Emirates A388 - Moscow UUDD, GA from 400 feet AGL, 8nm out.
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They are taught to fly with AP all the time and raw data is forbidden... But for some people, that the way it should be...
The other reality is that those guys fly like crazy and fatigue might definitely be a factor...
The other reality is that those guys fly like crazy and fatigue might definitely be a factor...
GoAround of EK-131 on 12. and 13. of Sep as well.
They are taught to fly with AP all the time and raw data is forbidden... But for some people, that the way it should be...
If you can't do it, you don't fly.
It's simple. Cleared to 900 mts. Dial in 900'. Figure out you're not supposed to be there go around.
that a raw data approach is part of the type rating exam.
Ah come on centaurus, negative.
A/P off, Autothrottle off, F/D off, 500' overcast, intercept the ils manually in that configuration, and fly the bloody airplane neatly to land in the touchdown zone. That includes all configuration changes necessary.
It's a bloody shame that this is not part of every pilot's minimum requirement.
Look at yourself in the mirror and ask....
A/P off, Autothrottle off, F/D off, 500' overcast, intercept the ils manually in that configuration, and fly the bloody airplane neatly to land in the touchdown zone. That includes all configuration changes necessary.
It's a bloody shame that this is not part of every pilot's minimum requirement.
Look at yourself in the mirror and ask....
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It's simple. Cleared to 900 mts. Dial in 900'. Figure out you're not supposed to be there go around.
It is said they descended to 400'-ish agl. Correct, they should not have been there, or anywhere near there at that point. But........ if AB's EGPWS is anything like the B738's first it would have woken up the Rad Alt at 2500'. Every airline I've worked for uses this as a situation awareness alert and has an SOP call for it. However, in my last airline, much to my chagrin, it was treated by F/O's in parrot fashion. Rad Alt says "2500" and the response is "OMG etc." They didn't make a cross check to the Baro to see if it made sense and was as expected. They'd made the SOP call and all was good. Duh.
Secondly, I'm assuming EK had flaps out at 8nm but not gear, so there could have been a "too low gear" EGPWS alert before then.
Do they have a VSP display?
They surely have a runway symbol on there MAP that would have been half way up the screen with range rings.
They surely had a DME & Glide slope displayed. The latter would have been alive at some point then off the scale PDQ as they descended.
i.e. there should have been many clues that all was not good with their world long before the reached 400'. AND they should have been VMC visual at night looking for the runway.
People talk about tiredness. Could have been accumulative, but the arrival was early evening not early morning; i.e. a day flight. And tiredness has to affect both pilots to be so lost in space.
Questions, not many answers; from the outside.
It is said they descended to 400'-ish agl. Correct, they should not have been there, or anywhere near there at that point. But........ if AB's EGPWS is anything like the B738's first it would have woken up the Rad Alt at 2500'. Every airline I've worked for uses this as a situation awareness alert and has an SOP call for it. However, in my last airline, much to my chagrin, it was treated by F/O's in parrot fashion. Rad Alt says "2500" and the response is "OMG etc." They didn't make a cross check to the Baro to see if it made sense and was as expected. They'd made the SOP call and all was good. Duh.
Secondly, I'm assuming EK had flaps out at 8nm but not gear, so there could have been a "too low gear" EGPWS alert before then.
Do they have a VSP display?
They surely have a runway symbol on there MAP that would have been half way up the screen with range rings.
They surely had a DME & Glide slope displayed. The latter would have been alive at some point then off the scale PDQ as they descended.
i.e. there should have been many clues that all was not good with their world long before the reached 400'. AND they should have been VMC visual at night looking for the runway.
People talk about tiredness. Could have been accumulative, but the arrival was early evening not early morning; i.e. a day flight. And tiredness has to affect both pilots to be so lost in space.
Questions, not many answers; from the outside.
Last edited by RAT 5; 21st Sep 2017 at 12:23.
fox niner,
We used to do that every six months in the simulator - manual flying (raw data, no autopilot, no autothrottle), ADF approach, engine out, 500 ft cloud base in a strong cross wind.
Very good exercise, but then that was when pterodatyls ruled the air!!
We used to do that every six months in the simulator - manual flying (raw data, no autopilot, no autothrottle), ADF approach, engine out, 500 ft cloud base in a strong cross wind.
Very good exercise, but then that was when pterodatyls ruled the air!!
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That same dataset has the aircraft leveled out at 1000m from 17:51:13 to 17:51:33, at the end of the initial descent from FL380.
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If I may interject with a silly SLF question, would (hypothetically) GPS spoofing be a possible factor that could lead a crew to descend towards a non-existing runway?
