Whitehall 'bottled' mission to rescue British hostage
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If the FCO travel advice says 'here be bad people, don't go there', just don't go. And if you do, on your own head be it.
Most countries in the World have a FCO 'travel advisory' including the USA.
I have made my home in a part of the World which has been under one as long as I can remember. I work in another part of the World also subject to a bloody 'travel advisory'.
NOT part of the equation in this case.
One of the -53 pilots was a regular speaker at NAS Whiting. His is but one voice, but he portrayed a skewed vision of joint operations. As he was likely on Uncle Sam's dime at the time he was talking to classes, one had to read between the lines a bit.
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Son Tay was a smaller, leaner Op
He maintained that when the op.was first planned to go in, the PoWs were still there, but the delay in working up the more complex plan and bringing in the USAF aircraft and crews meant the PoWs had been moved before they went in.
<<Conspiracy theory alert!!!>> It might seem highly unlikely to some, but he also said he wouldn't have been at all surprised if someone on Kissinger's staff hadn't given the North Vietnamese a headsup to move the PoWs so the political loss of face wouldn't be too great, thus screwing up the peace talks.
Some reports say the prisoners were moved as little as 48 hours before the raid. If that's true, given the (hopefully high level of) pre-op scrutiny the camp would have been under immediately before the raid, many would find it hard to believe the Americans (or someone at the top) didn't know they'd been moved. Even if they did, an op. like that develops a momentum of its own, and the political pressures (possibly within the US military) may have been too intense to see it cancelled.
Wiley,
By comparison to Eagle Claw the Son Tay raid was considerably smaller - though the Air America/CAA crew would still see it as too large given the way they went about business. Compare and contrast Son Tay to Op Barras as ways to approach a similar problem. Doubtless something similar was on the cards for the unfortunate chap in Africa recently.
Eagle Claw's biggest problem was always going to be the extraction of so many people - hence the need for C130s.
By comparison to Eagle Claw the Son Tay raid was considerably smaller - though the Air America/CAA crew would still see it as too large given the way they went about business. Compare and contrast Son Tay to Op Barras as ways to approach a similar problem. Doubtless something similar was on the cards for the unfortunate chap in Africa recently.
Eagle Claw's biggest problem was always going to be the extraction of so many people - hence the need for C130s.
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Not sure I totally agree with you, Evalu8er. I was in Washington when the attack went in, and was mixing with quite a few people in uniform who, in the immediate aftermath, had quite a lot to say, (as you may well imagine), about what went wrong.
In my opinion, (from what I heard at the time), the major problem (of many, many major problems with the Tehran op.) was micromanagement from the Pentagon. The man on the spot was not allowed to make any decisions. They all came from someone sitting in a conference room way back in Washington. Anyone who's been involved in the field in something even 1/100th as complicated would agree this was a recipe for disaster.
In my opinion, (from what I heard at the time), the major problem (of many, many major problems with the Tehran op.) was micromanagement from the Pentagon. The man on the spot was not allowed to make any decisions. They all came from someone sitting in a conference room way back in Washington. Anyone who's been involved in the field in something even 1/100th as complicated would agree this was a recipe for disaster.
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Evalu8ter
At the risk of more thread creep.
I hope my post came across well enough for you to realise I agree with most of what you later said (I posted it in response to what I saw as an unfair bashing of the op).
From what I have heard, one of the downfalls of the operation what due to the mix of pilots from differing services, and their differing training to cockpit warnings relating to the CH53 rotor blades.
I cannot remember which way around the different levels were, but ISTR that USAF CH53's and Navy/marine CH53's had different blades, so when a blade damage warning flashed up (due to sand storm damage), some of the pilots had been trained that there would be an issue with the blades which would need servicing later, while others had been taught that blade failure was imminent, and so set down in the desert immediately, thus withdrawing their aircraft from the operation.
As I say, this is what I have heard, but I am happy to be corrected, or hear from anyone with a more technical knowledge.
Colonel Beckwith has often been cited to have been very unlucky in his SF career, but IMHO it was a good leadership call when he refused to carry on with less aircraft than he deemed he required. I suspect a less strong leader may have caved in to the president, with the result of more lost lives.
I too have heard conspiracies regarding the movement of the hostages, in order to ruin the image of Carter, and his hopes of re-election. It does seem odd when the eventual date of their release and that of the election of Reagon are somewhat linked!
I guess this just brings us back to the link between military ops and the interference of politicians.
I hope my post came across well enough for you to realise I agree with most of what you later said (I posted it in response to what I saw as an unfair bashing of the op).
From what I have heard, one of the downfalls of the operation what due to the mix of pilots from differing services, and their differing training to cockpit warnings relating to the CH53 rotor blades.
I cannot remember which way around the different levels were, but ISTR that USAF CH53's and Navy/marine CH53's had different blades, so when a blade damage warning flashed up (due to sand storm damage), some of the pilots had been trained that there would be an issue with the blades which would need servicing later, while others had been taught that blade failure was imminent, and so set down in the desert immediately, thus withdrawing their aircraft from the operation.
As I say, this is what I have heard, but I am happy to be corrected, or hear from anyone with a more technical knowledge.
Colonel Beckwith has often been cited to have been very unlucky in his SF career, but IMHO it was a good leadership call when he refused to carry on with less aircraft than he deemed he required. I suspect a less strong leader may have caved in to the president, with the result of more lost lives.
