Afghanistan Deployment
It dosent matter if the bombs hit the runway or not, they frightened the bejesus out of the poor sods, and they gave up all the quicker for it. That is the value of Air Power.
That is why we have laser designators, GPS nav'd bombs....and the rest.
It takes troops on the ground...with bayonets fixed to extended rifles...to control the battlefield. Air power plays a role but I would think reading the history of the Second World War would prove the folly of what you said in the quote. The Vulcans did not exactly carpet bomb the Oppos into the Stone Age in the FI now did they? More like a participation to say they showed up I would say. Talk to the Marines and Paras...and the rest of the folks on the ground before you brag about the Vulcan's "winning" the day.
You're so right, SASless!
Unless you include nuking them back to the stone age, no matter what the air power protaganists might think, at the end of the day it's the 'grunt with the gun' who probably has to go in to finish things off.
Air power just makes that job less hassle.
Unless you include nuking them back to the stone age, no matter what the air power protaganists might think, at the end of the day it's the 'grunt with the gun' who probably has to go in to finish things off.
Air power just makes that job less hassle.
Yes, at the end of the day it takes troops to take, and hold ground. All other military arms, air or naval, are ultimately in support of this aim - which is why we cut back the number of troops at our peril, especially as we spend increasing amounts of time on 'policing' type actions!.
However, to win a ground war you need air superiority, as Rommel could have told you. Look at the WWII example of the Falaise (spelling?) gap. During the ground campaign in France, which saw some excellent tactics employed by the US Army, the Germans were unable to move by day, and had large numbers of their ground forces destroyed by Allied Air Power. That lesson has not yet been forgotten, and we would do so at our peril!!
However, to win a ground war you need air superiority, as Rommel could have told you. Look at the WWII example of the Falaise (spelling?) gap. During the ground campaign in France, which saw some excellent tactics employed by the US Army, the Germans were unable to move by day, and had large numbers of their ground forces destroyed by Allied Air Power. That lesson has not yet been forgotten, and we would do so at our peril!!
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BBC News, 28 Feb 2006
Fears over UK troops' readiness
The conflict in Iraq left a third of Britain's armed forces less prepared for action than they should have been, an influential group of MPs has warned.
The Public Accounts Committee found major operations in Iraq and elsewhere had produced "worrying signs of strain" in the military.
Troops had to "cannibalise" equipment from material left at home to keep units up to strength, the MPs said.
But defence minister Adam Ingram said he did not agree with the findings.
'Serious' weaknesses.
The PAC report said there were concerns that the priority placed on re-equipping the RAF and Army may have hit the Royal Navy's capabilities.
Over the year up until September 2005, around 30% of the UK's armed forces had "serious" or "critical" weaknesses to their peacetime readiness levels, the MPs said.
Edward Leigh, the committee's Conservative chairman, said: "This reflects the high levels of demands being put on them, and there are worrying signs of strain on equipment.
"I am particularly concerned about the potential impact on future operational capabilities of the fleet.
"The Ministry of Defence needs to make clear its plans for bringing the armed forces up to readiness."
'Long term effects'
Military forces are kept at varying levels of preparedness to respond to emerging operations, so they can deploy from anything between a few hours to several months.
But the committee warned that "continuing high levels of operational commitment" were leading to "significant strain on equipment support in particular areas, with long term effects".
During operations in Iraq, 44 Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks - 22% of those not deployed to the conflict - were "cannibalised", the report said.
However, Mr Ingram insisted that the PAC report did not reflect the current state of British forces.
He argued that the conclusions were at odds with a positive National Audit Office report.
'Good plans'
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives," he said.
"The National Audit Office was absolutely clear that the MoD has a good system for reporting the readiness of the armed forces and has a good understanding of the risks to readiness and good plans to mitigate them.
"The impact of current operations on the armed forces is judged by the chiefs of staff to be manageable and the armed forces as a whole remain ready for future operations."
Richard Bacon, a Liberal Democrat member of the committee, said 30% of the armed forces equated to 60,000 servicemen and women who were not at the right level of readiness.
"The Ministry of Defence must discharge its duty as to ensure British forces are properly trained and equipped to deploy," he said.
Cannibalisation of equipment "decreases the pool of available vehicles and equipment and increases the wear and tear they are subjected to, shortening their useful life", he added.
Fears over UK troops' readiness
The conflict in Iraq left a third of Britain's armed forces less prepared for action than they should have been, an influential group of MPs has warned.
