounded until made airworthy). The RAF used to do that sort of thing once, indeed it did so when I was a sprog co-pilot on Hastings. Not anymore though it would seem.
To back up Chugs' thoughts on the RAF's past record of airworthiness issues:
Buccaneer Wings fell off in the very early 80s - the likely causes were well debated and the final remedy was to grind the damage out of the wing main spars reducing the usable carrying ability from 16,000lb to less than 8,000lb - the remedial methods used were to stop Buccs flying for almost 8 months to do the work - and all this during the Cold War and continuous preparations for NATO readiness commitments.
In those days of the 70's and 80's, it was only "almost" unthinkable to ground a fleet for airworthiness issues. And the Nimrods are even older than Buccs!
All the technology of todays modern aircraft is all based on what has been learned from accidents and incidents of the past. thats why a falsly reported BOI is an immoral and selfish waste of life, time and effort. All of aviation safety is based on past lessons. Moreover, there is NO new technology that is deemed infallible or fault free. Indeed, the most expensive and cosetted planes ever built (B117 and B2) still manage to crash.
We are always waiting for the next accident - and hoping it won't be "one of ours".
Chugs,
Even the unelected one-eyed scot at No 10 is accountable to someone.
Buccaneer Wings fell off in the very early 80s - the likely causes were well debated and the final remedy was to grind the damage out of the wing main spars reducing the usable carrying ability from 16,000lb to less than 8,000lb - the remedial methods used were to stop Buccs flying for almost 8 months to do the work - and all this during the Cold War and continuous preparations for NATO readiness commitments.
In those days of the 70's and 80's, it was only "almost" unthinkable to ground a fleet for airworthiness issues. And the Nimrods are even older than Buccs!
All the technology of todays modern aircraft is all based on what has been learned from accidents and incidents of the past. thats why a falsly reported BOI is an immoral and selfish waste of life, time and effort. All of aviation safety is based on past lessons. Moreover, there is NO new technology that is deemed infallible or fault free. Indeed, the most expensive and cosetted planes ever built (B117 and B2) still manage to crash.
We are always waiting for the next accident - and hoping it won't be "one of ours".
Chugs,
Even the unelected one-eyed scot at No 10 is accountable to someone.
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Is there any senario however remote when the cross feed pipe could be needed in flight, even if it is a million to one chance of it happening ?
The Staneval has looked at the various scenarios that might need the use of a supplementary air conditioning system (ie open the crossfeed pipe), but there are no such scenarios that do not require multiple, unrelated, in flight system failures. Therefore, the SCP valve is now being replaced by a solid metal bar running between the 2 clamps that used to connect the valve to the adjacent pipes.
The only other possible use of the crossfeed duct in the air is for air starting engines. A published drill is in place to air start an engine from the adjacent engine, while keeping the crossfeed duct shut. We would be in a very complicated multiple failure situation if we had to use that pipe to start an engine from the other side, through the crossfeed duct. Nimrod peformance tables indicate that the 3 engine (climb) ceiling is above our normal cruise altitude. The aircraft is grossly overpowered and, therefore, with 3 engines running there is never any need to air start the single failed engine. Even a double engine failure just after take off at max weight in temperate climates is survivable if the drag is minimized. I doubt that most modern airliners can match that degree of performance. There is more to this aircraft, in safety aspects, that most people outside of Maritime, don't know about. sadly, the crossfeed pipe is the fabled Achilles Heel in all aspects.
Regards
Ed Sett
Good post Rigga. There is never a good time to ground an entire fleet. The Hastings stayed where they were until Field Rectification teams arrived to do a major re-riveting job on the tail assembly as well as replacing the errant outrigger bolts. In my case that meant an enforced stopover in Sydney while the rest of the crew of our Mk4 Hastings were repatriated to Changi, leaving me, as Co and Imprest Holder, and two groundcrew guys to attend the old girl once a week at Kingsford Smith. Start the engines, taxi her onto a new heading, shut down, and complete the STI. Then recover from that ordeal until the following week. I think the two airmen were paying the RAF, rather than vice-versa, for months after but it was a once in a lifetime opportunity for them to... well 'nuff said as they say.
