- The Canberra - Unsafe in 1950, Still unsafe
Join Date: Nov 2000
Location: Glorious Devon
Posts: 721
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The best PR aeroplane ever made (Lockheed U2) first flew in 1955 and is, I believe, scheduled to remain in USAF service "indefinitely", because it is relatively simple, cheap to operate, and much more flexible than satellites. It has only one engine. The Canberra has two and so should be safer in most flight segments. If you lose an engine on T/O in the U-bird, you keep straight ahead and take your chance. Same with the Canberra if you lose one below safety speed. Or so it was when I instructed on them at CFS.
The accident looked survivable
Only one Ess and two Emms, Jackonicko - and you a journo!
I suppose fatal accidents are so relatively rare these days that all these expressions of grief and sympathy to the N of K are inevitable. But to my generation, when fatals were a regular feature of service life, they seem somehow OTT. A little bit of the "Diana" syndrome seems to be creeping in. Our repects to the deceased and condolences to their family should go without saying. Their fellow squadron members will no doubt, in the old tradition, sink a pint to the deceased and move on.
The accident looked survivable
Only one Ess and two Emms, Jackonicko - and you a journo!
I suppose fatal accidents are so relatively rare these days that all these expressions of grief and sympathy to the N of K are inevitable. But to my generation, when fatals were a regular feature of service life, they seem somehow OTT. A little bit of the "Diana" syndrome seems to be creeping in. Our repects to the deceased and condolences to their family should go without saying. Their fellow squadron members will no doubt, in the old tradition, sink a pint to the deceased and move on.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: in the hills
Age: 68
Posts: 358
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Milt, before you start speculating on what may have occured take a little time to think! You comment on inexperienced crew being unaware of the Canberra's asymmetric ahndling was far off. One of the pilots was an old colleague of mine, he began flying the canberra in @ 1989.
All canberra crew practised regularly for an engine failure, in fact the statistics show that more died practising than in the real case. Due to the nature of the role the curent canberra pilots are all very experienced on type.
In future save your speculation for the stock market.
In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries.
I suspect that this may be the end of the canberra, it led a wonderful life but it's about time that it went to a museum.
Rest in peace to the 2 that died.
All canberra crew practised regularly for an engine failure, in fact the statistics show that more died practising than in the real case. Due to the nature of the role the curent canberra pilots are all very experienced on type.
In future save your speculation for the stock market.
In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries.
I suspect that this may be the end of the canberra, it led a wonderful life but it's about time that it went to a museum.
Rest in peace to the 2 that died.
Join Date: May 2004
Location: Lincs
Posts: 267
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FV, I have to disagree with you - why should expressions of condolences go unsaid? This is especially true of those of us currently located in some far-flung corner of the world. I knew both of the pilots; one of them very well, having spent considerable time with him at Marham, deployed on various ops and in the pub. Due to my location I will be unable to express my condolences directly to his family, and if a post on this board gives some small shred of comfort to them - or to me - then surely that is better than the 'stiff upper lip' attitude of days of yore. Things have changed and your 'Diana Syndrome' comment does you no service.
SBG
SBG
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: uk
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for some really interesting points of view in this thread, thoughtfully put. My heart goes out to those of you who are close to or right inside the news.
Do hope you have all forgiven me for being so forceful on originally opening the topic - felt it deserved more than just a meek expression of sadness.
Here's the latest:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/3624896.stm
-----
Those of us who went to Paddy Thompson's funeral in the early 80s know that the beast bites the very best of us. Those of us back then who got caught to be qfis - they seem to be "Instructor/ Invigilators" now, apparently - who had to do night-flying in the T4 every week because the wheels knew it was too dangerous for the ordinary chaps on the squadron to do night asymmetrics on their own, know that even the smartest among us can get into trouble. Every accident we hear of since then seems to bring back the same frustration that what we knew was true then, is still true now.
The role of the Canberra PR9 is for others to decide. Actually, some of us feel immense pride viewing recent press pictures of a PR9 over Afghanistan, as pictures of exactly the same airframe over Aden or Singapore 30 years ago still grace our dining-rooom or office walls. Those brilliant new sensor gadgets and data-links are really impressive, and quite an investment. Of course purse strings might be an issue for any replacement programme.
But the T4 training accidents are beyond belief. They have to be unnecessary. We simply don't have problems killing pilots on night asymmetric training on the Boeing or Airbus products some of us may have moved onto.
Not just because the modern aircraft are safer, certainly not because the pilots are any better - but because we use simulators for the perilous stuff. Crash? Freeze it, debrief, start again just as you were, back at 5 miles, you owe me a beer. Simulators don't cost that much, certainly the training costs of 2 modern military fast-jet pilots would probably cover one. Or a few of those sensors and data-links.
Where is the Canberra sim ? There isn't one ? WHY NOT ? Bang seats are not an alternative. Purse strings are NOT a valid argument for risking lives.
