Improving flight safety in the future
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Improving flight safety in the future
How do people perceive their influence on flight safety?
From the Lynham threads, there is obviously considerable concern about the engineering processes going on, but how does this fit with ‘breaking the chain? While I entirely sympathise with these concerns, when there is now more talk about ‘risk acceptance’ than ‘breaking then chain’, where are we? -
The accident rate since say the 50’s has dropped markedly – eg more planes were being lost in a year then than are now in the whole inventory and despite the Lynham problems, aircraft aren’t falling out of the sky (so I believe that, as ever, people there are working harder and harder to maintain standards to the detriment of their quality of life, with little recognition). Even compared to the start of 1996, when we lost a handlful of jets in short order, things don’t seem that bad.
In the future, safety targets are going to be getting tighter for the platform safety management. As technology reaches a limit of improvement, the only avenue left for a ‘return’ is in operating more safely (ie approx 4x as many accidents caused by some form of human error vs technical failure during flight). But how are we going to implement the required improvement, and then measure it so that the required levels can be demonstrated?
5206
From the Lynham threads, there is obviously considerable concern about the engineering processes going on, but how does this fit with ‘breaking the chain? While I entirely sympathise with these concerns, when there is now more talk about ‘risk acceptance’ than ‘breaking then chain’, where are we? -
The accident rate since say the 50’s has dropped markedly – eg more planes were being lost in a year then than are now in the whole inventory and despite the Lynham problems, aircraft aren’t falling out of the sky (so I believe that, as ever, people there are working harder and harder to maintain standards to the detriment of their quality of life, with little recognition). Even compared to the start of 1996, when we lost a handlful of jets in short order, things don’t seem that bad.
In the future, safety targets are going to be getting tighter for the platform safety management. As technology reaches a limit of improvement, the only avenue left for a ‘return’ is in operating more safely (ie approx 4x as many accidents caused by some form of human error vs technical failure during flight). But how are we going to implement the required improvement, and then measure it so that the required levels can be demonstrated?
5206
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Flight Safety or Aviation safety
5206
One thing we have always been good at in Mod is causing confusion with alternative definitions. I don't have the publication to hand, it's Sunday and I'm at home, but look up the definition of Flight Safety in JSP553. I believe that you are really talking about improving is what the MoD now (officially) refers to as Aviation Safety, the definition of which is:
Aviation Safety. The scope of aviation safety covers every activity that could impact on the ability to deliver safe aviation. It includes:
- The design, manufacture, build, maintenance and support of aircraft
- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services
- Provision of appropriately trained and competent personnel.
Aviation safety is achieved when the operation of aircraft poses no significant risk to aircrew, ground crew, passengers, other airspace users or to the general public over which such aircraft are flown.
According to 553 Flight Safety IIRC is about the process of review and continuous improvement.
Any Help ?
Safety_Helmut
One thing we have always been good at in Mod is causing confusion with alternative definitions. I don't have the publication to hand, it's Sunday and I'm at home, but look up the definition of Flight Safety in JSP553. I believe that you are really talking about improving is what the MoD now (officially) refers to as Aviation Safety, the definition of which is:
Aviation Safety. The scope of aviation safety covers every activity that could impact on the ability to deliver safe aviation. It includes:
- The design, manufacture, build, maintenance and support of aircraft
- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services
- Provision of appropriately trained and competent personnel.
Aviation safety is achieved when the operation of aircraft poses no significant risk to aircrew, ground crew, passengers, other airspace users or to the general public over which such aircraft are flown.
According to 553 Flight Safety IIRC is about the process of review and continuous improvement.
Any Help ?
Safety_Helmut
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Flight vs Aviation safety
S_H, thanks.
Okay then,
Isn't the 'review and continuous improvement ' bit about
'- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services' ??
If not, how do you think 'aviation safety' can be improved, and measured to be improved as per the future targets. I don't see much point in those at the top looking back and saying 'yep, we met our target last year, we must have done the right things' when it could so easily be 'B*gger, that accident, which we could have done something about, messes up the target. Oh, and how do we explain that to the widows?'
5206
Okay then,
Isn't the 'review and continuous improvement ' bit about
'- Operating aircraft
- Support to aircraft operation including, for example, infrastructure, air traffic management and emergency services' ??
