Future Carrier (Including Costs)
What we're seeing here is the impact of dumb decisions rippling through the system: the F-35B, V-22 and CH-53K are bigger, heavier and need more fuel than the aircraft they replace, so the air wing has crowded out the well deck and reduced the Marine contingent to airborne forces.
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UK JSF ISD slips from 2014 to 2017
Av Week reports that the JCA in-service date has slipped to 2017, with "...British industry officials close to the program suggest[ing] the latest delay has resulted at least in part from budgetary issues related to Equipment Program 07 deliberations."
AW&ST also reports that "...consideration is being given to the option for pushing the Harrier GR9 out of service date (OSD) beyond 2018-19. Industry executives involved in the program confirm the Defense Ministry is examining extending the aircraft's service life again..."
I/C
AW&ST also reports that "...consideration is being given to the option for pushing the Harrier GR9 out of service date (OSD) beyond 2018-19. Industry executives involved in the program confirm the Defense Ministry is examining extending the aircraft's service life again..."
I/C
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Not a boffin's link
Has anyone seen the bit on the link Not a Boffin mentions above, about a tanker 'front falling off' ?
Funniest thing ( the first bit, an Australian skit about it ) I've seen in a long time, reminds me of the 2 Johns.
A very interesting site.
Funniest thing ( the first bit, an Australian skit about it ) I've seen in a long time, reminds me of the 2 Johns.
A very interesting site.
Actually, that reminds me of something you gents may be able to help with:
Some time ago I saw a video of a Leander (I think) class destroyer gently colliding with a fleet oiler (I think) whilst RASing. Would anyone happen to know of an online copy?
Many thanks in advance.
Some time ago I saw a video of a Leander (I think) class destroyer gently colliding with a fleet oiler (I think) whilst RASing. Would anyone happen to know of an online copy?
Many thanks in advance.
Thread Starter
I am reluctant to start another page on this thread (after all, one of the reasons I started this thread was because the Sea Jet thread was getting very long) but the 25th anniversary of victory in the Falklands seems like a good reason to post.
Victory in the South Atlantic would have been impossible without Hermes and Invincible. Without organic air defence the task force would have been cut to pieces by Argentine airpower. Gaps in our defences (lack of organic AEW for instance cost ships and lives). Today we have organic AEW (and much else). Unfortunately we now lack organic air defence (as discussed at great length here). The lesson is that a carrier will need to have both defensive and offensive capabilities to be survivable.
Another significant lesson is that of deterrence. Galtieri invaded the Falklands because he though he could get away it, no doubt encouraged by the 1981 Nott review which proposed getting rid of the carriers, and amphibious forces, and much else. It was thought the UK would be both unwilling and unable to fight. Without the encouragement of Nott's intended cuts the invasion may never have taken place.
We owe it to those who fought 25 years ago to learn these lessons, and not to fall into the trap of only expecting the expected.
Victory in the South Atlantic would have been impossible without Hermes and Invincible. Without organic air defence the task force would have been cut to pieces by Argentine airpower. Gaps in our defences (lack of organic AEW for instance cost ships and lives). Today we have organic AEW (and much else). Unfortunately we now lack organic air defence (as discussed at great length here). The lesson is that a carrier will need to have both defensive and offensive capabilities to be survivable.
Another significant lesson is that of deterrence. Galtieri invaded the Falklands because he though he could get away it, no doubt encouraged by the 1981 Nott review which proposed getting rid of the carriers, and amphibious forces, and much else. It was thought the UK would be both unwilling and unable to fight. Without the encouragement of Nott's intended cuts the invasion may never have taken place.
We owe it to those who fought 25 years ago to learn these lessons, and not to fall into the trap of only expecting the expected.
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
WEBF, while you may be right that the carriers were essential without a rematch without carriers we cannot be certain.
Certainly the timescale would have been different. The method would have been different and the force composition would have been different.
Without going back too far, ie we would have had X more frigates if we had no carriers, you could re-examine force levels available. Maybe the SSNs would have been employed differently. Maybe we would have operated the Harrier from merchant men etc.
It would make for an interesting table top exercise to run the same scenario, same ship availability less the carriers.
Certainly the timescale would have been different. The method would have been different and the force composition would have been different.
Without going back too far, ie we would have had X more frigates if we had no carriers, you could re-examine force levels available. Maybe the SSNs would have been employed differently. Maybe we would have operated the Harrier from merchant men etc.
It would make for an interesting table top exercise to run the same scenario, same ship availability less the carriers.
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As vital as the SHAR contribution was, I think CONQUEROR's decisive and utterly devastating action against the Belgrano had more effect on the end result. Cdr Wreford-Brown's use of classic Perisher tactics sent the Argentine Navy home in a hurry, and rightly so. The Task Force carrier groups would have been at far greater risk had this not been the case.
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In part. The loss of their cruiser forced the 25 de Mayo back to port, which certainly relieved the pressure on the TF. However an SSN could do nothing to prevent her aircraft flying from airfields. In summary what the F-lands war demonstrates is the need for well balanced naval forces capable of operating globally.
Which reminds me, its now a decade since an RN Group Deployment with a carrier to the Far East. Well done Labour.
Which reminds me, its now a decade since an RN Group Deployment with a carrier to the Far East. Well done Labour.
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Sunk, agreed - but with a limited AAR capability the reach of shore based a/c would have been sorely limited leaving almost no time on task. The 25 would have alleviated that problem and, without SSN threat, have been able to refuel and re-arm for as long as possible. CONQUEROR took that option out of the equation and, in my view, stopped numerous direct actions against the TF carriers.
Ecce Homo! Loquitur...