There does seem to be support among us here for the idea that pilots should not routinely be forced to fly dangerous manoeuvres in ancient aircraft. Volunteers for historic displays are something else. It would of course be unlikely for any career board-of-inquiry head to put his neck on the line and say anything so big-picture unpopular. It will be easy instead to hide behind a mass of statistics of speed and crosswind and engine acceleration and descent rate and hours on type and all the other minutiae they will go through and allocate a nice tidy cause to it.
Someone senior needs to break this particular error chain NOW, and stop it happening ever again.
Do hope you have all forgiven me for being so forceful on originally opening the topic - felt it deserved more than just a meek expression of sadness.
Here's the latest:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/norfolk/3624896.stm
-----
Those of us who went to Paddy Thompson's funeral in the early 80s know that the beast bites the very best of us. Those of us back then who got caught to be qfis - they seem to be "Instructor/ Invigilators" now, apparently - who had to do night-flying in the T4 every week because the wheels knew it was too dangerous for the ordinary chaps on the squadron to do night asymmetrics on their own, know that even the smartest among us can get into trouble. Every accident we hear of since then seems to bring back the same frustration that what we knew was true then, is still true now.
The role of the Canberra PR9 is for others to decide. Actually, some of us feel immense pride viewing recent press pictures of a PR9 over Afghanistan, as pictures of exactly the same airframe over Aden or Singapore 30 years ago still grace our dining-rooom or office walls. Those brilliant new sensor gadgets and data-links are really impressive, and quite an investment. Of course purse strings might be an issue for any replacement programme.
But the T4 training accidents are beyond belief. They have to be unnecessary. We simply don't have problems killing pilots on night asymmetric training on the Boeing or Airbus products some of us may have moved onto.
Not just because the modern aircraft are safer, certainly not because the pilots are any better - but because we use simulators for the perilous stuff. Crash? Freeze it, debrief, start again just as you were, back at 5 miles, you owe me a beer. Simulators don't cost that much, certainly the training costs of 2 modern military fast-jet pilots would probably cover one. Or a few of those sensors and data-links.
Where is the Canberra sim ? There isn't one ? WHY NOT ? Bang seats are not an alternative. Purse strings are NOT a valid argument for risking lives.
There does seem to be support among us here for the idea that pilots should not routinely be forced to fly dangerous manoeuvres in ancient aircraft. Volunteers for historic displays are something else. It would of course be unlikely for any career board-of-inquiry head to put his neck on the line and say anything so big-picture unpopular. It will be easy instead to hide behind a mass of statistics of speed and crosswind and engine acceleration and descent rate and hours on type and all the other minutiae they will go through and allocate a nice tidy cause to it.
Someone senior needs to break this particular error chain NOW, and stop it happening ever again.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The T.4 which crashed was, I believe, the oldest Canberra still in service. It was built in late 1953 and delivered in, or about, May 1954. This makes it 50 years old this year!
But I've read this thread with growing dismay over some of the comments, especially the comment that "Canberras should be grounded". Why? It was a T.4 not a PR.9! Totally different aircraft, different characteristics entirely. And if "old" aircraft are to be grounded what about the B-52?
If you have read the BBC's web-site "fact file" on the Canberra you'll find it is totally misleading in this instance - Quote - The Canberra T4 is the training version of the plane, with the only difference from the PR9 being its dual controls. Rubbish! Any Canberra man will laugh at that. But that class of "understanding" is becoming obvious in this thread.
As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that. To my mind, the fact that there is no canopy or nav's hatch and all three seat tubes are showing means that the crew had some warning of impending disaster (the nav would have gone first the two pilots almost immediately after) - an "assymetric" is sudden and violent. As other posters have mentioned on this thread, zero/zero seats might have made a difference, but the crew didn't have them. If any of you feel the need to place blame don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.
But I've read this thread with growing dismay over some of the comments, especially the comment that "Canberras should be grounded". Why? It was a T.4 not a PR.9! Totally different aircraft, different characteristics entirely. And if "old" aircraft are to be grounded what about the B-52?
If you have read the BBC's web-site "fact file" on the Canberra you'll find it is totally misleading in this instance - Quote - The Canberra T4 is the training version of the plane, with the only difference from the PR9 being its dual controls. Rubbish! Any Canberra man will laugh at that. But that class of "understanding" is becoming obvious in this thread.
As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that. To my mind, the fact that there is no canopy or nav's hatch and all three seat tubes are showing means that the crew had some warning of impending disaster (the nav would have gone first the two pilots almost immediately after) - an "assymetric" is sudden and violent. As other posters have mentioned on this thread, zero/zero seats might have made a difference, but the crew didn't have them. If any of you feel the need to place blame don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.
Join Date: Aug 2000
Location: UK
Posts: 1,777
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
2LP - any aircraft is unsafe. There are 'coffin corners', bad flying, NOM's, Acts of God, and so on. Speculate all you like (I won't even give it a 'best guess') - I'll leave that to the BOI.
