Bucs and Black Buck
I think the 'RN blaming the RAF' came about largely because our political masters had decided our forces would not operate outside the NATO theatre area in future.
'No role East of Suez' marked the beginning of the end.
Hence we didn't need carriers because the RAF coud provide air cover for the fleet locally. This of course ignored the point that in any sort of shooting war in Europe the RAF would have been be more than busy enough trying to defend BAOR, let alone the sea areas.
Perhaps some RAF senior officers saw benefit in supporting this daft idea but I suspect (hope) it was not common.
'No role East of Suez' marked the beginning of the end.
Hence we didn't need carriers because the RAF coud provide air cover for the fleet locally. This of course ignored the point that in any sort of shooting war in Europe the RAF would have been be more than busy enough trying to defend BAOR, let alone the sea areas.
Perhaps some RAF senior officers saw benefit in supporting this daft idea but I suspect (hope) it was not common.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
You could argue of course that splitting what small forces we had between 2 MNC was contrary to 'concentration of force'.
True Pontius. I think you make a very good point about dilution of effort. Also the snag for SACLANT was exactly that - he would not have had his own dedicated force, but would risk diversion to another theatre. Having your own organic force under command is much better. Naval airmen understand naval problems.
The apparently lesser threat gets sidelined by focus on the 'main 'threat'. All organisations suffer that. The RAF showed that before WW". Notionally in charge of Fleet defence, but that got ignored becasue of the much greater threat.
(Note - I'm not bashing the RAF here. This is normal behaviour, hard to avoid. It's one reason why the Captain of HMS Sheffield decided to abandon ship so soon - he was distracting the Task Force)
The apparently lesser threat gets sidelined by focus on the 'main 'threat'. All organisations suffer that. The RAF showed that before WW". Notionally in charge of Fleet defence, but that got ignored becasue of the much greater threat.
(Note - I'm not bashing the RAF here. This is normal behaviour, hard to avoid. It's one reason why the Captain of HMS Sheffield decided to abandon ship so soon - he was distracting the Task Force)
Join Date: Apr 2004
Location: Southern UK
Posts: 372
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Having your own organic force under command is much better.
The Buccanneers (XV353 and XV868) arrived at Stanley on 5 March 1983, staying several days before returning to the UK .....
http://biblioteka.mycity-military.co...d_Special_.pdf
Mar. 1983
Joined XV353 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '868'
Joined XV353 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '868'
Mar. 1983
Joined XV868 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '353'
Joined XV868 in detachment to RAF Stanley, Falkland Islands - coded '353'
See page 17 at following link
http://biblioteka.mycity-military.co...d_Special_.pdf
XV868 - S.Mk.2 Production
XV353 - S.Mk.2D Production
http://biblioteka.mycity-military.co...d_Special_.pdf
XV868 - S.Mk.2 Production
XV353 - S.Mk.2D Production
There seems to be something amiss then, as the Yorkshire Aircraft Museum seem to think that their Bucc, XX901, was part of the detatchment.
Blackburn Buccaneer S.2B - Yorkshire Air Museum
Last edited by AndySmith; 28th Oct 2017 at 18:55.
Thanks TEEEJ.
There seems to be something amiss then, as the Yorkshire Aircraft Museum seem to think that their Bucc, XX901, was part of the detatchment.
Blackburn Buccaneer S.2B - Yorkshire Air Museum
There seems to be something amiss then, as the Yorkshire Aircraft Museum seem to think that their Bucc, XX901, was part of the detatchment.
Blackburn Buccaneer S.2B - Yorkshire Air Museum
I had a further search and found the airborne spare Buccaneer - XW547. Perhaps XX901 was a spare and remained at Ascension?
3 Mar 83 Flew to RAF Ascension from Lossiemouth with Buccaneers XV353 and XV868, in company with Victor tankers and Nimrod SAR, as part of Operation ‘Corporate’, as a spare aircraft. Flight time 10 hours, the longest
ever RN/RAF Buccaneer flight. XV353 and XV868 flew on to Ascension on 5 March 1983, with XW547 as airborne spare. XW547 returned to Ascension, then flew back to Lossiemouth on 7 March 1983 in company with a Victor tanker and Nimrod SAR.
ever RN/RAF Buccaneer flight. XV353 and XV868 flew on to Ascension on 5 March 1983, with XW547 as airborne spare. XW547 returned to Ascension, then flew back to Lossiemouth on 7 March 1983 in company with a Victor tanker and Nimrod SAR.
