B777 Emergency DXB
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Nocookies | The Australian
Opinion
Emirates B777 crash was accident waiting to happen
The crash of an Emirates B777 during an attempted go-around in Dubai last Wednesday was always an accident waiting to happen.
It was not the fault of the pilots, the airline or Boeing, because this accident could have happened to any pilot in any airline flying any modern glass cockpit airliner — Airbus, Boeing or Bombardier — or a large corporate jet with autothrottle.
It is the result of the imperfect interaction of the pilots with supposedly failsafe automatics, which pilots are rigorously trained to trust, which in this case failed them.
First, let us be clear about the effect of hot weather on the day. All twin-engine jet aircraft are certified at maximum takeoff weight to climb away on one engine after engine failure on takeoff at the maximum flight envelope operating temperature — 50 degrees C in the case of a B777 — to reach a regulatory climb gradient minimum of 2.4 per cent.
The Emirates B777-300 was operating on two engines and at a lower landing weight, so climb performance should not have been a problem. I have operated for years out of Dubai in summer, where the temperature is often in the high 40s, in both widebody Airbus and Boeing B777 aircraft.
Secondly, a pilot colleague observed exactly what happened as he was there, waiting in his aircraft to cross runway 12L. The B777 bounced and began a go-around. The aircraft reached about 150 feet (45 metres) with its landing gear retracting, then began to sink to the runway.
This suggests that the pilots had initiated a go-around as they had been trained to do and had practised hundreds of times in simulators, but the engines failed to respond in time to the pilot-commanded thrust. Why?
Bounces are not uncommon. They happen to all pilots occasionally. What was different with the Emirates B777 bounce was that the pilot elected to go around. This should not have been a problem as pilots are trained to apply power, pitch up (raise the nose) and climb away. However pilots are not really trained for go-arounds after a bounce; we practise go-arounds from a low approach attitude.
Modern jets have autothrottles as part of the autoflight system. They have small TOGA (take off/go-around) switches on the throttle levers they click to command autothrottles to control the engines, to deliver the required thrust. Pilots do not physically push up the levers by themselves but trust the autothrottles to do that, although it is common to rest your hand on the top of the levers. So, on a go-around, all the pilot does is click the TOGA switches, pull back on the control column to raise the nose and — when the other pilot, after observing positive climb, announces it — calls “gear up” and away we go!
But in the Dubai case, because the wheels had touched the runway, the landing gear sensors told the autoflight system computers that the aircraft was landed. So when the pilot clicked TOGA, the computers — without him initially realising it — inhibited TOGA as part of their design protocols and refused to spool up the engines as the pilot commanded.
Imagine the situation. One pilot, exactly as he has been trained, clicks TOGA and concentrates momentarily on his pilot’s flying display (PFD) to raise the nose of the aircraft to the required go-around attitude — not realising his command for TOGA thrust has been ignored. The other pilot is concentrating on his PFD altimeter to confirm that the aircraft is climbing due to the aircraft momentum. Both suddenly realise the engines are still at idle, as they had been since the autothrottles retarded them at approximately 30 feet during the landing flare. There is a shock of realisation and frantic manual pushing of levers to override the autothrottle pressure.
But too late. The big engines take seconds to deliver the required thrust before and before that is achieved the aircraft sinks to the runway.
It could have happened to any pilot caught out by an unusual, time-critical event, for which rigorous simulator training had not prepared him.
Automation problems leading to pilot confusion are not uncommon; but the designers of the autoflight system protocols should have anticipated this one. Perhaps an audible warning like “manual override required” to alert the pilots immediately of the “automation disconnect”.
My feeling is the pilots were deceived initially by the autothrottle refusal to spool up the engines, due to the landing inhibits, and a very high standard of simulator training by which pilots are almost brainwashed to totally rely on the automatics as the correct thing.
Byron Bailey is a commercial pilot with more than 45 years’ experience and 26,000 flying hours, and a former RAAF fighter pilot. He was a senior captain with Emirates for 15 years.
Emirates B777 crash was accident waiting to happen
The crash of an Emirates B777 during an attempted go-around in Dubai last Wednesday was always an accident waiting to happen.
It was not the fault of the pilots, the airline or Boeing, because this accident could have happened to any pilot in any airline flying any modern glass cockpit airliner — Airbus, Boeing or Bombardier — or a large corporate jet with autothrottle.
It is the result of the imperfect interaction of the pilots with supposedly failsafe automatics, which pilots are rigorously trained to trust, which in this case failed them.
First, let us be clear about the effect of hot weather on the day. All twin-engine jet aircraft are certified at maximum takeoff weight to climb away on one engine after engine failure on takeoff at the maximum flight envelope operating temperature — 50 degrees C in the case of a B777 — to reach a regulatory climb gradient minimum of 2.4 per cent.
The Emirates B777-300 was operating on two engines and at a lower landing weight, so climb performance should not have been a problem. I have operated for years out of Dubai in summer, where the temperature is often in the high 40s, in both widebody Airbus and Boeing B777 aircraft.