Meantime, can we give up this thread attacking a fine airframe that's still doing a top-rate task after all theses years of sterling service?
Meantime, can we give up this thread attacking a fine airframe that's still doing a top-rate task after all theses years of sterling service?
Join Date: Aug 2004
Location: Far Far Far Away
Posts: 63
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gentlemen :
Ive' read the following threads with interest, but no one seems to have asked the Question "why"
Why where these aviators having to operate although be it a
fine machine in its time a 50 year old aeroplane.
Where is the PR9's replacement. Certainly not where it should be in service. In fact where it should have been since the 1980's.
Yet a further screw up in Military procurement has cost lives.
They used to call it the "ASTOR" possibly gone through several name changes since.
Help's Im advise to change the name occassionally, Confuses the polititians when asking for further fundings.
Those guys should have been training in a modern jet not riding around on a seat whose limited envelope was surpassed in the early 60's.
Had chance to look over a PR9 recently in Bari, covered in speed tape. Like some South American meat hauling frieghter.
Ive' read the following threads with interest, but no one seems to have asked the Question "why"
Why where these aviators having to operate although be it a
fine machine in its time a 50 year old aeroplane.
Where is the PR9's replacement. Certainly not where it should be in service. In fact where it should have been since the 1980's.
Yet a further screw up in Military procurement has cost lives.
They used to call it the "ASTOR" possibly gone through several name changes since.
Help's Im advise to change the name occassionally, Confuses the polititians when asking for further fundings.
Those guys should have been training in a modern jet not riding around on a seat whose limited envelope was surpassed in the early 60's.
Had chance to look over a PR9 recently in Bari, covered in speed tape. Like some South American meat hauling frieghter.
Dear Mr Hoon,
"What is the average age today of the RAF's front-line aircraft compared to those of the USA and France?"
....and no cheating by counting yet-to-be-delivered TypHoons or Nimrod Y2K!
"What is the average age today of the RAF's front-line aircraft compared to those of the USA and France?"
....and no cheating by counting yet-to-be-delivered TypHoons or Nimrod Y2K!
TAC Int Bloke
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: UK
Posts: 975
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Lets see, when was the last B-52 built? How old is their oldest C-130? Old dosen't necessarily equal bad
Far point about the lack of a replacement but let's see BEags spin forty years of piss-poor procurement into another anti-Labour tirade
-Nick
Far point about the lack of a replacement but let's see BEags spin forty years of piss-poor procurement into another anti-Labour tirade
-Nick
2LP, particularly,
Is it your feeling that practise asymmetrics are actually so dangerous as to be of no training benefit, especially because real asymmetric situations are so 'few and far between'. In other words that this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save? (As Wheelbarrow infers).
Or are practise asymmetrics at night exponentially more risky?
If it's a practise asymmetric, with the QFI in particular knowing exactly what's going to happen and when, why is it so fraught with danger? Presumably dozens of training asymmetric approaches and overshoots pass without incident every year - what is so different about the ones that end in tragedy?
Is one problem that a 'macho attitude' to the need for (and desirability of) asymmetric training has developed and that the need for it was established long ago, by older aircrew, when comparison with older types (Meteors, Hastings, etc.) the Canberra looked relatively benign, whereas in today's 'fluffier' more H&S conscious times, the damned thing looks more lethal?
Wheelbarrow,
"In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries." - Do you remember roughly when this study was undertaken? I'm fascinated by this - it seems as disgraceful as the decision not to give V-bomber back-seaters (or Canberra B(I)8 navs) ejection seats. I wonder how many lives might have been saved by providing the Canberras with a zero-zero ejection capability.
Beagle/Maverick Lad, Bizflyer etc.,
There is nothing wrong with operating a 50 year old aeroplane. The Yanks plan to be operating 80 year old Buffs, for goodness sake. And in point of fact, the PR9s are pretty low houred, and are only 40 - scarcely ten years older than some of the RAF's Jags, and certainly not much different to the older VC10s and C-130s! Many entirely sensible people would have been happy to keep the Canberra PR9 going for another 12-20 years had we sufficient airframes (or even noses with fewer pressurisation cycles on them and a cheap, robust solution to the upper wing skin issue). Had we not thrown away so many serviceable, low houred PR9 airframes in the late 70s and early 80s, further service would be likely. And quite rightly, since the machine has performed better in its intended role than even the U-2R/S in some recent ops. It's far from obsolete. But whether it should have undergone more safety-related upgrades (new seats, even a fixed base sim) is perhaps another matter.
Beeaye8,
You say: "As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that."
The Beeb say:
"The jet, a 50-year-old Canberra T4, was involved in "touch and go" training, where the crew practise landing and take-off.
'State of shock'
Squadron Leader Mike Lence, deputy commander of 39 Squadron - the Canberra squadron - paid tribute to the men who lost their lives.
