Nimrod crash in Afghanistan Tech/Info/Discussion (NOT condolences)
NL
No link. If you want Ingram's response (which spells out the original statement in full, then denies it) I suggest you submit a FoI request asking for Ingram's written correspondence on airworthiness, to other MPs, while in office. Ask for the briefing notes as well - you can often glean from them WHO advised him.
Of equal concern now is why Mr Haddon-Cave chose not to refer to this evidence in his report. It was submitted to him. After all, his task arose from the statement in the Nimrod BoI report that airworthiness regulations were not being implemented properly. One would have thought he would regard as key evidence letters which clearly illustrate that ACM Loader's statement was not a revelation, but a mere reiteration of long known facts. His report was damning but, as I said before, it is compartmentalised to such a degree that there are quite a few individuals breathing a sigh of relief he (a) didn't go further back than 1999, (b) selected the easy targets while protecting those above them and (c) concentrated on the Nimrod Safety case when the point made by ACM Loader was that (by definition) the failings also applied to other aircraft.
But, rest assured, slowly but surely the details will emerge.
No link. If you want Ingram's response (which spells out the original statement in full, then denies it) I suggest you submit a FoI request asking for Ingram's written correspondence on airworthiness, to other MPs, while in office. Ask for the briefing notes as well - you can often glean from them WHO advised him.
Of equal concern now is why Mr Haddon-Cave chose not to refer to this evidence in his report. It was submitted to him. After all, his task arose from the statement in the Nimrod BoI report that airworthiness regulations were not being implemented properly. One would have thought he would regard as key evidence letters which clearly illustrate that ACM Loader's statement was not a revelation, but a mere reiteration of long known facts. His report was damning but, as I said before, it is compartmentalised to such a degree that there are quite a few individuals breathing a sigh of relief he (a) didn't go further back than 1999, (b) selected the easy targets while protecting those above them and (c) concentrated on the Nimrod Safety case when the point made by ACM Loader was that (by definition) the failings also applied to other aircraft.
But, rest assured, slowly but surely the details will emerge.
tucumseh, confirmation of your conviction that it was the deliberate and orchestrated replacement of qualified and experienced engineers with unqualified (for the job) stackers and scribblers:
Reinstate qualified RAF engineers -Times Online :
Reinstate qualified RAF engineers -Times Online :
Sir, Having spent most of my working life involved with the airworthiness of many types of military aircraft, I read the detailed and forensic report into the loss of Nimrod XV230 with great interest and deep concern (report, Oct 29). There are serious aspects of the report that should concern the public who ought to demand thoroughgoing changes to restore faith in the airworthiness of our military aircraft.
The age of our Nimrod fleet is not unusual for a military aircraft. Our defence budget only allows us to replace aircraft fleets every 30 years or so, and usually heavier aircraft remain in service for longer. During these extended lifetimes aircraft normally change roles and have many different operating procedures. Standard design and maintenance safety regulations are frequently challenged by these changes and new methods of achieving the required levels of safety have to be worked out. All such changes have to be tracked throughout the remaining life of the fleet and new generations of maintenance personnel trained to understand their implications for the long-term battle against the inevitable consequences of metal fatigue, corrosion and the like. The resulting programmes require the reservation of funds and facilities for many years ahead. However, day-to-day problems and crisis arising from training and operations are urgent and never ending. Inevitably, there is a temptation to neglect the longer term with potential disastrous consequences.
From the formation of RAF Strike Command in the early Sixties the engineering branch of the RAF met these challenges by co-locating all the specialist engineering staff for each aircraft in a single office — the Role Office — and required each office to prepare an annual review of its long-term airworthiness plans. By the late 1990s these reviews were heard by the Chief Engineer himself so that he could satisfy the responsibility that all RAF aircraft were airworthy.
