Future Carrier (Including Costs)
why oh why did the Royal Navy request\demand\stipulate STOVL carriers as being the carrier of choice?
The real problem is that the Equipment Capability customer in town started with the assumption that STOVL was the way forward and that view never really changed.
There's also an entire sub-theme on the perception of risk for EMALS or steam cats and their maturity and manning costs over the last fifteen years, but that is only a sub-plot. The meat of it pertains to organisational rivalry and budgets.
As for bringback - the landing technique referred to is apparently only for specific environmental circumstances and payloads, not the method of landing every time.
As to why not STOBAR - check out the Liaoning in the picture. Safe parking area defined by the hatched red line. That's a ship broadly the same size as QEC and yet I think you'd struggle to range more than 8 cabs in the safe parking area - something like 75%+ of the deck is required for launching and recovering aircraft. If you want to park more you have to move them between recovery and the next launch, which last time I looked requires chockheads, lots of chockheads, which we haven't got. QEC will comfortably park the best part of 20 cabs on the roof, without affecting launch or recovery and without having to re-spot.
The Russ are not putting cats on Kuznetsov. The Chinese appear to be going for CTOL in their next carriers.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 2nd May 2013 at 16:57. Reason: Missed the bit about STOBAR
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Originally Posted by my-boffin
that was unclear? The "Royal Navy" does not / did not get to specify anything. Read the middle paragraphs again mate, the answer lies there.
There's also an entire sub-theme on the perception of risk for EMALS or steam cats and their maturity and manning costs over the last fifteen years, but that is only a sub-plot. The meat of it pertains to organisational rivalry and budgets.
There's also an entire sub-theme on the perception of risk for EMALS or steam cats and their maturity and manning costs over the last fifteen years, but that is only a sub-plot. The meat of it pertains to organisational rivalry and budgets.
I was a bit on the slow side today and point taken.I confess to being impressed by the progress being made with that first ship and it is certainly taking shape.
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Glojo I think you are making assumptions about what was and wasn't done.
There are two papers that were presented to the Royal Institution of Naval architects
R.N. AIRCRAFT CARRIER STUDIES BY J.F.P. EDDISON, RCNC.
(formerly FP211 CV(F) Project in DNA&FP)
© Crown Copyright/MoD (1997).
and
THE DESIGN OF HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HMS PRINCE OF WALES BY S. T. D. KNIGHT THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ALLIANCE, UK
© Crown Copyright/MoD (2009).
I see a lot of statements about why didn't we go cat and trap etc etc etc as if it was 'forgotten about' I suggest you hit google and then read through those papers. They are posted in full on one of the naval forums along with a lot of other engineering papers about carriers and give some insight into what went on. Both authors were members of the MOD Directorate of Future Projects (Navy) so I'd assume they kind of know what they are talking about.
There are two papers that were presented to the Royal Institution of Naval architects
R.N. AIRCRAFT CARRIER STUDIES BY J.F.P. EDDISON, RCNC.
(formerly FP211 CV(F) Project in DNA&FP)
© Crown Copyright/MoD (1997).
and
THE DESIGN OF HMS QUEEN ELIZABETH AND HMS PRINCE OF WALES BY S. T. D. KNIGHT THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER ALLIANCE, UK
© Crown Copyright/MoD (2009).
I see a lot of statements about why didn't we go cat and trap etc etc etc as if it was 'forgotten about' I suggest you hit google and then read through those papers. They are posted in full on one of the naval forums along with a lot of other engineering papers about carriers and give some insight into what went on. Both authors were members of the MOD Directorate of Future Projects (Navy) so I'd assume they kind of know what they are talking about.
Last edited by eaglemmoomin; 2nd May 2013 at 16:37.
"The real problem is that the Equipment Capability customer in town started with the assumption that STOVL was the way forward and that view never really changed."
True, and a classic example of an assumption being undermined by facts, but so slowly that it was not perceived until so late in the game that, barring catastrophe, it would not be changed.