He said: "The squadron is in a state of shock over the loss of two valued men. I knew them personally and they will be sorely missed. Our thoughts at the moment are with their families."
The squadron leader added that the three men involved in the accident were all experienced aircrew.
"They were practising a specific technique - and one pilot would have been acting as an invigilator or instructor", he said.
"I want to stress that these were all experienced aircrew. They were not training in the sense that they were novices. They were practising a specific technique."
I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.
I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?
Is it your feeling that practise asymmetrics are actually so dangerous as to be of no training benefit, especially because real asymmetric situations are so 'few and far between'. In other words that this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save? (As Wheelbarrow infers).
Or are practise asymmetrics at night exponentially more risky?
If it's a practise asymmetric, with the QFI in particular knowing exactly what's going to happen and when, why is it so fraught with danger? Presumably dozens of training asymmetric approaches and overshoots pass without incident every year - what is so different about the ones that end in tragedy?
Is one problem that a 'macho attitude' to the need for (and desirability of) asymmetric training has developed and that the need for it was established long ago, by older aircrew, when comparison with older types (Meteors, Hastings, etc.) the Canberra looked relatively benign, whereas in today's 'fluffier' more H&S conscious times, the damned thing looks more lethal?
Wheelbarrow,
"In answer to another post; a survey was prepared on refitting the canberra with Zero / Zero seats but as usual the cost was felt to be too much, I hope the person who came out with that felt the two lives that were lost were worth it, they both ejected but due to the antiquated seat did not get out within the seat's boundaries." - Do you remember roughly when this study was undertaken? I'm fascinated by this - it seems as disgraceful as the decision not to give V-bomber back-seaters (or Canberra B(I)8 navs) ejection seats. I wonder how many lives might have been saved by providing the Canberras with a zero-zero ejection capability.
Beagle/Maverick Lad, Bizflyer etc.,
There is nothing wrong with operating a 50 year old aeroplane. The Yanks plan to be operating 80 year old Buffs, for goodness sake. And in point of fact, the PR9s are pretty low houred, and are only 40 - scarcely ten years older than some of the RAF's Jags, and certainly not much different to the older VC10s and C-130s! Many entirely sensible people would have been happy to keep the Canberra PR9 going for another 12-20 years had we sufficient airframes (or even noses with fewer pressurisation cycles on them and a cheap, robust solution to the upper wing skin issue). Had we not thrown away so many serviceable, low houred PR9 airframes in the late 70s and early 80s, further service would be likely. And quite rightly, since the machine has performed better in its intended role than even the U-2R/S in some recent ops. It's far from obsolete. But whether it should have undergone more safety-related upgrades (new seats, even a fixed base sim) is perhaps another matter.
Beeaye8,
You say: "As for it being an "assymetric". Has this been proven? Is this the cause? If so, I apologise, because the "public" gen doesn't say that."
The Beeb say:
"The jet, a 50-year-old Canberra T4, was involved in "touch and go" training, where the crew practise landing and take-off.
'State of shock'
Squadron Leader Mike Lence, deputy commander of 39 Squadron - the Canberra squadron - paid tribute to the men who lost their lives.
He said: "The squadron is in a state of shock over the loss of two valued men. I knew them personally and they will be sorely missed. Our thoughts at the moment are with their families."
The squadron leader added that the three men involved in the accident were all experienced aircrew.
"They were practising a specific technique - and one pilot would have been acting as an invigilator or instructor", he said.
"I want to stress that these were all experienced aircrew. They were not training in the sense that they were novices. They were practising a specific technique."
I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.
I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?
Controversial, moi?
But to my generation, when fatals were a regular feature of service life, they seem somehow OTT. A little bit of the "Diana" syndrome seems to be creeping in. Our repects to the deceased and condolences to their family should go without saying.
Much like the misuse of the word hero.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Location: Over there, behind that tree.
Posts: 581
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Jackonicko
I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.
Yes I read the beeb's report but didn't automatically infer that asymetric was the special technique referred to. Two thoughts here. The spokesman could have said that to in order to save having to explain a procedural complexity to the jurno and thereby risk having overly speculative or 'sensatational' reportage on a sensitive issue. Secondly, there are several "special techniques" that the Sqn Ldr could have meant. Such things as flapless landings practice, tailplane actuator "failure" practice, and many more. I believe that there are even some techniques that are practised only during night flying. A Canberra jocky could probably give you a whole list (if you don't know them already).
That's not to say that asymetric wasn't the first thing I thought of too as, I suspect, you probably did, and as have others here. If it turns out to be the case (as found by the BoI) then that's the way it goes. I was just trying to prevail on the posters not to automatically assume that asymetric was the cause before the findings of the BoI.
