Whitehall 'bottled' mission to rescue British hostage
 

Whitehall ‘bottled’ mission to rescue a British hostage | The Sun |News|Campaigns|Our Boys

WHITEHALL “bottled” an SAS mission to rescue a British hostage just before he was executed, The Sun can reveal.

The elite unit were furious, believing they could have sprung tourist Edwin Dyer from al-Qaeda’s clutches.
Mr Dyer, 61, was shot dead at a desert terror camp in Mali, West Africa, ten days ago.
But it has emerged that the Who Dares Wins regiment had been planning a classic hostage rescue.
In a rare breach of protocol that reveals the SAS’s anger, serving members have given us details of the top-secret action.
Operation Aerobic was organised after al-Qaeda’s North Africa wing set a deadline for the release of hate preacher Abu Qatada in exchange for Mr Dyer’s life.

But with time almost up at the end of May, senior military officers in the MoD advised Foreign Secretary David Miliband that the operation must not go ahead.
SAS officers and other ranks across the board were left furious.
A senior SAS source said: “We knew where he was. We are convinced we could have got him out alive, but Whitehall bottled it.
“Whether it was the Directorate of Special Forces, the military chiefs or Government ministers, we don’t know. We have our suspicions.
“Of course there was risk, there always is in hostage rescue. The group said they were going to kill him anyway, so what was there to lose?
“And if we did it, it would have sent a powerful message to these sorts of people not to screw with Brits.”
More than 100 SAS troopers and expert infantry back-up from the Special Forces Support Group were kept on standby for a month.
An advanced party was sent to Africa to liaise with allies in the region.
The night raid would have hit the north and south sides of the terrorist camp.

Troops would parachute from 25,000ft, while Predator unmanned drones with infra-red cameras would circle at 10,000ft, giving commanders a real-time feed.
Once the terrorists were overrun a fleet of helicopters were synchronised to arrive to whisk Mr Dyer and assault teams to safety.
Mr Dyer, who lived in Austria and worked for a plumbing company, had a British father and a German mother.
He was among a group of tourists kidnapped in January after going to an African music event near Timbuktu.
His stepfather Paul Mead, 84, said last night: “We were not aware of an SAS operation, but if there was a chance Edwin could have been saved then they should have gone for it.”
Mr Mead, of Marlow, Bucks, who is married to Mr Dyer’s mother Ingeborg, added: “Edwin’s death came as a terrible shock to us.

“We were told to keep quiet for months after he was captured, and then suddenly ‘bang’ — he had been shot and that was it. It was a truly terrible thing.”
The Foreign Office last night refused to discuss any details of the operation, but senior sources insisted it was not Mr Miliband’s decision to scrap it.
A Foreign Office spokesman said last night: “Ministers at no point made decisions contrary to military advice.”

That'll be a first, then.

There could be many reasons why the Foreign Secretary vetoed the operation. Firstly, the UK would not carry out an operation like that without the agreement of the host-country, and the Malian government may not have given their agreement. If they had given their agreement, they would almost certainly insist on having some element of control over the operation, which might not have been acceptable to the MOD. Second, FS may have decided that even with permission from the Malian government, the political risk to UK of it going wrong outweighed the benefits.

No Cirrus, they bottled it.

Given Brown's and the New Labour lot's current low standing in the country, at the time any perceived "failure" af the rescue would have lain at Brown's door and we know how risk averse he is. He won't even chance a referendum or an election, let alone a risky mission out in the bundu.

The FO comment is full of the usual double negatives and yukspeak. Military advice will always include a calculated risk assessment. "They" didn't want to take the risk

At the end of the day, an innocent man has been murdered and perhaps justice will be served to the perpetrators, very cold, one day.................

The decision would not have been Brown's - it would have been Miliband's. In a previous career I have written many submissions of this sort to the FS - there is a very clear process laid down to obtain authoristation for these sorts of operations in the UK.

Well he's dead now and they are still sat in the desert puffing on their bongs.