Pre-JSF, UK sea-based air was clearly welded to the CVS. Even the JAST/JSF planning stage assumed that the jet would arrive while the CVS still had some lifetime left (remember little folding wingtips on the LMT PWSC B-model?) and that the follow-on would be a small STOVL carrier.
At the same time, STOVL was UK plc's ticket on to the JSF program and by 1994-96 it was pretty clear that JSF was the closest the UK would come to building a stealth fighter.
I think it was 2003 when I was briefed on the 65000 ton CVF, so in the meantime three key discoveries had been made about sea-based fast-jet air, on a system basis: Ship size was driven by aircraft numbers, and catapult/arrest vs STOVL was not a big factor; steel was cheap; personnel was the cost driver.
But by that time nobody wanted to throw anything in the path of the JSF train - indeed, I think it was still predicted to enter service in 2010, and the B was projected to beat bring-back requirements...
True, and a classic example of an assumption being undermined by facts, but so slowly that it was not perceived until so late in the game that, barring catastrophe, it would not be changed.
Pre-JSF, UK sea-based air was clearly welded to the CVS. Even the JAST/JSF planning stage assumed that the jet would arrive while the CVS still had some lifetime left (remember little folding wingtips on the LMT PWSC B-model?) and that the follow-on would be a small STOVL carrier.
At the same time, STOVL was UK plc's ticket on to the JSF program and by 1994-96 it was pretty clear that JSF was the closest the UK would come to building a stealth fighter.
I think it was 2003 when I was briefed on the 65000 ton CVF, so in the meantime three key discoveries had been made about sea-based fast-jet air, on a system basis: Ship size was driven by aircraft numbers, and catapult/arrest vs STOVL was not a big factor; steel was cheap; personnel was the cost driver.
But by that time nobody wanted to throw anything in the path of the JSF train - indeed, I think it was still predicted to enter service in 2010, and the B was projected to beat bring-back requirements...
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I can see the issues re the carriers specs - I just want to know what lunatic decided to build a set of destroyers costing around £1Bn each all up with no surface-surface capacity.................
I can see the issues re the carriers specs - I just want to know what lunatic decided to build a set of destroyers costing around £1Bn each all up with no surface-surface capacity...............
that will be the last Goverment in power ,which decide that 1 ship was so good that it can replace 2 ship's. at the same time forgetting to spead the R&D over a 12 ship fleet,which would of work out to about just under £600m each.
Because of that a lot stuff was Fitted For but not fitted.
Surface-Surface is one of these item's
that will be the last Goverment in power ,which decide that 1 ship was so good that it can replace 2 ship's. at the same time forgetting to spead the R&D over a 12 ship fleet,which would of work out to about just under £600m each.
Because of that a lot stuff was Fitted For but not fitted.
Surface-Surface is one of these item's
I admit to not knowing much about this programme but I do recall, in 2003, finding myself working with a chap who had recently transferred from the IPT. I had the same debate with him over the options and he stated, categorically, that converting the ship to whatever system was a "nil cost" change, so what they chose to contract was immaterial. I was gobsmacked but you hear crap like that every day.
A couple of years earlier the same IPT had, theoretically, FOAEW under it's wing (the replacement for Sea King ASaC). The man in charge was recruiting staff and rejected ANYONE who claimed related knowledge on the grounds that "AEW/ASaC are in no way related to FOAEW", despite the costing a assumptions dictating re-use of the ASaC mission system (itself a flawed assumption).
Just a comment on the general level of competence I experienced at the time. It was difficult to imagine who was worse; DEC for assuming the above or DPA for blithely accepting the programme based on such assumptions.
A couple of years earlier the same IPT had, theoretically, FOAEW under it's wing (the replacement for Sea King ASaC). The man in charge was recruiting staff and rejected ANYONE who claimed related knowledge on the grounds that "AEW/ASaC are in no way related to FOAEW", despite the costing a assumptions dictating re-use of the ASaC mission system (itself a flawed assumption).
Just a comment on the general level of competence I experienced at the time. It was difficult to imagine who was worse; DEC for assuming the above or DPA for blithely accepting the programme based on such assumptions.