There have reportedly been instances of ships finding themselves far inland based on GPS location, or moving at speeds beyond their capabilities.
Far-fetched, I know, but I would still be interested to know if it could play even a small role in an incident like this.
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/blac...hacking-russia
There have reportedly been instances of ships finding themselves far inland based on GPS location, or moving at speeds beyond their capabilities.
Far-fetched, I know, but I would still be interested to know if it could play even a small role in an incident like this.
https://www.wired.co.uk/article/blac...hacking-russia
kristofera,
It is not a silly question. All navigation aids must be regarded as aids not gospel. It is always necessary to maintain simple common sense checks like 10,000 feet per 30 Nms. (plus or minus a bit) and at 10Nms from touch-down you should be at or around 3000 feet. These gross error checks work and one needs to use ALL available sources.
And as RAT5 has pointed out, what is the Rad Alt for?
It is not a silly question. All navigation aids must be regarded as aids not gospel. It is always necessary to maintain simple common sense checks like 10,000 feet per 30 Nms. (plus or minus a bit) and at 10Nms from touch-down you should be at or around 3000 feet. These gross error checks work and one needs to use ALL available sources.
And as RAT5 has pointed out, what is the Rad Alt for?
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It's strange to read about conversion inconvenience for skilled airmen. Just get everything ready for any flight wherever you fly
This was a not a short flight. There was time to discuss TEM items and IMHO FL - feet - metres should have been included in that discussion. EK Flt Ops would know about this threat. Perhaps they have an airfield brief covering that topic? Was this the crews' first visit?
There was AC A320 at SFO. We don't know, but speculate, that TEM items were not considered before approach: in that case the closure of a // runway at night.
What is disturbing, in both cases, is that 2 pilots allowed a mistake to happen. A/C are designed with nearly every system having a back-up. One fails and the other takes over. There are 2 pilots for a similar reason, as well as others. PM is supposed to think independently and monitor what PF is doing. They will have discussed the operation phase by phase, agreed on a course of action, and then executed it. If PM sees things that don't seem sensible, or differ from the briefing in an unsafe way, they should speak up. If not then the back-up system doesn't work. Not ideal. I didn't think EK has cadets, so one can assume both plots are reasonably experienced. Who was PF? That could be significant. Are EK F/O's encouraged to speak up?
Either way, we are seeing quite a few events where the error can be seen as a CREW error; i.e. PF made a mistake and PM left them do it. Not good. And I don't mean some cowboy manually flown approach, but an A/P FMC or MCP manipulated profile where the sequence of events are very conspicuous and with plenty of time to see what has been selected and what is happening over a couple of minutes. There is no startle factor for PM.
This was a not a short flight. There was time to discuss TEM items and IMHO FL - feet - metres should have been included in that discussion. EK Flt Ops would know about this threat. Perhaps they have an airfield brief covering that topic? Was this the crews' first visit?
There was AC A320 at SFO. We don't know, but speculate, that TEM items were not considered before approach: in that case the closure of a // runway at night.
What is disturbing, in both cases, is that 2 pilots allowed a mistake to happen. A/C are designed with nearly every system having a back-up. One fails and the other takes over. There are 2 pilots for a similar reason, as well as others. PM is supposed to think independently and monitor what PF is doing. They will have discussed the operation phase by phase, agreed on a course of action, and then executed it. If PM sees things that don't seem sensible, or differ from the briefing in an unsafe way, they should speak up. If not then the back-up system doesn't work. Not ideal. I didn't think EK has cadets, so one can assume both plots are reasonably experienced. Who was PF? That could be significant. Are EK F/O's encouraged to speak up?
Either way, we are seeing quite a few events where the error can be seen as a CREW error; i.e. PF made a mistake and PM left them do it. Not good. And I don't mean some cowboy manually flown approach, but an A/P FMC or MCP manipulated profile where the sequence of events are very conspicuous and with plenty of time to see what has been selected and what is happening over a couple of minutes. There is no startle factor for PM.
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Guys - it is really shocking what most of you are writing here - only excuse for it, is if you have not been back to Russia recently. :
As one poster already stated, Russia has changed the Rules and exclusively uses QNH altimetery below Transition Level and this has been in effect since Feb 2017. It is no longer a QFE environment.
Just have a look at your charts: No more conversion tables and need to work out meteres, as there are no longer clearances issued in meteres. Just set the given QNH after TL fly in feet and that's it.
: As one poster already stated, Russia has changed the Rules and exclusively uses QNH altimetery below Transition Level and this has been in effect since Feb 2017. It is no longer a QFE environment.
Just have a look at your charts: No more conversion tables and need to work out meteres, as there are no longer clearances issued in meteres. Just set the given QNH after TL fly in feet and that's it.