I've contacted the Yorkshire Air Museum and passed on the info.
Last edited by TEEEJ; 29th Oct 2017 at 19:26.
I've just checked my logbook and I was on the 3 March 83 deployment, on one of the Victors. The op was called Latherton.
I flew 7:05 MR to DAK then 2:20 DAK to ASI. Can't remember the details but we probably topped up another Victor which carried on to ASI with the Buccs whilst we dived in to Dakar for a top up.
I then flew another Op Latherton trip on 5 Mar 83, ASI-ASI which was 10:10, so we must have gone a fair way south with the Buccs then.
I flew 7:05 MR to DAK then 2:20 DAK to ASI. Can't remember the details but we probably topped up another Victor which carried on to ASI with the Buccs whilst we dived in to Dakar for a top up.
I then flew another Op Latherton trip on 5 Mar 83, ASI-ASI which was 10:10, so we must have gone a fair way south with the Buccs then.
Join Date: May 2011
Location: Goose Bay
Posts: 56
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
this may be a very silly question, so forgive my ignorance, but why did anyone think it a good idea to send Buccs down to the FI in March 83?
there were already 4(?) Phantom FGR2 in the FI, and while they were AD orientated, the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft - so why send another aircraft type with all the duplication of the logs/spt train that entailed rather than just bump up the number of Phantoms?
certainly the Bucc was a far more capable bomber than the Phantom, but was it really worth the effort of getting it down there and supporting it over the flexibility of having another couple of multi-role (ish) Phantoms?
there were already 4(?) Phantom FGR2 in the FI, and while they were AD orientated, the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft - so why send another aircraft type with all the duplication of the logs/spt train that entailed rather than just bump up the number of Phantoms?
certainly the Bucc was a far more capable bomber than the Phantom, but was it really worth the effort of getting it down there and supporting it over the flexibility of having another couple of multi-role (ish) Phantoms?
the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft
...the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft...
It would have been one heck of a challenge, both in engineering and training terms, to have resurrected any A/G capability of the F-4 in 1982. Had there been a serious A/G requirement beyond the ability of the SHAR, the Buccaneer was the obvious choice.
But if we'd had CVA-01, perhaps even with P.1154...ah well
the Phantom was still a handy strike/CAS aircraft
By early 83 It has been a while since the UK's F4s had been used in any strike/CAS/mud moving role so heaven knows what state the wiring was in for any of the air to ground functions (though as Beags said the cockpit switches were still in situ, gathering dust..).
Obviously the centreline SU-23 hardware had been maintained for air to air purposes and before deploying south we did a limited strafe work up. I was down south for the first time late 82 - March 83 and some of us did the odd strafe "currency"" session against some surplus to requirement Pucaras but I'm not sure how well the profile we flew would have worked in anger against a grunt armed with a SAM 7 or Blowpipe....
The wiring hadn't been checked for years and legend has it that when someone did move one of the switches, the tanks fell off
and lost the centerline tank...not sure if it's really true but it's a good story.....
Last edited by wiggy; 30th Oct 2017 at 17:10.
Obviously the centreline SU-23 hardware had been maintained for air to air purposes and before deploying south we did a limited strafe work up.
One of my few really enjoyable F-4 trips, made doubly so after I was told I'd scored 52% on the range!
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: Lincolnshire
Age: 63
Posts: 27
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Wiggly, the centreline drop did happen. It was the last of the pre-80-update FG1s on 43(F). The nav had recently completed the QWI course and both he and his pilot were working with the Navy up north with little happening. The nav remarked that all of the jets had had the special wiring removed which meant that if his pilot selected master arm on, 'special' on the pedestal, and if the nav were to make the consent switch, nothing would happen if the pilot pickled. There was a sickening thud and they came home. Great pair of guys, not so lucky a year or so later. RIP
In October 1989 we flew a trial at Boscombe to increase the maximum take-off weight of the Phantom from 58 000 lbs to 60 000 lbs. We used a FG1 that had a high basic weight and flew with 3 tanks and 4 x 1000 lb bombs. I suspect that we must have still had the jettison facility available for the bombs (but cannot be certain), and as it was a standard squadron airframe that capability must still have existed in the fleet even then.
The Bucc also had the MARTEL system for anti shipping use