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Not a Boffin
Just noticed the additional part of your post, thanks very much.
I have only ever read rumours regarding converting the Russian carrier to a CATOBAR specification and take onboard your comments
You speak wise words regarding that final selection
The alleged choices in 2002 were
Or 2006
The 'customer' clearly made the correct choice
Just noticed the additional part of your post, thanks very much.
I have only ever read rumours regarding converting the Russian carrier to a CATOBAR specification and take onboard your comments
You speak wise words regarding that final selection
The alleged choices in 2002 were
Or 2006
The 'customer' clearly made the correct choice
Last edited by glojo; 3rd May 2013 at 14:23. Reason: Picture did not upload
Thread Starter
From: F-35 Cancelled, then what ?
Great stuff. So the ships are progressing, the F-35 is making progress (regardless of delays it is still moving in the right direction, the RN fixed wing cadre is being kept alive, but what of the skills needed aboard the carrier? Surely a system of systems approach involves worrying about the role played by carrier personnel (throughout the ship) as much as the aircrew? See the comments of Bismark, Not_a_boffin, orca, and Whiteovies (from the Harrier thread and the recent Sharkey Ward one).
Bismark:
Bismark:
Not a boffin:
WhiteOvies:
orca:
Are we doing enough to prepare? Is sending eight Chockheads on exchange enough?
This 1987 article is interesting: The Self-Designing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea
Originally Posted by Not_a_boffin
And it isn't just QE that's coming on apace. This useful little link gives a feel for PoW as well. They're managing to install 10km of cabling per week in one of PoW lower blocks.
Programme update - Aircraft Carrier Alliance
Still some way off delivery, but impressive progress nonetheless.
Programme update - Aircraft Carrier Alliance
Still some way off delivery, but impressive progress nonetheless.
Bismark:
As I am sure has been said elsewhere, the aircraft and pilots just represent the front end of the carrier strike capability. The idiocy of the SDSR decision, which the PM is about to compound in the FR/UK Defence deal (FT Today), is that we risk losing the capability to operate jets off carriers. All of the expertise on the current CVSs will have gone (we are getting rid of the CVSs), the aircrew will have gone (either PVRd, redundant or moved to other aircraft types, the command experience will have gone (as will the met, ATC, FC, deck handlers, planners etc, etc).
But what is missing in 2020 is the crews on the ships with any experience of aviation - from the CO downwards....I am sure the MAA will have something to say about that, indeed I wonder whether they are doing anything about it at the moment?
I'd put a fair bit of money that the guys who've done exchange tours have not done time in CATCC, Wings / Little F (Air & mini-boss in USN), handlers office or the squadron engineering and logs posts.
While they may be adept at doing the mission plan, launch, mission, recovery thing, they are unlikely to have a great understanding of how to spot a deck, arrange aircraft for servicing vice maintenance, weapons prep and bombing up and how all the various departments both in the squadrons and on the ship work to deliver the sortie rate. People thinking just about aircrew and (to some degree) chockheads are missing the point - it's the corporate experience of how to put it all together that is about to be lost. Nor can that be maintained at HMS Siskin - that just gives the basics of handling, not the fine art of pulling it all together.
As SDSR says "we need a plan to regenerate the necessary skills"- all I can say is it had better be a f8cking good one, cunning eneough to do more than brush your teeth with!
While they may be adept at doing the mission plan, launch, mission, recovery thing, they are unlikely to have a great understanding of how to spot a deck, arrange aircraft for servicing vice maintenance, weapons prep and bombing up and how all the various departments both in the squadrons and on the ship work to deliver the sortie rate. People thinking just about aircrew and (to some degree) chockheads are missing the point - it's the corporate experience of how to put it all together that is about to be lost. Nor can that be maintained at HMS Siskin - that just gives the basics of handling, not the fine art of pulling it all together.
As SDSR says "we need a plan to regenerate the necessary skills"- all I can say is it had better be a f8cking good one, cunning eneough to do more than brush your teeth with!
