A new CAS platform?
Thread Starter
A new CAS platform?
There's plainly overstretch in the FJ force, and its clear that there's a shortfall in Close Air Support capabilities.
The Harriers are plainly over-stretched. With aircraft going through upgrade, sending one extra jet caused Cottesmore's pips to squeak.
They have no gun.
The Jaguars are on the way out - and with no capacity at St Athan and with no support contracts, cannot be kept in service.
They have inadequate payload/range and poor hot & high characteristics.
The GR4's availability is barely sufficient to meet existing commitments.
On another thread Flt Lt Spry said:
"Air-to-ground gunnery? Why not use the mighty F3?
I'm sure those guys would appreciate some Op experience?!"
Ho ho, I thought. Nice one! But apparently he wasn't joking.
I wonder whether any of our resident F3 blokes are going to put aside their customary modesty and step up and tell us how brilliant Treble One already are at strafe, having been practising it at Tain during Exercise Flying Rhino, controlled by FACs ...... and with Neptune Warrior coming up?
I wonder whether any of the 'host of ongoing UORs' are aimed at providing F3 with Recce Lite and PW/EPW?
I wonder whether we'll go to the expense of developing a really impressive capability (as we did with F3 SEAD) only for some demarcation obsessed senior officer to veto its operational use?
Or has someone seen sense, and realised that retaining two squadrons of low-houred F3s would spread GR4 hours better, giving the GR4 a sporting chance of getting to its extended OSD?
The Harriers are plainly over-stretched. With aircraft going through upgrade, sending one extra jet caused Cottesmore's pips to squeak.
They have no gun.
The Jaguars are on the way out - and with no capacity at St Athan and with no support contracts, cannot be kept in service.
They have inadequate payload/range and poor hot & high characteristics.
The GR4's availability is barely sufficient to meet existing commitments.
On another thread Flt Lt Spry said:
"Air-to-ground gunnery? Why not use the mighty F3?
I'm sure those guys would appreciate some Op experience?!"
Ho ho, I thought. Nice one! But apparently he wasn't joking.
I wonder whether any of our resident F3 blokes are going to put aside their customary modesty and step up and tell us how brilliant Treble One already are at strafe, having been practising it at Tain during Exercise Flying Rhino, controlled by FACs ...... and with Neptune Warrior coming up?
I wonder whether any of the 'host of ongoing UORs' are aimed at providing F3 with Recce Lite and PW/EPW?
I wonder whether we'll go to the expense of developing a really impressive capability (as we did with F3 SEAD) only for some demarcation obsessed senior officer to veto its operational use?
Or has someone seen sense, and realised that retaining two squadrons of low-houred F3s would spread GR4 hours better, giving the GR4 a sporting chance of getting to its extended OSD?
Basic thought:-
Why not put a certain number of JRP-equipped F3s at Al Udeid to do what is shortening the GR4 lifespan? High-fatigue low-houred F3's would surely be better used in that profile, especially with its slightly higher fuel load, than mid-fatigue high-houred GR4s, and would the lack of PW capability really be that much of an issue? Perhaps a small Diamond Fleet of F3's might help the GR4 see out 2020+ in a less expensive way than is coming, i.e another major upgrade?
Thoughts anyone, genuinely interested in a hypothetical discussion.
Jobza
Why not put a certain number of JRP-equipped F3s at Al Udeid to do what is shortening the GR4 lifespan? High-fatigue low-houred F3's would surely be better used in that profile, especially with its slightly higher fuel load, than mid-fatigue high-houred GR4s, and would the lack of PW capability really be that much of an issue? Perhaps a small Diamond Fleet of F3's might help the GR4 see out 2020+ in a less expensive way than is coming, i.e another major upgrade?
Thoughts anyone, genuinely interested in a hypothetical discussion.
Jobza
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Or why not put some money across to Apache and let them have the backing to extend the good work that they are already able to do in theatre bridging the gaps in the CAS capability? Proven record and ability, more funding required!
