Defence: Public ignorance, the media, and cutbacks
WEBF
A useful document to red [sic] that Read [sic] Teaming!
1. Have you seen the original edition (i.e. Edition 1) that pre-dates the SDSR? A lot of this strategic 'guff' doesn't actually change much when it is re-issued. It could be the only changes from the First to the Second edition are editorial (i.e to reflect the new Director Concepts and Doctrine) or a higher level reference (perhaps a NATO doctrine document) has been updated requiring all the subordinate documents to be similarly updated.
2. Regardless of point 1 above the use of the term "such as" suggests that Red Teaming was used for other policy works but they weren't all listed. For instance I saw no mention of FAS 2020, the redundancy programme or indeed the RAF Future Basing Study. Doesn't mean they weren't 'red teamed' though.
I do applaud you (
) however, for your good use of links to threads that have fallen off the front page of this board.
A Guide To Read Teaming
1. Have you seen the original edition (i.e. Edition 1) that pre-dates the SDSR? A lot of this strategic 'guff' doesn't actually change much when it is re-issued. It could be the only changes from the First to the Second edition are editorial (i.e to reflect the new Director Concepts and Doctrine) or a higher level reference (perhaps a NATO doctrine document) has been updated requiring all the subordinate documents to be similarly updated.
2. Regardless of point 1 above the use of the term "such as" suggests that Red Teaming was used for other policy works but they weren't all listed. For instance I saw no mention of FAS 2020, the redundancy programme or indeed the RAF Future Basing Study. Doesn't mean they weren't 'red teamed' though.
I do applaud you (
) however, for your good use of links to threads that have fallen off the front page of this board.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"forcing the Navy, Army and Royal Air Force to the margins of national experience."
which was the case for much of British history - and that's how the average man-in -the-street likes it - no wars, no large armed forces, no draftwith the military as a place for those who want to be there (or, in past times, a place who have no alternative)
The novels of Ms Austen, Mr Trollope & Mr Dickens contain many interesting characters but the military (as opposed to the Militia) are rarely seen or referred to
which was the case for much of British history - and that's how the average man-in -the-street likes it - no wars, no large armed forces, no draftwith the military as a place for those who want to be there (or, in past times, a place who have no alternative)
The novels of Ms Austen, Mr Trollope & Mr Dickens contain many interesting characters but the military (as opposed to the Militia) are rarely seen or referred to
Thread Starter
Originally Posted by Wrathmonk
I do applaud you () however, for your good use of links to threads that have fallen off the front page of this board.
Those threads have had lots of views over months (not so much over the last couple of months though), despite having no links directing people towards them, and being far from page one. If the issues are of interest, people will read about them.
By the way: Good spot with respect to "read teaming".
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 20th Jul 2013 at 10:16.
Red Teaming
The changes to the latest Red Team Guide are quite a bit more in-depth than just editorial.
The problem with Red-Teaming (concept testing) documents is that you can find them truly awful and report back as such, but there is no way of forcing those changes on the authors. Indeed, the worst solution is if they don't listen, publish the original twaddle and then peddle it as having been 'DCDC cleared'.
The problem with Red-Teaming (concept testing) documents is that you can find them truly awful and report back as such, but there is no way of forcing those changes on the authors. Indeed, the worst solution is if they don't listen, publish the original twaddle and then peddle it as having been 'DCDC cleared'.
Thread Starter
When I mentioned ill thought through policy decisions, I was mostly thinking of the last minute rewriting of SDSR for political reasons.
Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Now that the departure of British forces from Afghanistan is approaching, and the Arab Spring is causing all sorts of crises, SDSR certainly appears that it was on the wrong side of history. It certainly does appear that Britain will need to have a presence in the Middle East for the forseeable future.
The New East of Suez Question: Damage Limitation after Failure Over Syria
Have the media pundits like Max Hastings, ever keen to describe RN or RAF assets as redundant (on the basis that all future conflicts will be land centric), managed to learn anything from events since 2010?
