Defence Select Committee - Cut Nimrod

[MOA]

Mad,

My description of SAS was far too simplistic but all I was trying to convey was that the SAS is not an autopilot. I fully appreciate that there are variable gains within a modern autopilot (I have been trying to find the optimum numbers for MRA4 for a while now!). SAS is not trying to control the aircraft to a pre-determined set of conditions whether they are flight path management, speed management etc. There is no great distinction between inner loop and outer loop functionality. When comparing to the autopilot, SAS is puely inner loop as the pilot's have no means of monitoring the performance. The autopilot outer loop functions can be monitored by the pilot by looking at the flight director or performance instruments, there are no such 'visual' outer loop SAS performance terms.

The SAS has been designed to provide flying qualities of an aircraft with an apparent CG that is forward of the actual CG. It also has aileron position compensation terms (prevents aircraft pitch-up with large aileron deflection), compensation terms for thrust lever movement and flap, gear and undercarrigae selection.

I am not trying to make out that this is new technology (I am unsure of equivalent systems on civil aircraft), what I am trying to convey is the time frame from conception to flight has been excellent.

The split of engineering between Woodford and Warton does not prevent any difficulties with the flight test and engineering aspects of the project. What has been very clear is the few times we have operated the aircraft out of Woodofrd, aircraft generation is far superior at Woodford than Warton.

[davejb]

The clue is in the title:

Defence Select Committee - Cut Nimrod

[XR219]

The SAS has been designed to provide flying qualities of an aircraft with an apparent CG that is forward of the actual CG.

Ah, so the real problem is that the CG is in the wrong place? Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes?

[Jetex Jim]

CG too far aft

Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes?

Too right, a wadge of plasticine (about the size of a pea) on the nose generally works for my designs.

[SidHolding]

So is this the project winding down?

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7328191.stm

[I've_got a traveller]

It would seem that way.

There was also an interesting article in Janes Defence weekly mentioning the overspend of MOD of new projects, highlighting the MRA4 as a contender for the chop.

[GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU]

BBC

About 134 job cuts are planned at the Woodford operation, near Manchester where the Nimrod surveillance aircraft is made. However, jobs related to that plane are safe.

So it must be those jobs then.

[Jackonicko]

Why did this long range, long endurance MPA have to transit via Lajes and the Bahamas to get to Nashville?

Are we being told everything about the state of the fuel system?

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Originally Posted by XR219

Ah, so the real problem is that the CG is in the wrong place? Isn't that a bit of a "schoolboy error" when it comes to designing aeroplanes?

Well, yes and no. Getting the cg in the wrong place for a new design is something of a howler and would (or should) result in red faces in your advanced design/configuration design/whatever design bods who do the initial design.

But when faced with a stretch/development/legacy programme, where you're being told that you have to re-use old components and minimize (costly) redesign whereever possible, it's very easy to end up with the cg in the "wrong place" - because the traditional fix at initial design is to move the wing, so that the cg is in the right place, and moving the wing on an existing design is not cheap.

[Jetex Jim]

But when faced with a stretch/development/legacy programme, where you're being told that you have to re-use old components and minimize (costly) redesign whereever possible, it's very easy to end up with the cg in the "wrong place" - because the traditional fix at initial design is to move the wing, so that the cg is in the right place, and moving the wing on an existing design is not cheap.

A competent and honest supplier - having discovered thru analysis the potential problems, would have explained them at the proposal stage.

But this, of course, would have opened the door to the new airframe option, and likely meant a lost order for BAE.

As they evidently didn't explain, they ought to absorb the cost, as they would have to if they dropped the ball in a commercial situation.

[On_The_Top_Bunk]

Originally Posted by Mad (Flt) Scientist

Well, yes and no. Getting the cg in the wrong place for a new design is something of a howler and would (or should) result in red faces in your advanced design/configuration design/whatever design bods who do the initial design.

Lockhead managed it for the short C130J Mk5 making it too tail heavy so nothing new here.

[Seldomfitforpurpose]

Could have sworn I saw a couple of Mk 5's flying this week

[tucumseh]

Wait a Moment

The mathematics may be complex, but the management process is simple and the airworthiness regulations clear.

• The weight and moment characteristics of the aircraft are established. The aircraft enters Service at a given build standard and the design is brought Under Ministry Control (UMC).
• MoD appoints and contracts an Aircraft Design Authority (ADA) to maintain that build standard, through all changes.
• The Weight and Moment information is kept up-to-date, so that a modification programme such as this does not have to regress. But, it makes sense to validate and verify the information, because upon induction the ADA will almost certainly find his data has been invalidated by, for example, Service Engineered Modifications which the MoD has not had properly appraised. That is, there is an ADA design baseline and in all probability a different In-Use baseline. Much time is spent on risk reduction, for example by conducting detailed aircraft surveys. Having got over this right up front, weight (and power) budgets are allocated to each design team. Mainplanes, radar and so on. The top level design team constantly monitors what is, or should be, a significant risk. (And I understand this is a long standing risk on Nimrod, as the original CofG was quite tight). Trading-off is common, but every proposal is accompanied by a W&M impact statement. Therefore, CofG problems do not suddenly appear 12 years later; they are known immediately.