If not, how do you think 'aviation safety' can be improved, and measured to be improved as per the future targets. I don't see much point in those at the top looking back and saying 'yep, we met our target last year, we must have done the right things' when it could so easily be 'B*gger, that accident, which we could have done something about, messes up the target. Oh, and how do we explain that to the widows?'
5206
“Aviation safety is achieved when the operation of aircraft poses no significant risk to aircrew, ground crew, passengers, other airspace users or to the general public over which such aircraft are flown.
In practice, “during peacetime” should be added to this. I don’t entirely agree with this, just an observation based on experience of what is permitted to enter service and reasons given for ignoring risks. My own opinion is that the purpose of most military aircraft is warfighting, so they should be fit for purpose, including safety. Others may not agree, but my view is that of someone who has to sign for that safety.
In practice, “during peacetime” should be added to this. I don’t entirely agree with this, just an observation based on experience of what is permitted to enter service and reasons given for ignoring risks. My own opinion is that the purpose of most military aircraft is warfighting, so they should be fit for purpose, including safety. Others may not agree, but my view is that of someone who has to sign for that safety.
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An operational safety case will require thought and input from many 'operational' people unused to having to justify why what they do is safe. So, they'll need some training first.
While the upcoming targets are numerical, it will be harder to provide a quantitative answer to the probability of 'hazardous situation x' occurring, but a qualitative argument of a ball-park figure will go some way. Then, a reasoned, compelling argument as to why the risks associated with 'x' have been mitigated will be needed.
Biggest problem will be the cultural change in having to think hard about these things and produce an acceptable argument. (not that I'm suggesting that the risks aren't thought about now, just that it isn't all joined up)
sw
While the upcoming targets are numerical, it will be harder to provide a quantitative answer to the probability of 'hazardous situation x' occurring, but a qualitative argument of a ball-park figure will go some way. Then, a reasoned, compelling argument as to why the risks associated with 'x' have been mitigated will be needed.
Biggest problem will be the cultural change in having to think hard about these things and produce an acceptable argument. (not that I'm suggesting that the risks aren't thought about now, just that it isn't all joined up)
sw
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The other problem with trying to clear wartime safety cases is categorizing the risk. You have to consider the effects of a range of weapons, with different lethality for varying modes of operation and delivery (assuming you can get this detail) on the weapon. The "safe route" would probably be to armour and over design everything, the end effect may be a flying tank or something that can outfly Janes book of weapons.
Alternatively, you lower the threshold to gain an acceptable design.
Regards
Retard
Alternatively, you lower the threshold to gain an acceptable design.
Regards
Retard
"In the future, safety targets are going to be getting tighter for the platform safety management. As technology reaches a limit of improvement, the only avenue left for a ‘return’ is in operating more safely (ie approx 4x as many accidents caused by some form of human error vs technical failure during flight). But how are we going to implement the required improvement, and then measure it so that the required levels can be demonstrated?"
Enough of your engineering w@nkwords, number 5206.
One of the RN's best ways of ensuring that technical failure was minimised was to invite the spanner-wielder who did any engine change at sea to sit in the back for the resulting engine air test when fired off the front of one of Pusser's flat tops. A thoroughly good idea, to my mind. Some of the shabby old wrecks I used to air test might have perhaps have been inspected rather more carefully by the alleged engineers if they'd been told they'd be flying with us on the subsequent air test.....
'Platform safety management' indeed. Good grief.
Enough of your engineering w@nkwords, number 5206.
One of the RN's best ways of ensuring that technical failure was minimised was to invite the spanner-wielder who did any engine change at sea to sit in the back for the resulting engine air test when fired off the front of one of Pusser's flat tops. A thoroughly good idea, to my mind. Some of the shabby old wrecks I used to air test might have perhaps have been inspected rather more carefully by the alleged engineers if they'd been told they'd be flying with us on the subsequent air test.....
'Platform safety management' indeed. Good grief.
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Ah well
Beags,
There I was thinking you were quite astute, right up to
Some of us have to live in the real world.
