The mathematics may be complex, but the management process is simple and the airworthiness regulations clear.
- The weight and moment characteristics of the aircraft are established. The aircraft enters Service at a given build standard and the design is brought Under Ministry Control (UMC).
- MoD appoints and contracts an Aircraft Design Authority (ADA) to maintain that build standard, through all changes.
- The Weight and Moment information is kept up-to-date, so that a modification programme such as this does not have to regress. But, it makes sense to validate and verify the information, because upon induction the ADA will almost certainly find his data has been invalidated by, for example, Service Engineered Modifications which the MoD has not had properly appraised. That is, there is an ADA design baseline and in all probability a different In-Use baseline. Much time is spent on risk reduction, for example by conducting detailed aircraft surveys. Having got over this right up front, weight (and power) budgets are allocated to each design team. Mainplanes, radar and so on. The top level design team constantly monitors what is, or should be, a significant risk. (And I understand this is a long standing risk on Nimrod, as the original CofG was quite tight). Trading-off is common, but every proposal is accompanied by a W&M impact statement. Therefore, CofG problems do not suddenly appear 12 years later; they are known immediately.
No brainer, right? Wrong. MoD long ago decided not to fund maintaining build standards; at least not to the desired level. See the QinetiQ report on MR2 (which is what we’re talking about). The drawings are wrong. Tech Pubs are outdated. Repair procedures and schemes cannot be adhered to. The Safety Case is not applicable to the In-Use build standard. The usual gross breaches of airworthiness regs. In short, the design baseline is unknown, varies between tail numbers and is a moving feast. Under these circumstances, any ADA may indeed agree a fixed or firm price, but within carefully planned boundaries which most in MoD barely understand. Then there is the cost-plus element, in these contracts termed “emerging work”. The aim is to reduce this through (a) maintaining the build standard and (b) an early risk reduction phase.
Remember, the design is Under Ministry Control, not Contractor. If MoD chooses not to maintain the design, then I’d say the ADA need only state his case. Few would expect him to fund such work himself. Almost certainly BAeS very quickly identified MoD-owned risks. You must take my word for this, but almost every DA is acutely aware of his position of strength caused by MoD’s own failure to apply the above mandated airworthiness regs properly. I can’t comment on implied BAeS failings, but there are always two sides.
Read this from 1999.
http://www.publications.parliament.u.../300/30005.htm
The MoD trashed for failure to implement what I’m talking about. Specifically;
a. The time taken to progress modifications
b. The cost of Modification activity, specifically;
·poor configuration control and the effort involved in restoring it (a recurring theme) forcing delays and cost over-runs.
c. The effectiveness of modification management information
None of this is new. It’s a simple question…… What action was taken by the PE/DPA 2 Star in response to this report? None, it would appear. To be fair, having previously stated this was “of no concern to MoD(PE)” you’d hardly expect him to change his mind, would you? That’s the kind of consistency that costs lives.