The XV230 report details that early this century the post of Chief Engineer was discontinued, that the chain of delegation now no longer passes through the hands of properly qualified and experienced engineers. Instead, it seems to follow the chain of command, which could and did include not just non-engineers but also personnel who had no experience of military aircraft operation. In addition, a whole management layer was removed and with it the capability to supervise the Role Offices — now expanded and retitled integrated project teams. This was a recipe for disaster. It was akin to giving a GP responsibility for the quality and extent of cancer care — or even giving the task to a non-medical person.
The report into XV230 rightly takes to task personnel who failed to meet the standards required of them, but it does not address the larger problem of allowing airworthiness responsibility to be held by untrained personnel. Nor does it sufficiently criticise the convoluted dissipation of airworthiness responsibility in the new tri-service logistic organisation so that the heavy weight of this task is not clearly laid on specific individuals. The public should demand the immediate restoration of airworthiness responsibility to those who are qualified and trained to handle it.
Air Vice-Marshal K. A. Campbell RAF (Ret’d)
The age of our Nimrod fleet is not unusual for a military aircraft. Our defence budget only allows us to replace aircraft fleets every 30 years or so, and usually heavier aircraft remain in service for longer. During these extended lifetimes aircraft normally change roles and have many different operating procedures. Standard design and maintenance safety regulations are frequently challenged by these changes and new methods of achieving the required levels of safety have to be worked out. All such changes have to be tracked throughout the remaining life of the fleet and new generations of maintenance personnel trained to understand their implications for the long-term battle against the inevitable consequences of metal fatigue, corrosion and the like. The resulting programmes require the reservation of funds and facilities for many years ahead. However, day-to-day problems and crisis arising from training and operations are urgent and never ending. Inevitably, there is a temptation to neglect the longer term with potential disastrous consequences.
From the formation of RAF Strike Command in the early Sixties the engineering branch of the RAF met these challenges by co-locating all the specialist engineering staff for each aircraft in a single office — the Role Office — and required each office to prepare an annual review of its long-term airworthiness plans. By the late 1990s these reviews were heard by the Chief Engineer himself so that he could satisfy the responsibility that all RAF aircraft were airworthy.
The XV230 report details that early this century the post of Chief Engineer was discontinued, that the chain of delegation now no longer passes through the hands of properly qualified and experienced engineers. Instead, it seems to follow the chain of command, which could and did include not just non-engineers but also personnel who had no experience of military aircraft operation. In addition, a whole management layer was removed and with it the capability to supervise the Role Offices — now expanded and retitled integrated project teams. This was a recipe for disaster. It was akin to giving a GP responsibility for the quality and extent of cancer care — or even giving the task to a non-medical person.
The report into XV230 rightly takes to task personnel who failed to meet the standards required of them, but it does not address the larger problem of allowing airworthiness responsibility to be held by untrained personnel. Nor does it sufficiently criticise the convoluted dissipation of airworthiness responsibility in the new tri-service logistic organisation so that the heavy weight of this task is not clearly laid on specific individuals. The public should demand the immediate restoration of airworthiness responsibility to those who are qualified and trained to handle it.
Air Vice-Marshal K. A. Campbell RAF (Ret’d)
Chug
Thanks for this. A concise letter, summarising many pprune posts.
The "non-engineers" bit is particularly galling. When AMSO was formed in the early 90s, the edict came down - any admin grade was senior to any (civilian) engineer. The young lady who was appointed as my line manager was 2 grades below me. That particular problem was fixed quickly (much to her relief) but funding to investigate critical safety failures was routinely refused by her supplier colleagues, even more junior than the above young lady. Not all I may say, but sufficient to cause real safety probelms. I've still got a letter from an Admin Assistant telling me that as "reliability increases with age, and this is old equipment (the example was in C130), there is no need for fault investigations". Her bosses, all the way up to Director General Support Management (2 Star), supported her. When you have airworthiness delegation but the system encourages others to prevent you doing your job, then you always retain evidence! (Which is why Air Cdre Baber's evidence will be interesting if he ends up in court).