The Public Accounts Committee found major operations in Iraq and elsewhere had produced "worrying signs of strain" in the military.
Troops had to "cannibalise" equipment from material left at home to keep units up to strength, the MPs said.
But defence minister Adam Ingram said he did not agree with the findings.
'Serious' weaknesses.
The PAC report said there were concerns that the priority placed on re-equipping the RAF and Army may have hit the Royal Navy's capabilities.
Over the year up until September 2005, around 30% of the UK's armed forces had "serious" or "critical" weaknesses to their peacetime readiness levels, the MPs said.
Edward Leigh, the committee's Conservative chairman, said: "This reflects the high levels of demands being put on them, and there are worrying signs of strain on equipment.
"I am particularly concerned about the potential impact on future operational capabilities of the fleet.
"The Ministry of Defence needs to make clear its plans for bringing the armed forces up to readiness."
'Long term effects'
Military forces are kept at varying levels of preparedness to respond to emerging operations, so they can deploy from anything between a few hours to several months.
But the committee warned that "continuing high levels of operational commitment" were leading to "significant strain on equipment support in particular areas, with long term effects".
During operations in Iraq, 44 Challenger 2 Main Battle Tanks - 22% of those not deployed to the conflict - were "cannibalised", the report said.
However, Mr Ingram insisted that the PAC report did not reflect the current state of British forces.
He argued that the conclusions were at odds with a positive National Audit Office report.
'Good plans'
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives," he said.
"The National Audit Office was absolutely clear that the MoD has a good system for reporting the readiness of the armed forces and has a good understanding of the risks to readiness and good plans to mitigate them.
"The impact of current operations on the armed forces is judged by the chiefs of staff to be manageable and the armed forces as a whole remain ready for future operations."
Richard Bacon, a Liberal Democrat member of the committee, said 30% of the armed forces equated to 60,000 servicemen and women who were not at the right level of readiness.
"The Ministry of Defence must discharge its duty as to ensure British forces are properly trained and equipped to deploy," he said.
Cannibalisation of equipment "decreases the pool of available vehicles and equipment and increases the wear and tear they are subjected to, shortening their useful life", he added.
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Spinning nicely
How could the minister agree with the findings when the SofS had announced this piece on Sunday.
The Helmand Task Force will comprise elements of the Headquarters of Colchester-based 16 Air Assault Brigade, and airborne infantry battlegroup. Based initially around the Third Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, it will incorporate a force of eight Apache Attack Helicopters, provided by 9 Regiment, Army Air Corps, the first time we have deployed this impressive new capability on an operation. 9 Regiment will also supply four Lynx Light Utility Helicopters while 27 Squadron, Royal Air Force, will provide a detachment of six Chinook Support Helicopters.
Other major units and capabilities include Scimitar and Spartan armoured vehicles from the Household Cavalry Regiment, a battery of 105mm Light Guns from 7th Parachute Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, a battery of Desert Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from 32 Regiment, Royal Artillery, 13 Air Assault Regiment and 29 Regiment of the Royal Logistics Corps, 7 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and 16 Close Support Medical Regiment. We shall also deploy four additional Royal Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.
Other major units and capabilities include Scimitar and Spartan armoured vehicles from the Household Cavalry Regiment, a battery of 105mm Light Guns from 7th Parachute Regiment, Royal Horse Artillery, a battery of Desert Hawk Unmanned Aerial Vehicles from 32 Regiment, Royal Artillery, 13 Air Assault Regiment and 29 Regiment of the Royal Logistics Corps, 7 Battalion Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and 16 Close Support Medical Regiment. We shall also deploy four additional Royal Air Force C-130 Hercules transport aircraft.
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Military readiness increasing
This hot off the MOD website:
28 Feb 06
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report into Military Readiness describes the MoD's system for defining measuring and reporting readiness as 'sophisticated'. The report was welcomed by Armed Forces Minister, the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP.
However, Mr Ingram highlighted a number of areas in which the PAC report does not reflect the current UK Forces readiness situation.
"It would simply not be true to interpret the report to say that about a third of Britain's Armed Forces would struggle to deploy. At the moment no forces are reporting critical weaknesses," he said.
"No military in the world is designed to have 100 per cent of its forces at full readiness at any one time. As of last September 79 per cent of Forces were ready to deploy with no serious or critical weaknesses. Performance continues to improve and we confidently expect to exceed the target we have agreed with the Treasury of an annual average of 73 per cent by April 2008," he added.