The bigger issue is getting everyone else to be ready for a large, busy flight deck. At least there is a team of people looking into this issue and both deckcrew, aircrew and engineers are being appropriately positioned to give them some exposure to this dangerous environment prior to QEC.
All we need to see is a signed document from CAS saying that he will embark his jets as soon as the CO indicates his ship is ready in all respects to conduct aviation.
The second sentence will indicate that he will disembark them only when the Air Management Organisation is fully up to speed, the Air Group is fulfilling ATO tasking, the Air Weapon supply team have produced weapons to surge capacity and these have been loaded on jets and dropped, the Yellow Coats can marshal, chain and chock a fourship in all weathers, whilst another fourship is taxying for take off. The jets will remain embarked until every Fighter Controller in the fleet has worked a fourship through Red Crown procedures and the JFACCHQ have established resilient comms for a week or two and Flyco have exercised being b#ggered about from dawn to dusk. Repeat all for night ops. When all this is crimped the TG in its entirety will take part in a COMAO based exercise of Neptune Warrior type scope and we'll call it good.
The third sentence will indicate that the jets will be back as soon as any of the above notice any degree of skill fade and the process will start again.
The second sentence will indicate that he will disembark them only when the Air Management Organisation is fully up to speed, the Air Group is fulfilling ATO tasking, the Air Weapon supply team have produced weapons to surge capacity and these have been loaded on jets and dropped, the Yellow Coats can marshal, chain and chock a fourship in all weathers, whilst another fourship is taxying for take off. The jets will remain embarked until every Fighter Controller in the fleet has worked a fourship through Red Crown procedures and the JFACCHQ have established resilient comms for a week or two and Flyco have exercised being b#ggered about from dawn to dusk. Repeat all for night ops. When all this is crimped the TG in its entirety will take part in a COMAO based exercise of Neptune Warrior type scope and we'll call it good.
The third sentence will indicate that the jets will be back as soon as any of the above notice any degree of skill fade and the process will start again.
This 1987 article is interesting: The Self-Designing High-Reliability Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea
Operations manuals are full of details of specific tasks at the micro level but rarely discuss integration into the whole. There are other written rules and procedures, from training manuals through standard operating procedures (SOPs), that describe and standardize the process of integration. None of them explain how to make the whole system operate smoothly, let alone at the level of performance that we have observed. It is in the real-world environment of workups and deployment, through the continual training and retraining of officers and crew, that the information needed for safe and efficient operation is developed, transmitted, and maintained. Without that continuity, and without sufficient operational time at sea, both effectiveness and safety would suffer.
Moreover, the organization is not stable over time. Every forty months or so there is an almost 100 percent turnover of crew, and all of the officers will have rotated through and gone on to other duty. Yet the ship remains functional at a high level. The Navy itself is, of course, the underlying structural determinant. Uniforms, ranks, rules and regulations, codes of conduct, and specialized languages provide a world of extensive codification of objects, events, situations, and appropriate conduct; members who deviate too far from the norm become "foreigners" within their own culture and soon find themselves outside the group, figuratively if not literally.
Behavioral and cultural norms, SOPs, and regulations are necessary, but they are far from sufficient to preserve operational structure and the character of the service. Our research team noted three mechanisms that act to maintain and transmit operational factors in the face of rapid turnover. First, and in some ways most important, is the pool of chief petty officers, many of whom have long service in their specialty and circulate around similar ships in the fleet. Second, many of the officers and some of the crew will have at some time served on other carriers, albeit in other jobs, and bring to the ship some of the shared experience of the entire force. Third, the process of continual rotation and replacement, even while on deployment, maintains a continuity that is broken only during a major refit. These mechanisms are realized by an uninterrupted process of on-board training and retraining that makes the ship one huge, continuing school for its officers and men.
