RN took Nukes to the Falklands???
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"Thanks navaleye. I thought I'd been given 'gen' but when it comes to grey funnel lines floaty things I am very, very easy to mislead."
We knew that given your total lack of knowledge on why aircraft carriers are so vital
(hopefully WEBF isnt going to make an appearance now on the SHAR issue!)
We knew that given your total lack of knowledge on why aircraft carriers are so vital
(hopefully WEBF isnt going to make an appearance now on the SHAR issue!)
Suspicion breeds confidence
In the case of the T21, I think you'll find that they were "fiitted for but not with..." not all ships carried then all the time. In Sheffield's case yes she was left to drift as bait for the Argentine's 209 should it decide to make an appearance. Sheffield still had some useful kit which could have salvaged including full complement of Sea Darts at £250k a pop plus some other stuff like a gun and various radar antenna. They didn't take her 20mm canon which surprised me, they were like gold dust later.
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HMS Sheffield
Pardon the delay in responding but I have only just seen this thread. As an unfortunate visitor to the hangar on 5 May 82 to collect the 700, Sea Skua live plugs and as many fire fighting sets as we could get into a net, I can assure the curious that WE177 was not present in HMS SHEFFIELD then, or when she sank under tow on 10 May 82.
Three live Sea Skuas remained on the aircraft - safely on deck in HMS HERMES; the 'stbd outer missile' had been damaged and ditched over the side. Both sides of the air weapons magazine were open and only the Mk46 torpedoes remained. A practice WE177 had been transfered, in its container, to a RFA in the vicinity of Ascension Island during the transit down to the Falklands Islands. I hope this helps.
Three live Sea Skuas remained on the aircraft - safely on deck in HMS HERMES; the 'stbd outer missile' had been damaged and ditched over the side. Both sides of the air weapons magazine were open and only the Mk46 torpedoes remained. A practice WE177 had been transfered, in its container, to a RFA in the vicinity of Ascension Island during the transit down to the Falklands Islands. I hope this helps.
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RN Salvage Options
Navaleye. Salvage options were minimal. By mid morning on the 5th May, a very brave 846 NAS Sea King Mk4 crew was winching and load lifting to the flight deck while the fire had extended forward, close to the Sea Dart magazine. I never knew how successful the attempts to flood the magazine had been because this was in the days when the firemain was connected. Much of the water, hydraulics and HP steam had dumped into the South Atlantic through the hole in the starboard side. Both engine rooms were burning and smoke still billowed out of the foremast access points and the bridge. Neither Oerlikon could be reached and later, from a helo recce on about the 8th May, both weapons had been cooked as the fire spread upwards.
There was time to fill one net only so the priority was for breathing apparatus, pumps, hoses and anything else we had rudely borrowed from half the Fleet. The team on deck were ship’s company back in their comfort zone and so accepted the risk. However, with hindsight and a good bottle of red, I am reminded to tip my hat to the Junglies as they loitered around, watching a wreck that still had the capability to splinter their day. May I offer them a sincere thank you.
There was time to fill one net only so the priority was for breathing apparatus, pumps, hoses and anything else we had rudely borrowed from half the Fleet. The team on deck were ship’s company back in their comfort zone and so accepted the risk. However, with hindsight and a good bottle of red, I am reminded to tip my hat to the Junglies as they loitered around, watching a wreck that still had the capability to splinter their day. May I offer them a sincere thank you.
MoD papers reveal Falklands nuclear fear_
Rob Evans and Richard Norton-Taylor
Monday October 10, 2005
The Guardian_
British commanders sailed into the Falklands war deeply concerned that the Argentinians could capture their nuclear weapons, previously secret official papers reveal.
The documents also include a graphic description by Christopher Wreford-Brown, commander of the submarine Conqueror, of the controversial sinking of the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano with the loss of 321 lives.
They show the naval taskforce was dispatched in such haste that there was no time to remove nuclear depth charges carried on seven Royal Navy ships. Two of the ships, Hermes and Invincible, carried 75% of the navy's entire stockpile of nuclear depth charges, the papers reveal.
Offloading the weapons would have given the Argentinians more time to tighten their grip on the islands. But keeping them on board the ships was also dangerous. The papers show the extent of the concern. They say: "It was also conceivable that weapons might fall into the hands of the Argentines, by salvage, if one of the [Royal Navy] ships had been sunk, stranded or captured."
They add: "However unlikely, the consequences of this would be most serious and the acquisition of UK nuclear weapon technology in this way by a state which had no such weapon would have damaging consequences."