"The Committee is right to highlight continuing likelihood that greatest operational demands will be made on the Army and some areas of the RAF and that we consequently focus efforts on those assets, but, as the committee recognises, this has not prevented the Royal Navy carrying out its operational tasks."
Last June the NAO praised the MoD for the good system it has in place which compares well with other countries' systems. The NAO noted that the system has the confidence of our military commanders, has proven itself on recent operations and is continuously improving.
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives."
Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP.
Mr Ingram said:
"Given the overwhelmingly positive report into military readiness produced by the National Audit Office last June I find it somewhat surprising that the Public Accounts Committee can look at the same evidence and produce the report they have produced today.
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives. In June the National Audit Office was absolutely clear that the MOD has a good system for reporting the readiness of the Armed Forces and has a good understanding of risks to readiness and good plans in place to mitigate them.
"The impact of current operations on the Armed Forces is judged by the Chiefs of Staff to be manageable and the Armed Forces as a whole remain ready for future operations."
Having 79 per cent of forces reporting no serious or critical weaknesses does not mean 21 per cent of UK forces would be unable to deploy. A serious weakness, as opposed to critical weakness, is one that would make delivering the force element concerned within the required time difficult but not impossible. The key to dealing with a serious weakness is identifying the weakness and addressing it.
28 Feb 06
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) report into Military Readiness describes the MoD's system for defining measuring and reporting readiness as 'sophisticated'. The report was welcomed by Armed Forces Minister, the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP.
However, Mr Ingram highlighted a number of areas in which the PAC report does not reflect the current UK Forces readiness situation.
"It would simply not be true to interpret the report to say that about a third of Britain's Armed Forces would struggle to deploy. At the moment no forces are reporting critical weaknesses," he said.
"No military in the world is designed to have 100 per cent of its forces at full readiness at any one time. As of last September 79 per cent of Forces were ready to deploy with no serious or critical weaknesses. Performance continues to improve and we confidently expect to exceed the target we have agreed with the Treasury of an annual average of 73 per cent by April 2008," he added.
"The Committee is right to highlight continuing likelihood that greatest operational demands will be made on the Army and some areas of the RAF and that we consequently focus efforts on those assets, but, as the committee recognises, this has not prevented the Royal Navy carrying out its operational tasks."
Last June the NAO praised the MoD for the good system it has in place which compares well with other countries' systems. The NAO noted that the system has the confidence of our military commanders, has proven itself on recent operations and is continuously improving.
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives."
Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP.
Mr Ingram said:
"Given the overwhelmingly positive report into military readiness produced by the National Audit Office last June I find it somewhat surprising that the Public Accounts Committee can look at the same evidence and produce the report they have produced today.
"Recent operations prove we can deploy the right number of forces to achieve our objectives. In June the National Audit Office was absolutely clear that the MOD has a good system for reporting the readiness of the Armed Forces and has a good understanding of risks to readiness and good plans in place to mitigate them.
"The impact of current operations on the Armed Forces is judged by the Chiefs of Staff to be manageable and the Armed Forces as a whole remain ready for future operations."
Having 79 per cent of forces reporting no serious or critical weaknesses does not mean 21 per cent of UK forces would be unable to deploy. A serious weakness, as opposed to critical weakness, is one that would make delivering the force element concerned within the required time difficult but not impossible. The key to dealing with a serious weakness is identifying the weakness and addressing it.
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Cobras into border country
Pakistan helicopters hit militants on Afghan border around Miram Shah, about 200km SE of Kabul in North Waziristan, Pakistan. The army sent Cobra helicopter gunships after pro-Taliban tribesmen occupied the government buildings on Saturday morning, forced shopkeepers to close down their businesses then traded mortar and gunfire with security forces.
Part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) across the border inside Pakistan, this province is inhabited by fiercely independent tribesmen, many of whom sympathize with the Taliban, their fellow ethnic Pashtuns. Meanwhile, the Presidents of both countries bicker about border control.
Stability across the Pakistan/Afghanistan border is yet another crucial element for UK Force protection so this action may be postive.
Part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) across the border inside Pakistan, this province is inhabited by fiercely independent tribesmen, many of whom sympathize with the Taliban, their fellow ethnic Pashtuns. Meanwhile, the Presidents of both countries bicker about border control.
The tribal region - roughly the size of the U.S. state of Vermont - belongs to Pakistan in name only. Pakistani police and courts have no jurisdiction, and, until recently, the central government in Islamabad never tried to assert control.