While both the AVM and Haddon-Cave make a point of saying the Chief Engineer post still existed until recently, in MoD(PE) the Chief of Defence Procurement announced in 1996 that he wanted rid of 500 engineers from AbbeyWood. He compounded this 2 years later (December 1998) by ruling that non-engineers could make or over-rule engineering design and airworthiness decisions, so completely ignoring the regulations on delegation and scrutiny. This ruling is still upheld / supported today, not least by Ainsworth.
Like I say, far worse than those named by Haddon-Cave.
Thanks for this. A concise letter, summarising many pprune posts.
The "non-engineers" bit is particularly galling. When AMSO was formed in the early 90s, the edict came down - any admin grade was senior to any (civilian) engineer. The young lady who was appointed as my line manager was 2 grades below me. That particular problem was fixed quickly (much to her relief) but funding to investigate critical safety failures was routinely refused by her supplier colleagues, even more junior than the above young lady. Not all I may say, but sufficient to cause real safety probelms. I've still got a letter from an Admin Assistant telling me that as "reliability increases with age, and this is old equipment (the example was in C130), there is no need for fault investigations". Her bosses, all the way up to Director General Support Management (2 Star), supported her. When you have airworthiness delegation but the system encourages others to prevent you doing your job, then you always retain evidence! (Which is why Air Cdre Baber's evidence will be interesting if he ends up in court).
While both the AVM and Haddon-Cave make a point of saying the Chief Engineer post still existed until recently, in MoD(PE) the Chief of Defence Procurement announced in 1996 that he wanted rid of 500 engineers from AbbeyWood. He compounded this 2 years later (December 1998) by ruling that non-engineers could make or over-rule engineering design and airworthiness decisions, so completely ignoring the regulations on delegation and scrutiny. This ruling is still upheld / supported today, not least by Ainsworth.
Like I say, far worse than those named by Haddon-Cave.
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Tail Wagging The Dog?
Some interesting comments regarding civilian admin or stackers turning down requests for funds for fault investigations. I doesn't really matter what the grade/rank of the person is or indeed the trade/branch because at the end of the day they are not the specialist and should not be expected to see the full ramifiactions of their actions. That is why we have specialist, qualified personnel in key posts to effect the checks and balances required. We can't get away from the fact that this is our responsibility as leaders. If 'the computer say's no' are we not beholden to ask why or even explain the ramifications. In my experience such personnel do not have the knowledge /interest in such matters and are merely following the rules and regualations set down - this is where the leadership bit comes in. At some point someone has to raise their voice and say that something is wrong and yes if required to hold onto the evidence for the subsequent BOI. We should be challenging the Loggie 'Tail' when required and remember that 'the standard you walk past is the standard we set'.
Boozy
Absolutely spot on. However, DGSM ruled in December 1992 that it was a sackable offence to challenge the "system" in the way you describe. (He threatened me with dismissal for seeking to, inter alia, maintain airworthiness). Over in MoD(PE), and later DPA and DLO, this ruling was also implemented, but it was "merely" a formal warning. Faced with such "leadership" (bullying) there are many who simply give in.
If 'the computer say's no' are we not beholden to ask why or even explain the ramifications. In my experience such personnel do not have the knowledge /interest in such matters and are merely following the rules and regualations set down - this is where the leadership bit comes in. At some point someone has to raise their voice and say that something is wrong and yes if required to hold onto the evidence for the subsequent BOI. We should be challenging the Loggie 'Tail' when required and remember that 'the standard you walk past is the standard we set'.
Absolutely spot on. However, DGSM ruled in December 1992 that it was a sackable offence to challenge the "system" in the way you describe. (He threatened me with dismissal for seeking to, inter alia, maintain airworthiness). Over in MoD(PE), and later DPA and DLO, this ruling was also implemented, but it was "merely" a formal warning. Faced with such "leadership" (bullying) there are many who simply give in.
