Emergencies brief
 

Do many FIs give their students a simple take-off emergencies brief these days. During early lessons, something along the lines of:

"OK then Sam. This will be your take-off on RW26.

If there is any problem on the ground after you've started the take-off, I want you to close the throttle, bring the aircraft to a halt and call 'Take-off abandoned".

If there's any problem once we're airborne and climbing, I will take control. If there's enough runway left, I will land there. Otherwise I will choose somewhere safe to land within about 30 deg of the runway heading"

The reason I ask is that a friend of mine has started flying training and is currently on the circuits phase. But not once has any form of take-off emergencies brief been given by the instructor. Which I find surprising.

As more experience is gained, I would expect the student to give the brief.

What you describe is basically how we do it at the school where I instruct. However, I would say that around half of the pilots who come to us, either mid-PPL course, or qualified looking for a rental checkout seem incapable of delivering a competent departure brief.

G

Well there is such a thing as overloading a student.
At some point the instructor is required to cover ‘Emergencies’ including EFATO.

Well there is such a thing as overloading a student

I hate to pour water on the need to brief your student (or have him brief you) on emergecies. I learned to fly a Tiger Moth at a small flying school in Sydney, Australia in 1951. Emergency briefs simply did not exist. It was all done as part of the ground course. I then flew in the RAAF for 18 years and during out training for the pilot's bevet or Wings, again there was no such thing as a before take off brief. Of course we had ground lectures on what was called Airmanship and that covered such things as actions to be taken in event of engine failure before and after take off.

The same principle applied when we flew multi-engined aircraft like the Dakota and Lincoln bomber. There was no before take off brief. There was certainly no briefing prior to conducting an instrument approach in those days. In later years when I flew airliners we seemed to brief for everything including fuel reserves for diversion.

I recall when I was a copilot on the Boeing 737 as my first airline job. We were going to Hong Kong and I was the PF. I started to read the approach plate details to the captain who told me to stop there. He said he had the same chart in front of him and he knew how to read the chart and there was little point wasting his time listening to me rattle off all the chart details,missed approach etc as it was all in front of him. He had a good point I thought. The same captain said there was no point in briefing engine failure on take off. For example he said, where do we stop with emergency briefings? Do we brief loss of hydraulics on take off, loss of a generator, tyre failure before V1, failure of flaps to retract after take off, failure to pressurise after take off - and so on.

I recall being a jump seat observer on a Fokker F28 with an Australian airline. One of their SOP's was that on levelling at cruise height the captain would be required to go through the emergency descent procedure in case there was a depressurisation at cruise altitude.
The captain had done the same SOP brief hundreds of time and knew it off by heart word for word. He also knew the CVR was big brother. On this occasion he turned his head towards the left and looking out of his side window said in a bored voice the words "In event of an emergency descent, l will close the throttles and extend the speed brake while you (the copilot) will close the outflow valve and advise ATC (and so on).

The copilot had heard all this before and knowing the captain always looked out of the left hand window while giving his briefing, the copilot winked at me and while the captain was talking the copilot stuck up his middle finger at the captain, made faces and stuck his tongue out at the captain meanwhile timing it to perfection so when the captain turned his head forward on completion of his emergency briefing the copilot was looking straight ahead with a stony face. I had to stifle a giggle.

Nowadays, briefings are the big deal and many a pilot has been castigated by check pilots or simulator instructors for making his briefing too brief or having items left out, It begs the question how does one define "too brief?" It reminds me of the old adage " One man's meat is another man's poison.". . If you have never heard of that saying the explanation is as follows: The adage "One man's meat is another man's poison" means that what one person finds beneficial or enjoyable, another person may find harmful or distasteful, highlighting the subjective nature of preferences and tolerances. The expression serves to emphasize that tastes and what is good for one individual is not necessarily so for someone else.

I’ve seen a few YouTube videos by the flying reporter and have been impressed by his self briefings before departure. The impression given is of a professional training experience.

For single engine training flights, I generally do not brief, unless it's an element of the training itself (like briefing your passengers). I do though, be sure to regularly ask of there are any questions during the training, and I pay my attention to the candidate, and wait for an answer (so they know that they should). On the other hand, and learned the hard way, when I am flight testing or multi engine flying with a second pilot, I do brief, and often it's fairly comprehensive as to who will do what when - and who will not! The core element being: "we're flight testing, in accordance with a flight test plan, and I will fly. I will fly no matter what. If you want to take control, say "I have control", and I will let go. But be careful what you ask for, because you'll suddenly be flying.". There will be more, describing the testing being flown, and limitations, and expected exceedances. In one case, after this briefing (and for an airplane I had not yet flown (Caravan floatplane), my right seater told me that he would not be saying "I have control" - because the airplane had no controls on the right side. We agreed that I would fly the whole flight.