Short Blunt Shock
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Quote:
It dosent matter if the bombs hit the runway or not, they frightened the bejesus out of the poor sods, and they gave up all the quicker for it. That is the value of Air Power.
Typical Air Force bovine feces!
That is why we have laser designators, GPS nav'd bombs....and the rest.
It takes troops on the ground...with bayonets fixed to extended rifles...to control the battlefield. Air power plays a role but I would think reading the history of the Second World War would prove the folly of what you said in the quote. The Vulcans did not exactly carpet bomb the Oppos into the Stone Age in the FI now did they? More like a participation to say they showed up I would say. Talk to the Marines and Paras...and the rest of the folks on the ground before you brag about the Vulcan's "winning" the day.
It dosent matter if the bombs hit the runway or not, they frightened the bejesus out of the poor sods, and they gave up all the quicker for it. That is the value of Air Power.
Typical Air Force bovine feces!
That is why we have laser designators, GPS nav'd bombs....and the rest.
It takes troops on the ground...with bayonets fixed to extended rifles...to control the battlefield. Air power plays a role but I would think reading the history of the Second World War would prove the folly of what you said in the quote. The Vulcans did not exactly carpet bomb the Oppos into the Stone Age in the FI now did they? More like a participation to say they showed up I would say. Talk to the Marines and Paras...and the rest of the folks on the ground before you brag about the Vulcan's "winning" the day.
You're so right, SASless!
Unless you include nuking them back to the stone age, no matter what the air power protaganists might think, at the end of the day it's the 'grunt with the gun' who probably has to go in to finish things off.
Air power just makes that job less hassle.
Unless you include nuking them back to the stone age, no matter what the air power protaganists might think, at the end of the day it's the 'grunt with the gun' who probably has to go in to finish things off.
Air power just makes that job less hassle.
And Air Power CAN be decisive - Milosovich surrendered over Kosovo before a single boot hit the ground there.
16B
16,
I find that a bit hard to accept.
The Argies could easily do a threat analysis and arrive at that conclusion but at the same time the simple math of bomb load times airframes would prove that threat to be akin to balloons on sticks. That is unless you lot were prepared to use Nukes. The Vulcan fleet did not provide a real threat against the mainland due to the lack of numbers and the inability for the RAF to provide fighter escort and Electronic Warfare support aircraft.
The only real benefit that would have occurred would have been psychological. The leaders of the Oppos would have been embarrassed but no critical damage would have resulted from a Vulcan raid on the mainland (assuming no nukes used). Plainly, the use of Nukes was not ever a choice....world opinion would have not allowed that.
The Vulcan was past its sell by date long before the Falklands and did not provide a valuable contribution no matter how you want to spin it.
I find that a bit hard to accept.
The Argies could easily do a threat analysis and arrive at that conclusion but at the same time the simple math of bomb load times airframes would prove that threat to be akin to balloons on sticks. That is unless you lot were prepared to use Nukes. The Vulcan fleet did not provide a real threat against the mainland due to the lack of numbers and the inability for the RAF to provide fighter escort and Electronic Warfare support aircraft.
The only real benefit that would have occurred would have been psychological. The leaders of the Oppos would have been embarrassed but no critical damage would have resulted from a Vulcan raid on the mainland (assuming no nukes used). Plainly, the use of Nukes was not ever a choice....world opinion would have not allowed that.
The Vulcan was past its sell by date long before the Falklands and did not provide a valuable contribution no matter how you want to spin it.
Red On, Green On
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And following on from you, SASless, remember the effect of the sinking of the Belgrano - no Argentinian ship left port after she was sunk.
Comparing the sinking of the Belgrano to the Vulcan threat is definitely apples and oranges.
Unrestricted submarine warfare with modern sophisiticated subs against helpless surface vessels is a completely different of fish as compared to a Vulcan dropping some bombs on the Falklands. The Vulcan is much easier to defend against and did not have the strength of force that the Royal Navy submarine force did in that conflict.
Unrestricted submarine warfare with modern sophisiticated subs against helpless surface vessels is a completely different of fish as compared to a Vulcan dropping some bombs on the Falklands. The Vulcan is much easier to defend against and did not have the strength of force that the Royal Navy submarine force did in that conflict.
Although the Waddington-based Vulcan B.2 bombers of 44, 50 and 101 Sqdns are due to retire from service, a number are fitted with extra ECM and readied for action. Four aircraft in total reach Ascension, the first two at the end of April to start a planned series of seven, single aircraft "Black Buck" missions against Stanley through to mid June. Conventional bombs are used on three occasions and Shrike anti-radar missiles on two, with one mission of each type being called off.