Regards
HEDP
Regards
HEDP
Whilst I have no desire to enter into a slanging match about the undoubted skill and determination of the Harrier operators, what I'd like to know is this;
If the GR7 is perceived to be vulnerable to small-arms fire from AK74/RPD/RPK as used by the Taliban, how would it have survived over the North German Plain against GSFG armed with AK74/RPD/RPK, the operational theatre for which both it and its previous manifestation were designed?
If, as I suspect, TPTB have known about such vulnerability, have we been misleading ourselves about the capability of the Harrier, which on introduction to service was hailed as just the thing for Close Air Support?
Just to bring my post back to a suitable level for Pprune, if this debate identifies a suitable candidate for a future CAS platform, can I assume that we will have a willy-waving contest about which Service will operate it?
If the GR7 is perceived to be vulnerable to small-arms fire from AK74/RPD/RPK as used by the Taliban, how would it have survived over the North German Plain against GSFG armed with AK74/RPD/RPK, the operational theatre for which both it and its previous manifestation were designed?
If, as I suspect, TPTB have known about such vulnerability, have we been misleading ourselves about the capability of the Harrier, which on introduction to service was hailed as just the thing for Close Air Support?
Just to bring my post back to a suitable level for Pprune, if this debate identifies a suitable candidate for a future CAS platform, can I assume that we will have a willy-waving contest about which Service will operate it?
Hellbound
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Cough cough, splutter, splutter
'Overstretch in the FJ Force'????????
I know you mean that there is a CAS capability deficit, but please don't try and tell the battlefield helo mob that the FJ personnel are overstretched!
(Harriers excluded, obviously, but they are only really moderately quick...
)
'Overstretch in the FJ Force'????????
I know you mean that there is a CAS capability deficit, but please don't try and tell the battlefield helo mob that the FJ personnel are overstretched!
(Harriers excluded, obviously, but they are only really moderately quick...
)
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Is the fast jet the right tool for CAS,or are we relearning the lessons of Vietnam that gave birth to the A-10 and Su-25 in the first place ?- i.e. what's needed is slower, heavily armed and armoured aircraft that can put a lot of things that go bang on target, and loiter until they are needed.
Or the original USMC operational plan for the Harrier - fast turnaround from FOBs so that again lots more things that go bang are put on target?
Or the original USMC operational plan for the Harrier - fast turnaround from FOBs so that again lots more things that go bang are put on target?
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If the GR7 is perceived to be vulnerable to small-arms fire from AK74/RPD/RPK as used by the Taliban, how would it have survived over the North German Plain against GSFG armed with AK74/RPD/RPK, the operational theatre for which both it and its previous manifestation were designed?
Regards
Blunted
Diginagain,
The Harriers suitability for CAS was provided, not by its survivability, but by it's ability to operate from close to the battlefield and therefore generate high sortie rates. No-one ever pretended that operating at low level in-close was anything other than an extremely hostile environment. The only measure of protection from small arms and hand-helds was provided by 500kts and 100ft. This was augmented in the GR7 by the ability to do it at night.
You will have noticed by the way the A10 is employed that even it will not loiter at low levels in a high threat environment and we have certainly learnt that Apache, for all its capabilities, is vulnerable to a farmer with a muzzle loader.
The Harriers suitability for CAS was provided, not by its survivability, but by it's ability to operate from close to the battlefield and therefore generate high sortie rates. No-one ever pretended that operating at low level in-close was anything other than an extremely hostile environment. The only measure of protection from small arms and hand-helds was provided by 500kts and 100ft. This was augmented in the GR7 by the ability to do it at night.
You will have noticed by the way the A10 is employed that even it will not loiter at low levels in a high threat environment and we have certainly learnt that Apache, for all its capabilities, is vulnerable to a farmer with a muzzle loader.