When operational continuity is broken or nonexistent, the effects are observable and dramatic. One member of our research group had the opportunity to observe a new Nimitz-class aircraft carrier as she emerged from the yard and remarked at how many things had to be learned before she could even begin to commence serious air operations. Even for an older and more experienced ship coming out of an ordinary refit, the workup towards deployment is a long and arduous process. Many weeks are spent just qualifying the deck for taking and handling individual aircraft, and many more at gradually increasing densities to perfect aircraft handling as well as the coordination needed for tight launch and recovery sequences. With safety and reliability as fixed boundary conditions, every moment of precious operational time before deployment is devoted to improving capability and efficiency.
The importance of adequate workup time--for flight operations to be conducted safely at present levels of technical and operational complexity and at the tempo required for demonstrating effectiveness--cannot be overemphasized. During our research we followed one carrier in which the workup was shortened by "only" two weeks, for reasons of economy. As a result, the ship was forced to complete its training during the middle of a difficult and demanding mid-ocean exercise; this placed an enormous strain on all hands. While the crew succeeded--the referees adapted compensating evaluation procedures--risks to ship's personnel and equipment were visibly higher. Moreover, officers and crew were openly unhappy with their own performance, with an attendant and continuing impact on morale.
Moreover, the organization is not stable over time. Every forty months or so there is an almost 100 percent turnover of crew, and all of the officers will have rotated through and gone on to other duty. Yet the ship remains functional at a high level. The Navy itself is, of course, the underlying structural determinant. Uniforms, ranks, rules and regulations, codes of conduct, and specialized languages provide a world of extensive codification of objects, events, situations, and appropriate conduct; members who deviate too far from the norm become "foreigners" within their own culture and soon find themselves outside the group, figuratively if not literally.
Behavioral and cultural norms, SOPs, and regulations are necessary, but they are far from sufficient to preserve operational structure and the character of the service. Our research team noted three mechanisms that act to maintain and transmit operational factors in the face of rapid turnover. First, and in some ways most important, is the pool of chief petty officers, many of whom have long service in their specialty and circulate around similar ships in the fleet. Second, many of the officers and some of the crew will have at some time served on other carriers, albeit in other jobs, and bring to the ship some of the shared experience of the entire force. Third, the process of continual rotation and replacement, even while on deployment, maintains a continuity that is broken only during a major refit. These mechanisms are realized by an uninterrupted process of on-board training and retraining that makes the ship one huge, continuing school for its officers and men.
When operational continuity is broken or nonexistent, the effects are observable and dramatic. One member of our research group had the opportunity to observe a new Nimitz-class aircraft carrier as she emerged from the yard and remarked at how many things had to be learned before she could even begin to commence serious air operations. Even for an older and more experienced ship coming out of an ordinary refit, the workup towards deployment is a long and arduous process. Many weeks are spent just qualifying the deck for taking and handling individual aircraft, and many more at gradually increasing densities to perfect aircraft handling as well as the coordination needed for tight launch and recovery sequences. With safety and reliability as fixed boundary conditions, every moment of precious operational time before deployment is devoted to improving capability and efficiency.
The importance of adequate workup time--for flight operations to be conducted safely at present levels of technical and operational complexity and at the tempo required for demonstrating effectiveness--cannot be overemphasized. During our research we followed one carrier in which the workup was shortened by "only" two weeks, for reasons of economy. As a result, the ship was forced to complete its training during the middle of a difficult and demanding mid-ocean exercise; this placed an enormous strain on all hands. While the crew succeeded--the referees adapted compensating evaluation procedures--risks to ship's personnel and equipment were visibly higher. Moreover, officers and crew were openly unhappy with their own performance, with an attendant and continuing impact on morale.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 10th Jul 2013 at 07:27.
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Have we got the man power to deploy this ship, the extra ships to act as escort or escorts and furthermore, have we got any type of AEW aircraft to operate from it deck? I have read all the promises of a replacement aircraft for the Sea King but I also read how the Nimrod was going to be upgraded!