And your comment on putting the engineer in the back is a good idea (getting an FJ flight is generall morale +ve with the troops), while valid in focussing the minds of the maintainer, has no +ve effect on either design or operational safety
5206
There I was thinking you were quite astute, right up to
Enough of your engineering w@nkwords
And your comment on putting the engineer in the back is a good idea (getting an FJ flight is generall morale +ve with the troops), while valid in focussing the minds of the maintainer, has no +ve effect on either design or operational safety
5206
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Design safety - in the helo world we are making huge strides. The next generation will have icing clearances that actually mean something, OEI performance most if not all of the time (OK the Wokka usually has it now at the push of a button), true duplex AFCS and hydraulics, crashworthy structures, redundant load paths in primary components, proper engine response, controls with some design input from the ergonomics people, decent seats and harnesses ...
Operational safety - I think we are again doing OK. Despite the ever-expanding environmental envelope, we are approaching the limits in a considered manner, with more focussed training and a much more mature attitude across all experience levels than I remember as a 1st tourist.
Where I fear it may come apart is that the operational pressure will increasingly lead to either "Managed" (=accepted) risk, or risk carried because the formal "managing" process is just too difficult. The engineers seem to be drowning in paperwork to the detriment of concentration on the important bit, the continual battle for spares for our old and knackered aircraft is debilitating to aircrew, engineer and supplier alike, the admin support is on a 3 1/2 day week which really annoys the 24/7 bits of the Service, and the balls to shout STOP (or AVA-A-AST if you are dark blue) seem to be scarce indeed.
When I joined I calculated the odds on living through 16 years on FJ (based on the recent accident rate at the time) as about 4 in 5. By the end of those 16 years that had gone up to about 99 in 100 for the next 16. So we were really succeeding on the safety front. I am unconvinced that we are maintaing the rate of improvement, and right now there are bits of the Service where I fear we may be going backwards.
I'm mildly worried, but that may just be onset of old age. I hope so.
Sven
Operational safety - I think we are again doing OK. Despite the ever-expanding environmental envelope, we are approaching the limits in a considered manner, with more focussed training and a much more mature attitude across all experience levels than I remember as a 1st tourist.
Where I fear it may come apart is that the operational pressure will increasingly lead to either "Managed" (=accepted) risk, or risk carried because the formal "managing" process is just too difficult. The engineers seem to be drowning in paperwork to the detriment of concentration on the important bit, the continual battle for spares for our old and knackered aircraft is debilitating to aircrew, engineer and supplier alike, the admin support is on a 3 1/2 day week which really annoys the 24/7 bits of the Service, and the balls to shout STOP (or AVA-A-AST if you are dark blue) seem to be scarce indeed.
When I joined I calculated the odds on living through 16 years on FJ (based on the recent accident rate at the time) as about 4 in 5. By the end of those 16 years that had gone up to about 99 in 100 for the next 16. So we were really succeeding on the safety front. I am unconvinced that we are maintaing the rate of improvement, and right now there are bits of the Service where I fear we may be going backwards.
I'm mildly worried, but that may just be onset of old age. I hope so.
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Flight safety is on the way up. Good show to all who recognise this.
Its all about breaking the chain, whether it be from aircrew during walk round or engine starts to, crew chief, armourer, rigger, loadie, the chap in the caravan at the end of the runway or the controller during on task.
An area where we might fall down is the 'can do' mentality. In the military we are (creditably) prone to making the most of a situation and doing the best we can given the resources we have. In the deployed operations that exist now, we are ever more isolated from our aircraft home bases, with fewer working eng shifts and fewer operating crews and far less in the way of command supervision. The upshot is that all sides of military aviation and aviation support, especially in deployed operations, are stretched and it is only a matter of time before a major incident that can directly be attributed to aircrew, groundcrew or supervision occurs. Self preservation is a natural reaction so maybe the answer has to lie in the supervision chain with regard to flight safety.
Comments chaps!
Retirement is great but it can be dull!
Its all about breaking the chain, whether it be from aircrew during walk round or engine starts to, crew chief, armourer, rigger, loadie, the chap in the caravan at the end of the runway or the controller during on task.
An area where we might fall down is the 'can do' mentality. In the military we are (creditably) prone to making the most of a situation and doing the best we can given the resources we have. In the deployed operations that exist now, we are ever more isolated from our aircraft home bases, with fewer working eng shifts and fewer operating crews and far less in the way of command supervision. The upshot is that all sides of military aviation and aviation support, especially in deployed operations, are stretched and it is only a matter of time before a major incident that can directly be attributed to aircrew, groundcrew or supervision occurs. Self preservation is a natural reaction so maybe the answer has to lie in the supervision chain with regard to flight safety.
