MRA 4, delayed again?
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Getting back to the topic...
Here are a few thoughts about the Nimrod MRA4 programme as it stands today. Not what it could be, or might be – but what is actually going on right now...and, more importantly, what has been contracted and funded.
The only contracted level of capability that BAE has to deliver is for an ASW aircraft. That is not BAE's fault – that is what the customer has ordered and paid for. Bizarrely, that requirement has never changed and sooner or later some serious questions are going to have to be answered about the procurement brains behind the MRA4.
There is immense potential within the MRA4's systems to do all the ISTAR and other funky 'new' missions of the MR2 fleet – but none of that has been contracted or funded so it remains entirely notional.
Thanks to the legion of UORs applied to the MR2 fleet that aircraft is today significantly better at the overland role than the MRA4 will be when it's delivered.
The same is true for all of MRA4's potential as a long-range strike platform. When the jets are delivered the ONLY weapon cleared for carriage will be Sting Ray. It is capable of carrying a lot more, but nothing else has been contracted.
BAE and the MoD are now about to start new negotiations over two rather important issues:
1.
The MRA4 needs a stability augmentation system because it doesn't fly in a straight line. Fixing this will incur additional costs and will bring a delay to initial deliveries.
2.
Even though the announced order in 2006 was for 12 aircraft, BAE has only been contracted to supply nine, plus three options. All of BAE's programme costings are based on a production run of 12 aircraft. If, for some reason, it turns out not to be 12 then the price goes up again.
Right now the entire programme from design and development to end of production is costing about £4 billion.
The target ISD for the fleet is still 2010 but confidence is slipping that that will be met. When the MRA4 does enter service it will be as an ASW platform – anything beyond that will have to be newly paid for and implemented.
The growth potential in the aircraft and its systems is enormous but until someone decides to unlock and PAY for that it remains a potential only.
I would ask, who is in charge of this programme and why has it been allowed to carry in a direction set out in 1996 (or earlier) with seemingly no regard for what is really required from the aircraft, and the people who are working hard to make it happen?
VC
The only contracted level of capability that BAE has to deliver is for an ASW aircraft. That is not BAE's fault – that is what the customer has ordered and paid for. Bizarrely, that requirement has never changed and sooner or later some serious questions are going to have to be answered about the procurement brains behind the MRA4.
There is immense potential within the MRA4's systems to do all the ISTAR and other funky 'new' missions of the MR2 fleet – but none of that has been contracted or funded so it remains entirely notional.
Thanks to the legion of UORs applied to the MR2 fleet that aircraft is today significantly better at the overland role than the MRA4 will be when it's delivered.
The same is true for all of MRA4's potential as a long-range strike platform. When the jets are delivered the ONLY weapon cleared for carriage will be Sting Ray. It is capable of carrying a lot more, but nothing else has been contracted.
BAE and the MoD are now about to start new negotiations over two rather important issues:
1.
The MRA4 needs a stability augmentation system because it doesn't fly in a straight line. Fixing this will incur additional costs and will bring a delay to initial deliveries.
2.
Even though the announced order in 2006 was for 12 aircraft, BAE has only been contracted to supply nine, plus three options. All of BAE's programme costings are based on a production run of 12 aircraft. If, for some reason, it turns out not to be 12 then the price goes up again.
Right now the entire programme from design and development to end of production is costing about £4 billion.
The target ISD for the fleet is still 2010 but confidence is slipping that that will be met. When the MRA4 does enter service it will be as an ASW platform – anything beyond that will have to be newly paid for and implemented.
The growth potential in the aircraft and its systems is enormous but until someone decides to unlock and PAY for that it remains a potential only.
I would ask, who is in charge of this programme and why has it been allowed to carry in a direction set out in 1996 (or earlier) with seemingly no regard for what is really required from the aircraft, and the people who are working hard to make it happen?
VC
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VC.
A thousand thanks for that very informed update. It's just as Chicked leg and myself feared -- no, it's worse.
One question on the subject of computer software. If and when MRA enters service, who will be tasked with carrying out updates?
DV
A thousand thanks for that very informed update. It's just as Chicked leg and myself feared -- no, it's worse.
One question on the subject of computer software. If and when MRA enters service, who will be tasked with carrying out updates?
DV
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
The MRA4 needs a stability augmentation system because it doesn't fly in a straight line. Fixing this will incur additional costs and will bring a delay to initial deliveries.
Even though the announced order in 2006 was for 12 aircraft, BAE has only been contracted to supply nine, plus three options.
18 July 2006:
The Secretary of State for Defence (Des Browne): I can announce that the contract for foil (sic) production of 12 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft has been placed with BAE Systems. This is the culmination of many years of hard work by BAE Systems and its supply chain, and builds upon the considerable investment already made by the Ministry of Defence and BAE Systems. Nimrod MRA4 has had a troubled and well publicised history of time delays and cost overruns. The contract restructuring introduced since early 2003 has been successful in stabilising costs and with three aircraft participating in the flight trials programme, the design has now reached a level of maturity which permits a commitment to foil production.....