I would love to see Scotland get its independance as that would really throw a huge spanner into the works. I am of the opinion the Ministry of Defence has dismissed this issue and as far as they are concerned it will never happen, but if it did...... What would happen to the Prince of Wales as we do not buy warships from 'Johnny Foreigner' or should that be 'Jock' foreigner
I would love to see Scotland get its independance as that would really throw a huge spanner into the works. I am of the opinion the Ministry of Defence has dismissed this issue and as far as they are concerned it will never happen, but if it did...... What would happen to the Prince of Wales as we do not buy warships from 'Johnny Foreigner' or should that be 'Jock' foreigner
I would love to see Scotland get its independance as that would really throw a huge spanner into the works. I am of the opinion the Ministry of Defence has dismissed this issue and as far as they are concerned it will never happen, but if it did...... What would happen to the Prince of Wales as we do not buy warships from 'Johnny Foreigner' or should that be 'Jock' foreigner
Straight from here (also on this thread http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...s-defence.html
http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-co...rt-LOW-RES.pdf
"As regards the construction of the two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft
carriers, suggestions that construction could be moved out of Scotland upon
independence are misplaced. Work on both carriers is well underway,
and it would be neither practical nor sensible to move the operations at this
advanced stage. Regarding the Article 346 exemption, Luff has made clear that “the exemption applies to the prevailing conditions at the time it is applied. It would not be invalidated by a Scottish separate state. The carriers would not be affected, as I understand it.”
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 10th Jul 2013 at 11:25.
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Hi Not a Boffin,
I finally got that first link to work and if folks want to view it then I had to delete the last two keystrokes, namely the ):
I am not sure what you mean by
But if it is an Independent Scotland then I guess we had better ask the current first minister for Scotland that question.
Your second link appears to simply highlight the total lack of planning that has not gone into this whole Independent Scotland m'larky but if it did happen it may well mean the end of trident which then might have even further ramifications for our so called 'special relationship' I say the end of Trident as I have not seen or read any literature that talks about an alternative location for this nuclear deterrent. Certainly not Devonport or Falmouth!!
I am a sad person that enjoys listening to the various Parliamentary Select Committees and during one of these debates the Minister responsible for procurements made it crystal clear that no warships will be built outside of the UK.
I am with you however when you hint at the fact that these carrier builds have started and it would be inconceivable to stop the build so near to completion plus I am guessing that the UK will need authority under article 346 to enable this to happen. Drifting slightly off topic.. Is Portsmouth capable of building the new type 26 frigates?
I finally got that first link to work and if folks want to view it then I had to delete the last two keystrokes, namely the ):
I am not sure what you mean by
And what possible reason would anyone have to want to see that
Your second link appears to simply highlight the total lack of planning that has not gone into this whole Independent Scotland m'larky but if it did happen it may well mean the end of trident which then might have even further ramifications for our so called 'special relationship' I say the end of Trident as I have not seen or read any literature that talks about an alternative location for this nuclear deterrent. Certainly not Devonport or Falmouth!!
I am a sad person that enjoys listening to the various Parliamentary Select Committees and during one of these debates the Minister responsible for procurements made it crystal clear that no warships will be built outside of the UK.
I am with you however when you hint at the fact that these carrier builds have started and it would be inconceivable to stop the build so near to completion plus I am guessing that the UK will need authority under article 346 to enable this to happen. Drifting slightly off topic.. Is Portsmouth capable of building the new type 26 frigates?
What I meant was - why would any rational person want to see "a huge spanner" thrown into the works of the QE programme, which was the implication of your post.
Particularly now when the build (of both ships) is progressing so well.
Portsmouth is perfectly capable of building T26 and larger ships. One might argue that the bigger cost savings would come from concentrating the build and in-service support of shipping in the one place (reducing overheads and giving a bigger critical mass of staff). However, that would entail closure of both Govan and Scotstoun and the end of shipbuilding on the Clyde. That level of intestinal fortitude appears to be lacking within HMG and BAES.
Particularly now when the build (of both ships) is progressing so well.