I too have heard conspiracies regarding the movement of the hostages, in order to ruin the image of Carter, and his hopes of re-election. It does seem odd when the eventual date of their release and that of the election of Reagon are somewhat linked!
I guess this just brings us back to the link between military ops and the interference of politicians.
Barnstormer,
The issue over mixed crews with different -53s is always raised as a reason for failure - imagine trying to get a mixed bag of UK Merlin Mk1/2 & Mk3/3A drivers with competing RTS, crew training and SOPs to mount something similar.
Wiley,
I defer to your experience, but would say that a lack of "Mission Command" delegated by senior officers/politicians is nothing new (just think Rolling Thunder...) and that a victory has many parents and a failure has an alarming lack of them...
The issue over mixed crews with different -53s is always raised as a reason for failure - imagine trying to get a mixed bag of UK Merlin Mk1/2 & Mk3/3A drivers with competing RTS, crew training and SOPs to mount something similar.
Wiley,
I defer to your experience, but would say that a lack of "Mission Command" delegated by senior officers/politicians is nothing new (just think Rolling Thunder...) and that a victory has many parents and a failure has an alarming lack of them...
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
Thread drift back to the subject;
Wow, imagine The Sun using hyperbole and sensationalism to create an impression of "supporting our boys", while everyone apparently forgets all those reptile journo's following Military personnel everywhere (including their Royal Highness') desperate for the chance to report some inappropriate behavior (Harrier weekends to Spain?).
As to the story, well I'm sure Lofty and Dusty were ticked off not to get another Op in between their current cycle, but sadly there are a couple of points Rupert Murdochs toilet paper seems to miss;
Now I'm sure some punchy full-screw from the Hereford Hooligans may have some stunning ideas on democracy and justice, but we don't elect him, instead we elect this shower of shiat, so more shame on us.
Secondly, I have a bit of paper in a draw somewhere that says words to the effect;
Try as I might, I can't find anything about 'as directed by some Antipodean mental pygmy's daily rag' or 'Subject to a cracking idea we dreamt up after a few beers".
By all means be outraged that we didn't even attempt to save the bloke, but don't subscribe to this claptrap that operatives decide National policy because The Sun says it's so.
Wow, imagine The Sun using hyperbole and sensationalism to create an impression of "supporting our boys", while everyone apparently forgets all those reptile journo's following Military personnel everywhere (including their Royal Highness') desperate for the chance to report some inappropriate behavior (Harrier weekends to Spain?).
As to the story, well I'm sure Lofty and Dusty were ticked off not to get another Op in between their current cycle, but sadly there are a couple of points Rupert Murdochs toilet paper seems to miss;
The Army carries out tasks given to it by the democratically elected Government of the United Kingdom (UK).
Secondly, I have a bit of paper in a draw somewhere that says words to the effect;
And We do hereby Command them to Obey you as their superior Officer and you to Observe and follow such Orders and Directions as from time to time you shall recieve from Us, or any superior Officer, according to the Rules and Discipline of War, in pursuance of the Trust hereby reposed in you.
By all means be outraged that we didn't even attempt to save the bloke, but don't subscribe to this claptrap that operatives decide National policy because The Sun says it's so.
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As much I like to bash the FS and the government but….practicalities need to be thought about before jumping on them too much. Yes the men from Hereford might have had a plan but was it in terms of support from the RAF?
100 troops plus their kit into theatre…at least a couple of Hercs or TriStars needed
Predator and the support kit
A Herc to remain in theatre (for airdrop)
Helicopters to insert and recover the troops – what’s that a couple of Chinooks?
So more AT needed to get the Chinook support in and out of theatre.
Mind you if the AT and Helo support is not available then lets bash the government for that!
100 troops plus their kit into theatre…at least a couple of Hercs or TriStars needed
Predator and the support kit
A Herc to remain in theatre (for airdrop)
Helicopters to insert and recover the troops – what’s that a couple of Chinooks?
So more AT needed to get the Chinook support in and out of theatre.
Mind you if the AT and Helo support is not available then lets bash the government for that!
Could`ve given a contract to the Israelis ....
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Countries the FCO advises against all travel to parts of
* Afghanistan
* Albania
* Azerbaijan
* Burundi
* Cambodia
* Cameroon
* Chad
* Colombia
* Congo (Democratic Republic)
* Djibouti
* Ecuador
* Eritrea
* Ethiopia
* Georgia
* Haiti
* India
* Iran
* Iraq
* Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
* Italy
* Lebanon
* Mali
* Niger
* Nigeria
* Pakistan
* Philippines
* Russian Federation
* Sri Lanka
* Sudan
* Thailand
* Uganda
* Zimbabwe
Countries the FCO advises against all but essential travel to
* Burundi
* Central African Republic
* East Timor
* Guinea
* Mauritania
* Yemen
Countries the FCO advises against all but essential travel to parts of
* Afghanistan
* Algeria
* Angola
* Armenia
* Bangladesh
* Chad
* Comoros
* Congo
* Congo (Democratic Republic)
* Ecuador
* Ethiopia
* India
* Iraq
* Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories
* Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire)
* Kenya
* Kosovo
* Lebanon
* Liberia
* Libya
* Mauritania
* Nicaragua
* Niger
* Nigeria
* Pakistan
* Russian Federation
* Rwanda
* Sudan
* Thailand
* Turkey
* Uganda
* Uzbekistan
* Zimbabwe