BAe Investors Brief, same month: ..Nimrod Production contract
During Farnborough Airshow, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Rt Hon Des Browne MP announced that the UK Government had signed a production contract for a 12-aircraft fleet of the next-generation Nimrod, the MRA4....
Last edited by ORAC; 6th Apr 2007 at 18:08.
Violet Club,
Isn't the real problem that the 'customer' in this case is DEC Underwater Warfare, who sees the aircraft as his trainset (the money came from his piggy bank), and who would see the addition of land attack (Storm Shadow), ISTAR and other such roles as being a 'diversion'.
Isn't the real problem that the 'customer' in this case is DEC Underwater Warfare, who sees the aircraft as his trainset (the money came from his piggy bank), and who would see the addition of land attack (Storm Shadow), ISTAR and other such roles as being a 'diversion'.
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Nimrod Catch Up
ORAC
Re: SAS costs
I believe this issue may have been highlighted as a potential risk by the time the 2006 contract was agreed and so the need for possible extra funding may have been flagged up then. Now that the fear has become fact the horse-trading begins.
And perhaps it doesn't fly in a straight line because of something the customer specified...I don't know.
Re: Yes Minister
You have quoted those two statements exactly as they were given at the time.
They do not, however, reflect actual reality – go and check BAE's 2006 Annual Report of December 06 and see what is says there. That's the ultimate bottom line. If anyone can explain to me the rather glaring discrepancy between the Minister's statement and the booked order I'd love to hear it.
Jacko
In a word, yes. And even the prospective maritime missions for the MRA4 seem to be locked in a timewarp...it will only carry Sting Rays for gawd's sake.
LowObz
I would be no good at that rock star lifestyle.
Re: SAS costs
I believe this issue may have been highlighted as a potential risk by the time the 2006 contract was agreed and so the need for possible extra funding may have been flagged up then. Now that the fear has become fact the horse-trading begins.
And perhaps it doesn't fly in a straight line because of something the customer specified...I don't know.
Re: Yes Minister
You have quoted those two statements exactly as they were given at the time.
They do not, however, reflect actual reality – go and check BAE's 2006 Annual Report of December 06 and see what is says there. That's the ultimate bottom line. If anyone can explain to me the rather glaring discrepancy between the Minister's statement and the booked order I'd love to hear it.
Jacko
In a word, yes. And even the prospective maritime missions for the MRA4 seem to be locked in a timewarp...it will only carry Sting Rays for gawd's sake.
LowObz
I would be no good at that rock star lifestyle.
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You should know better, ORAC, Hansard simply records misinformation given out by politicians. The BAe 2006 annual report is probably stating the truth
"Flight developement of Nimrod MRA4 programme continues and the formal production contract was received in July for nine aircraft with the option for the conversion of the three aicraft currently in flight developement to production standard."
DV
"Flight developement of Nimrod MRA4 programme continues and the formal production contract was received in July for nine aircraft with the option for the conversion of the three aicraft currently in flight developement to production standard."
DV
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Feature in this week's Av Week on the MRA4's problems, adding to the insight provided by VC. Extracts:
Undesirable handling characteristics are forcing BAE Systems to augment the flight control system on its Nimrod MRA4 maritime reconnaissance and attack aircraft, with first flight of a modified version by year-end.
The U.K. MoD and BAE have yet to formally contract for the work package. According to a company official, discussions are ongoing. One issue is likely to be which organization pays for the cost of the so-called stability augmentation system (SAS).
There was a realization, even before the flight test program began, that there might be an issue with longitudinal stability, according to the company official, although there was "no definitive proof." The concern over longitudinal stability turned out to be valid, with the aircraft having a tendency to "porpoise," given the right conditions.
While the test crews are understood to be at ease dealing with "porpoising" effect, it was decided that the characteristic could not be disregarded.
The augmentation system will use a digital system to interface with the manual flight controls. The BAE official says integrating the package "is not a major issue."
There are indications the in-service date could slip until the end of 2010, or possibly further.
I/C
Undesirable handling characteristics are forcing BAE Systems to augment the flight control system on its Nimrod MRA4 maritime reconnaissance and attack aircraft, with first flight of a modified version by year-end.
The U.K. MoD and BAE have yet to formally contract for the work package. According to a company official, discussions are ongoing. One issue is likely to be which organization pays for the cost of the so-called stability augmentation system (SAS).
There was a realization, even before the flight test program began, that there might be an issue with longitudinal stability, according to the company official, although there was "no definitive proof." The concern over longitudinal stability turned out to be valid, with the aircraft having a tendency to "porpoise," given the right conditions.
While the test crews are understood to be at ease dealing with "porpoising" effect, it was decided that the characteristic could not be disregarded.
The augmentation system will use a digital system to interface with the manual flight controls. The BAE official says integrating the package "is not a major issue."
There are indications the in-service date could slip until the end of 2010, or possibly further.
I/C
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The stability issue was identified very early on in the development process, and replicated in the sim; first flight(s) just confirmed the precise characteristics. As to who pays? The taxpayer, who else?