Portsmouth is perfectly capable of building T26 and larger ships. One might argue that the bigger cost savings would come from concentrating the build and in-service support of shipping in the one place (reducing overheads and giving a bigger critical mass of staff). However, that would entail closure of both Govan and Scotstoun and the end of shipbuilding on the Clyde. That level of intestinal fortitude appears to be lacking within HMG and BAES.
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Thank you for getting back and I now understand your post.
My thoughts are that these builds are progressing very well and the silence coming from all the gloom and dooms merchants is defeaning. I confess to having my doubts about manning levels but the construction is a seperate issue and going very well indeed.
I asked about the type 26 build as there was a lot of talk about whether Portsmouth still had the expertise to build these ships but to me it makes far more sense to build them here in England. Unfortunately if Scotland remains in the UK then will Portsmouth keep this ship building ability?
My thoughts are that these builds are progressing very well and the silence coming from all the gloom and dooms merchants is defeaning. I confess to having my doubts about manning levels but the construction is a seperate issue and going very well indeed.
I asked about the type 26 build as there was a lot of talk about whether Portsmouth still had the expertise to build these ships but to me it makes far more sense to build them here in England. Unfortunately if Scotland remains in the UK then will Portsmouth keep this ship building ability?
Part of the TOBA with BAES is a commitment to rationalise shipbuilding capacity to a sustainable level post-QEC.
In essence that means shutting one or more of Scotstoun, Govan and Portsmouth (shipbuilding facility only). Scotstoun and Govan are interdependent, so what it actually means is that post-QEC (and actually in something like 2 years time), either Portsmouth shipbuilding facility or both Clyde yards will close.
You can explain why you'd love to see a "huge spanner thrown in the works" any time now....
In essence that means shutting one or more of Scotstoun, Govan and Portsmouth (shipbuilding facility only). Scotstoun and Govan are interdependent, so what it actually means is that post-QEC (and actually in something like 2 years time), either Portsmouth shipbuilding facility or both Clyde yards will close.
You can explain why you'd love to see a "huge spanner thrown in the works" any time now....
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You can explain why you'd love to see a "huge spanner thrown in the works" any time now....
If Scotland becomes an independant country that wants ALL nuclear weapons removed from its territory then in my humble opinion
That would........
throw a HUGE spanner in the works
Is there any location in the remaining countries that could safely store** the weapons for these submarines and allow armed ships to dock?
** By safely I mean comply with current legislation for the storing of these weapons
I would love to see Scotland get its independance as that would really throw a huge spanner into the works. I am of the opinion the Ministry of Defence has dismissed this issue and as far as they are concerned it will never happen, but if it did...... What would happen to the Prince of Wales as we do not buy warships from 'Johnny Foreigner' or should that be 'Jock' foreigner
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Hi Boffin,
Just me reading too many things, most of which predict doom and gloom.
Prince of Wales would be completed on 'foreign soil' which contradicts British policy but the build was started in a United Kingdom so no spanner
Trident however = big spanner
Scotland remaining in the UK might lead to big spanner for Portsmouth ship building capability.
Another spanner might see the closure of either Devonport or Portsmouth Naval bases. Lots of reading, lots of possible spanners but the build of the carriers will probably continue post an independant Scotland... My bad for the confusion of that post.
Do you disagree with my observation about Trident (I always respect your input)
Just me reading too many things, most of which predict doom and gloom.
Prince of Wales would be completed on 'foreign soil' which contradicts British policy but the build was started in a United Kingdom so no spanner
Trident however = big spanner
Scotland remaining in the UK might lead to big spanner for Portsmouth ship building capability.
Another spanner might see the closure of either Devonport or Portsmouth Naval bases. Lots of reading, lots of possible spanners but the build of the carriers will probably continue post an independant Scotland... My bad for the confusion of that post.
Do you disagree with my observation about Trident (I always respect your input)
Last edited by glojo; 10th Jul 2013 at 12:51. Reason: Typo
Read some different stuff mate.
Trident? Old news, see here..
House of Commons - The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident-Days or Decades? - Scottish Affairs Committee
Guz or Pompey to close? Highly unlikely given carriers only fitting into Pompey and new RM base Tamar in Guz. Nothing to do with Scottish Independence.