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At para 7.30 of the H-C report, it states;
"It was worth remembering, however, that in the case of XV230, the BOI recorded that the centre section overheat warning was not reported as activated by what was, without doubt, a large fire within the aircraft's starboard No.7 Tank Dry Bay, the heat from which reached into the bomb bay. The BOI did note that there could be two explanations for this: (1) the electrical power to the system could have been distrupted by the fire before it could register the rise in temperature; or (2) another possibility was that the centre section overheat was triggered at about the same time as the other alarms, but the air engineer chose not to mention it on intercom as it was, by then, superfluous."
Can someone remind me as to where this appears in the BOI report
DV
"It was worth remembering, however, that in the case of XV230, the BOI recorded that the centre section overheat warning was not reported as activated by what was, without doubt, a large fire within the aircraft's starboard No.7 Tank Dry Bay, the heat from which reached into the bomb bay. The BOI did note that there could be two explanations for this: (1) the electrical power to the system could have been distrupted by the fire before it could register the rise in temperature; or (2) another possibility was that the centre section overheat was triggered at about the same time as the other alarms, but the air engineer chose not to mention it on intercom as it was, by then, superfluous."
Can someone remind me as to where this appears in the BOI report
DV
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H-C Pg 493
I make Recommendations for the creation of a New Military Airworthiness Regime under ten headings:
A. New Military Airworthiness Authority.
B. Clearly identified Airworthiness ‘Duty Holders’.
C. Proper training in Airworthiness Management and Regulatory skills.
D. Proper system of Mandatory Reporting and Analysis.
E. Single Safety Case and single Risk Management System.
F. New joint independent Accident Investigation process.
G. Readable and concise Airworthiness Regulations.
H. Coherent Flight Safety management across the three Services.
I. Clarification of Integrated Project Team Responsibilities.
J. Restoration of the Chief EngineerI make Recommendations for the creation of a New Military Airworthiness Regime under ten headings:
A. New Military Airworthiness Authority.
B. Clearly identified Airworthiness ‘Duty Holders’.
C. Proper training in Airworthiness Management and Regulatory skills.
D. Proper system of Mandatory Reporting and Analysis.
E. Single Safety Case and single Risk Management System.
F. New joint independent Accident Investigation process.
G. Readable and concise Airworthiness Regulations.
H. Coherent Flight Safety management across the three Services.
I. Clarification of Integrated Project Team Responsibilities.
I personally think that H-C has more than addressed the whole MAA issue. It just all depends on how these recommendations are actioned from this point on.
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Many thanks CLA for that prompt reply. Having read the paragraphs you have mentioned, I have always regarded that as an explanation as to why there is no recording of the aileron bay warning being activated. However, the final part of para 27 does mention the Centre Section Overheat warning. So we now have a double sensor failure (or failure to notice).
I have always been troubled by the fact that if the fire started as a "pool" fire at the bottom of dry bay No 7, why did the heat sensor in that bay not trigger the waring light on the Eng's pannel? Mr Breakell was the first person to bring this sensor to everyones notice at the inquest.
Mr Rawlinson (Counsel for the families) went on to say;
"And yet we have had numerous engineers, technicians, service engineers, even Mr Nelson, who have given evidence that there was nothing there."
I believe that such information should have been included in the H-C report.
DV
I have always been troubled by the fact that if the fire started as a "pool" fire at the bottom of dry bay No 7, why did the heat sensor in that bay not trigger the waring light on the Eng's pannel? Mr Breakell was the first person to bring this sensor to everyones notice at the inquest.
Mr Rawlinson (Counsel for the families) went on to say;
"And yet we have had numerous engineers, technicians, service engineers, even Mr Nelson, who have given evidence that there was nothing there."
I believe that such information should have been included in the H-C report.
DV
Last edited by Distant Voice; 12th Nov 2009 at 17:45.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
RAF officers investigated over Nimrod crash
Two senior RAF officers criticised in a devastating report into the crash of an Nimrod aircraft over Afghanistan with the loss of all 14 people on board are being investigated by military police, Bob Ainsworth, the defence secretary, said today.
He also announced that a new Military Aviation Authority would regulate, independently audit and monitor all military aviation activity, and said a review was under way into the way the MoD drew up contracts with arms companies.