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SASless, hate to say it, but your wrong.
History proves it:
US bombed mainland Japan to prove that the war isnt just at arms length.
The UK ability to carry out bombing raids on Falklands demonstrated that not only could the islands be hit, but should we choose to, mainland argentina could be targeted also.
It is naive to assert that naval power is the be all and end all in terms of warfare.
I beleive that the american phraseology is 'force projection' - the intention was not to bomb the living cr@p out of the enemy positions, but merely to point out the fact that should we decide to get nasty, then we had the where-with-all to push them out of the way.
This should be viewed as a precursor to the american 'shock and awe' strategy - you are demonstrating to the opposition that you have overwhelming firepower at your finger tips, so they best just pack up and go home now.
History proves it:
US bombed mainland Japan to prove that the war isnt just at arms length.
The UK ability to carry out bombing raids on Falklands demonstrated that not only could the islands be hit, but should we choose to, mainland argentina could be targeted also.
It is naive to assert that naval power is the be all and end all in terms of warfare.
I beleive that the american phraseology is 'force projection' - the intention was not to bomb the living cr@p out of the enemy positions, but merely to point out the fact that should we decide to get nasty, then we had the where-with-all to push them out of the way.
This should be viewed as a precursor to the american 'shock and awe' strategy - you are demonstrating to the opposition that you have overwhelming firepower at your finger tips, so they best just pack up and go home now.
Originally Posted by SASless
16,
and did not provide a valuable contribution no matter how you want to spin it.
and did not provide a valuable contribution no matter how you want to spin it.
Admiral Leach (also at the seminar) expressed a similar view, although he isn't quoted in the publication.
The whole point of the Vulcan raid was that it had an effect (before the word 'effect' became a piece of jargon) that supported the overall effort.
Woodward rejects the notion usually put forward that the raid was merely the RAF trying to get in on the act, and the comments of the then-CAS (from the same source, and which Woodward endorsed) show clearly that the whole purpose was to provide support for the overall effort to retake the islands.
The point is that the Argenitines didn't do an analysis and withdrew assets out of range of the Falklands as a result of the raid. Obviously not war-winning, but not quite the utter waste of fuel a certain SHAR driver/author later suggested...
Daede,
Let me get this straight now...you are saying five single aircraft Vulcan sorties equals the "Shock and Awe" campaign during the latest war with Iraq....is that what you are saying? I dare say you way under-estimate the Argies if you think the Vulcan's intimidated them a bit. Four aircraft was it doing the missions and two of seven sorties were aborts? Pray tell what did the Vulcans actually destroy in their whole five sorties? Compare that to the Shock and Awe air campaign for a start and see what a trivial role the Vulcan played in the Falklands campaign.
Now I understand it is a hurtful time for the British military with all of the budget cuts and such, but dear fellow you really are confused in your thinking if you think the Vulcans posed any kind of real threat to the Argies.
If you care to check it....the Falkland Islands was as successful as it was for two simple reasons. The Royal Navy sticking with the ground forces and the Army and Marines ability to outfight the Argies.
Sea Power and Air Power are an essential part of the equation but are only two parts of the total force structure that leads to success.
Stategic bombing with conventional weapons has never won a war yet nor will it ever. Tactical application of airpower in support of ground action does.
Wars are won by the Squaddies toting rifles, riding in Tanks, and shooting artillery but ultimately it boils down to boots on the ground to seize and hold the enemy's land before you have victory in war.
Are you as well equipped and manned today as you were during the Falklands?
Let me get this straight now...you are saying five single aircraft Vulcan sorties equals the "Shock and Awe" campaign during the latest war with Iraq....is that what you are saying? I dare say you way under-estimate the Argies if you think the Vulcan's intimidated them a bit. Four aircraft was it doing the missions and two of seven sorties were aborts? Pray tell what did the Vulcans actually destroy in their whole five sorties? Compare that to the Shock and Awe air campaign for a start and see what a trivial role the Vulcan played in the Falklands campaign.
Now I understand it is a hurtful time for the British military with all of the budget cuts and such, but dear fellow you really are confused in your thinking if you think the Vulcans posed any kind of real threat to the Argies.
If you care to check it....the Falkland Islands was as successful as it was for two simple reasons. The Royal Navy sticking with the ground forces and the Army and Marines ability to outfight the Argies.
Sea Power and Air Power are an essential part of the equation but are only two parts of the total force structure that leads to success.
