And then you took off, forgot the noise abatement procedure and narrowly missed the aircraft ahead that was following the correct procedure in flying across your take off climb path. That did actually happen and was reported as an Airprox.

With respect this may be a clue in that you may not be seeing the wood for the trees!

Considering that's a 30-year-old practice, it would be prudent to ask if it’s still relevant today—or if a better way exists. Aviation is constantly progressing, which can make decades-old practices potentially irrelevant.

Not sure I understand your point. This is an emergency brief and compliments not replaces the requirement to attain and maintain situational awareness during all parts of the flight.

The fundamental is making sure your immediate actions, both normal, and abnormal, went through your head just before the take-off. Whilst those actions may change with time, the basic principle seems pretty timeless to me.

G

Whilst I agree with the sentiment of continually checking whether what we do is still valid, just because something is decades-old does not imply irrelevance. I would argue that, given the rapid increase in reliability of aircraft engines, that an emergency briefing is more relevant today than it was decades ago where a pilot could reasonably expect to have an engine failure (or other system malfunction) at least a few times in a career. Perhaps I'm biased watching Juan Brown talk about different Loss of Control events around the industry, but it does seem that we have moved away from teaching many of the fundamentals that kept pilots safe for decades, simply because the instructors have never experienced a situation themselves.

Not to get too far away from the argument, but I see this akin to the vaccine argument. A lot of people don't want to vaccinate their children because they don't see the point, or otherwise view it as big-pharma making money. But I wonder how quickly that viewpoint would change were they to see their sick child laying in an iron lung, possibly for the rest of their life. The same goes with any type of emergency talk in aviation - they happen so rarely, that many pilots are too unprepared for when it does, yet the situation may have had a positive outcome had that pilot simply took 30 seconds to think about it.

What exactly are "immediate normal actions," and why would a pilot need to brief them immediately before takeoff? Normal actions are usually covered by the printed checklist and do not require last-minute verbalisation from memory.

You also mention "immediate abnormal actions," and again, I am confused. I have never heard of that specific term. Abnormal procedures rarely require immediate memory action; they are typically non-critical, giving the pilot or crew time to refer to a checklist or Quick Reference Handbook (QRH).

What does "went through your head" mean in this context? We are talking about the verbalisation of a takeoff safety briefing.

A good point about improved engine reliability but there are very few jet or diesel engined C152s or PA 28s at flying schools! There are however a lot of pilots who still do not seem to understand fuel drains, carburettor icing and the requirement to manage fuel to keep the engine running! Of course It would also help if these vintage trainers actually had serviceable and reliable fuel gauges.

You mention LOC, so looking at BPFs take off briefing for his Cessna 172, can you point out which parts covers possible LOC (I) including it’s mitigation and recovery? After all, it was a take off emergency brief.

Without speaking on Genghis' behalf, I can imagine that "normal" and "abnomal" actions (as you mention) rarely require immediate memory action, thus probably also don't require a crew briefing - or in the context of this thread, teaching to brief during instruction. Thus, to me, and as I do, I refresh my thinking (in my head) of these non emergency actions before takeoff. Relevant emergency actions are verbally briefed to a second crew member, or, if I'm by myself, [go] through my head. When I fly an RG airplane, regardless of solo or with another occupant, landing gear position, and landing surface are spoken aloud before each final approach (not just 'through my head).

For the more simple single engine GA types I normally fly and train in, I will train emergency event pre takeoff briefings appropriate to the type, and possible emergency, but as brief as possible, to prevent diluting the whole thing in too many words...

Centaurus, a lot has changed since you flew the Dakota and the Lincoln, including auto brake, carbon brakes, two wheels per leg, spoilers and thrust reversers and most importantly the realisation that the only thing dangerous on an aircraft is the pilot! I can assure you that my Airbus stops very well! A few years back a 319 landed at LBA with the parking brake on and took all the wheels and tyres out, it stopped well too!

The other big change is on my take off briefing when as PF I can state how much runway I will have left from a V1 stop after my unnatural claw like grip closes the thrust levers. Hand on the thrust lever to V1 and then off prevents getting trigger happy after V1. Nonsense comes in many flavours but standard operating practice only comes in one.

By the way, my colleague, who has recently died, flew the Lincoln that is in the UK RAF Cosford museum!

Hmmm... not what I teach on GA airplanes! Hand on power levers until safely airborne, established in the climb [and need to remove it for gear and flaps]. There have been a few King Air accidents in recent years attributed, at least in part, to un gaurded power lever(s) rolling back just after breaking ground.

I'm far from an Airbus pilot, but I can say that the right procedure, normal, abnormal, or emergency, may be type specific. Briefing actions may also be type specific.

- How I'm going to fly the take-off, particularly key speeds.
- What I'm going to do if I lose the engine during, or shortly after take-off.
- Any immediate actions just after the take-off.

This typically takes 20-30 seconds, then I get on with the take-off. Much as was the case with my RAF colleagues in the 90s.

There is no QRH in most light singles, and if there was, for the pilot to start mucking about with it in a single pilot operation, when they've had an engine failure after take-off would not be wise. I'm well aware that things are different on a part 25 transport aeroplane, but that's not what I fly and instruct on.