I ride jumpseat in the turbine DC-3 a fair amount these days to witness systems flight testing. I'm fairly impressed by the company procedures for briefing, and really like the "are there any questions" part. Briefing is on thing, but if the other pilot (particularly if they will be flying) has questions, which have gone unanswered, that's not good! A few times, while PF in the helicopter, what the PNF was imagining (particularly about an unusual approach and landing) was apparently different than what I was thinking it would be. They only realized the difference in thinking when they witnessed me diverge from the flight path they had imagined. "Are there any questions" would probably been well placed much earlier!

Often, when I ask during testing or a lull in the training, "are there any questions?", I am told "no". Generally, I will pause what we're doing, and say :well, there should be!". in the hope that the candidate will imagine up something to ask. There's no way my instruction is so good, that they got everything!

I will fly no matter what. If you want to take control, say "I have control", and I will let go. But be careful what you ask for, because you'll suddenly be flying.

I hope this is the appropriate forum to bring up the subject when talking about the handing over/taking over techique when it comes to briefing. In March 2007 there was a Garuda Indonesia Boeing 737 over-run crash with fatal consequences. The investigation stated the accident was caused by an overspeed approach and improper landing configuration due to pilot error. The copilot had warned the captain who was PF that the aircraft was too fast and that they should go-around. The captain ignored the advice and all the copilot could do was to give further warnings. He made no attempt to take over physical control from the captain. The Investigation criticised the copilot for his lack of action. This is a perennial problem in many airlines and which puts the copilot in a difficult postion. For example, does he risk being sacked for making a too early intervention? .

One simple method of forcing a go-around without resorting to physical intervention (and all that implies), is to say "Go-around" and simultaneously select the landing gear lever to up. No captain would then deliberately land wheels up just to make a point. By then the CVR would have recorded the voice of the copilot warning the approach was unstable and thus clearing the copilot of any wrong doing. This recommended action could be covered in company SOP's. When reading the numerous world wide accident reports caused by poor piloting by the PIC, countless lives could have been saved if the PM had resorted to falling back on gear retraction as a means of forcing a go around and thus preventing a potential accident.

A good example of copilot action that saved an almost certain accident was a Boeing 737 landing at a regional airfield in SE Asia. The captain was very high on final approach in good weather and to the astonishment of the copilot the captain proceeded to apply full aileron in both directions to lose height. He later said the spoiler operation actuated by full aileron would have aided into getting back on glide path without excessive speed increase. The copilot was thoroughly alarmed by the actions of the captain who ignored the copilots call-outs to go around. In sheer desperation the copilot placed his hand under the captain's hand on the thrust levers and pushed them forward to go-around thrust thus forcing a go-around.. In other words he did not try to physically take over from the captain. There was an Inquiry and the captain was repriminded by his company.

Interestingly here is a cut and paste report just arrived into the Accidents and Close calls forum. A perfect case for the copilot to force the captain into a go-around by selecting gear up.

The aircraft departed Lagos with 96 passengers and seven crew members on board. Conditions in Port Harcourt were good, with clear skies, calm weather and daylight visibility. Investigators explained that the aircraft was stable on approach until it got close to landing. At 1,000 feet above the ground the situation appeared normal, and the captain disconnected the autopilot at 500 feet to complete the landing manually. Shortly after, the aircraft drifted above the normal landing path.

The captain later admitted that by the time he realised, the aircraft was already too high. It crossed the runway threshold at about 200 feet, which is much higher than the recommended landing height. The first officer, who was younger and had less than 900 hours of flying experience, told the captain to go around and attempt another landing. This is a standard safety procedure, but the captain, an older and highly experienced pilot with over 10,000 hours on the Boeing 737, decided to continue.

The fact that this question even needs to be asked is a reflection of the low standard of light aircraft training in the UK.

All UK flight instructors should be familiar with the contents of UK CAA Standards Document 19, version 9, November 2020, which covers the LAPL and PPL Skill Test (Aeroplanes) and provides policy and guidance for applicants and examiners.

From Standard Document 19, section 3.6.2:

"Although a private pilot would not normally give a take-off safety brief to a passenger, the applicant is expected to give such a brief to the examiner."

