Stanley Runway

[John Purdey]

There is a letter in yesterday's Daily Telegraph by a gallant and highly experienced Royal Marine officer, suggesting that not a single bomb dropped by the Vulcans actually hit the runway target at Stanley in 1982. Can anyone with real knowlege comment on this ? JP

[forget]

I read the letter. It was badly worded. He said he'd seen the runway immediately after liberation and no 'repairs' were evident.

[Mike Oxmels]

Looks like a nice DH to me. I have never heard anybody else dispute the fact.

[hobie]

ITN did an interview only last week with a couple of the guys that flew that mission ..... they were standing beside a repaired section of the runway to illustrate the most direct hit ..... it was certainly a $$$$$ $$$$$$ $$$ hole ....

[toddbabe]

Hitting the runway was only a minor part of what that mission was all about! the overall aim of keeping the mirages and skyhawks at home in Argentina was achieved and it also displayed our ability to hit their mainland bases if needed.
Blackbuck was a huge success without actually doing a lot of physical damage.

[forget]

Here's the letter -


The effects of bombing Stanley runway

Sir - I must balance some well-honed RAF myths with facts ("Bombing Argentines with all the lights on 'just wasn't cricket' ", report, April 30).

Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets. Until the last night of the war Stanley runway was used continually by enemy Hercules aircraft and often by their Pucara ground attack aircraft.

The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.

Throughout the war those of us on the ground and at sea continued to suffer the consequences of fast jets operating out of Rio Gallegos, a mere 304 nautical miles from Falkland Sound. I have been to Rio Gallegos: it has a very long runway indeed and would have taken considerably more than a couple of inaccurate Vulcan bombing raids to have closed it.

Immediately after the Argentine surrender, I and a Falkland Islander drove the length and breadth of the Stanley runway looking for signs of damage and repair. There were none and the concrete was in as good condition as when I had been responsible for its security in 1978 and 1979.

My friend and I marvelled, not for the first time, at the inventiveness of the Argentine engineers. Certainly the RAF's bombing operations against Stanley airport were strategically useful but of little tactical value to us actually in the Falklands.

War is not cricket. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility."

Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon

[splitbrain]

I did my one and only stint in the Falklands in 1983. less than a year after the war had ended. The concrete runway had been covered with an interlocking covering - AM2 matting I think it was called.
One of the 'sights' to see at Stanley was the edge of the bomb crater that could be clearly seen at the side of the runway sticking out from the AM2. We were told that the bomb hadn't denied the Argentinians the use of the runway as they had managed to operate down the side of it.

[wokkameister]

Was it Stanley runway he was looking at? I mean...Gibraltar/Spain....all very similar.

[forget]

Hmmm. Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon.

Retired Lt.Colonel Southby-Tailyour (OBE) served with the British Royal Marines for thirty two years. Currently Ewen works as an amphibious consultant for international companies and defence organisations and skippers naval explorations to the Arctic. Ewen is also the acclaimed Editor of Jane's Amphibious and Special Forces.

[Sven Sixtoo]

Ewen Southby-Taylor was, IIRC (and I am doing this without checking so if you know different I won't challenge) a RM Major when he led a sailing exped round the Falklands in late 70's. As a result he was a most imprtant adviser to the Cmd staff for Op CORPORATE.

The Stanley runway could not operate fast jets?

Errr - After we patched it we operated Phantoms off it for at least 3 years late 82 till MPA opened. We had to stop every so often to repatch it.
4500 feet was long enough. The remaining ends - 2 and a bit 000 - would not have been.

Sven

[izod tester]

I arrived at Stanley in early July 1982 and left in November. There was certainly a large crater in the runway then which took the Royal Engineers considerable effort to fill before they covered the whole runway with AM2 matting. Certainly, the Argentinians operated Pucaras and C130 from Stanley even after the runway had been bombed. However, the Aer Macchis which were parked at the Eastern end of the runway did not operate after the bombing, nor was the runway adequate to operate either Mirage or Super Etendard which allowed the Harriers (of both RN and RAF variety) more freedom of operation and reduced the risk to the Fleet from the Etendard born Exocet. Rio Galagos may have had a long runway, but that 390 miles - each way - certainly had an effect on the operating radius of the Argentinian Attack aircraft looking for Hermes and Invincible.