Curiously though, after seeing the video film of the crash site on Look East last evening, the T.4 looked to be amazingly "flat" on the landscape, almost like the result of a wheels-up landing. Although I realise that every crash is unique, I understand that there is a certain "wing-down" component to asymetrics which generally results in a more damaged and sideways-sloping airframe. But this is just a whimsy on my part, no more than an idle speculative thought.
I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?
Both your instances seem the same to me, all ejections would seem to be emergency and premeditated. My conjecture was that the crew seemed to have had sufficient time to 'evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject. All this takes time (albeit several seconds), but it's an element that's usually sadly lacking in asymetric emergencies. A few have walked away from such crashes but more have not, hence the infamous nature of the thing.
I don't think it's unreasonable to infer what the 'specific technique' was.
Yes I read the beeb's report but didn't automatically infer that asymetric was the special technique referred to. Two thoughts here. The spokesman could have said that to in order to save having to explain a procedural complexity to the jurno and thereby risk having overly speculative or 'sensatational' reportage on a sensitive issue. Secondly, there are several "special techniques" that the Sqn Ldr could have meant. Such things as flapless landings practice, tailplane actuator "failure" practice, and many more. I believe that there are even some techniques that are practised only during night flying. A Canberra jocky could probably give you a whole list (if you don't know them already).
That's not to say that asymetric wasn't the first thing I thought of too as, I suspect, you probably did, and as have others here. If it turns out to be the case (as found by the BoI) then that's the way it goes. I was just trying to prevail on the posters not to automatically assume that asymetric was the cause before the findings of the BoI.
Curiously though, after seeing the video film of the crash site on Look East last evening, the T.4 looked to be amazingly "flat" on the landscape, almost like the result of a wheels-up landing. Although I realise that every crash is unique, I understand that there is a certain "wing-down" component to asymetrics which generally results in a more damaged and sideways-sloping airframe. But this is just a whimsy on my part, no more than an idle speculative thought.
I was puzzled about your remarks about ejection seat tubes and hatches. Wouldn't the aftermath of a 'last minute' emergency ejection look exactly the same as the aftermath of a 'premeditated' ejection in these respects?
Both your instances seem the same to me, all ejections would seem to be emergency and premeditated. My conjecture was that the crew seemed to have had sufficient time to 'evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject. All this takes time (albeit several seconds), but it's an element that's usually sadly lacking in asymetric emergencies. A few have walked away from such crashes but more have not, hence the infamous nature of the thing.
Join Date: Oct 1998
Location: West Wales
Posts: 187
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It's been thirty years since I last flew the Canberra but I seem to remember that there was an inbuilt delay in the ejection sequence so that an explosive link could allow the control column to go fully forward to clear the pilots' knees. Possibly this short hiatus was the difference between the nav's successful escape and the two guys up front.
A sad day, as always, but calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case. It has a vulnerability to power loss on takeoff due to an appreciable difference between (in airline terms) Vr and V2 and loss of speed on final approach was potentially fatal. These were known problems and every Canberra man trained assiduously in these areas and thought about them on every flight. Viewed against sortie rate it was no more or less dangerous than any other military combat jet. I'd fly one again tomorrow.
A sad day, as always, but calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case. It has a vulnerability to power loss on takeoff due to an appreciable difference between (in airline terms) Vr and V2 and loss of speed on final approach was potentially fatal. These were known problems and every Canberra man trained assiduously in these areas and thought about them on every flight. Viewed against sortie rate it was no more or less dangerous than any other military combat jet. I'd fly one again tomorrow.
Beeayate;
Yes, it reminded me of the way Chris Durbs' aircraft ended up, remember that? Also Marham, must have been late '70s. They probably survived because they didn't eject. It was due to uneven engine accel times which is, arguably, a form of asymmetric.
By the way F. Veteranus and M. Mouse, I had the same reaction to the public expressions of grief as you did. If that puts us all in the Dinosaur Park, well so be it - I'll be more comfortable there.
the T.4 looked to be amazingly "flat" on the landscape, almost like the result of a wheels-up landing.
By the way F. Veteranus and M. Mouse, I had the same reaction to the public expressions of grief as you did. If that puts us all in the Dinosaur Park, well so be it - I'll be more comfortable there.
Last edited by keithl; 4th Sep 2004 at 19:19.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Mar 1999
Location: uk
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Thanks for some more good points:
1) Beeayeate & Maple 01: Why not ground the B52 ? C130 ?
Very reasonable question. An answer might be that its not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk. Boeing built 109 of the late model B52H, not just 30 like Shorts built PR9s, they still have 75 B52Hs on active service together with 10 in attrition reserve, not just the 4 PR9s, and they are not afraid to spend the money needed on simulators, major technology upgrades, and even discussing 4 billion dollars for re-engine-ing the fleet for a life extension beyond year 2025 towards 2042, unlike the PR9s for which no-one wants to spend any money and which will be lucky to last beyond 2006. Meanwhile the B52s are a major capability for the projection of US strategic power abroad and cannot be replaced by Global Hawks, whereas it appears Unmanned vehicles, satellites and other reconnaissance assets could make a good stab at replacing PR9s. Similar discussion for C130s.
