Having not posted here for a while, one of the answers is...remove the fear factor. And allow Pilots to use common sense. But I no longer think that is possible in certain airlines. And while this continues, things won't get better. Does anyone think that the crew in this latest incident will be treated with a 'just culture'?

Great to see you SOPs, I'd have to concur with Don, Wiz et al regarding airmanship etc, it's part of the wider issue that can be traced back in part to the explosive growth of European locos and their cadet programmes. Far different to the old legacy programmes where cadets were taught on the job by experienced and capable trainers. Nowadays cadet programmes are still able to produce a standard product but they are flawed in the sense that a large number of second and third generation of airline pilots have no real world experience beyond a set of SOPs and operating manuals, throw into the mix that many of the trainers are mere facsimiles themselves of those cadet programmes and you have more potential for significant gaps in knowledge and the ability to show resilience.
Recently I asked a chap I was flying with if he would consider landing with no autobrake selected, he told me it was "outside SOPs" so he wouldn't consider it unless it was an emergency, I asked him about disconnecting the AP above 10k if it wasn't doing what you wanted it to do, again "outside of SOPs" so only in an emergency, I asked him how did he plan his descent, "VNAV" does it for me.
At every turn his answer was that automation and SOPs would solve his problems for him as well as protect him from fleet etc.
For me that is ostensibly the result of the policies and blame mindset that currently exists, it's also why people don't move thrust levers, why they don't anticipate and identify small problems before they become bigger ones and it's why people make preventable mistakes as they have neither the capacity or skills to have a plan B..C..or even D sometimes stored away for when the proverbial hits the fan.
In the case of what's currently happening, based on the available information the Air Seychelles crew displayed far more resilience than the EK crew.

Looking out the front and turning to avoid a collision is now "resilience"...?

Hallelujah! At last a sensible post on this forum. How many times were clues passed by ATC, and ignored by EK crew. Airmanship, what airmanship...

We have a large problem here at EK and that is a lack of maturity in terms of age and experience in both seats.
My remarks are not directed at this crew but the situation in general.
On the boeing side of the house it is rare to see a cpt with a seniority number of less than 400 and not an uncommon sight to see cpts with 410+ seniority numbers.

I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.

Lots of talk about lack of SA, but... SA depends on your perception.

If you haven't picked up the error, your perception is that you have the correct information and your SA is based on that.

Yes, we'd like to think we'd all have picked up the incorrect read back or the opposite traffic clearance. But, no one here was there to know what was happening, what other threats were there.

Oh, to be as perfect as some here!

There does appear at times to be an air of overconfidence among some of our peer group. I know more than I could safely write about certain pilot personalities, let's just say that some feel more elevated and superior than others and aren't afraid to tell you so, despite their own failings.

It's not only a question about slipping standards but also the requirement for pilots to occupy cockpit seats no matter how inexperienced (globally) they may be. As has been said before, you can't buy junior pilots experience, neither in a cockpit seat or in life {maturity}, you can only earn them over time. In today's fast growing airlines, it really is not Safety > Commercial > Training, but is more like Commercial > Safety/Training.

What's seen as important? Get the job done, earn the revenue, recruit whoever is required to achieve the revenue. Sadly, aviation in the cockpit is far too much of the office flying the flight deck and too many decade only experienced pilots thinking that they deserve the Big Jet L/R seats because for them, it's all about me, myself and I.

Sad to say and again I stick my neck out on the block. People are asking how this should be rectified and a good start will be to slow down the loss of experience in certain airlines that are suffering experience shortages. It's not that experience is everything but there is value that can be passed down and those values appear to be disappearing faster year on year.


J

Mac - we can only aspire.

What's disturbing is the assumption from the arm chair brigade above - that what we heard on YouTube is what was picked up by the Flt deck comm system on that 380 - even though no one here is privy to that CVR - or that they lacked airmanship & should have maneuvered without visual contact on a TA. Who knows whether they saw traffic? Air Sez maneuvered on a TA because they had visual (repeatedly stated in recording) and is part of the maneuver "if needed"

But the EK crew lacked airmanship from the posters above because...the said posters above - knew what that crew saw and heard that day!?

Look, the point is - they may well have FUBAR'd it completely & the Air Sez guys were spot on.

No one knows yet - so why not give our colleagues a little slack - because if it is their bad - they won't get much from the third floor who will hopefully gather ALL the facts before sentencing.

Accepted reaction to near collision and TCAS approved procedures - Learning w this ev
 

http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/ACAS_Bulletin_-_EUROCONTROL

Referring to the above several bulletins, it is not recommended to innitiate any avoidance maneuver based on visual or TA only information.
More is said about not trying to avoid a traffic by turning (horizontal avoidance)

Other more basic regulations are clear about avoiding a colision by turning to the R.