Will the successful deployment of the Typhoon during over Libya prove that it is a capable combat aircraft, which deployments to the Gulf make those who suggest that the UK does not need proper combat aircraft wind their necks in? We do seem to have gone back to facing potential adversaries who do have air forces and air defences?
Does the participation of shipborne aircraft in Libya operations prove how short sighted SDSR was?
Has successful deployment of the Type 45 Destroyers to the Middle East been noted by those who claimed it was a white elephant that would never be used? They have done deployments to the Gulf in their intended role, contributing to the capabilities of coalition naval forces, controlling aircraft flying missions into Afghanistan, or exercising to protect a carrier group, merchant shipping, or a mines countermeasures force against air/missile attack?
It would be easy to go on. Apart from my oft repeated point that SDSR got it wrong, the idea that the maritime and air domains will never be contested is incredibly dangerous. Yet many of the public, and politicians who should know better, swallow this line. Why?
Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD's plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
So, at the same time as signalling he'd like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD's room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn't feel a certain frustration here.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn't want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what's possible and what's not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
So, at the same time as signalling he'd like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD's room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn't feel a certain frustration here.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn't want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what's possible and what's not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
The New East of Suez Question: Damage Limitation after Failure Over Syria
The events of the last month have reinforced the fact, as if it needed any reinforcement, that the UK has neither the appetite nor the capacity to get meaningfully involved in the Syria crisis. A year or more ago a major military/diplomatic initiative might have had a beneficial effect, and in another year or two the conditions may be right for such an initiative to help close some sort of peace deal. But for now, the suffering will go on while the Western powers have little more to offer than a prayer for the weak and a cheer for the brave.
The international community cannot address the centre of the crisis – a deeply sectarian civil war in which the political choice is between many sets of bad guys who control the fate of the victims. But the war is destabilising the region. The Levant could go into a meltdown that would see political collapse in Lebanon and Iraq, whatever happens in Syria, immense pressure on Jordan and Israel, and a not-so-proxy war throughout the region between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.
In response to these prospects, the Western powers are being drawn into much greater involvement at the periphery of the crisis. As with the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, if the time is not propitious for an imposed peace, at least the external powers could act to contain the conflict and limit its political fallout. That is no comfort to the victims of a vicious civil war, but neither is it a dishonourable political strategy.
The international community cannot address the centre of the crisis – a deeply sectarian civil war in which the political choice is between many sets of bad guys who control the fate of the victims. But the war is destabilising the region. The Levant could go into a meltdown that would see political collapse in Lebanon and Iraq, whatever happens in Syria, immense pressure on Jordan and Israel, and a not-so-proxy war throughout the region between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.
In response to these prospects, the Western powers are being drawn into much greater involvement at the periphery of the crisis. As with the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, if the time is not propitious for an imposed peace, at least the external powers could act to contain the conflict and limit its political fallout. That is no comfort to the victims of a vicious civil war, but neither is it a dishonourable political strategy.
Will the successful deployment of the Typhoon during over Libya prove that it is a capable combat aircraft, which deployments to the Gulf make those who suggest that the UK does not need proper combat aircraft wind their necks in? We do seem to have gone back to facing potential adversaries who do have air forces and air defences?
Does the participation of shipborne aircraft in Libya operations prove how short sighted SDSR was?
Has successful deployment of the Type 45 Destroyers to the Middle East been noted by those who claimed it was a white elephant that would never be used? They have done deployments to the Gulf in their intended role, contributing to the capabilities of coalition naval forces, controlling aircraft flying missions into Afghanistan, or exercising to protect a carrier group, merchant shipping, or a mines countermeasures force against air/missile attack?
It would be easy to go on. Apart from my oft repeated point that SDSR got it wrong, the idea that the maritime and air domains will never be contested is incredibly dangerous. Yet many of the public, and politicians who should know better, swallow this line. Why?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 23rd Sep 2013 at 06:03.
Yet many of the public, and politicians who should know better, swallow this line. Why?