2) Beeayeate, FJJP and Jackonicko: "assymetric". Has this been proven? "Speculate all you like"
Hope I've not jumped the gun mentioning night asymmetrics, but the comments from the Marham staish mentioned "emergency landing techniques". Actually, it doesn't matter what any immediate cause of the accident was: if it had been a simulator, they would have walked away giggling, and as it wasn't, they died. Here is a training situation, well-known for its risk, that has caused endless heartache in the past, and here it is still causing heartache.
3) Beeayeate: blame - don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.
While you are probably right that bean-counters are a dead-weight and do have a say, they tend not to make policy. One of their airships is probably responsible for these beloved machines still being in service. One of them needs to have the courage now to come forward and acknowledge what the flight safety folk these days call the "error chain" - safety follows when ALL the little things that go to make an accident, not just the one thing a pilot did or did not do, are given attention.
This particular chain can be broken at once, guaranteeing no more loss of life in training. Perhaps a policy of: don't bring out another T4: restrict the PR9 to only those already qualified on it until it leaves service: do their asymmetric training if necessary on any 2-engine simulator. By the way, an old b737 sim is not much more different from a PR9 than was a T4: you can fly it at speeds similar enough, the engines are in percent even. And the Nav could have the day off !
4) Jackonicko : "Is it your feeling that ...this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save?"
Yessir, it is. Asymmetric training is not required to save aircrew on bang seats - it is required to save airframes, especially as here those in short supply.
5) Pirate & keithl : "calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case"
Perhaps, but unsafe was the opening message and the T4 most certainly is unsafe. It has first-generation jet engines, not resistant to FOD or birds or icing, and as keithl says, prone to surge, prone to bleed valve malfunctions, prone to not accelerate together, with hugely different thrust feel from the PR9, in a very different cockpit with very different canopy, instrumentation, different throttle and HP cocks, doing asymmetric training which has a history of being a testing manoeuvre, doing roller landings which require absolute concentration on rpms to get right - yes its unsafe to do that. Worse we knew that 30 years ago, and it is still true.
And why, oh why, do pilot training with a navigator on board, knowing the history ? What can't you do from the front that needs to be done ?
6) Pirate : "I'd fly one again tomorrow."
So would I, in my dreams. Ah, the joy of racing back into the Akrotiri circuit in a T4 for a run and break with an over-confident JP, quietly closing the HP cock during his clever tight level break while he looked out of the window, then opening it again so it all looked right but the engine was out, tee hee ... However, the Canberra does not pass the John Selwyn Gummer "British beef is fine for my daughter" test - I would not want my lad posted to 39 Sqn to fly its ancient airframes.
Sorry - prudence and a bad accident history say it is time for the Canberra to leave the front line.
1) Beeayeate & Maple 01: Why not ground the B52 ? C130 ?
Very reasonable question. An answer might be that its not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk. Boeing built 109 of the late model B52H, not just 30 like Shorts built PR9s, they still have 75 B52Hs on active service together with 10 in attrition reserve, not just the 4 PR9s, and they are not afraid to spend the money needed on simulators, major technology upgrades, and even discussing 4 billion dollars for re-engine-ing the fleet for a life extension beyond year 2025 towards 2042, unlike the PR9s for which no-one wants to spend any money and which will be lucky to last beyond 2006. Meanwhile the B52s are a major capability for the projection of US strategic power abroad and cannot be replaced by Global Hawks, whereas it appears Unmanned vehicles, satellites and other reconnaissance assets could make a good stab at replacing PR9s. Similar discussion for C130s.
2) Beeayeate, FJJP and Jackonicko: "assymetric". Has this been proven? "Speculate all you like"
Hope I've not jumped the gun mentioning night asymmetrics, but the comments from the Marham staish mentioned "emergency landing techniques". Actually, it doesn't matter what any immediate cause of the accident was: if it had been a simulator, they would have walked away giggling, and as it wasn't, they died. Here is a training situation, well-known for its risk, that has caused endless heartache in the past, and here it is still causing heartache.
3) Beeayeate: blame - don't put it on the Canberra, put it down to the bean-counters.
While you are probably right that bean-counters are a dead-weight and do have a say, they tend not to make policy. One of their airships is probably responsible for these beloved machines still being in service. One of them needs to have the courage now to come forward and acknowledge what the flight safety folk these days call the "error chain" - safety follows when ALL the little things that go to make an accident, not just the one thing a pilot did or did not do, are given attention.
This particular chain can be broken at once, guaranteeing no more loss of life in training. Perhaps a policy of: don't bring out another T4: restrict the PR9 to only those already qualified on it until it leaves service: do their asymmetric training if necessary on any 2-engine simulator. By the way, an old b737 sim is not much more different from a PR9 than was a T4: you can fly it at speeds similar enough, the engines are in percent even. And the Nav could have the day off !