Portsmouth shipbuilding or Clyde. One is f8cked - irrespective of Scottish independence.
Trident? Old news, see here..
House of Commons - The Referendum on Separation for Scotland: Terminating Trident-Days or Decades? - Scottish Affairs Committee
Guz or Pompey to close? Highly unlikely given carriers only fitting into Pompey and new RM base Tamar in Guz. Nothing to do with Scottish Independence.
Portsmouth shipbuilding or Clyde. One is f8cked - irrespective of Scottish independence.
Last edited by Not_a_boffin; 10th Jul 2013 at 13:06.
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I think your link is basically corroborating what my spanner is trying to say.
I totally, fully accept I am cherry picking from a document but rather than just pick sentences I will highlight paragraphs:
This link you supplied is dated October 2012 but it is still in line with the latest select committee meetings but they have dismissed Falmouth as an option.
I believe having the new Royal Marine Base in Plymouth is a very good idea plus we are seeing 45 cdo coming back into the warmer climate of the south-West of England away from their base up in Arbroath.
If Scotland went independent then I am certain the future for Portsmouth Naval Base is secure (strong wording but where else could we build those new frigates) and who would care about the future of Clyde shipbuilding?
Again many apologies for my very poorly and misleading first post, my bad, my error, my wording.
I totally, fully accept I am cherry picking from a document but rather than just pick sentences I will highlight paragraphs:
25. The result, if the weapons were forced to leave Scotland too quickly, would affect the UK's ability to operate its nuclear deterrent: In the particular circumstances of Trident bases in Scotland there is no way in which the UK Government could rapidly rebase these forces in England. [...] Arguably, it would be politically impossible for them to do so, so for Scotland in those circumstances to insist on them leaving would be to force the UK to make a decision effectively to de-nuclearise
26. John Ainslie was asked what would happen to the nuclear weapons if his timetable was implemented, and he confirmed:
You are forced into a position of disarming. You cannot move them to England or Wales. You cannot move them to the United States, because that was previously ruled out, and Ile Longue in France—what you are talking about in France is a new site.
Furthermore, he confirmed CND Scotland would campaign for the weapons to be removed from Scotland within two years knowing that the result could mean disarmament for the UK, and they would not wish to allow the UK extra time to develop a new base:
For Scottish CND to say, "Let us move them in 20 years' time to England," is not something we would have any time for at all. If what you are saying is that in 20 years' time, we will build another facility at Falmouth, which is the more viable of the options, we could not say, "Oh, yes, we will go along with that."
This view appeared to be shared by the First Minister in an interview after the SNP October 2012 Conference, where he was quoted as saying that if Scotland won independence then "far better it was curtains for Trident", and that given the options the UK could decide on "a much better policy, which would be to decommission the weapons system
You are forced into a position of disarming. You cannot move them to England or Wales. You cannot move them to the United States, because that was previously ruled out, and Ile Longue in France—what you are talking about in France is a new site.
Furthermore, he confirmed CND Scotland would campaign for the weapons to be removed from Scotland within two years knowing that the result could mean disarmament for the UK, and they would not wish to allow the UK extra time to develop a new base:
For Scottish CND to say, "Let us move them in 20 years' time to England," is not something we would have any time for at all. If what you are saying is that in 20 years' time, we will build another facility at Falmouth, which is the more viable of the options, we could not say, "Oh, yes, we will go along with that."
This view appeared to be shared by the First Minister in an interview after the SNP October 2012 Conference, where he was quoted as saying that if Scotland won independence then "far better it was curtains for Trident", and that given the options the UK could decide on "a much better policy, which would be to decommission the weapons system
I believe having the new Royal Marine Base in Plymouth is a very good idea plus we are seeing 45 cdo coming back into the warmer climate of the south-West of England away from their base up in Arbroath.
Portsmouth shipbuilding or Clyde. One is f8cked - irrespective of Scottish independence.
Again many apologies for my very poorly and misleading first post, my bad, my error, my wording.