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Has successful deployment of the Type 45 Destroyers to the Middle East been noted by those who claimed it was a white elephant that would never be used? They have done deployments to the Gulf in their intended role, contributing to the capabilities of coalition naval forces, controlling aircraft flying missions into Afghanistan, or exercising to protect a carrier group, merchant shipping, or a mines countermeasures force against air/missile attack?"
I don't think many people thought they'd never be used - it's just that something half the cost might mean twice as many with much of the capability - as ever we spend 50% of the cost to get that 10% extra capability which is rarely needed
I don't think many people thought they'd never be used - it's just that something half the cost might mean twice as many with much of the capability - as ever we spend 50% of the cost to get that 10% extra capability which is rarely needed
Thread Starter
I don't think many people thought they'd never be used - it's just that something half the cost might mean twice as many with much of the capability - as ever we spend 50% of the cost to get that 10% extra capability which is rarely needed
Likewise some seem to think that instead of Typhoon, we could have a cheaper aircraft with is slower, less agile, and has little or no air to air capability.....
The next conflict will be unlike Afghanistan, so our forces need to be able to survive in an environment where there are credible air or maritime threats.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 27th Sep 2013 at 09:12.
Join Date: Apr 2011
Location: Torquay, England
Posts: 838
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Sacrifices were made by the Royal Navy to allow the purchase of these carriers, the numbers of destroyers was decimated and are we now seeing RFA's carrying out the role that we expect of a warship?
click
click
Glojo - thanks for the link.
Just one thing...look at the link - at the bottom of the page and there is a picture of a suspect being arrested, in the presence of RN personnel. Non look at his feet. 6 toes.
Are the RN now patrolling The Wash?
Just one thing...look at the link - at the bottom of the page and there is a picture of a suspect being arrested, in the presence of RN personnel. Non look at his feet. 6 toes.
Are the RN now patrolling The Wash?
Originally Posted by glojo
Sacrifices were made by the Royal Navy to allow the purchase of these carriers, the numbers of destroyers was decimated and are we now seeing RFAs carrying out the role that we expect of a warship?
click
click
Last edited by FODPlod; 26th Sep 2013 at 17:21.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TBH we don't need a 23 or a 45 to chase pirates - any ship that can carry an armed helicopter and a couple of dozen marines will do nicely
There has been some talk that the RN should be looking at some Danish "Absalon" -type vessels for this sort of work
Absalon-class support ship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
There has been some talk that the RN should be looking at some Danish "Absalon" -type vessels for this sort of work
Absalon-class support ship - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Thread Starter
Originally Posted by Heathrow Harry
TBH we don't need a 23 or a 45 to chase pirates - any ship that can carry an armed helicopter and a couple of dozen marines will do nicely
The T23 or T45 is for Operation Kipion, the ongoing commitment in that part of the world. Counter piracy is a sideshow. See this part of a discussion here.
We are doing anti-piracy in the Gulf area as an adjunct to the Op Kipion mission, rather than a dedicated tasking. The reason we're using "the £1Bn pound destroyer" that CDS is so upset about, is because that destroyer (or the T23 that is often on Kipion) needs to go into the Persian Gulf and contribute capability if it all kicks off there. Something that your corvette / sloop would be largely incapable of.
Unfortunately, the media chooses to describe East of Suez deployments as counter piracy. Portraying counter piracy as the RN's major role is similar to the school of though that suggests that as the Taliban has no air force, we should bin the Typhoon in favour of a cheaper aircraft without speed, agility, air to air capability, and complex avionics.
Another interesting discussion :
Similarly, "taking hits" isn't a good metric: the A-10 has the radar cross-section of a Routemaster bus covered in corner reflectors, a low top speed and very little excess power (especially in hot and high conditions like Afghanistan) which mean it is easily spotted, easily shot at, is a bugger to defend with ECM, and runs out of energy very quickly while trying to take evasive action. It's resistant to small-arms fire and light AAA, but any teen-series MANPADS will drive it up to 15,000' AGL if it wants to live. It's a specialist COIN airframe, and (once it gained better sensors) quite good at it, but it's dead meat against any sort of air defences.
