Thanks for the feedback Fred.Kite!

After reading some of the briefs: Re engine failure in a piston engine..if time permits you may want to confirm that the fuel is on, this may lead to the resumption of noise from the front of the aircraft.
Only mentioned because an acquaintance had an engine failure in a 172 because his fidgeting 5 year old son in the back seat accidentally kicked the fuel selector to off. His son survived the event.

That 5 year old must have had long legs, was he not strapped in? But at least you have pointed out one of the holes in BPF’s C 172 take off safety brief and there are several. Any one got any other suggestions?

One of the more challenging things to teach in ab initio training is how to prepare a low time student for an EFATO. As +TRSA pointed out at post 32 outcomes that relies on a cognitive decision making process at a very stressful time are likely not to work with very low levels of experience. I want the student to if time permits, to shut down the engine for 2 reasons. It forces the mental shift from "I am trying to restore power" to " The engine has failed and I will concentrate on flying the airplane to a survivable forced landing" and second it will stop the potential of the engine starting at an in opportune time. I know of one case where a pilot had the engine fail at about 1000 ft. He had continued straight ahead to a smooth field off the end of the runway. As he started to flare the engine roared back to life he started to climb away and at about 200 AGL it failed again. He ended up crashing in to trees at the end of the field wrecked the airplane and was very fortunate to avoid serious injury.

Al that been said the flow to shut check down the engine is the same one to determine a cause of the engine failure. If the engine fails at say 900 feet and after establishing a stable glide the pilot actions the shut down flow and finds the fuel already off, then it would be reasonable to turn it back on. The important point is 1000 ft AGL to landing is 60 to 80 seconds. A lot has to happen in that very short period of time and spending a lot of time trying to get the engine going is likely to detract from flying the airplane which has to be the primary focus.

Fred.Kite
I am always looking to steal better ideas. Please describe what you would teach a 15 hour student to prepare them for an EFATO ?

I don’t teach EFATO. For the last 40 years on FI courses I have taught EMATO. Engine malfunction during and after take off. If you read my previous posts it may give you a clue as to why!

So my first lesson for the FIC students is, “ If your here thinking I am just going to repeat what you can find in every book on flying instruction dating back to 1939, you’re on the wrong course, you need the aviation historians course”!

So there's a distinction between the "failure" of an engine [to produce climb power], and, the "malfunction" of the engine - it's not doing what you expect at the moment. Sure. I've had a stuck exhaust valve, on a four cylinder, departing out over water in a landplane. It ran very poorly, was certainly malfunctioning, but continued in a very stable way, to develop enough power that I did not splash, nor actually set up to ditch. But, this was me, with thousands of hours, and a few stuck valves under my belt. Could I teach an ab initio student to very quickly diagnose a 25% power loss as continue to climb away with a very short decision time? I dunno. Should they close the throttle and land into the middle of the soccer game when 75% power, shaking like crazy was still available? Not ideally. However, a decision based upon best interpretation of available information, and then executing it well without changing horses mid stream, is still better than spinning in, or executing a second, horrible forced approach from the same first single "malfunction".

When the instructor can teach, and the student can understand, the distinction between a malfunction, and a failure, sure, let's treat a malfunctioning engine as not failed (yet). But that could be well into a pilot's career, and I opine probably during advance training post license. I don't think that PPL training normally gets into accurate low altitude diagnosis of engine malfunctions for the purpose of treating them other than a failure. Having trained many new PPL's to an advanced type, I have taken the time to begin to train these refinements, but still experience doing this tells me that while learning the advanced type, the student is task saturated again, and the secondary lessons of malfunction vs failure still don't stick well.

Do we do specific training in a pilot's early training on malfunction vs failure? Not so much! It'd be a great idea, but it's a deep subject, and I worry that many instructors might be at the edge of their training skill to convey it properly (and it can be difficult or impossible to simulate).