The problem with the Royal Marine Lt Col is that he is unable to give due credit to the efforts of the RAF in support of the RN led but nevertheless, Joint, operation which recovered the Falklands. I do not wish to denigrate the contributions of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines or the Army. It may have been the case that the operation could have succeeded without any RAF contribution. No one knows or will ever know. The fact is that the RAF provided support in a number of areas. RAF aircrew were prepared to put their lives on the line and large numbers of RAF ground crew worked long and hard to support the operation.

He may have doubts about the effectiveness of the RAF contribution. Fortunately, I have met other Royal Marines who have a much better appreciation of RAF operations and realize that the RAF and the Royal Marines are not in competiton but provide different capabilities in support of Joint Operations.

[forget]

PS. Should anyone wish to discuss this with yer man, you'll find him here.

Thursday 31st May 2007
Falklands Lecture
Commencing: 11.00am - 1.00pm
Place: National Maritime Museum, Greenwich
Lecture by Commodore Michael Clapp and Lieutenant-Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour.

Beachcombing by Lieutenant- Colonel Ewen Southby-Tailyour: Beachcombing is the expression used for covert beach intelligence undertaken by people like me when 'on holiday' and which is then forwarded to DI4 - undertaken, seemingly by an innocent 'tourist' without obvious equipment for, say, measuring the stability of sand surface or underwater gradients. In 1978, Ewen Southby-Tailour was an officer commanding a small Royal Marines detachment in the Falkland Islands. On his own initiative he sailed around and extensively chartered the waters and compiled a notebook filled with data on harbours, inlets and landing spots. Even today it is still the most comprehensive sailing guide to the area. After the Argentine forces invaded, the British Forces asked for his book but he refused unless assigned as ‘staff officer without portfolio.’ ( Isn't that 'aiding the bad guys'?) He was made the navigation adviser to the command as well as commander of the Task Force Landing Craft Squadron.

Major Ewen Southby-Tailour joined the Royal Marines in 1960, served in 42, 43 and 45 (twice) Cdos and numerous UK, US and French ships as a Landing Craft Officer. He was seconded to the Sultan of Muscat's Armed Forces from 1966-68 as a Company Commander and was awarded the Sultan's Bravery Medal for operations during the Dhofar War. He commanded naval party 8901 in the Falklands 1978-79 - (surveyed beaches for own use) then returned in 1982 as the Amphibious and Navigational Adviser and as CO of the specially formed Task Force Landing Craft Squadron. He invented, formed then commanded for 4 years 539 Assault Squadron Royal Marines before retiring in 1992 when he became an author of military biographies and built yachts for high-latitude exploring and surveying.
Tickets: £7.50/£5.50

[John Purdey]

I regret that i shall not be able to be present for the presentation on 31st May, but i very much hope that one or more of the contributers here will be there to tackle him! Meanwhile, many thanks for putting the record straight. What made him fire off like this, one wonders.

[Pontius Navigator]

Forget,

I was sitting immediately behind him when he was called to take the telephone call that he was required.

Quite correct, he wrote he surveyed and wrote the Falklands Pilot. Mind you, if you were stuck down in Stanley for weeks on end on rotation and you like sailing, what better way to fill your time. Much better than actually soldiering

[LFFC]

What made him [Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour] fire off like this, one wonders.

I fear that in this current atmosphere of "severe financial constraint" the level of inter-service rivalry has reached new heights of bitterness.

[Zoom]

Can someone interpret this sentence from his letter:

'The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.'

Further north on the mainland is Brazil, isn't it?

[Pontius Navigator]

Zoom,

I could be read as:

'The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north

ie they stayed South

[quote] "so they couldn't take part in the fighting":[/quote}

and not safe in the north.

further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated

which would have been the case if they wanted to protect BA?

[exMudmover]

Ewen Southby-Tailyour presents a very one-sided and partisan view of RAF operations in the Falklands War. RAF Harriers also made determined efforts put the Stanley runway out of action, but their efforts were largely frustrated by the general incompetence of their RN superiors, who were ignorant of the requirements of Ground Attack operations, Tactical Air Recce and Intelligence dissemination. The full story of this is contained in RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands, published shortly.

[scroggs]

The good Lt Col is incorrect. The runway was indeed penetrated by one bomb, at the mid-point of the runway on its southern side. I was on the second RAF C130 to land there, a day or two after the fighting ceased, and we spent some considerable time inspecting the damage. Even after the runway was repaired and the AM2 laid, that crater continued to cause problems which were never really sorted.

Scroggs

[beamer]

We are getting old Scroggs !