What's stopping us now?

Ohhhhhhh for Maggie.

Some of us cousins across the pond share your view.

Even Blair (for all I dislike him) might have been more decisive

Brown made a decision, all right. Being undecisive wasn't the problem. The problem was the decision that he made.

He probably read the account of the Americans attempt to rescue the hostages in Tehran. :hmm:

Hmmmm. Maybe he should have read the account of the Brits' successful attempt in Sierra Leone... Back me up here, Minigundiplomat?

Regrettably, hostage release scenarios are rarely as clear cut as Prince's Gate, however much we would like them to be.

Read here for a more cogent argument than I can give:

BBC NEWS | UK | Hostages and limits on negotiation

That said, I'm sure the strength of character of a Govt and its leader will make a huge difference to the eventual outcome of any situation.

In expressing heartfelt sorrow for the Dyer family, may I remind Prune readers there remain 5 (or maybe less) British hostages somewhere in or around Baghdad.

They've only been held for 2 years.

I wonder what Maggie would have done?

That's a bit of a low blow!

What about a rescue mission to save the UK from the clutches of Gordon Brown:sad:

Terrible shame, but at least they went. If for politics only, but they tried.

Green Granite
 

GG - You are capable of better. You cannot compare the American hostage rescue attempt to any SF attempt at a close quarter rescue mission in down town Baghdad. You have let yourself down.

Of course once you 'send in the SAS' to liberate one British tourist who gets himself kidnapped in a known problem area, you'll then have to send them in for all British citizens who bet and lose on their personal security in well-known and well-publicised high-risk environements.

If the FCO travel advice says 'here be bad people, don't go there', just don't go. And if you do, on your own head be it.

Sorry if that sounds harsh.

West Coast and saudipc-9
 

Colonel Beckwiths attempt to rescue the hostages was very well planned, and it seems was mainly ruined through bad luck (not poor planning, except the CH53 pilots lack of joint knowledge on blade failure warnings), which seemed to dog Beckwith throughout his career.
With his new unit, he attempted something few if any other country could mount, so I salute him for at least trying.

Whereas his president asked him to carry on, even though he did not have enough CH53's to continue, my own government seemed to have cancelled an operation where there was deemed to be enough support!

It was mentioned above that the UK would have needed host nation support to carry out the operation, and in our new labour PC country that may be the case. It's just as well the Israeli's did not need it for Entebbe, or it may not have gone quite so well if they had pre announced their arrival.:bored:

This kind of operation can be done succesfully, as has been shown by the live release of Mr Muse(sp) by US special forces.

Don't usually jump to your defence but in this case you are spot on, excuse GG as I suspect alcohol had something to do with him posting in that rather child like fashion :=

At the risk of Thread creep...

Beckwith's plan for Eagle Claw was fundementally sound. However, he was let down by inter-service rivalry and bad luck.

In an outrageous piece of dividing up potential glory the Op was up-scaled and over-complicated. The various -53s (and pilots) had a wide range of backgrounds and qualifications (from Mine Counter Measure Sea Dragon, through USMC to USAF SOS...) hence not all were up to flying low level at night on NVDs in a sandstorm (believe me, it is bloody hard....). Incredibly, some pilots were flying aircraft they were barely qualified to fly with nothing like the appropriate experience for the conditions. Why? So that all services could claim a piece of the action. This lack of familiarity/experience was in no small part responsible for the aborts that robbed Desert One of enough serviceable ac to complete the mission.

It was bad luck that the -53's were unreliable that night, and in combo with the poor skills base, made the mission unworkable. It was also bad luck that the road through Desert One was unusually busy and that, of all things, an oil tanker came through and lit the sky for miles around when engaged by the cordon.

Don't assume that the US always get it wrong - the Son Tay mission was well planned and executed, only to be let down by poor Intel. Interestingly, Son Tay was a smaller, leaner Op. Most succesful Ops of this nature are small in scale and flown by the most experienced of aviators.