When I mentioned ill thought through policy decisions, I was mostly thinking of the last minute rewriting of SDSR for political reasons.
Rethinking defence cuts: the more things change, the more they stay the same…
Largely shielded from cuts in the SDSR, surely the Army could lose a few more thousand posts to free up some cash for the RAF and Navy? For much of the SDSR process, that was the MoD's plan, but the Army cuts were scaled back by the PM.
That last-minute decision skewed the rest of the review and its outcomes, with negative consequences for the other services that are still becoming clear. Awareness of that problem is spreading across Whitehall.
Indeed, the annoyingly well-informed Alex Barker of the FT reports today that even the generals now accept that argument. But Mr Cameron, wary of more bad headlines about sacking Our Boys while they fight in Afghanistan, has said No.
So, at the same time as signalling he'd like to soften the defence cuts, the PM is limiting the MoD's room for manoeuvre on the issue. Liam Fox and his friends would not be human if they didn't feel a certain frustration here.
So, to summarize, we have a Downing Street machine that wants to avoid bad headlines on defence but is squeamish about radical alternatives, a Treasury that doesn't want to give an inch, and an MoD that feels that neither of them really understand the real state of defence and what's possible and what's not. The result is last-minute compromise deals that mean short-term delays in spending, clever accounting wheezes to understate liabilities, and pressure for politically-expedient climbdowns on cuts — all of which can only increase long-term costs.
Now that the departure of British forces from Afghanistan is approaching, and the Arab Spring is causing all sorts of crises, SDSR certainly appears that it was on the wrong side of history. It certainly does appear that Britain will need to have a presence in the Middle East for the forseeable future.
The New East of Suez Question: Damage Limitation after Failure Over Syria
The events of the last month have reinforced the fact, as if it needed any reinforcement, that the UK has neither the appetite nor the capacity to get meaningfully involved in the Syria crisis. A year or more ago a major military/diplomatic initiative might have had a beneficial effect, and in another year or two the conditions may be right for such an initiative to help close some sort of peace deal. But for now, the suffering will go on while the Western powers have little more to offer than a prayer for the weak and a cheer for the brave.
The international community cannot address the centre of the crisis – a deeply sectarian civil war in which the political choice is between many sets of bad guys who control the fate of the victims. But the war is destabilising the region. The Levant could go into a meltdown that would see political collapse in Lebanon and Iraq, whatever happens in Syria, immense pressure on Jordan and Israel, and a not-so-proxy war throughout the region between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia.
In response to these prospects, the Western powers are being drawn into much greater involvement at the periphery of the crisis. As with the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, if the time is not propitious for an imposed peace, at least the external powers could act to contain the conflict and limit its political fallout. That is no comfort to the victims of a vicious civil war, but neither is it a dishonourable political strategy.
Have the media pundits like Max Hastings, ever keen to describe RN or RAF assets as redundant (on the basis that all future conflicts will be land centric), managed to learn anything from events since 2010?
Will the successful deployment of the Typhoon during over Libya prove that it is a capable combat aircraft, which deployments to the Gulf make those who suggest that the UK does not need proper combat aircraft wind their necks in? We do seem to have gone back to facing potential adversaries who do have air forces and air defences?
Does the participation of shipborne aircraft in Libya operations prove how short sighted SDSR was?
Has successful deployment of the Type 45 Destroyers to the Middle East been noted by those who claimed it was a white elephant that would never be used? They have done deployments to the Gulf in their intended role, contributing to the capabilities of coalition naval forces, controlling aircraft flying missions into Afghanistan, or exercising to protect a carrier group, merchant shipping, or a mines countermeasures force against air/missile attack?
It would be easy to go on. Apart from my oft repeated point that SDSR got it wrong, the idea that the maritime and air domains will never be contested is incredibly dangerous. Yet many of the public, and politicians who should know better, swallow this line. Why?