Ainsworth was responding to a report in October by Charles Haddon-Cave QC, who referred to systemic and "lamentable" failings by the MoD, Britain's biggest arms company, BAE Systems and the privatised defence research company Qinetiq. He said the crash of the ageing Nimrod – involving the biggest single loss of life of British service personnel since the Falklands war – could have been avoided if those in charge of ensuring the safety of RAF aircraft had been more responsible.
Haddon-Cave, an aviation expert, said safety had become secondary to cost at the MoD. He described the Nimrod's production as "a story of incompetence, complacency and cynicism".
The two officers being investigated by the RAF police are Air Commodore George Baber and Wing Commander Michael Eagles. They have not been suspended but Ainsworth told MPs that neither man currently held any safety-related position.
Baber led the integrated project team responsible for a safety review of RAF Nimrods from 2001-05. Haddon-Cave accused him of a "fundamental failure of leadership" in drawing up the "safety case". His performance "fell well below the standard that might be expected of someone in his position at the time". Haddon-Cave described Baber's "personal failure to take reasonable care" and "to make safety his first priority".
Eagles was criticised for failing to perform his role and exercise proper supervision in managing production of the Nimrod's safety review. He failed "to give adequate priority, care and personal attention to the … task. He failed properly to utilise the resources available to him within the Nimrod [project] to ensure the airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet."
Haddon-Cave's report said design flaws played a "crucial part" in the loss of the Nimrod, from the fitting in 1969 of the hot air piping whose design is believed to have caused the crash on 2 September 2006, to the fitting of air-to-air refuelling changes in 1989 which increased the risk of a fire. The report said BAE Systems "deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards". The new Military Aviation Authority would ensure that the MoD and its industry partners were operating to "the highest safety standards", Ainsworth said.
Haddon-Cave referred to severe financial pressures and "deep organisational trauma" within the MoD between 1998 and 2006. Ainsworth said today that there would be reforms to the "bureaucratic" way safety concerns were handled, and an audit of all current cases that would be completed "in the next couple of weeks". He also said he had a "personal commitment" to improving safety of military aviation and apologised "for the part my department played in failing to prevent [the Nimrod accident]".
Two senior RAF officers criticised in a devastating report into the crash of an Nimrod aircraft over Afghanistan with the loss of all 14 people on board are being investigated by military police, Bob Ainsworth, the defence secretary, said today.
He also announced that a new Military Aviation Authority would regulate, independently audit and monitor all military aviation activity, and said a review was under way into the way the MoD drew up contracts with arms companies.
Ainsworth was responding to a report in October by Charles Haddon-Cave QC, who referred to systemic and "lamentable" failings by the MoD, Britain's biggest arms company, BAE Systems and the privatised defence research company Qinetiq. He said the crash of the ageing Nimrod – involving the biggest single loss of life of British service personnel since the Falklands war – could have been avoided if those in charge of ensuring the safety of RAF aircraft had been more responsible.
Haddon-Cave, an aviation expert, said safety had become secondary to cost at the MoD. He described the Nimrod's production as "a story of incompetence, complacency and cynicism".
The two officers being investigated by the RAF police are Air Commodore George Baber and Wing Commander Michael Eagles. They have not been suspended but Ainsworth told MPs that neither man currently held any safety-related position.
Baber led the integrated project team responsible for a safety review of RAF Nimrods from 2001-05. Haddon-Cave accused him of a "fundamental failure of leadership" in drawing up the "safety case". His performance "fell well below the standard that might be expected of someone in his position at the time". Haddon-Cave described Baber's "personal failure to take reasonable care" and "to make safety his first priority".
Eagles was criticised for failing to perform his role and exercise proper supervision in managing production of the Nimrod's safety review. He failed "to give adequate priority, care and personal attention to the … task. He failed properly to utilise the resources available to him within the Nimrod [project] to ensure the airworthiness of the Nimrod fleet."