Stategic bombing with conventional weapons has never won a war yet nor will it ever. Tactical application of airpower in support of ground action does.
Wars are won by the Squaddies toting rifles, riding in Tanks, and shooting artillery but ultimately it boils down to boots on the ground to seize and hold the enemy's land before you have victory in war.
Are you as well equipped and manned today as you were during the Falklands?
Short Blunt Shock
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If you care to check it....the Falkland Islands was as successful as it was for two simple reasons. The Royal Navy sticking with the ground forces and the Army and Marines ability to outfight the Argies.
Stategic bombing with conventional weapons has never won a war yet nor will it ever.
And Air Power CAN be decisive - Milosovich surrendered over Kosovo before a single boot hit the ground there.
Wars are won by the Squaddies toting rifles, riding in Tanks, and shooting artillery but ultimately it boils down to boots on the ground to seize and hold the enemy's land before you have victory in war.
And how do you suppose those 'boots' get there? Military air power isn't just about fast jets.
Now, back to the thread topic: Let's discuss the relevance of The Royal Navy in current operations in Afghanistan (ie - Zero!).
16B
SASless - if the Argentines weren't slightly intimidated (i.e they didn't think there was a real threat) why did they withdraw aircraft to protect the capital against possible Vulcan raids. Intimidation/coercion takes many forms, and getting the opposition preparing for the worst falls into that.
In terms of 'Shock and Awe' (which arguably failed to impose either on the Iraqis), your point:
slightly misses the target, with respect - Shock and Awe does not necessarily involve physical destruction. Blackbuck could be said to have destroyed something - namely Argentine belief that the mainland was totally safe... And that thought did come as a shock to the junta.
If that's the case, why is Milosevic sitting in a cell in the Hague, while the Kosovars talk about independence?
Tactical targeting during ALLIED FORCE largely failed to have any effect on Milosevic's thinking, while attacking 'strategic' (in the broadest sense of the word) target sets worked, since it started loud squeals of protest from his supporters as their cash-cow disappeared in flames. Now of course, the targeting was sometimes bodged (Chinese embassy amongst a couple of others), and the diplomatic pressure from Russia was hugely significant - yet 'strategic' air attack was fundamental to success.
I agree with the premise that land power is invariably the arbiter, and that the role of air power is to faciliate success of the land component as rapidly as possible - but it can do that through the mechanism of sorties that appear to be nothing more than token old-fashioned 'strategic bombardment'. The Vulcan raid was, I would contend, the first signs of an air force fumbling towards the notion that the division between strategic and tactical could be blurred and that blowing the living daylights out of a target might not be the sole measure of success.
Blackbuck had relatively limited objectives, which were predominantly not destructive and the ops fulfilled them.
We can argue about the efficacy of the SEAD raids and the bombing attacks that didn't hit the runway (costs versus benefits) until the cows come home - but the key commanders of the time, from all three services thought that Blackbuck could have an effect that did not have destruction of the target as its prime aim - and they were not disappointed by the outcome.
In terms of 'Shock and Awe' (which arguably failed to impose either on the Iraqis), your point:
Pray tell what did the Vulcans actually destroy in their whole five sorties?
Stategic bombing with conventional weapons has never won a war yet nor will it ever. Tactical application of airpower in support of ground action does.
Tactical targeting during ALLIED FORCE largely failed to have any effect on Milosevic's thinking, while attacking 'strategic' (in the broadest sense of the word) target sets worked, since it started loud squeals of protest from his supporters as their cash-cow disappeared in flames. Now of course, the targeting was sometimes bodged (Chinese embassy amongst a couple of others), and the diplomatic pressure from Russia was hugely significant - yet 'strategic' air attack was fundamental to success.
I agree with the premise that land power is invariably the arbiter, and that the role of air power is to faciliate success of the land component as rapidly as possible - but it can do that through the mechanism of sorties that appear to be nothing more than token old-fashioned 'strategic bombardment'. The Vulcan raid was, I would contend, the first signs of an air force fumbling towards the notion that the division between strategic and tactical could be blurred and that blowing the living daylights out of a target might not be the sole measure of success.
Blackbuck had relatively limited objectives, which were predominantly not destructive and the ops fulfilled them.
We can argue about the efficacy of the SEAD raids and the bombing attacks that didn't hit the runway (costs versus benefits) until the cows come home - but the key commanders of the time, from all three services thought that Blackbuck could have an effect that did not have destruction of the target as its prime aim - and they were not disappointed by the outcome.