Comments chaps!
Retirement is great but it can be dull!
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In my humble opinion, the human factors side of things are taking a turn for the worse 
. Yes, technology, operating procedures and experience have all improved rapidly over the last few decades, but at the moment we seem to be asking more and more of engineers, crews and most other people in the flight safty "chain"., and being asked to do so with less and less resources.
With the current engineering set-up at lyneham, as I have mentioned in other threads, we are VASTLY undermanned, and as a result more and more frames are being presented to the crews with long lists of ADF's and LIM's, neither of which can be conducive to flight safty.
The other problem I forsee is now that multi-skilling is taking place, people are going to assume that twice the work can be done, by half the number of people, and manpower will be cut accordingly. A huge number of experienced tradesmen are applying for redundancy, and if they don't get that they are going to PVR, which is going to have a big dent in the engineering skillbase, which again is going to cause long term problems. As all other areas of flight safty have moved on so well, it is about time someone called time on the beancounters, and made sure that the most vunerable area of flight safty , ie human factors, is taken care of properly, and stop expecting miracles from under-equipped, over stretched engineers. Somthing somewhere has to give soon, and it could so easily be prevented........
. Yes, technology, operating procedures and experience have all improved rapidly over the last few decades, but at the moment we seem to be asking more and more of engineers, crews and most other people in the flight safty "chain"., and being asked to do so with less and less resources. With the current engineering set-up at lyneham, as I have mentioned in other threads, we are VASTLY undermanned, and as a result more and more frames are being presented to the crews with long lists of ADF's and LIM's, neither of which can be conducive to flight safty.
The other problem I forsee is now that multi-skilling is taking place, people are going to assume that twice the work can be done, by half the number of people, and manpower will be cut accordingly. A huge number of experienced tradesmen are applying for redundancy, and if they don't get that they are going to PVR, which is going to have a big dent in the engineering skillbase, which again is going to cause long term problems. As all other areas of flight safty have moved on so well, it is about time someone called time on the beancounters, and made sure that the most vunerable area of flight safty , ie human factors, is taken care of properly, and stop expecting miracles from under-equipped, over stretched engineers. Somthing somewhere has to give soon, and it could so easily be prevented........
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kengineer-130
I agree wholeheartedly with most of your last post. However
The whole point of ADFs and LIMs is that aircraft can be flown SAFELY whilst awaiting rectification or spares etc. They should never be used in any situation that compromises flight safety.
long lists of ADF's and LIM's, neither of which can be conducive to flight safty.
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The other problem I forsee is now that multi-skilling is taking place
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C-130tecchie, yes I see your point about ADF's and LIM's, but IMHO they are there to allow the aircraft to fly when it is paramount to operations, NOT to keep the aircraft flying locals etc untill it is so broken that it is useless. Stuff like minor cracks, broken anchor nuts nuts, fine, but IMHO stuff like ATM's and aircon packs should NOT be LIM'd, as they are important items.
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Good Authors
4Greens,
Nancy Leveson is also good to read, esp on the 'management oversight' of safety. She has some very interesting info/views on how organisations like NASA get into trouble. And it doesn't take any stretch of the imagination to see parallels in this country.
sw
Nancy Leveson is also good to read, esp on the 'management oversight' of safety. She has some very interesting info/views on how organisations like NASA get into trouble. And it doesn't take any stretch of the imagination to see parallels in this country.
sw
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I agree with most of the statements on this post and it is true that, per flying hour the incident rate has fallen.
However would the rate not fall further still if recommendations from BoIs were actually implemented rather than just looking good in print?
R1a
However would the rate not fall further still if recommendations from BoIs were actually implemented rather than just looking good in print?
R1a
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R1a,
True, but a BoI recommendation isn't made on the basis of having carried out a cost benefit analysis, but purely on identifying issues that would have prevented 'that' accident from happening again.
sw
True, but a BoI recommendation isn't made on the basis of having carried out a cost benefit analysis, but purely on identifying issues that would have prevented 'that' accident from happening again.
sw