Haddon-Cave's report said design flaws played a "crucial part" in the loss of the Nimrod, from the fitting in 1969 of the hot air piping whose design is believed to have caused the crash on 2 September 2006, to the fitting of air-to-air refuelling changes in 1989 which increased the risk of a fire. The report said BAE Systems "deliberately did not disclose to its customer the scale of the hazards". The new Military Aviation Authority would ensure that the MoD and its industry partners were operating to "the highest safety standards", Ainsworth said.
Haddon-Cave referred to severe financial pressures and "deep organisational trauma" within the MoD between 1998 and 2006. Ainsworth said today that there would be reforms to the "bureaucratic" way safety concerns were handled, and an audit of all current cases that would be completed "in the next couple of weeks". He also said he had a "personal commitment" to improving safety of military aviation and apologised "for the part my department played in failing to prevent [the Nimrod accident]".
Orac:
The senior officers that should be helping the RAFP with their enquiries come a lot lot more senior than these two scape goats. Let us hope that the RAFP, as a result of their enquiries, seek them out.
Two senior RAF officers criticised in a devastating report into the crash of an Nimrod aircraft over Afghanistan with the loss of all 14 people on board are being investigated by military police, Bob Ainsworth, the defence secretary, said today
Quite right Chug. It is a pity H-C didn’t pursue that line when given their details.
Throughout that period, and since 1991, it was MoD’s stated policy not to routinely maintain build standards, a fundamental pre-requisite to a valid Safety Case. As the Nimrod Whole Aircraft Safety Case is dependant on hundreds of individual Safety Cases, most of which the IPTL has no control over, the obvious thing to do is simply insert this as a risk in the Risk Register, and place ownership with his 2 Star to resolve the conflict. It is this “management oversight” which is sadly lacking, as stated by the HCDC when criticising MoD on Chinook Mk3, among others.
That he actually initiated a Safety Case task places him well above those who think it a waste of money. Various 2, 3 and 4 Stars are on record that functional safety is optional, and have been fully supported, in writing, by Ingram, Moonie, Caplin and Ainsworth. Specifically, a contract can be paid in full and an aircraft offered to the Service as airworthy, in the full knowledge that it is not functionally safe. THAT is a “personal failure” (and offence) of far greater magnitude, clearly illustrating that those above Air Cdre Baber gave no mind to making safety their first priority. Again, this puts him well above these Stars.
Similar applies to Wg Cdr Eagles. The same Stars are on record as withholding / refusing resources (money or staff) to manage safety/airworthiness/risk (and a host of other mandated activities) even when advised they are placing man and machine in danger. “You are standing into danger” was the term used in the advice to them. Navy types know what that means. (“You are a **** up and have royally ****** up”).
Right, does anyone have the address of the Senior Investigating Officer or boss of RAFP? I’m sure he’d be interested in a Ministerial briefing from MoD (to Ingram), stating (as a criticism) that I am the only MoD employee who thinks these and related regulations should be implemented properly. By definition, that statement condones the actions of those who don’t apply them properly and, especially, those who INSTRUCT lower ranks not to obey the regulations. The said officers may not have done their jobs properly, but against the prevailing background and ethos demonstrated from above, theirs is a relatively minor “offence”.
Baber led the integrated project team responsible for a safety review of RAF Nimrods from 2001-05. Haddon-Cave accused him of a "fundamental failure of leadership" in drawing up the "safety case".
His performance "fell well below the standard that might be expected of someone in his position at the time". Haddon-Cave described Baber's "personal failure to take reasonable care" and "to make safety his first priority".
Similar applies to Wg Cdr Eagles. The same Stars are on record as withholding / refusing resources (money or staff) to manage safety/airworthiness/risk (and a host of other mandated activities) even when advised they are placing man and machine in danger. “You are standing into danger” was the term used in the advice to them. Navy types know what that means. (“You are a **** up and have royally ****** up”).