Flaps62
Thanks for the clarification. So we've happily gone along with the fast(ish), low-level, quick turnaround concept for operations against a heavily armed opposition for 30 years and now suddenly it isn't suitable against small-arms equipped militia?
Thanks for the clarification. So we've happily gone along with the fast(ish), low-level, quick turnaround concept for operations against a heavily armed opposition for 30 years and now suddenly it isn't suitable against small-arms equipped militia?
For 30 years it was all we had! Now, the perfect solution might be a platform with 100s of different sub-munitions that can stay on station for hour after hour at medium to high level with tailored deliveries being guided by laser/tv/gps. We didn't have the technologies to support that then and that solution is not sustainable in all threat environments but it would be ideal in Afg. As in all these things we have to compromise and, lets face it, most of the platforms we have now (including Typhoon) were designed for an environment that was hostile from 0ft all the way up.
The Harrier could do that job as well as most and makes a pretty damn good job of the medium level role where it doesn't have any air-air threat to worry about.
The Harrier could do that job as well as most and makes a pretty damn good job of the medium level role where it doesn't have any air-air threat to worry about.
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! Now, the perfect solution might be a platform with 100s of different sub-munitions that can stay on station for hour after hour at medium to high level with tailored deliveries being guided by laser/tv/gps. We didn't have the technologies to support that then and that solution is not sustainable in all threat environments but it would be ideal in Afg.
Sounds like a job for the B-52 - or the Nimrod?
Thread Starter
Stap me! I thought I over-simplified......
"......the fast(ish), low-level, quick turnaround concept for operations against a heavily armed opposition for 30 years and now suddenly it isn't suitable against small-arms equipped militia?"
Surely the point about low level in C Europe in the Cold War is that:
1) The air threat and sophisticated SAM threat made low level SAFER than medium level, surely? With no air- and double-digit SAM threat, medium altitude offers sanctuary, and low level becomes RELATIVELY more dangerous.
2) We had bigger force structures, and the conventional elements were not expected to sustain ops for long - blunting an enemy offensive enough to give pause for thought, buying thinking time before escalation,etc. But expected to operate for days, not months, and thus able to sustain higher loss rates.
3) In a real war, acceptable loss rates are determined logically, by the military itself, and the public trust the military to know best. In limited and peace-keeping ops the attitude of the public to seeing the C-17s off-loading coffins is critical, acceptable loss rates are effectively determined by the politicians and the voters, and a much lower level of losses is deemed acceptable.
One of the most interesting aspects of the major's e-mail was his comment about R&R and leave hampering his ability to conduct operations. Because the politicians are desparate to portray current ops in Afghanistan and Iraq as relatively low intensity 'peace-keeping' and reconstruction efforts, we don't have a "wartime attitude" to things like R&R and leave, nor to getting adequate force levels.
"......the fast(ish), low-level, quick turnaround concept for operations against a heavily armed opposition for 30 years and now suddenly it isn't suitable against small-arms equipped militia?"
Surely the point about low level in C Europe in the Cold War is that:
1) The air threat and sophisticated SAM threat made low level SAFER than medium level, surely? With no air- and double-digit SAM threat, medium altitude offers sanctuary, and low level becomes RELATIVELY more dangerous.
2) We had bigger force structures, and the conventional elements were not expected to sustain ops for long - blunting an enemy offensive enough to give pause for thought, buying thinking time before escalation,etc. But expected to operate for days, not months, and thus able to sustain higher loss rates.
3) In a real war, acceptable loss rates are determined logically, by the military itself, and the public trust the military to know best. In limited and peace-keeping ops the attitude of the public to seeing the C-17s off-loading coffins is critical, acceptable loss rates are effectively determined by the politicians and the voters, and a much lower level of losses is deemed acceptable.
One of the most interesting aspects of the major's e-mail was his comment about R&R and leave hampering his ability to conduct operations. Because the politicians are desparate to portray current ops in Afghanistan and Iraq as relatively low intensity 'peace-keeping' and reconstruction efforts, we don't have a "wartime attitude" to things like R&R and leave, nor to getting adequate force levels.
