Getting back to the topic...
Here are a few thoughts about the Nimrod MRA4 programme as it stands today. Not what it could be, or might be – but what is actually going on right now...and, more importantly, what has been contracted and funded.
The only contracted level of capability that BAE has to deliver is for an ASW aircraft. That is not BAE's fault – that is what the customer has ordered and paid for. Bizarrely, that requirement has never changed and sooner or later some serious questions are going to have to be answered about the procurement brains behind the MRA4.
There is immense potential within the MRA4's systems to do all the ISTAR and other funky 'new' missions of the MR2 fleet – but none of that has been contracted or funded so it remains entirely notional.
Thanks to the legion of UORs applied to the MR2 fleet that aircraft is today significantly better at the overland role than the MRA4 will be when it's delivered.
The same is true for all of MRA4's potential as a long-range strike platform. When the jets are delivered the ONLY weapon cleared for carriage will be Sting Ray. It is capable of carrying a lot more, but nothing else has been contracted.
BAE and the MoD are now about to start new negotiations over two rather important issues:
1.
The MRA4 needs a stability augmentation system because it doesn't fly in a straight line. Fixing this will incur additional costs and will bring a delay to initial deliveries.
2.
Even though the announced order in 2006 was for 12 aircraft, BAE has only been contracted to supply nine, plus three options. All of BAE's programme costings are based on a production run of 12 aircraft. If, for some reason, it turns out not to be 12 then the price goes up again.
Right now the entire programme from design and development to end of production is costing about £4 billion.
The target ISD for the fleet is still 2010 but confidence is slipping that that will be met. When the MRA4 does enter service it will be as an ASW platform – anything beyond that will have to be newly paid for and implemented.
The growth potential in the aircraft and its systems is enormous but until someone decides to unlock and PAY for that it remains a potential only.
I would ask, who is in charge of this programme and why has it been allowed to carry in a direction set out in 1996 (or earlier) with seemingly no regard for what is really required from the aircraft, and the people who are working hard to make it happen?
VC