As to wee Gordon McBrown being answerable to someone, who's that then? It plainly isn't me! I'm afraid that "accountable" and "responsible" have both become discredited words in the modern lexicon. Until people are prepared to stand up and fight against the perverting of airworthiness or the rigging of inquiries, if necessary at the cost of their own careers, such abuse will go on happening. That is why I am convinced that only by taking responsibility for both away from the MOD and the RAF to a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB will we be assured of regaining the old standards that you and I recall.
As to wee Gordon McBrown being answerable to someone, who's that then? It plainly isn't me! I'm afraid that "accountable" and "responsible" have both become discredited words in the modern lexicon. Until people are prepared to stand up and fight against the perverting of airworthiness or the rigging of inquiries, if necessary at the cost of their own careers, such abuse will go on happening. That is why I am convinced that only by taking responsibility for both away from the MOD and the RAF to a separate and independent MAA and MAAIB will we be assured of regaining the old standards that you and I recall.
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Thanks Ed Sett I feel reassured that all senarios have been looked into. However I do feel that the QinetiQ report on the hot air system that recommends a temperature sensor or the cross-feed pipe, because the in-flight temp is unknown should not be ignored.
QinetiQ and BAE are I am sure very aware of the consequences should the worst happen again, but it appears that once again the RAF are reverting baclk to their cavalier we know best attitude which I find very disturbing.
I am no flight engineer but I am aware of the transfer of heat though conduction, the cross feed valves may be switched off and secured as you say but heat can be conducted along this pipe though the hot air system.
If QinetiQ are saying that the inflight temperature is unkown then it is unknown.
If the the RAF has carried out their own research and are 100% sure of the temp then perhaps they should inform QinetiQ if not then they should follow the expert advice that Ainsworth ensures the families the RAF is doing.
QinetiQ and BAE are I am sure very aware of the consequences should the worst happen again, but it appears that once again the RAF are reverting baclk to their cavalier we know best attitude which I find very disturbing.
I am no flight engineer but I am aware of the transfer of heat though conduction, the cross feed valves may be switched off and secured as you say but heat can be conducted along this pipe though the hot air system.
If QinetiQ are saying that the inflight temperature is unkown then it is unknown.
If the the RAF has carried out their own research and are 100% sure of the temp then perhaps they should inform QinetiQ if not then they should follow the expert advice that Ainsworth ensures the families the RAF is doing.
TD
I refer you to the BOI report, who conducted ground trials to determine the hot air pipe surface temps (which backed up theoretical temps from BAES) and allowed them to identify the SCP pipe as the most likely source of ignition.
You are correct that heat will conduct but even if there is hot air on the engine side of the crossfeed cock it will not reach full engine exit temp unless it is allow to flow ie. through the cross feed to the other engines or to the SCP. As Edsett has stated the SCP has been permanently blocked. As I mentioned earlier, it would require the engines to be at maximum rpm to produce temps approaching the XV230 scenerio - and fuel held in close prox to the crossfeed pipe (if used) and this is very unlikely. I think you should accept that the risks have been addressed and that your fears are unfounded.
It is wrong to keep suggesting that the MOD/RAF is running rough shot over safety issues. Advice from QQ is and has always been simply that - ADVICE on which to base decisions.
I refer you to the BOI report, who conducted ground trials to determine the hot air pipe surface temps (which backed up theoretical temps from BAES) and allowed them to identify the SCP pipe as the most likely source of ignition.
You are correct that heat will conduct but even if there is hot air on the engine side of the crossfeed cock it will not reach full engine exit temp unless it is allow to flow ie. through the cross feed to the other engines or to the SCP. As Edsett has stated the SCP has been permanently blocked. As I mentioned earlier, it would require the engines to be at maximum rpm to produce temps approaching the XV230 scenerio - and fuel held in close prox to the crossfeed pipe (if used) and this is very unlikely. I think you should accept that the risks have been addressed and that your fears are unfounded.
It is wrong to keep suggesting that the MOD/RAF is running rough shot over safety issues. Advice from QQ is and has always been simply that - ADVICE on which to base decisions.
Last edited by Softie; 26th Jun 2009 at 16:39.
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Softie:
What is the engine situation, on task at low level? It use to be two running and two shut down. I have heard that it is now, two running, one shut down and one at idle.
DV
What is the engine situation, on task at low level? It use to be two running and two shut down. I have heard that it is now, two running, one shut down and one at idle.
DV