Based on one regulation, or it may be correct to say, recommendation, the R turn in this event, was incorrect. Based on the other, it was necessary and correct.

So I ask you.....what is correct, if this happened in Europe, and Eurocontrol ACAS recommended procedures not followed, the pilot who turned R would be penalized?

And that in of itself is part of the problem, one size does not fit all, what is a practical and sensible procedure in hi density airspace is rather cumbersome and overly prescriptive in sparsely populated airspace where you might be lucky to see any other aircraft.
Quite frankly this kind of incident happens on a fairly regular basis in various parts of Africa and IMHO you would be an ass to wait until you got an RA before initiating any avoiding or mitigating action.....and yet there are many many flying around that would happily hang their hat on the eurocontrol guidance purely because it's written down and quantifiable, rather than being this nefarious and outright dangerous concept of airmanship.
It's the same kind of mindset that makes some happier to penertrate convective weather as they wait for a clearance rather than exercising sound judgement by avoiding the weather and filling out a bit of paperwork afterwards.
I know it's a bit of a drift from they subject matter here, but it's all part of the larger picture.

[QUOTE=
I see pilots sitting with their legs crossed and seat back in cruise and thus blocking the controls in the event of a TCAS RA or having a good chat with the FG1 on the jumpseat as I return from a bathroom break.[/QUOTE]

Totally agree, so it also happens in EK.... it happens to me with most FOs, they start a chat with the cabin crew, and some without the headset (NOP if alone). I often see them turning back facing the jumpseat when I return.

ricfly744

Yes, similar experience on return from crew rest. I asked the F/O if he sat in the simulator the same way (sideways). My final comment was a reminder "the passengers sit in the back, alluding that he should consider which position he should occupy.

CK

A very wise training captain once told me in EK if you need to go to the bathroom, then take the F/O with you as he will do less damage than if you leave him there!

Looks like mandatory headsets and Chinese lessons all round as operation knee jerk commences.

That's a good one, I was thinking the same a few times!!!!!
Have to agree the amount of stupitidy whether intentional or not that one can observe here sometimes makes me speechless.
And what those idiots are good at is complaining, complaining complaining ....

This incident is now front page news Daily Telegraph UK.
A bad pr week for EK and the UAE in general. WaPo article receiving additional verification.

Appears in front page news in quite a few papers abroad now...in fact the Seychelles crew are been celebrated for taking avoiding action.

Perhaps they will awaken on the top floors



...or they'll sack a few pilots because they were to blame and continue as before...

Yes. That's right Wizzy Wee!

The Torygraph are running it right next to this article. The effing irony!

Everything that happens to your body when you don't get enough sleep

We know what has happened from the media and AVHerald. Now it's time for the transparency test over the next week!

J

None of you sky gods have any idea what actually happened. You think the media has the whole and accurate picture? You don't know what could be heard on any frequency by any of the people involved or what was going on in either flight deck or in the ATC office. Why is it so easy for some of you to sit back and judge someone else after the fact despite not really knowing any of the details or facts? Shouldn't we all just wait to see what comes out of this at the end and learn something in the process.

Good grief Mos...

How much evidence do you need? The recording is enough. ATC cleared him to FL 380, he read back FL 360. MISTAKE #1

ATC did not challenge mistake #1...which brings us to MISTAKE #2.

There is tons of evidence where proper RT and radio discipline is paramount...think Tenerife.

Right, wrong or otherwise this is a subject VERY worth of discussion even on this site. If it changes just one pilot's radio discipline for the better then mission accomplished.


We are in a business that learns from the mistakes of others...sadly, sometimes that comes with a death toll. Anything we as pilots can do to learn without the loss of life or equipment is not only a benefit, but its our responsibility.

This was a FUK up... as professionals, lets do our best to ensure it doesn't happen again.

Sounds like a failing at poor English skills - a language related miscommunication?

I would say that it's poor listening "actively" skills and not properly processing/understanding/questioning what's being said is more likely the issue here.

I am led to understand that the pilots both possess their "own" versions of the English language, shouldn't be a factor in this case though.

J

Really? Is the other guy supposed to sit with hands on controls staring out the window telling the crew not to speak while over the ocean on CPDLC? Are you one of these guys who reads FMAs and states that the autopilot is engaged as part of his 'I'm going to the ****ter' brief?
Guessing your 'Perth' related name explains it

Outlaw,

My point is that any recording doesn't tell us what they actually heard in the flight deck. How readable was it? None of us know. What I do know from personal experience is that ATC quality southbound after Muscat is sketchy at best. Does 466601 ring a bell? I've been on frequency with another aircraft that couldn't hear ATC at all even though it was perfectly clear to me. Does that mean the other pilot lacked SA or basic airmanship? I think not. None of us know what they were able to hear. The recording is of the transmission, not the reception. That's my point. So let's stop pointing fingers like we have any idea what really happened to lead to this series of ultimately non events.