Secondly, a pilot colleague observed exactly what happened as he was there, waiting in his aircraft to cross runway 12L. The B777 bounced and began a go-around. The aircraft reached about 150 feet (45 metres) with its landing gear retracting, then began to sink to the runway.
This suggests that the pilots had initiated a go-around as they had been trained to do and had practised hundreds of times in simulators, but the engines failed to respond in time to the pilot-commanded thrust. Why?
Bounces are not uncommon. They happen to all pilots occasionally. What was different with the Emirates B777 bounce was that the pilot elected to go around. This should not have been a problem as pilots are trained to apply power, pitch up (raise the nose) and climb away. However pilots are not really trained for go-arounds after a bounce; we practise go-arounds from a low approach attitude.
Modern jets have autothrottles as part of the autoflight system. They have small TOGA (take off/go-around) switches on the throttle levers they click to command autothrottles to control the engines, to deliver the required thrust. Pilots do not physically push up the levers by themselves but trust the autothrottles to do that, although it is common to rest your hand on the top of the levers. So, on a go-around, all the pilot does is click the TOGA switches, pull back on the control column to raise the nose and — when the other pilot, after observing positive climb, announces it — calls “gear up” and away we go!
But in the Dubai case, because the wheels had touched the runway, the landing gear sensors told the autoflight system computers that the aircraft was landed. So when the pilot clicked TOGA, the computers — without him initially realising it — inhibited TOGA as part of their design protocols and refused to spool up the engines as the pilot commanded.
Imagine the situation. One pilot, exactly as he has been trained, clicks TOGA and concentrates momentarily on his pilot’s flying display (PFD) to raise the nose of the aircraft to the required go-around attitude — not realising his command for TOGA thrust has been ignored. The other pilot is concentrating on his PFD altimeter to confirm that the aircraft is climbing due to the aircraft momentum. Both suddenly realise the engines are still at idle, as they had been since the autothrottles retarded them at approximately 30 feet during the landing flare. There is a shock of realisation and frantic manual pushing of levers to override the autothrottle pressure.
But too late. The big engines take seconds to deliver the required thrust before and before that is achieved the aircraft sinks to the runway.
It could have happened to any pilot caught out by an unusual, time-critical event, for which rigorous simulator training had not prepared him.
Automation problems leading to pilot confusion are not uncommon; but the designers of the autoflight system protocols should have anticipated this one. Perhaps an audible warning like “manual override required” to alert the pilots immediately of the “automation disconnect”.
My feeling is the pilots were deceived initially by the autothrottle refusal to spool up the engines, due to the landing inhibits, and a very high standard of simulator training by which pilots are almost brainwashed to totally rely on the automatics as the correct thing.
Byron Bailey is a commercial pilot with more than 45 years’ experience and 26,000 flying hours, and a former RAAF fighter pilot. He was a senior captain with Emirates for 15 years.
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Arrogance
Here you go EK....lets assist you with some corporate advertising..Hope your level of arrogance is satisfied at the outcome. Thank God the fatalities were minimal and my prayers and well wishes go out to the family of the firefighter.
In my opinion, give it time and you'll perfect that too...
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Training budget.
Jennifer Anniston provided with US$ 5 million training budget, allegedly .... We hear she may now seek legal action as the company has recently removed her shower-plane from some US routes.
Last edited by Plank Cap; 10th Aug 2016 at 01:03. Reason: Text
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Originally Posted by Wizofoz
Both of our pilots are well experienced - they each have over 7000 flying hours to their credit
Not for the first time.
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1.- anybody knows why Captain Ibrahim Alseouni had only 7000 hrs?
Being staff number 202xxx, how is that possible?
I estimate not less than 17 years in EK.
Another UAE prominent family Golden Boy?
2.- EK Media centre
http://www.emirates.com/media-centre...rd-august-2016
OPERATIONAL INCIDENT??? Aircraft crashed and burnt and it is an OPERATIONAL INCIDENT???
get out of there guys, you might be the next one...and you do not know it, because fatigue don't let you think about it...
Being staff number 202xxx, how is that possible?
I estimate not less than 17 years in EK.
Another UAE prominent family Golden Boy?
2.- EK Media centre
http://www.emirates.com/media-centre...rd-august-2016
OPERATIONAL INCIDENT??? Aircraft crashed and burnt and it is an OPERATIONAL INCIDENT???
get out of there guys, you might be the next one...and you do not know it, because fatigue don't let you think about it...
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My feeling is the pilots were deceived initially by the autothrottle refusal to spool up the engines, due to the landing inhibits, and a very high standard of simulator training by which pilots are almost brainwashed to totally rely on the automatics as the correct thing.
Byron Bailey
Byron Bailey
Don't go for modes, go for moves!
Move the levers and the yoke yourself, sort out the modes of automation later.