The document shows that the UK regulator, the CAA, assumes that all UK flight instructors are teaching the take-off safety briefing. One day the CAA may catch up, but don't hold your breath.

Even Birch and Bramson included this in their books 40 years ago, where they used the somewhat outdated phrase "Captains Brief," a term still beloved by legacy Flight Instructors.

"Up until gear retraction, we will land and take the barrier.
From gear up until 180kt, it is an ejection, I call Eject! Eject! Eject!
Above 180 kt we can consider a turnback."

And after I call for ejection, if you say "What?" all you will hear is an echo.

While the example you quote is presumably for the current aircraft you fly, I presume it is jet powered hence your reference to an ejection. After a fatal turn back crash of a dual Vampire at the RAAF Central Flying School at East Sale in Victoria, Australia, many years ago, test pilots from the Aircraft Research and Development Unit (ARDU) were tasked to carry out turn back tests in the dual Vampire Mk 35. In short they recommended a minimum airspeed of 220 knots before a turn back was contemplated. . That depended on what type of engine failure. If the failure was because of engine seizure then because of the considerable drag caused by a seized engine no safe figure could be given simply because it wasn't possible to simulate a seizure.

In the case of the fatal accident, the engine had seized and a forced landing straight ahead in any one of obstacle free grass fields would have very likely been successful. Instead the Vampire crashed well short of the reciprocal runway during the course of the attempted turn back.
At the time of the accident there was no CFS policy for an emergency brief before take off and no minimum airspeed to be briefed either. The reason for this was that an engine could fail at any point from on the runway.to climb out and the decision to eject or land straight ahead could could vary with every second of flight. . .

In the mid/late 90s I was regularly flying as observer with RAF and other nationality military test pilots at Boscombe Down, and if I wasn't flying, I was often in telemetry with a headset on for testing single seat aircraft.

They all did a verbal take-off safety brief, even if flying solo in a single seat fast jet. I reasoned then, and have done ever since as a pilot, that if it was good enough for them, it was good enough for me.

The reasons should, I hope, be obvious enough to everybody here without my needing to repeat them.

G

I get all students to give basic brief "Engine falters stop, if after lift off land back on, consider ground loop rather than through the hedge. If on climb, pitch for glide, carb on look for field. If partial turn for any runway" having had a few excitements over the years.

My brief for C172

In the event of any malfunction during the takeoff roll I will
- pull throttle to idle
- select flaps up
- apply max braking to a full stop
- set park brake
- asses the situation
-action any appropriate emergency checklist
-advise ATC

In the event of an engine failure or any fire after liftoff I will
-push forward on the wheel/stick and establish the gliding attitude
- pull throttle to idle
- If below 1000 ft AGL continue straight ahead turning only to avoid major obstacles
- If above 1000 ft AGL turn back to the nearest flat section of the airport
- If time permits
- fuel off
- mixture ICO
- Mags Off
- flaps as required
- mayday call
- master off
- doors unlatched.

You really brief all that?

How much of that litany would anyone be expected to remember?

I would argue if they can’t remember how to say everything they need to do in an emergency when sitting on the ground in comfort, there is not a chance they’ll remember even half of it when the engine stops, the pulse is up, and the altitude is dropping.

What BPF describes is within the ballpark for the brief my company requires on a 737. We give it first flight of the day or on any change to one of the pilots, and when I was instructing I would tell my students that if they could talk through the briefing verbatim, then just think it through in their heads when they see it in the sim, and they’ll never have an issue.

I’ve been on again and off again on whether an emergency briefing is warranted at any level of aviation. After 25 years, one real-world V1 cut, and four other engine malfunctions on takeoff (one of which was in a light single), I’ve settled on it is a good thing. It puts the most unlikely, but high risk emergency front and centre of our minds for takeoff. We are immediately primed to stop a takeoff if needed, or primed to look for places to set down after we rotate. Plus, if the regulator wants to hear it during a flight exam, then it’s better for that to have been a part of patter from day one than a last minute addition. As an examiner, I felt I could tell how a ride would go just on the emergency briefing alone. A solid brief often resulted in a good ride. A weak brief often resulted in a weak ride. I figure if someone is willing to put the work in to make the brief sound good and professional , then they’re putting the work in elsewhere as well.

i agree we throw a lot at a student, and that this can seem like overkill. But the whole point of flight training is that we are teaching people how not to kill themselves. Ergo, an emergency briefing puts us in the right frame of mind before we ever get to the dangerous parts of flying.