As for my emergencies brief, they will certainly vary by situation. Landing gear selection and flap retractions in RG's will always be spoken aloud, even if I am solo. If I'm briefing a co crew member, it's thorough (I experienced the goods and bads of crew briefings). And, if it's unusual, I may give the briefing to ground crew, so they know what to expect to see me do. Once, while solo flight testing a significantly modified Navajo, my emergency brief to the boss (who was not flying with me) was: "if an engine even farts, I'm gently pulling back both throttles and landing ahead as though it was a single". He nodded and agreed. Vmca handling was in question following the mod, so I was not going to experiment at low altitude with an attempt at a single engine climb away not being confident where Vmca, and Vyse were.

Just so you can see why this was in question....


https://cimg0.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....8da448b948.jpg

My interpretation of failure is a complete loss of power. My interpretation of malfunction is that the engine has completely failed or it is producing partial power. Malfunction then is a more apt title, IMO. Engines can stop during take off or after take off too! In fact our syllabus calls for the teaching of engine malfunction on every leg of the circuit, such fun!

Traditionally in the UK we have always taught complete engine failure only which I believe all ICAO countries have done. In 2010, after 10 years of research, The AustralianTransport Safety Board pointed out that most serious engine malfunctions were in fact partial power reductions, not complete failures. I had long suspected that, that’s why I changed to teaching both partial and complete failures in 1985 after I experienced a partial power loss at 200 feet and flew a low level circuit to land. The UK CAA have finally caught up and partial power failure training was introduced in October this year.

Partial power events are very easy to teach but they call for sound decision making in regard to the chosen flight path to fly.

As a matter of interest, which I know I am going to dread mentioning, we never close the throttle immeadiately from full power because it’s unnecessary and not best practice, IMO. We set either approx 2000 or 1500 RPM depending on the option and decision we want to explore with the student.




https://flyer.co.uk/partial-power-lo...nnial-flights/

Fred.kite

OK, then please describe how you would teach a 15 hour student to prepare them for an EMATO. I am particularly interested in the specific instructions you would give them.

I am also interested in your statement that partial power events are "Very easy to teach". I fully agree with your contention that these type of failures are more common than complete loss of power but because they can manifest themselves in many ways I personally find them more challenging to incorporate them in in exercises in meaningful and realistic ways.

Depends on where they are in their aviation life. If it's the 15 hr about to go solo, then simple is good - select the gliding attitude/speed, select a field in front, select flap as required. If you have any spare time/capacity switch the engine off (pump, throttle, mixture, mags, fuel or whatever). At some point a conversation can be had "if you've got the gliding speed and the ac is maintaining/gaining height then we can think about etc etc etc".

Thank you. We are drifting off the original topic, which was the briefing. Teaching EMATO is a separate matter.

If you look back over my posts, you'll see I'm not engaging in the classic forum style of 'I am right and you are wrong.' This is because I am genuinely interested in teaching and learning, and I'm fascinated by how you all approach the briefing exercise. However, I am suggesting that you may want to look at things differently.

So, BPF, may I ask you: How could you improve upon the briefing you gave? Perhaps you feel it doesn't need improvement, which is fine.

I've attempted to facilitate a different answer from each of you. You are all very experienced and knowledgeable, but so too are many of the pilots who have catastrophic accidents. Experience has a downside as well. Think of your experience as being like a turbine blade: the more hours it flies, the closer it comes to breakdown and failure! This of course applies to me too, but perhaps I have just taught myself to be more aware of it.

I’ve attempted to drop a few clues: wood for the trees, history, outdated, and noise abatement. A few other posters have also dropped hints. Beagle, for instance, stated, 'Do you really expect them to remember all that?' This man has enormous experience!

The key word here is DIFFERENCE!

BPF, you mentioned human factors. Here are some examples:

We all suffer from cognitive biases. We don’t handle the possibility of being wrong well; we prefer to be right rather than wrong.

When I debrief a student, I could list everything they did wrong, pat them on the head, and say, 'See you next week.' That’s called flying instruction. Or, I could attempt to teach them by encouraging them to think about what they could have done better or differently. Encouraging them to discover their own mistakes makes them feel much better about those mistakes, and the big plus is that it tells me how they are processing and thinking about what I’ve taught them. That’s called teaching! I want to develop judgment, not resentment!"