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GLOW FISH
You are 100% right! Unlike the statement by the ozzie ex-EK Captain above, I have never in 19000 hours of flying a heavy jet either bounced a landing or observed others do it.Hard/heavy landings yes, but not a bounce so I cant really say how to respond, however many times ive been required to carry out a very low level go-around in either a low energy state or in nasty weather and I can strongly recommend that the best way, after asking for the go-around flap setting leave the gear alone, then HAND FLY THE MACHINE FCUK the MODES.POWER PLUS ATTITUDE EQUALS PERFORMANCE.15 DEGREES PITCH PLUS MAXIMUM POWER......IN YOUR HANDS INITIALY WILL GET YOU OUT OF TROUBLE.STAB TRIM AND GEAR UP A LITTLE LATER....Peter.
You are 100% right! Unlike the statement by the ozzie ex-EK Captain above, I have never in 19000 hours of flying a heavy jet either bounced a landing or observed others do it.Hard/heavy landings yes, but not a bounce so I cant really say how to respond, however many times ive been required to carry out a very low level go-around in either a low energy state or in nasty weather and I can strongly recommend that the best way, after asking for the go-around flap setting leave the gear alone, then HAND FLY THE MACHINE FCUK the MODES.POWER PLUS ATTITUDE EQUALS PERFORMANCE.15 DEGREES PITCH PLUS MAXIMUM POWER......IN YOUR HANDS INITIALY WILL GET YOU OUT OF TROUBLE.STAB TRIM AND GEAR UP A LITTLE LATER....Peter.
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Having retired from the UAE I was horrified to hear that (allegedly) the Co Pilot is the subject of police action for "failing to support his Captain". Is this factual or merely another rumour? In any case as with all speculation it is damaging and I sadly feel glad to be out of the environment.
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Forget it, Wiz, no problem.
What modes? TOGA is a single button press. Even LNAV automatically engages. Press it and climb away, manually or with the A/P engaged. Or are you suggesting there's no need to press TOGA? TOGA needs to be pressed regardless and if you can't handle that then you may need to re-assess your choice of career. Sorry but that's how it is.
Some great advice being given out here.
Don't go for modes, go for moves!
Move the levers and the yoke yourself, sort out the modes of automation later
Move the levers and the yoke yourself, sort out the modes of automation later
Some great advice being given out here.
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Not a rebuttal or criticism, but it all depends on when or if the TOGA button was pressed and the subsequent action or inaction. This from the FCTM:
Note: An automatic go-around cannot be initiated after touchdown.
Go-Around after Touchdown
If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with
normal go-around procedures. The F/D go-around mode will continue to provide
go-around guidance commands throughout the maneuver.
If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection,
auto speedbrakes retract and autobrakes disarm as thrust levers are advanced. The
F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around is selected after
becoming airborne.
I think Glofish may be correct if GA was initiated after a touchdown. Likewise Piratepete, I can't remember seeing or doing it in anger and it's been so long since I was shown it in the sim, I forget.
Note: An automatic go-around cannot be initiated after touchdown.
Go-Around after Touchdown
If a go-around is initiated before touchdown and touchdown occurs, continue with
normal go-around procedures. The F/D go-around mode will continue to provide
go-around guidance commands throughout the maneuver.
If a go-around is initiated after touchdown but before thrust reverser selection,
auto speedbrakes retract and autobrakes disarm as thrust levers are advanced. The
F/D go-around mode will not be available until go-around is selected after
becoming airborne.
I think Glofish may be correct if GA was initiated after a touchdown. Likewise Piratepete, I can't remember seeing or doing it in anger and it's been so long since I was shown it in the sim, I forget.
Last edited by BLOGGSON; 10th Aug 2016 at 11:27. Reason: Typo
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@maligno
It is still an operation incident,not a hull loss. Engineering is a miracle worker. They will take a donor frame and fix this MSN/REG keeping same hex codes. EMW will be reactivated with DCAA/GCAA approval.
So clear all those pictures from your mind.
It is still an operation incident,not a hull loss. Engineering is a miracle worker. They will take a donor frame and fix this MSN/REG keeping same hex codes. EMW will be reactivated with DCAA/GCAA approval.
So clear all those pictures from your mind.
Or are you suggesting there's no need to press TOGA? TOGA needs to be pressed regardless and if you can't handle that then you may need to re-assess your choice of career. Sorry but that's how it is.
I've seen (and failed) guys in the sim who push the switch, then just assume the thrust will appear.
I'm not 777, but I asked a 777 bloke is it possible to hit the toga button and not get TOGA. He said no, the auto throttle will always give you TOGA. I said what if you have touched down? He said - "I don't know- I think so". He went and looked it up and said bugger him, he didn't know that that it might not advance the throttles if you had done a bounced landing.
He is very experienced on the 777 and said that that scenario, i.e. going around after a bounced landing, he has never practiced.
For once I think the airbus automation may be better for a go around (i.e. we always push the THRUST levers fully forward.
Caveat - I am in no way suggesting that this occurred in EK 521, but it does provide food for thought.
He is very experienced on the 777 and said that that scenario, i.e. going around after a bounced landing, he has never practiced.
For once I think the airbus automation may be better for a go around (i.e. we always push the THRUST levers fully forward.
Caveat - I am in no way suggesting that this occurred in EK 521, but it does provide food for thought.