The papers include extracts from Cdr Wreford-Brown's personal log. "Orange fireball seen just aft of the centre of the target," he wrote after he torpedoed the Belgrano on May 2 1982. "Third explosion heard but not seen - I was not looking!" The previous day he recorded: "A good day - in contact with the Enemy at last!"
The papers have been posted on the Ministry of Defence website, after the MoD earlier refused to release them to the Guardian and other newspapers under the Freedom of Information Act.
The war cabinet agreed to change the rules of engagement to allow the sinking of the Belgrano, even though the cruiser was outside the total exclusion zone Britain imposed around the Falklands.
Cdr Wreford-Brown sent a signal to London four hours before firing his torpedoes, saying that the cruiser had changed course, away from the islands. The signal was received by Vice-Admiral Peter Herbert, flag officer submarines, but it was not passed on to the MoD or to Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of the Falklands taskforce. Sir Lawrence Freedman, who has written an official history of the conflict, says Admiral Herbert believed the task force "had to take its chances when it could".
I couldn't find 'em!
I wonder which the other five ships were?
Rob Evans and Richard Norton-Taylor
Monday October 10, 2005
The Guardian_
British commanders sailed into the Falklands war deeply concerned that the Argentinians could capture their nuclear weapons, previously secret official papers reveal.
The documents also include a graphic description by Christopher Wreford-Brown, commander of the submarine Conqueror, of the controversial sinking of the Argentinian cruiser General Belgrano with the loss of 321 lives.
They show the naval taskforce was dispatched in such haste that there was no time to remove nuclear depth charges carried on seven Royal Navy ships. Two of the ships, Hermes and Invincible, carried 75% of the navy's entire stockpile of nuclear depth charges, the papers reveal.
Offloading the weapons would have given the Argentinians more time to tighten their grip on the islands. But keeping them on board the ships was also dangerous. The papers show the extent of the concern. They say: "It was also conceivable that weapons might fall into the hands of the Argentines, by salvage, if one of the [Royal Navy] ships had been sunk, stranded or captured."
They add: "However unlikely, the consequences of this would be most serious and the acquisition of UK nuclear weapon technology in this way by a state which had no such weapon would have damaging consequences."
The papers include extracts from Cdr Wreford-Brown's personal log. "Orange fireball seen just aft of the centre of the target," he wrote after he torpedoed the Belgrano on May 2 1982. "Third explosion heard but not seen - I was not looking!" The previous day he recorded: "A good day - in contact with the Enemy at last!"
The papers have been posted on the Ministry of Defence website, after the MoD earlier refused to release them to the Guardian and other newspapers under the Freedom of Information Act.
The war cabinet agreed to change the rules of engagement to allow the sinking of the Belgrano, even though the cruiser was outside the total exclusion zone Britain imposed around the Falklands.
Cdr Wreford-Brown sent a signal to London four hours before firing his torpedoes, saying that the cruiser had changed course, away from the islands. The signal was received by Vice-Admiral Peter Herbert, flag officer submarines, but it was not passed on to the MoD or to Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, commander of the Falklands taskforce. Sir Lawrence Freedman, who has written an official history of the conflict, says Admiral Herbert believed the task force "had to take its chances when it could".
I couldn't find 'em!
I wonder which the other five ships were?
Last edited by Jackonicko; 10th Oct 2005 at 23:15.
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Forgive my ignorance on reading between the lines, but how come this topic is being aired..??
Surely things of this nature are deemed under wraps for at least 30 years...
Op Corporate was 1982.....plus 30yrs = 2012.....
As we are in 2005, I cant see how things are being made common knowledge...
But then again I have been on th PC all day and guess i'm suffering VDU blindness....
Surely things of this nature are deemed under wraps for at least 30 years...
Op Corporate was 1982.....plus 30yrs = 2012.....
As we are in 2005, I cant see how things are being made common knowledge...
But then again I have been on th PC all day and guess i'm suffering VDU blindness....
It's partly the fault of the Freedom of Information Act.
A list of nuclear accidents and incidents was released, which included reports of damage to WE177 containers during ship-to-ship transfers in 1982. This in turn provoked further questions, which led to some detail being released about nukes and the Falklands campaign.
It is still less than 30 years ago, you're right. Though it is 23 years. And we are talking about a weapon - WE177C (and indeed a category of weapon - the NDB) which was withdrawn in 1992 - 13 years ago. And WE177 itself has been dead and buried for nine years now.
And while those connected with such once top secret things might still be horrified that it's all being openly discussed, the ombudsman decided there was no danger to national security in discussing such issues if the weapons were no longer in service.