Right, does anyone have the address of the Senior Investigating Officer or boss of RAFP? I’m sure he’d be interested in a Ministerial briefing from MoD (to Ingram), stating (as a criticism) that I am the only MoD employee who thinks these and related regulations should be implemented properly. By definition, that statement condones the actions of those who don’t apply them properly and, especially, those who INSTRUCT lower ranks not to obey the regulations. The said officers may not have done their jobs properly, but against the prevailing background and ethos demonstrated from above, theirs is a relatively minor “offence”.
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I make no apologies for posting this:
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/group.php?gid=115661521789621
Support For A Memorial For The Lost Nimrod Crew
After my Dad and 13 others were killed when their aircraft failed on them in Afghanistan on 2nd September 2006, you, the people of Forres, donated thousands of pounds into a fund for their memory. Our plans were to use this fund to create a memorial in the form of a cairn, to be placed in the town of Forres, somewhere everyone can see, pay their respects and remember our men. In trying to create this memorial to commemorate our 14 loved ones, we have come up against brickwall after brickwall! As a daughter of one of the men I am outraged and disgusted by the lack of support from prominent figures in the Forres Community. On behalf of the sons, daughters, wives, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, family and friends who lost their loved one, I'm calling on you to show that you would support a memorial for Ady Davies, Allan Squires, Steve Swarbrick, Steve Johnson, Leigh Mitchelmore, Gareth Nicholas, Gary Andrews, Gerard Bell, Stephen Beattie, Benjamin Knight, John Langton, Gary Quilliam, Oliver Dicketts and Joseph Windall.
Suzanne Davies
1,498 members since last Sunday.
http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/group.php?gid=115661521789621
Support For A Memorial For The Lost Nimrod Crew
After my Dad and 13 others were killed when their aircraft failed on them in Afghanistan on 2nd September 2006, you, the people of Forres, donated thousands of pounds into a fund for their memory. Our plans were to use this fund to create a memorial in the form of a cairn, to be placed in the town of Forres, somewhere everyone can see, pay their respects and remember our men. In trying to create this memorial to commemorate our 14 loved ones, we have come up against brickwall after brickwall! As a daughter of one of the men I am outraged and disgusted by the lack of support from prominent figures in the Forres Community. On behalf of the sons, daughters, wives, mothers, fathers, brothers and sisters, family and friends who lost their loved one, I'm calling on you to show that you would support a memorial for Ady Davies, Allan Squires, Steve Swarbrick, Steve Johnson, Leigh Mitchelmore, Gareth Nicholas, Gary Andrews, Gerard Bell, Stephen Beattie, Benjamin Knight, John Langton, Gary Quilliam, Oliver Dicketts and Joseph Windall.
Suzanne Davies
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Sadly I don't Facebook but it does have my full support...The lack of support from the local big-wigs comes as no surprise...They sniped away at us when I was up there...Who could forget the 'Drambusters' incident where the local ar$e of a councillor attempted to catch out a jet returning from France supposedly laden down with bootleg booze only to meet it and discover it was just carrying the usual 13 chunky crew?
Whilst I fully support the wish to have a memorial, I do not understand why the push is to have it in Forres. Surely it should be at Kinloss either on the Station or nearby. I think that only a relative few of those that tragically died actually lived in Forres and I wonder if it is this lack of a local link that is possibly making Forres reluctant to have the memorial in the town rather than at RAF Kinloss.
The memorials to others that have died in accidents are at RAF Kinloss such as the stunning stain glass window in the church with the 7 Maple Leafs to remember the crew who died in Toronto.
The memorials to others that have died in accidents are at RAF Kinloss such as the stunning stain glass window in the church with the 7 Maple Leafs to remember the crew who died in Toronto.
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I thought that a memorial had recently been created inside the main gate at Kinloss? If this is the case, then why the need for another memorial marking this tradgedy at a different location?
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The people of Forres have, since the Great War - and probably before - commemorated their dead - up to and including Gulf War 1. Follow the tragic event of 2 Sep 06, as Suzanne states, the people of Forres donated money for a memorial to the crew. Perhaps they should get it.
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