Former Navy chief warns over soaring cost of ground forces
Sir Alan West, who retired last year as First Sea Lord and head of the Navy, has warned that the costly demands of Iraq and Afghanistan might make cancellation of the carrier project attractive to a hard-pressed MoD.
Despite government statements that "urgent operational requirements" (UORs) such as new mine-protected vehicles and extra helicopters are met from Treasury contingency funds, this is not always the case.
The defence equipment budget, already overstretched by paying for Typhoon Eurofighters, Type 45 destroyers, Astute submarines and new Nimrod surveillance aircraft, is now being tapped to pay for unplanned kit for the Army's front lines. Six Merlin helicopters bought from Denmark in March to shore up battlefield mobility will cost £180m. All of that has to be taken from the equipment budget and will not be underwritten by the Treasury.
Insiders say the Treasury meets only 60% of many UORs from the contingency war chest, leaving the MoD to find the rest from its existing, overstretched budget. A review of defence spending priorities has been under way since last year and most senior officers say money is being funnelled away from the Navy and the RAF to support ground forces facing daily combat.
Sir Alan, who spent three years arguing the strategic case for two large aircraft carriers, said: "There are still those in the MoD challenging the requirement for their own parochial reasons. The pressures of the Comprehensive Spending Review make the large piece of equipment programme money that has not yet been committed highly attractive to those running much less important projects who can see a painful squeeze coming."
If the carriers were cancelled, Sir Alan believes the consequences would be far-reaching for decades to come and would endanger the UK's security. "I see the CVF project as a make-or-break challenge for the MoD and, indeed, a litmus test for the government's commitment to defence," he added.......
Sir Alan West, who retired last year as First Sea Lord and head of the Navy, has warned that the costly demands of Iraq and Afghanistan might make cancellation of the carrier project attractive to a hard-pressed MoD.
Despite government statements that "urgent operational requirements" (UORs) such as new mine-protected vehicles and extra helicopters are met from Treasury contingency funds, this is not always the case.
The defence equipment budget, already overstretched by paying for Typhoon Eurofighters, Type 45 destroyers, Astute submarines and new Nimrod surveillance aircraft, is now being tapped to pay for unplanned kit for the Army's front lines. Six Merlin helicopters bought from Denmark in March to shore up battlefield mobility will cost £180m. All of that has to be taken from the equipment budget and will not be underwritten by the Treasury.
Insiders say the Treasury meets only 60% of many UORs from the contingency war chest, leaving the MoD to find the rest from its existing, overstretched budget. A review of defence spending priorities has been under way since last year and most senior officers say money is being funnelled away from the Navy and the RAF to support ground forces facing daily combat.
Sir Alan, who spent three years arguing the strategic case for two large aircraft carriers, said: "There are still those in the MoD challenging the requirement for their own parochial reasons. The pressures of the Comprehensive Spending Review make the large piece of equipment programme money that has not yet been committed highly attractive to those running much less important projects who can see a painful squeeze coming."
If the carriers were cancelled, Sir Alan believes the consequences would be far-reaching for decades to come and would endanger the UK's security. "I see the CVF project as a make-or-break challenge for the MoD and, indeed, a litmus test for the government's commitment to defence," he added.......
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A frighteningly attractive option is to provide the 2 "promised" carriers but with a FF/DD force just adequate to screen them. A nice neat number would be 15. We would then retain Global reach, albeit only on 1 grid reference at a time.
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FF/DDG Screen
Real question from the uniformed to the Fishead Experten out there: what would a balanced task group look like based on a CVF under the following scenarios? And this would be both UK only, UK in EU (ie non-US supported) coalition and UK in coalition with US support.
1. Littoral support to an air campaign without host nation support facing SSKs (hypothetically, like Iran)
2. Restricted area coalition ops defending against an all arms invasions fleet (hypothetically, like Taiwan)
3. Blue Water ops of classical fleet vs fleet (hypothetically, like vs FSU Navy in the GIUK gap?)
Just curious.
S41
1. Littoral support to an air campaign without host nation support facing SSKs (hypothetically, like Iran)
2. Restricted area coalition ops defending against an all arms invasions fleet (hypothetically, like Taiwan)
3. Blue Water ops of classical fleet vs fleet (hypothetically, like vs FSU Navy in the GIUK gap?)
Just curious.
S41
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Dave B
I can't help noticing the amount of support the CTOL F-35 is getting, seems the 'big ship & Phantom were the good old days ' contingent lives on...
How about the fact that VSTOL allows operating from rough forward airstrips, which is a huge increase in flexibility ?
I admit they'll have to train it to do STOVL, but can't see that being too hard.
Also with VSTOL you can use almost any ship in the fleet ( if you have one ) at a pinch - being restricted just to what will almost certainly be one very valuable & distant deck seems a high price to pay just to go a bit further or longer.
How about the fact that VSTOL allows operating from rough forward airstrips, which is a huge increase in flexibility ?
I admit they'll have to train it to do STOVL, but can't see that being too hard.
Also with VSTOL you can use almost any ship in the fleet ( if you have one ) at a pinch - being restricted just to what will almost certainly be one very valuable & distant deck seems a high price to pay just to go a bit further or longer.
Also with VSTOL you can use almost any ship in the fleet ( if you have one ) at a pinch - being restricted just to what will almost certainly be one very valuable & distant deck seems a high price to pay just to go a bit further or longer
Some truth in that for SHAR & GR3, doubtful for GR7/9, bloody big deck required if you're going to keep people clear of Dave-B.......
Some truth in that for SHAR & GR3, doubtful for GR7/9, bloody big deck required if you're going to keep people clear of Dave-B.......