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 27th Sep 2013 at 08:42.
Join Date: Apr 2010
Location: London
Posts: 7,072
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
what they are DOING is anti-piracy - hence the discussion about using RFA's
A single 23 or 45 isn't going to be able to do much to help invade Iran and the Iranian navy has very very limited capability anyway
A single 23 or 45 isn't going to be able to do much to help invade Iran and the Iranian navy has very very limited capability anyway
HH,
Utter bolleaux. They have some of the best DE SSK's in the world and a force of midget submarines armed with very capable torpedoes. Add to that the numbers of FAC/FIAC they are capable of launching and they pose a huge threat to coalition ships in the area, made even worse by not feeling shy about using them.
Have a look in the latest version of Jane's.
Iranian navy has very very limited capability anyway
Have a look in the latest version of Jane's.
Last edited by Party Animal; 27th Sep 2013 at 10:17.
Originally Posted by heathrow harry
what they are DOING is anti-piracy - hence the discussion about using RFA's
A single 23 or 45 isn't going to be able to do much to help invade Iran and the Iranian navy has very very limited capability anyway
A single 23 or 45 isn't going to be able to do much to help invade Iran and the Iranian navy has very very limited capability anyway
(P.S. Just between you and me, they're not there solely to help invade Iran. However, their stabilising presence is still valued by most states in the region. Trust me, I've been there a few times.)
PA
Calm down; it's Friday. HH is reknowned for throwing in statements purporting to be "facts", when he obviously doesn't really know what he's talking about. 
Utter bolleaux.
On the "we need lower spec vessels for anti piracy" argument, 1SL nailed his colours fairly firmly to the mast in a RUSI speech on 9 Sept:
"A frigate or destroyer can be involved in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. And it can then switch quickly from this maritime security role, to a high-end role in the choke points of the Gulf, working in very close proximity and partnership with our very many regional allies.
But to benefit from this choice, this ability to switch from low to high end performance, you need to maintain high-end capability, not just in the equipment, but in the practise, and indeed in the mind of the crews. And so a corvette designed for policing duties doesn't just fail this basic test of contingent flexibility.
The crews themselves are in a different mindset. Both Contingency and Sea Choice evaporate.
In the Royal Navy, we cross-connect the use of the entire frigate and destroyer force - and we have to, because of numbers - and to maximise output. In doing so, we move seamlessly from training on operations, to operations. We move from a high end role, to a simpler mission, and back again. And, at all times, high end training is necessary, on the right equipment, to be ready.
We allocate ships to more than one task, by double and triple counting - because we have to. And we work the crews very hard to make this 'ship chemistry' work.
That is why, set against today's tasks, and the sensible demands for contingent choice, we absolutely depend upon having highly capable units.
The real efficiency of highly capable assets is that they can go in harm’s way, and conduct the core of high end tasks, with an appropriate Force Generation cycle in support. This ensures credible, truly versatile and premier league capability."
He has a point. If you're fortunate enough not to be engaged in a hot war but are doing peacetime constabulory stuff, do you equip yourself for that peacetime task or to be prepared for whatever major challenge may emerge next from left of field? A high end unit can always reach down but a low end unit can't reach up.
"A frigate or destroyer can be involved in counter-piracy operations in the Indian Ocean. And it can then switch quickly from this maritime security role, to a high-end role in the choke points of the Gulf, working in very close proximity and partnership with our very many regional allies.
But to benefit from this choice, this ability to switch from low to high end performance, you need to maintain high-end capability, not just in the equipment, but in the practise, and indeed in the mind of the crews. And so a corvette designed for policing duties doesn't just fail this basic test of contingent flexibility.
The crews themselves are in a different mindset. Both Contingency and Sea Choice evaporate.
In the Royal Navy, we cross-connect the use of the entire frigate and destroyer force - and we have to, because of numbers - and to maximise output. In doing so, we move seamlessly from training on operations, to operations. We move from a high end role, to a simpler mission, and back again. And, at all times, high end training is necessary, on the right equipment, to be ready.