G

I believe that makes my point about the lack of experience from some instructors to hold their students accountable. Where I live we are having our first real snowfall today. If an instructor flying with a student today is not covering the possibility of fuel contamination when refueling the aircraft, carb icing when flying, or the change in fuel/air mixture with extreme temperature changes that are needed to keep the engine running smoothly, then it's not the student I'd be most concerned about. I do agree with the serviceability and reliability of fuel gauges, but even on a jet those gauges can be MEL'd with the alternate procedure being the magnetic dipstick and pen and paper for fuel burn, so teaching proper fuel management procedures from an early point in one's career sets a pilot up for success the whole way through.

Sure. If the pilot fails to properly adhere to the emergency procedures of the aircraft, many of which are memory items as laid out by BPF, that pilot might incorrectly manage an engine failure after takeoff which could lead to a stall, and thus a loss of control event. Had that pilot taken 10-20 seconds to mentally brief their DVAs, it is possible that the pilot would manage an engine failure or other systems malfunction better than they would had they not reviewed their procedures.

Part of what we have to remember here is that when teaching ab initio, you are not dealing with someone who has thousands of hours of experience to draw upon. If I suddenly forget every SOP my company wrote tomorrow, I know I can manage to fly the aircraft just fine, even if it's not the way Mr. Boeing wants. However, a student with 15 hours total time has no experience to draw upon and, as such, must be remindended at every opportunity so that we can quickly build that experience. Likewise, when you started flying your first jet with reverse and spoilers, I doubt that you managed to get the spoilers out following every RTO in the sim. If you did, you're a far better pilot than I. So taking a moment for most pilots to quickly refresh one's memory at the beginning of the day is not a bad thing, especially if that happens to be the difference between a successful outcome and a loss of control of any given day.

Don't want to interfere with discussions on how to instruct, but here's how I was instructed, and what I read to myself, aloud before every flight, well, perhaps not aloud if there are sensitive souls aboard:
1. Engine failure during start run: Power off, get off the rwy if able
2. Engine failure after takeoff and under 500 ft AGL: Nose down IMMEDIATELY, full flaps, land wherever possible
3. Engine failure above 500 ft AGL: Standard procedure - which I then go through.

Great stuff but it doesn’t answer my question!
Same with Ghengis, didn’t answer my questions!

You are not interfering at all, not as far as I am concerned anyway. Your self briefing is better than nothing and many PPL’s don’t bother at all! How do you think your briefing could be improved, have you missed anything out? Asking these sort of questions prevents sitting on an experience plateau.

The very first action in the second part of the brief

"In the event of an engine failure or any fire after liftoff I will
-push forward on the wheel/stick and establish the gliding attitude"

I didn't encounter take off briefings until my IFR training. Initially I found them very silly. Mostly because the instructors at The Professional Flying School were more concerned about the regurgitation of the briefing than actually conveying the information.

Lately I have learned to appreciate the general idea more, even when flying single pilot. But more on a higher level, as in 'i woud turn left/right and land there ' not 'and apply brakes and shut down the engine'.

For multi crew ops i find them very valuable if they are short. IMO they shouldn't contain any standard info, only what deviates from the standard.

I would suggest that human factors research has shown that internalizing even basic actions is important when pilots are placed in a situation of unexpected and sudden stress. I think setting the park break after the aircraft has come to a stop on an RTO is important because it sets the mental message that the airplane is going to stay stopped until there is clarity over what has happened and what is next.

I am sure I have missed out on something, and I suspect you are an instructor and am likewise suspecting you have suggestions for improvements, feel free !

Rejected Take Off and briefings
 

I am impressed that you said, "I am sure I have missed something out." That's a rare sentence on a forum! You would seem to be the only person to actually question what they believe to be right. A questioning attitude is a core element of Crew Resource Management (CRM) and effective Threat and Error Management (TEM). It reflects the belief that performance is malleable and improvable through critical analysis and continuous learning, but that is only ever likely to occur if you have a growth mindset rather than a fixed mindset.

Your suspicions are correct, but I prefer the term, 'teacher.' Instructors dump information on students; teachers follow a scientifically proven academic process that, amongst other things, encourages the self-development of the thinking pilot. Put another way: instructing is for the moment, teaching is for life. Pun intended!

As part of that teaching and learning process, rather than me tell you what I think, I would rather encourage you to come up with some suggestions yourself. This is facilitation—yet another important difference between instructing and modern-day flying teaching!

A good starting point for question and debate on the Rejected Takeoff (RTO), which I use on both FI courses and for airline training, is the Manchester, UK 737 accident of 1985. This was a watershed moment for the airline industry and forced us all to fundamentally reconsider the RTO procedure.

There are also some spring-off-the-page errors in some of the posts above, which seem to be the result of outdated thinking and a fixed mindset. I can perhaps understand this attitude in basket weaving or blacksmithing, but I find it difficult to understand how this exists in such an obviously modern, progressive, and high-consequence industry such as aviation.

The original poster's RTO call is incorrect and certainly not a standard CAP 413 call. In fact, the phrase ‘emergency brief’ is also not technically correct. Abandonded Take Off is a phrase no longer in use in the UK.

The use of the phrase ‘immediate abnormal actions’ is also incorrect. If a procedure calls for time-constrained immediate action, it is not an abnormal procedure; it is an emergency procedure. Neither I, nor any of my colleagues, have ever come across the term ‘immediate abnormal actions,’ but I am always happy to be corrected, given factual evidence!

Below is the link to a Wiki page that gives further useful links. The Smithsonian video is particularly interesting as it interviews some of the survivors and reinforces some key points. Without the link, it can be found on a search engine by using: Manchester 737 disaster 1985.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_M...rport_disaster