4) Jackonicko : "Is it your feeling that ...this training is killing more aircrew than it can possibly save?"
Yessir, it is. Asymmetric training is not required to save aircrew on bang seats - it is required to save airframes, especially as here those in short supply.
5) Pirate & keithl : "calling the Canberra dangerous is overstating the case"
Perhaps, but unsafe was the opening message and the T4 most certainly is unsafe. It has first-generation jet engines, not resistant to FOD or birds or icing, and as keithl says, prone to surge, prone to bleed valve malfunctions, prone to not accelerate together, with hugely different thrust feel from the PR9, in a very different cockpit with very different canopy, instrumentation, different throttle and HP cocks, doing asymmetric training which has a history of being a testing manoeuvre, doing roller landings which require absolute concentration on rpms to get right - yes its unsafe to do that. Worse we knew that 30 years ago, and it is still true.
And why, oh why, do pilot training with a navigator on board, knowing the history ? What can't you do from the front that needs to be done ?
6) Pirate : "I'd fly one again tomorrow."
So would I, in my dreams. Ah, the joy of racing back into the Akrotiri circuit in a T4 for a run and break with an over-confident JP, quietly closing the HP cock during his clever tight level break while he looked out of the window, then opening it again so it all looked right but the engine was out, tee hee ... However, the Canberra does not pass the John Selwyn Gummer "British beef is fine for my daughter" test - I would not want my lad posted to 39 Sqn to fly its ancient airframes.
Sorry - prudence and a bad accident history say it is time for the Canberra to leave the front line.
Join Date: Nov 2002
Location: UK, North Riding
Posts: 31
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Canberra Safety
2LP
You must have been particularly unfortunate with the Canberra
to hold the view that it was unsafe and suffered from so many inherent maladies. I flew it for close on 1600 hours in climates from Bardufoss to Butterworth and never experienced any of the engine problems you attribute to it. Nor can I recall any of my contemporaries beefing about these things either. In contrast to some of the other types in its earlier days it was a most forgiving aeroplane which needed very unsympathetic handling to make it bite.
You must have been particularly unfortunate with the Canberra
to hold the view that it was unsafe and suffered from so many inherent maladies. I flew it for close on 1600 hours in climates from Bardufoss to Butterworth and never experienced any of the engine problems you attribute to it. Nor can I recall any of my contemporaries beefing about these things either. In contrast to some of the other types in its earlier days it was a most forgiving aeroplane which needed very unsympathetic handling to make it bite.
2LP,
I don't want to get personal. You've been there and done it, while I've only been an interested observer. That alone makes you a better man than I! But you do seem remarkably risk averse for a former steely eyed Fast Jet man. Did you do a tour with the DLO before leaving, or as a TP?
Less flippantly (and I hope less offensively) I'd ask you whether you'd agree with the following:
More of the inherently 'more dangerous' Canberra fleet flying is undertaken on the T4 (more of the take offs, landings and circuits, and more of the emergency procedures) than on the PR9. Therefore you'd expect it to have a higher accident rate. Other in service types don't have similar dedicated trainer versions, so any comparison should be between type X and the Canberra Force and not just between it and the T4.
That's not that I don't hear what you say about the suitability of the T4 to prepare blokes for and simulate the PR9 - what a pity that they didn't put T4 noses on those redundant PR7s. Presumably the resulting aircraft (and I believe it was seriously considered) would have been a much more useful trainer for the PR9. And that's not to say that I don't agree with you that there should be clever use of sims and a more considered use of what should and shouldn't be undertaken during 'live' flying. I wouldn't pretend to know enough to judge whether another T4 should be brought out of storage, though I suspect that it should, even if the decision is that the aircraft should no longer fly practise asymmetric circuits and landings, or even if the decision is that an engine failure should be followed by ejection.
But what would you say if it transpires (as I think it will) that the Cat 5 accident rate per 100,000 FH for the Canberra 4/9 is lower than for the Tornado GR4, Jaguar or Harrier, or at broadly the same level? Would you still be quite so unwilling to let your son go and fly with No.39?
You are obviously rather out of touch with what the Canberra does today, with its EO LOROP and datalinks, and clearly are unaware that the PR9 was the only UK asset specifically requested by the Spams for use in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. You say that "it's not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk." The answer is that the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are.
I think, like Pindi, that you have a disproportionate idea of how dangerous the Canberra is. My Dad flew them (almost certainly well before you were even born), and even at 81 would be first in the queue to strap one on again. Most of his generation viewed aircraft like the Meteor and Venom, the Lincoln and the Hastings as being more dangerous than the Canberra. And in recent years (the last 20, I mean) I'd wager that the accident rate was lower than it was for the Bucc or the Tornado. And while I haven't flown one or flown in one since I was a cool young UAS blade on vac attachment with No.7 Squadron, I'd happily squeeze myself through the hatch and sit on that bloody uncomfortable 'swinging' seat in a T.Mk 4 - or even on the Rumbold seat in a TT.Mk 18, while someone more current shot a few circuits.
