It's strange to read about conversion inconvenience for skilled airmen. Just get everything ready for any flight wherever you fly
This was a not a short flight. There was time to discuss TEM items and IMHO FL - feet - metres should have been included in that discussion. EK Flt Ops would know about this threat. Perhaps they have an airfield brief covering that topic? Was this the crews' first visit?
There was AC A320 at SFO. We don't know, but speculate, that TEM items were not considered before approach: in that case the closure of a // runway at night.
What is disturbing, in both cases, is that 2 pilots allowed a mistake to happen. A/C are designed with nearly every system having a back-up. One fails and the other takes over. There are 2 pilots for a similar reason, as well as others. PM is supposed to think independently and monitor what PF is doing. They will have discussed the operation phase by phase, agreed on a course of action, and then executed it. If PM sees things that don't seem sensible, or differ from the briefing in an unsafe way, they should speak up. If not then the back-up system doesn't work. Not ideal. I didn't think EK has cadets, so one can assume both plots are reasonably experienced. Who was PF? That could be significant. Are EK F/O's encouraged to speak up?
Either way, we are seeing quite a few events where the error can be seen as a CREW error; i.e. PF made a mistake and PM left them do it. Not good. And I don't mean some cowboy manually flown approach, but an A/P FMC or MCP manipulated profile where the sequence of events are very conspicuous and with plenty of time to see what has been selected and what is happening over a couple of minutes. There is no startle factor for PM.