She said that it was difficult to envisage that the "release of information about events that happened some time ago to weapons that no longer exist could cause harm if made more widely available".
A list of nuclear accidents and incidents was released, which included reports of damage to WE177 containers during ship-to-ship transfers in 1982. This in turn provoked further questions, which led to some detail being released about nukes and the Falklands campaign.
It is still less than 30 years ago, you're right. Though it is 23 years. And we are talking about a weapon - WE177C (and indeed a category of weapon - the NDB) which was withdrawn in 1992 - 13 years ago. And WE177 itself has been dead and buried for nine years now.
And while those connected with such once top secret things might still be horrified that it's all being openly discussed, the ombudsman decided there was no danger to national security in discussing such issues if the weapons were no longer in service.
She said that it was difficult to envisage that the "release of information about events that happened some time ago to weapons that no longer exist could cause harm if made more widely available".
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
Jackinoko,
See PMs. Nothing to do with this thread but interesting on nuke plans.
See PMs. Nothing to do with this thread but interesting on nuke plans.
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Five Ships with WE177
Jackonicko.
For your missing ships, the two FORTs are an obvious choice as they carried just about everything that could go bang. I suspect the full list included all variants: one FORT received the practice variant from HMS SHEFFIELD on the run south and I believe another was offloaded by a T22. You may have only one ship to find.
Good luck and, by the way, your PMs are full.
For your missing ships, the two FORTs are an obvious choice as they carried just about everything that could go bang. I suspect the full list included all variants: one FORT received the practice variant from HMS SHEFFIELD on the run south and I believe another was offloaded by a T22. You may have only one ship to find.
Good luck and, by the way, your PMs are full.
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Racking my brains a bit here, but I do recall that several of the ships despatched with the task force - and before it - had been involved in major exercises in the Med, based at Gibraltar, immediately before the soutward push. Some of those vessels were deployed from the Atlantic assets to the Med for those exercises (Spring Train was, IIRC, the RAF element), and so were presumably fully complemented with their normal weapons inventory.
The turn-round time in UK before heading south was, for some of those ships, extremely short. Certainly short enough to make a change of armament impractical. In fact, nearly every ship in the Task Force left UK with equipment and weaponry inappropriate to its individual role, with the intention of sorting out the whole mess once the Task force regrouped at Ascension - where I was witness to the general chaos of trying to get everything where it should be! Rumours were rife at the time that various bits of nuclear ASW weaponry were aboard some ships. I saw nothing to suggest that any such weaponry was moved actually at Ascension, though whether any of the UK-type precautions and protections would have been applied is moot.
It does seem entirely plausible to me that such weapons were aboard some ships that went further south simply because it had not been possible to safely and expeditiously remove them. And for no other reason!
The turn-round time in UK before heading south was, for some of those ships, extremely short. Certainly short enough to make a change of armament impractical. In fact, nearly every ship in the Task Force left UK with equipment and weaponry inappropriate to its individual role, with the intention of sorting out the whole mess once the Task force regrouped at Ascension - where I was witness to the general chaos of trying to get everything where it should be! Rumours were rife at the time that various bits of nuclear ASW weaponry were aboard some ships. I saw nothing to suggest that any such weaponry was moved actually at Ascension, though whether any of the UK-type precautions and protections would have been applied is moot.
It does seem entirely plausible to me that such weapons were aboard some ships that went further south simply because it had not been possible to safely and expeditiously remove them. And for no other reason!
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Priorities
Agree completely. We joined Ex Spring Train in Mar 82 off Gibraltar after a full Gulf Deployment. When the Ex was halted on orders to head south, a buddy system was devised to pair up one ship heading north and one south with the former passing as much equipment, ammo, stores, food and personnel as could be spared. In one particular Vertrep sortie, HMS ARROW provided us with a tasty consignment of Arg beef. Speed was essential and the transfers were almost frantic; I don’t remember many opportunities for the receiving warships to offload much, apart from non UK staff. Only the north-bound vessels could get back to Gib.
This Task Group then headed for the Falklands, almost a month ahead of the UK Task Force. We made a short stop off Ascension Island for helo transfers only and very little seemed to go ashore. Some kit and our practice WE177 were transferred around the group to make space – see earlier comments, while an impressive bunch of engineers ran a shuttle service on an RFA to fit Sea Skua for the first time to a number of Lynx Flights.
Frankly, there were other priorities and someone did a sensible risk analysis; scroggs is quite right.