Sorry, Jackonicko, for looking at the issue from the perspective of one who shared that low-level sanctuary, whilst doing what one could to blunt the SA-9/13 capability from my perspex 'bathtub'.
Last edited by diginagain; 27th Sep 2006 at 04:43.
Grandpa Aerotart
Why is it that the Defence Industry and the big bosses in the various services are always looking at more and more high tech solutions and yet the wars we end up fighting mostly don't need it?
The UK MOD are spending squillions on Typhoon, Nuc subs with ICBM and on etc when they have yet to actually fight an enemy that is significantly more technologocally advanced than the Viet Cong/NVA.
On the other thread there is umteen pages discussing the rights and wrongs of a complaint from Army Officer under DAILY ATTACK from a bunch of sandle wearing tribesmen with AK47/RPG and sod all else and all that is provided in the way of CAS is a lightweight jet with rocket pods.
I wonder what that Major would give for 3 squadrons of radial engined Skyraiders with their 4 20mm cannons and 8000lbs of other CAS ordinance they were famous for carrying and delivering with spine chilling accuracy...and a loiter time stretching to 8+ hrs.
I am half joking of course...although a Skyraider would be better than a Harrier in this case...I bet the Major and his peers would actually be overjoyed. You're fighting a desert version of the Viet Cong with cold war weapons...any wonder you are taking a kicking.
The US can be slated for much but they seem to always have the more or less right tool for the job and even when the tool aint quite perfect they make up for it by having lots of tools.
The UK/EU (Australia is no different) seem to always be planning and equiping for war against an incredible high tech foe when there just aint any high tech foes around. The high tech, stealthy, pointy things might be a shedload of fun but they rarely get used for their design purpose but more often a pressed into the breach because nothing better is available.
If I was the head occifer in charge of talking to Blair about such things I would be telling him to get on the phone to his mate and order up 5 squadrons of A10 or we pull out of Afghansitan and he can fight it himself.
The Major's primarly responsibility is to his men and the mission...not to worry about the sensibilities of his senior officers or their political leaders...and even less of the protocol of communications.
The UK MOD are spending squillions on Typhoon, Nuc subs with ICBM and on etc when they have yet to actually fight an enemy that is significantly more technologocally advanced than the Viet Cong/NVA.
On the other thread there is umteen pages discussing the rights and wrongs of a complaint from Army Officer under DAILY ATTACK from a bunch of sandle wearing tribesmen with AK47/RPG and sod all else and all that is provided in the way of CAS is a lightweight jet with rocket pods.
I wonder what that Major would give for 3 squadrons of radial engined Skyraiders with their 4 20mm cannons and 8000lbs of other CAS ordinance they were famous for carrying and delivering with spine chilling accuracy...and a loiter time stretching to 8+ hrs.
I am half joking of course...although a Skyraider would be better than a Harrier in this case...I bet the Major and his peers would actually be overjoyed. You're fighting a desert version of the Viet Cong with cold war weapons...any wonder you are taking a kicking.
The US can be slated for much but they seem to always have the more or less right tool for the job and even when the tool aint quite perfect they make up for it by having lots of tools.
The UK/EU (Australia is no different) seem to always be planning and equiping for war against an incredible high tech foe when there just aint any high tech foes around. The high tech, stealthy, pointy things might be a shedload of fun but they rarely get used for their design purpose but more often a pressed into the breach because nothing better is available.
If I was the head occifer in charge of talking to Blair about such things I would be telling him to get on the phone to his mate and order up 5 squadrons of A10 or we pull out of Afghansitan and he can fight it himself.
The Major's primarly responsibility is to his men and the mission...not to worry about the sensibilities of his senior officers or their political leaders...and even less of the protocol of communications.
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 26th Sep 2006 at 17:14.