No brainer, right? Wrong. MoD long ago decided not to fund maintaining build standards; at least not to the desired level. See the QinetiQ report on MR2 (which is what we’re talking about). The drawings are wrong. Tech Pubs are outdated. Repair procedures and schemes cannot be adhered to. The Safety Case is not applicable to the In-Use build standard. The usual gross breaches of airworthiness regs. In short, the design baseline is unknown, varies between tail numbers and is a moving feast. Under these circumstances, any ADA may indeed agree a fixed or firm price, but within carefully planned boundaries which most in MoD barely understand. Then there is the cost-plus element, in these contracts termed “emerging work”. The aim is to reduce this through (a) maintaining the build standard and (b) an early risk reduction phase.

Remember, the design is Under Ministry Control, not Contractor. If MoD chooses not to maintain the design, then I’d say the ADA need only state his case. Few would expect him to fund such work himself. Almost certainly BAeS very quickly identified MoD-owned risks. You must take my word for this, but almost every DA is acutely aware of his position of strength caused by MoD’s own failure to apply the above mandated airworthiness regs properly. I can’t comment on implied BAeS failings, but there are always two sides.


Read this from 1999.

http://www.publications.parliament.u.../300/30005.htm

The MoD trashed for failure to implement what I’m talking about. Specifically;

a. The time taken to progress modifications

b. The cost of Modification activity, specifically;

·poor configuration control and the effort involved in restoring it (a recurring theme) forcing delays and cost over-runs.

c. The effectiveness of modification management information


None of this is new. It’s a simple question…… What action was taken by the PE/DPA 2 Star in response to this report? None, it would appear. To be fair, having previously stated this was “of no concern to MoD(PE)” you’d hardly expect him to change his mind, would you? That’s the kind of consistency that costs lives.

[davejb]

Yes,
but surely you could see the huge blobs of plasticine on their noses?

[Jetex Jim]

No brainer, right? Wrong. MoD long ago decided not to fund maintaining build standards; at least not to the desired level. See the QinetiQ report on MR2 (which is what we’re talking about).

And you feel that the link you've given, which is about mature completed designs - currently in service equipment;
applies to MRA4 also?

How so?

[tucumseh]

Jetex


Nimrod MR2 is Government Furnished Equipment to the MRA4 programme. It is the design baseline, which is then modified. The contract will (or should) state "Qty x MR2 to be fed in at the following build standard". Initially the latter will have been the current ADA build standard, but as the actual standard of each tail number emerges the contract will change (at MoD cost). The process I describe is designed to minimise these changes and hence reduce cost escalation.

[Jetex Jim]

From the BAE website

The Nimrod MRA4 is 94 per cent new build and will give the UK at least 30 years .....

And the design baseline is still the MR2?

That's your trouble right there, I reckon.

[tucumseh]

It may indeed be 94% new build, but many of the CofG issues are determined by retention of (I believe) most of the fuselage, so rather less of it is a new design (in the sense that the basic layout is pre-determined). For example, you must put the mainplanes in the same place (give or take the extravagant tolerances between tail numbers). The underlying configuration control issues are discussed in the other Nimrod thread, but I think someone said that just enough of the MR2 was retained to make it a modification, not new build. This gets round certain MAR regs, but creates other problems – one of which is that the MR2 design baseline must be known and maintained. (In simple terms, the MRA4 build standard could be “MR2 plus mods”). Also, if the airworthiness of the MR2 is now doubt (AVM Loader’s conclusion, accepted by Des Browne) then it follows that this is a major emerging risk to MRA4 achieving MAR. If this is the case, then a non-MoD committee recommending cancellation as a “savings measure” is the MoD’s big “out” to avoid further embarrassment.

BAeS aren’t daft and I’m sure they have an engineering solution. But whether that is sufficient for some multi-Stars to sign MAR and RTS remains to be seen. I’m equally sure these stars will have been reading AVM Loader’s comments, speaking to him privately (and perhaps even reading the warnings going back 20 years!) and keeping an eye on the Nimrod Review developments – which is probably being delayed by political machinations at this level and above.

What worries me is that if MRA4 is cancelled, the Review will be a one-liner – “We’ve cancelled the programme, the problems are in the past and won’t be repeated”. Which would completely ignore the fact that the regulations which were not implemented apply to all aircraft, and management oversight is (meant to be) by the same people.

[LFFC]

BAE confirms it will cut 600 jobs

About 134 job cuts are planned at the Woodford operation, near Manchester where the Nimrod surveillance aircraft is made.

However, jobs related to that plane are safe.

[engineer(retard)]

Is that 94% new build by cost or mass. Seems an easy stat to spin.

regards

retard