This Task Group then headed for the Falklands, almost a month ahead of the UK Task Force. We made a short stop off Ascension Island for helo transfers only and very little seemed to go ashore. Some kit and our practice WE177 were transferred around the group to make space – see earlier comments, while an impressive bunch of engineers ran a shuttle service on an RFA to fit Sea Skua for the first time to a number of Lynx Flights.
Frankly, there were other priorities and someone did a sensible risk analysis; scroggs is quite right.
Last edited by Data-Lynx; 12th Oct 2005 at 14:03.
These latest papers, referred to by the Grauniad, seem to indicate a difference between what you'd expect to have happened and what was actually happening.
We know that the RN carriers were supposed to carry five WE177Cs and an inert training round when they carried nukes, and that the Type 22, Rothesay-class and Leander-class frigates, and the destroyers carried two per ship, plus an inert training round or a surveillance round, when embarked.
But these papers say that Hermes and Invincible together carried 75% of the RN inventory (eg: about 18 weapons of the RN's 25 C model WE177s). Perhaps this explains the previous statement that WE177s transferred at sea in 1982 were "held in those ships with the best-protected magazines prior to being returned to the UK," which we'd previously thought meant that the weapons were sent back on RFAs without entering the exclusion zone.
The implication in previously published stuff is that an inert training round or a surveillance round was carried only when live warshots were carried too, yet Data Lynx suggests that his ship had one, but no warshots.
When it was officially admitted that seven WE177 weapons containers were damaged in the course of ship-to-ship transfers during the Falklands campaign it was suggested that these transfers were made to comply with Britain's obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which had established a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone) with the implication that we did not send WE177's into Latin American waters and 'into harm's way' while the new papers suggest that we did exactly that.
Fascinating stuff!
We know that the RN carriers were supposed to carry five WE177Cs and an inert training round when they carried nukes, and that the Type 22, Rothesay-class and Leander-class frigates, and the destroyers carried two per ship, plus an inert training round or a surveillance round, when embarked.
But these papers say that Hermes and Invincible together carried 75% of the RN inventory (eg: about 18 weapons of the RN's 25 C model WE177s). Perhaps this explains the previous statement that WE177s transferred at sea in 1982 were "held in those ships with the best-protected magazines prior to being returned to the UK," which we'd previously thought meant that the weapons were sent back on RFAs without entering the exclusion zone.
The implication in previously published stuff is that an inert training round or a surveillance round was carried only when live warshots were carried too, yet Data Lynx suggests that his ship had one, but no warshots.
When it was officially admitted that seven WE177 weapons containers were damaged in the course of ship-to-ship transfers during the Falklands campaign it was suggested that these transfers were made to comply with Britain's obligations under the Treaty of Tlatelolco (which had established a Latin American Nuclear Free Zone) with the implication that we did not send WE177's into Latin American waters and 'into harm's way' while the new papers suggest that we did exactly that.
Fascinating stuff!
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Where is 'Wally' (WE177)
Jackonicko
Your supposition needs some consideration. This was a rapid move from peace to conflict against a country with conventional submarines. You should find that Fleet’s intent was to pack air weapon magazines with torpedoes, Mk11 depth charges, air to surface missiles – according to helo type – and pyrotechnics. By 1982, Navaleye’s comment on 21 August
was realistic for not just T21s but for almost all ships with the Wasp and for many single ship deployments in peacetime. I wonder if your search for this particular ‘Wally’ is closer to conclusion than you may think?
We know that the RN carriers were supposed to carry five WE177Cs and an inert training round when they carried nukes, and that the Type 22, Rothesay-class and Leander-class frigates, and the destroyers carried two per ship, plus an inert training round or a surveillance round, when embarked.
"fitted for but not with..."
Bit off topic but I can't help feeling that this would have made the plot for a good thriller - after the conflict Argentine divers attempt to recover the weapons, which are then used to blackmail the UK. Which then have to be dealt with....
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I was with the 845 flight on Fort Austin when she left Ascension for the first time in early April, going south to meet Endurance, and for a while afterwards.
I remember some of the weapons being transferred to us at sea but I can't remember which ships they came from, sorry.
I do remember that people were very concerned about who was watching the transfer, with all non essential staff being kept off the upper decks.
I also remember the containers bouncing off the ships a bit which caused some consternation !
I remember some of the weapons being transferred to us at sea but I can't remember which ships they came from, sorry.
I do remember that people were very concerned about who was watching the transfer, with all non essential staff being kept off the upper decks.
I also remember the containers bouncing off the ships a bit which caused some consternation !