Mos
Having gone from front to back of this thread there's been very little in the way of finger pointing, and much more in the way of soul searching along the lines of "how could this have happened?"
I don't get your defensiveness, regardless of the circumstances we, yes we bear ultimate responsibility for our crew, our passengers and for 99% of the time our outcomes.
MRU along with half a hundred other 3rd world "destinations" are high threat environments, even on your worst day I'd expect and demand the best from my colleague regarding their SA and anticipation skills. TBH I thought, given the nature of this that it was a training flight or something similar, but it appears that it wasn't.
To summarise my thoughts I'll leave you with this thought, would the crew have been in the same frame of mind going into Lagos or perhaps Addis? for me personally, I'd like to think so, but based on the outcome, I'm far from sure.

Classic swiss cheese with thankfully the final holes not aligned. I am sure in time honoured EK fashion the sole blame will be attached to the crew but there are other factors not least some seriously poor ATC. I am sure a reflection on EK crew fight hours and associated fatigue will not be part of the 'wash up'. Who hasn't made an error while seriously tired or fatigued? I have been in a similar type situation in the past due ATC cock up and ourselves and the intruding and opposite aircraft manoeuvred to avoid even with vertical separation. I didn't think then nor now that it was particularly heroic, just common sense.

He may not be, what you say, like me, he is just a professional captain, that when leaving the FD, delegates full control, communications and flight management to the FO, and in respect to him, the FO must act professionally.
When you are the PIC, do whatever you want, sit sideways facing back the cabin crew and talk to them as much as you wish, you may even leave your seat and do more...but if not.....respect the one who is responsible and trusted you the airplane and all onboard.

And my name is Marques.....by the way!

Sadly that's pretty much standard for expats at non-union third world airlines. :(

The controller knows this and tries to get SEY054 to not report the incident.

Language skills seem fine to me. It's normal to have several accents with international crews and destinations. However, as others have pointed out, we don't know if Emirates could hear the controller very well, he asked to have a couple of transmissions repeated.

The comment was made by perthbound that there was something wrong with returning to the flight deck and finding the FO 'having a good chat' with the FG1. I'm not sure what is wrong with this WHEN APPROPRIATE, especially in certain locations like oceanic. On the way to Perth I would most certainly not see the point in wearing a headset when you aren't talking to anyone and can easily have a chat with the crew. But in busy Europe, I have always worn a headset personally when it gets busy with both crew in the flight deck before they had to spoon feed us about lost comms. Likewise I prefer to face someone when I talk to them and can somehow manage to do that without removing myself from the seat and still being able to use the rudder pedals and am shockingly still able to be "trusted with all onboard" - even while wearing pyjamas, which I'm sure you'd also find shocking.
The guys going to MRU should have had major alarm bells ringing in a non radar environment with traffic cleared through your level. That isn't a time I'd be having a good chat with the FG1.. all common sense, something that seems to be totally lacking in EK.
Instead we have guys briefing that the autopilot is engaged before the go to the bathroom and briefing the runway width, PAPI angles into Dubai believing they are being safer/professional when in reality the other person is rolling their eyes and/or fast asleep.

Outlaw

We don't seem to agree on much these days but I do agree with your recent comments. There is a growing apathetic and complacent culture growing among our colleagues, however, I do not hold the Company entirely responsible. Huge strides have been made through recurrent classroom training and in the simulator to reinforce airmanship, big picture and basic professional standards. We have moved a long way forward from 7-10 years ago. Unfortunately, with the improvement in training has come a commensurate reduction in experience along with a general culture of relaxed indifference. Generational? Maybe, although I have flown with some super new guys who are very switched on. Unfortunately, the variation of standards is definitely growing.

Obsessive use of phones throughout all aspects of the flight, from briefing to hotel reception, spending all ULR flights in pyjamas, paperwork in climb, non standard R/T, not wearing uniform correctly, poor PA's. The list could go on. While some may see this as the ramblings of a typical grumpy old fart, I see it as an insidious decline in professional attitude. It is incumbent on all of us to maintain those standards and reinforce it to those intent on intentionally or unintentionally ignoring them.

It does not mean having to promote a dour and autocratic environment, far from it. It's for us to create and promote a relaxed yet professional work ethos that maintains minimum standards. That tone is set at the briefing and should continue throughout the flight. This airline has never been one to promote feedback yet this is the only way we can improve or be made aware of the things that we do wrong. It's also a way to reinforce the good we observe, not just the negative. It does take effort, and requires motivated and knowledgable crew to do so. 99% of the guys finish with a 'thank you' and hand shake regardless of the flights events. That's not enough.