We allocate ships to more than one task, by double and triple counting - because we have to. And we work the crews very hard to make this 'ship chemistry' work.
That is why, set against today's tasks, and the sensible demands for contingent choice, we absolutely depend upon having highly capable units.
The real efficiency of highly capable assets is that they can go in harm’s way, and conduct the core of high end tasks, with an appropriate Force Generation cycle in support. This ensures credible, truly versatile and premier league capability."
He has a point. If you're fortunate enough not to be engaged in a hot war but are doing peacetime constabulory stuff, do you equip yourself for that peacetime task or to be prepared for whatever major challenge may emerge next from left of field? A high end unit can always reach down but a low end unit can't reach up.
Thread Starter
Originally Posted by Heathrow Harry
what they are DOING is anti-piracy - hence the discussion about using RFA's...
Working with shore and carrier based aircraft and providing fighter control
Protecting a force of MCMVs
Exercising with Kuwaiti forces
International Mine Countermeasures Exercise
As well as minehunting and keeping sea lines open, a key strand of the two-week-long exercise is the general protection of infrastructure such as ports and the many oil rigs and platforms which pepper the waters of the Gulf, plus the safe passage of a convoy.
For the latter, naval vessels – including new destroyer, HMS Dragon, the UK’s sixth and final IMCMEX participant – and a large natural gas tanker are travelling in convoy through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the oceans’ great choke points, led by mine countermeasures ships.
Thirty per cent of the world’s sea-borne oil – 17 million barrels of oil a day – are shipped through Hormuz, while 90 per cent of the UK’s natural gas comes from the Gulf.
“Understanding how to escort merchant ships through the Strait of Hormuz is a complicated evolution,”
Originally Posted by Frostchamber
He has a point. If you're fortunate enough not to be engaged in a hot war but are doing peacetime constabulory stuff, do you equip yourself for that peacetime task or to be prepared for whatever major challenge may emerge next from left of field? A high end unit can always reach down but a low end unit can't reach up.
Remember the lobby that proposed that instead of using Harrier/Tornado/etc for CAS in Afghanistan, we should replace them with armed Tucanos? Surely it is obvious that a slower aircraft is moe vulnerable to ground fire, has a longer transit time, and just how many Hellfires can a Tucano carry?
So you would have a less survivable aircraft, that takes longer to perform the task, has a smaller weapon load, and had to be developed specifically for that role. In anything other than a low threat environment, they would be dead meat.
The pundits always mention the use of the Skyraider in Vietnam, yet they seem to ignore that its lack of speed made it very vulnerable to gunfire, so the Americans stpped using it over North Vietnam. An invonvenient lesson from history?
Continuing on the aviation theme, there are naturally PPRuNe threads about the retirement of the VC10 and the upcoming retirement of the C130K. Are the replacement aircraft ready yet? Last time I looked Voyager was not ready to perform the tanker role, and A400M is where exactly?
Last edited by WE Branch Fanatic; 28th Sep 2013 at 12:30.
WEBF
Re Voyager, as at the end of July 6 had been delivered and they were cleared to refuel both Tornado and (under a temporary emergency clearance) Typhoon. Full clearance for Typhoon was expected shortly. Tristar remains in service until April 14 (one has now replaced the VC10 that was in the Falklands) and I understand a short term extension of the Tristar OSD hasn't been ruled out. Others may have more up to date info. Full Voyager capability with a core of 9 aircraft is due to be declared in May 14.
Re Voyager, as at the end of July 6 had been delivered and they were cleared to refuel both Tornado and (under a temporary emergency clearance) Typhoon. Full clearance for Typhoon was expected shortly. Tristar remains in service until April 14 (one has now replaced the VC10 that was in the Falklands) and I understand a short term extension of the Tristar OSD hasn't been ruled out. Others may have more up to date info. Full Voyager capability with a core of 9 aircraft is due to be declared in May 14.