Same here!

Fred.Kite

Ab initio flight training is different from pretty much all other flying instruction because it is no knowledge to knowledge. Most other instruction is apply the existing knowledge in different ways. For example teaching instrument flying. The student already knows how to maneuver the airplane by reference to the natural horizon. They now use that skill to maneuver the airplane by refence to the flight instruments. Having taught for all Canadian licenses and ratings as well as aerobatics and formation over the last 38 years I personally consider ab initio instruction and particularly the pre solo part the hardest of all the instruction I do. A student starts with knowing nothing but to solo they have to know quite a lot. Emergency procedures are a very good example of this. Just because it is there first solo doesn't mean quite a lot of bad things can't happen to them. So what you prepare them for and how you do it is quite important.

The EFATO brief I gave is probably about version 10 of that brief and is much different from the first one. It is informed by the accident record and specifically what pilots do wrong in actual EFATO's and by human factors research into the importance of initial pre programmed actions in situations of sudden high stress. I would also suggest that my brief while called an EFATO brief also works for takeoff malfunctions because it will cause a rejected takeoff in the even of a malfunction on the ground and the initial reaction for the inflight phase of lowering the noise will preserve airspeed, the loss of which is the number 1 cause of fatal EFATO/EMATO accidents. The subsequent system flow will either shut down the engine or identify an obvious cause of the problem

If you are going to instruct you have to prepare your students for emergencies. So I say again what are you going to tell a 15 hours student with respect to dealing with takeoff emergencies.

https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....87e801939.jpeg

There’s your runway captain and don’t forget your going to stop for ANY malfunction during the take off run!

QUOTE

My brief for C172

In the event of ANY malfunction during the takeoff roll I will
- pull throttle to idle
- select flaps up
- apply max braking to a full stop
- set park brake
- asses the situation
-action any appropriate emergency checklist
-advise ATC

A runway often used by 15 hour students :rolleyes:

You are obviously unwilling to constructively contribute to this topic so I think we are done here

Good Day Sir

I think that comparing a briefing appropriate to Courchevel airport operations to that appropriate for any initial pilot training differ so much that they are hardly worthy of discussion in the same theme. It defeats discussion to confuse two such things into each other, when they just don't fit. A student pilot spends a lot of their time being task saturated - over saturating them is pointless. As the candidate gains proficiency (and perhaps becomes "crew") there will be an expectation that they can absorb and effectively apply the contents of an appropriate emergencies briefing. Before that point, the "supervising" pilot has an added burden to execute the intent of the brief, probably expecting the candidate pilot to do little or nothing.

Of course, we want the candidate to get used to an emergencies brief as a part of their proper habits in developing pilot skills. So, we always include it as a mental placeholder. It is imposed more to the candidate as they progress to actually absorb, and expect to execute it if conditions demand.

As for "closing the throttle". I train that two phases will occur in prompt succession after an engine abnormality: (A) Assess if the airplane can still climb away [at all] with the power available. If it can, continue with high preparation for significant power loss. Gently turn away from built up areas toward suitable forced landing sites. If you can make it around to a safe runway landing (not a "turn back") then continue, with preparation for a significant power loss all the way along. If, on the other hand, (B) the power loss is such that continued powered flight is not possible: Lower the nose to maintain safe flying speed, and gently turn toward the most suitable forced landing site mostly ahead of you. If you just did something which you think caused it, reverse whatever that was. If reversing gets you some power back, revert to (A). If it does not, close the throttle, and execute a forced landing as best you can. As is the case with about any planned execution of emergency piloting, I seek to avoid "changing your mind" from one emergency action, to another - make the plan you judge to be best, and follow it through to complete as best you are able.

Of course, the foregoing stream of consciousness is hardly an emergency brief, it's way too long and wandering. It is "training" conducted in the class room. The emergency brief in the cockpit just before the throttle(s) is open is much more succinct, and hopefully tailored to the airplane type, local, crew capability, and conditions. That is why it is not a one size fits all.