If people are never told, they'll never learn. To achieve the goal of reaching and maintaining the high standards we strive for, surely we must all play a role in its facilitation.

Harry

Had a quick scan of this thread, just wondering if the guys had headsets on on not, bearing in mind how quiet the Dugong's flight deck is compared to the Tractor?
Not having dig, however, it may be a factor in mishearing or missing RT calls.

[QUOTE=speedbirdhopeful1;9836988]I'm not sure what is wrong with this WHEN APPROPRIATE, especially in certain locations like oceanic.

Totally agree with you on this one.

Being reasonable and not exaggerating in anything is the way to be safer.

Now....so far, only one reply about my post related to the correct procedure for traffic avoidance:

Would you turn (not recommended by all ACAS procedures) or stay put and wait for the RA and then follow correct standard procedures?

Sorry, but I didn't see one consideration about this incident, and I'm curious about it:

Some posts mention the TCAS, and how it should have been followed or not, and if it should be followed at the first warning or not.

But hasn't at least one accident happened exactly because one aircraft followed the TCAS and the other didn't, in the Überlingen case [1] ?

I'm aware that only with the final report any conclusion can be draw, but anytime I see some incident where midair collision could have happened I remember that even TCAS isn't a miracle if not followed by both aircrafts.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%9C...-air_collision

similarities to Air Canada @ SFO
 

perhaps both this incident and the taxiway lineup by the landing Air Canada at SFO could be avoided by doing away with pilots and just having pilotless aircraft flown by computers that follow their ATC clearance?

just saying....

G

"e1229" - TCAS should not be followed until you have an RA. So strictly speaking the manoeuvre by SEY054 would have been a non-standard and surely not according to SOP.

TCAS should not be acted upon if it is just advisory, which happens quite often all over the world.

I think what some have said here earlier, we can not know what the various crew heard as readable / audible radio in their cockpits, so it's very judgemental of some to start talking about lack of SA and bad airmanship, when the transmissions we have access to now, might not have been audible for the 2 flight crews involved.

ATC by failing to catch the EK transmission of FL360, was the only one who we know "heard" the full picture. And was probably one of the main reasons he wanted to avoid making a report.

Now this issue with ATC not catching wrong readbacks from flight crews happens quite often, specially in environments where they love to chatter on the radio in their own local languages, such as France, Italy and Spain.

I have though noticed at least in Europe, that Radar control often have full view of your new assigned Flight Levels / Altitudes, after they have given you a clearance, and you have selected this on your FCU.
Can we assume that ATC in this instance did not have such equipment, that they could see what level the aircraft was climbing too?

I have in past heard corrections from Radar Control over the radio for both cleared levels and QNH settings selected.

When the windscreen fills with the enlarging image of an oncoming aircraft you correct! Who is to say that TCAS is working correctly etc etc. We don't know what they SEY crew saw but watching the RADAR plot is looks close enough to me. Yes, in Europe or other very busy airspace you might not react in the same manner but this was not Europe. The SEY crew obviously felt the situation warranted maneuvering.

To say we never react to a TA is ridiculous. We do not 'usually' maneuver based on it for all the reasons mentioned. The SEY crew saw a problem and, with perhaps the local knowledge that the airspace is not busy (hence no chance of multiple cascading RA's) and the local knowledge that ATC is not the best, reacted.

Much better than a midair and, later on as a ghost, trying to tell the world that SOP's or some other rule forbid you from reacting.

Offset
 

At any airfield where the inbound and outbound airway is shared, why not stipulate that, within a given radius, all flights will offset by, say, 1 mile right? (Or left, if you are that way inclined.)
Prober:ok:

Harry, agree with some of what you say.

Do you have a reference as to why I can't fly in pyjamas? Also why we can't do paperwork in the climb above FL200? Again.. I personally don't, but when appropriate why not?

Apologies for the massive thread drift, but its amazing how one's choice of clothes in a locked room seems to affect your professionalism. One reason I love the freighter to be away from this kind of BS and wear a t-shirt for the whole flight.

Wow. I must say, I feel privileged to have shared the sky so many years with all of you GODS.

I'm a mere mortal, and because of that I've made mistakes, luckily none that made the news or a message board full of you aviation deities.

If you've never made a mistake/got distracted in the FD, feel free to comment, if you're human like me, maybe wait until more info comes out because the lot of you are coming off extremely arrogant.

Keep your heads up and safe flying in "the land that forgot about airmanship"

CC