Beeaye8,
If the Captain said 'eject, eject, eject' and the crew snatched for the handles there'd be no need to separately jettison the canopy or the nav's hatch, though they might do so (especially the latter) if there was more time available. But the view of the aircraft would be the same once it came to rest, surely? I don't think that it indicates there was much time to "evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject." I believe that many have attempted to eject asymmetric emergencies, but that most have been defeated by bank angle or rate of descent. Many aircraft seem to have come to rest 'rightway up', too, though seldom in quite such a complete and apparently 'undamaged' state. It really does look as if it was abandoned during a gear-up landing, doesn't it.
I don't want to get personal. You've been there and done it, while I've only been an interested observer. That alone makes you a better man than I! But you do seem remarkably risk averse for a former steely eyed Fast Jet man. Did you do a tour with the DLO before leaving, or as a TP?
Less flippantly (and I hope less offensively) I'd ask you whether you'd agree with the following:
More of the inherently 'more dangerous' Canberra fleet flying is undertaken on the T4 (more of the take offs, landings and circuits, and more of the emergency procedures) than on the PR9. Therefore you'd expect it to have a higher accident rate. Other in service types don't have similar dedicated trainer versions, so any comparison should be between type X and the Canberra Force and not just between it and the T4.
That's not that I don't hear what you say about the suitability of the T4 to prepare blokes for and simulate the PR9 - what a pity that they didn't put T4 noses on those redundant PR7s. Presumably the resulting aircraft (and I believe it was seriously considered) would have been a much more useful trainer for the PR9. And that's not to say that I don't agree with you that there should be clever use of sims and a more considered use of what should and shouldn't be undertaken during 'live' flying. I wouldn't pretend to know enough to judge whether another T4 should be brought out of storage, though I suspect that it should, even if the decision is that the aircraft should no longer fly practise asymmetric circuits and landings, or even if the decision is that an engine failure should be followed by ejection.
But what would you say if it transpires (as I think it will) that the Cat 5 accident rate per 100,000 FH for the Canberra 4/9 is lower than for the Tornado GR4, Jaguar or Harrier, or at broadly the same level? Would you still be quite so unwilling to let your son go and fly with No.39?
You are obviously rather out of touch with what the Canberra does today, with its EO LOROP and datalinks, and clearly are unaware that the PR9 was the only UK asset specifically requested by the Spams for use in Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. You say that "it's not just the age of the PR9s, so much as how useful they are for the lives at risk." The answer is that the damned things are of pivotal importance, and offer a unique capability. Useful they most assuredly are.
I think, like Pindi, that you have a disproportionate idea of how dangerous the Canberra is. My Dad flew them (almost certainly well before you were even born), and even at 81 would be first in the queue to strap one on again. Most of his generation viewed aircraft like the Meteor and Venom, the Lincoln and the Hastings as being more dangerous than the Canberra. And in recent years (the last 20, I mean) I'd wager that the accident rate was lower than it was for the Bucc or the Tornado. And while I haven't flown one or flown in one since I was a cool young UAS blade on vac attachment with No.7 Squadron, I'd happily squeeze myself through the hatch and sit on that bloody uncomfortable 'swinging' seat in a T.Mk 4 - or even on the Rumbold seat in a TT.Mk 18, while someone more current shot a few circuits.
Beeaye8,
If the Captain said 'eject, eject, eject' and the crew snatched for the handles there'd be no need to separately jettison the canopy or the nav's hatch, though they might do so (especially the latter) if there was more time available. But the view of the aircraft would be the same once it came to rest, surely? I don't think that it indicates there was much time to "evaluate and decide', then blow the nav's hatch, canopy and then eject." I believe that many have attempted to eject asymmetric emergencies, but that most have been defeated by bank angle or rate of descent. Many aircraft seem to have come to rest 'rightway up', too, though seldom in quite such a complete and apparently 'undamaged' state. It really does look as if it was abandoned during a gear-up landing, doesn't it.
Join Date: Aug 1999
Location: U.K
Posts: 78
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
OK boys.....
Being neither an experienced Canberra pilot or indeed an RAF pilot, can i respectfully suggest a few days silence on the possible causes of this rather unfortunate accident.
Relatives and friends of the deceased can and do read these forums, and being one of the latter, I would rather read the findings of informed and qualified investigators, no matter how long it should take.
Thankyou in advance
Being neither an experienced Canberra pilot or indeed an RAF pilot, can i respectfully suggest a few days silence on the possible causes of this rather unfortunate accident.
Relatives and friends of the deceased can and do read these forums, and being one of the latter, I would rather read the findings of informed and qualified investigators, no matter how long it should take.
Thankyou in advance