Any emergencies brief is a mental placeholder that something could suddenly happen at low altitude, which will wholly change what your flight is going to be, and a plan for that would be a good idea. It should be appropriate. It should not contain elements which are not applicable.

Do I recall that operations in and out of Courchevel requires a pilot "qualification"? When we start talking about airports which require special qualifications to operate, emergency briefings probably take on a form beyond the general theme of this thread! But hey, if some is familiar with a typical emergency briefing appropriate to this airport, feel free to post!

Instead of an autobiography why not concentrate on the reason why the picture is there. You do not stop for ANY malfunction, especially on a performance limiting runway. Would you like to comment on that fact?

Certainly: You cannot stop [on the runway]! You're going onward - make the best of it. In the case of a power loss, eventually, a stop is inevitable, the point of the emergency brief is to make that stop planned, and the most safe possible for the circumstances.

That's my whole point, the emergency brief is situational. It requires describing (succinctly) the best plan for what is an imagined emergency event, based upon that set of circumstances. I was riding jumpseat yesterday in the DC-3 for a test flight, and considering the emergency brief conducted by the captain - it was totally appropriate to what we were doing. An important element, which I appreciate with any two crew operation was: "Are there any questions?" and he paused, so the co-pilot had the opportunity to consider, and reply "no", and the power levers were smoothly advanced.

I was training the owner/PPL from this runway:

https://cimg2.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....0a2d57b524.jpg

I gave the emergency brief; It was: "Retract the gear once airborne, begin a turn to the right, in the case of engine failure, land on the water.". I did not say "ditch", because we were flying an amphibian. I intended a briefing appropriate to the circumstances. He was already on the edge of task saturation (with just avoiding the rocks), so I did not brief the things I might do as PNF to restore engine power, if that would work. In the mean time, I expected a decent water landing if power could not be restored. We did a number of circuits there, and it was a rewarding experience in something different!

I am sorry but even after separating the above from the autobiography I cannot understand what you are saying and I’ve read it at least 6 times!

Makes perfect sense to me, and I don't fly seaplanes or amphibians (more's the pity).

G

You cannot stop [on the runway]! You're going onward - make the best of it. In the case of a power loss, eventually, a stop is inevitable, the point of the emergency brief is to make that stop planned, and the most safe possible for the circumstances.

That’s perfect sense is it?

Especially when viewed in the context of my original question.

You do not stop for ANY malfunction, especially on a performance limiting runway. Would you like to comment on that fact?

Fred.Kite

The autobiography that you've provided in this thread indicates that you're an instructor (teacher) with decades of experience, and that you profess to enjoy the learning experience, attempting to get the best out of everyone through thoughtful discussion. I agree. So too would Big Pistons Forever and Pilot Dar and nearly every other user of PPRuNe, many of whom in this thread are heavy hitters, if you asked them. I would enjoy nothing more than learning from yet another professional.

You are quite right to question the need for an emergency brief or its contents. Indeed, asking and answering questions on everything we do in aviation is how we continue to learn after decades of plying our trade, by holding a light to our most sacred assumptions and beliefs. Every single one of us is here to learn. As we've gained experience, we begin to share our knowledge so that others may learn from us. It is always important to remember that a conversation must be clear in its content and intent. A question is asked and a question is answered. Thought provoking questions only remain thought provoking if the questioner provides context for where they are attempting to take their audience. Yet I cannot find in any of your replies thus far any attempt to answer the questions that have been posed to you. These are questions not asked out of malice, but out of genuine interest. When provided an answer that is acceptable to pilots of equal experience as you claim to have yourself, you allude to knowledge the rest of us are seemingly ignorant to, hoping that we will somehow stumble through the dark onto the answer. As seems to be the case, our naivety blinds us. If it may please you, enlighten us on this knowledge that you are seemingly guiding us to, so that we may better instruct our students. We would all be better for it.

Otherwise, I have no other option than to consider the latter half of your input to be as close to trolling as I've seen on these forums in a long while.