It always amused me to watch some captains during the takeoff roll, put their hands over the top of the thrust levers in an unnatural claw-like grip as if to emphasis how ready they were to rip the thrust levers back to idle up to V1. There is no need for that nonsense. For example, a tyre burst 10-15 knots below V1 on a limiting length runway would run the chance of an over-run due to lack of maximum braking availability. V1 is not the sacred cow of all possible takeoff go/stop situations.

Yes from the first flight. At the beginning I will do it and they will follow along and as training progresses they will do more of it. At the beginning it is rote recital but as training progresses the understanding of the actions increases. To maximize the potential for a safe outcome in the event of a takeoff emergency I think you need to do everything I listed.

In any case you could phone any of my students at 0200. wake him/her up from a deep sleep and bark "you are at 500 ft after takeoff and the engine FAILED!" and I will bet serous money they could immediately start reciting the emergency actions.

I feel if they can do that then if the bad thing happens I have given them the tools to help them survive.

You're quite right, a V1 cut is not the sacred cow of all situations, and there are many other malfunctions or situations that could cause a rejected takeoff or issue on the climb out. That's why our emergency briefing is pretty basic for the reject side of things, starting off with "In the event of a rejected takeoff, I will..." The parameters for what we will reject for are not discussed in the brief, but covered in length in our FOM. However, what we will do for an engine failure after V1 is briefed as it could require different FMA modes, a simple-special or complex-special engine out procedure, different checklists for the different malfunctions, different aircraft configurations and, in the case of the LEAP-1 engine Load Reduction Device (LRD), the possibility of toxic amounts of smoke entering the flight deck within seconds necessitating an immediate response versus one happening above the 4th segment climb. I've not given much thought to why we harp on about engine failures over other malfunctions in an emergency brief, just whether a briefing is a good thing or bad thing. I'd imagine that it's likely a carry-over from when aircraft malfunctions beat the pilots to an accident over their own mistakes. Any briefing puts us in the frame of mind to be ready to respond to whatever comes our way, and in an aircraft that cannot climb away after an engine failure or other malfunction, having a briefed plan in place before takeoff is better than not.

There are no airbags or chutes on this flight . In the event of an emergency unfasten your seatbelt and point your toes as we will be going in deep . We will die like men :)

I was taught in the RAF that before ground impact you should cross your right leg firmly over your left, as it's always easier to undo a right hand screw.

G

And then you took off, forgot the noise abatement procedure and narrowly missed the aircraft ahead that was following the correct procedure in flying across your take off climb path. That did actually happen and was reported as an Airprox.

With respect this may be a clue in that you may not be seeing the wood for the trees!

Considering that's a 30-year-old practice, it would be prudent to ask if it’s still relevant today—or if a better way exists. Aviation is constantly progressing, which can make decades-old practices potentially irrelevant.

Not sure I understand your point. This is an emergency brief and compliments not replaces the requirement to attain and maintain situational awareness during all parts of the flight.

The fundamental is making sure your immediate actions, both normal, and abnormal, went through your head just before the take-off. Whilst those actions may change with time, the basic principle seems pretty timeless to me.

G

Whilst I agree with the sentiment of continually checking whether what we do is still valid, just because something is decades-old does not imply irrelevance. I would argue that, given the rapid increase in reliability of aircraft engines, that an emergency briefing is more relevant today than it was decades ago where a pilot could reasonably expect to have an engine failure (or other system malfunction) at least a few times in a career. Perhaps I'm biased watching Juan Brown talk about different Loss of Control events around the industry, but it does seem that we have moved away from teaching many of the fundamentals that kept pilots safe for decades, simply because the instructors have never experienced a situation themselves.

Not to get too far away from the argument, but I see this akin to the vaccine argument. A lot of people don't want to vaccinate their children because they don't see the point, or otherwise view it as big-pharma making money. But I wonder how quickly that viewpoint would change were they to see their sick child laying in an iron lung, possibly for the rest of their life. The same goes with any type of emergency talk in aviation - they happen so rarely, that many pilots are too unprepared for when it does, yet the situation may have had a positive outcome had that pilot simply took 30 seconds to think about it.

What exactly are "immediate normal actions," and why would a pilot need to brief them immediately before takeoff? Normal actions are usually covered by the printed checklist and do not require last-minute verbalisation from memory.

You also mention "immediate abnormal actions," and again, I am confused. I have never heard of that specific term. Abnormal procedures rarely require immediate memory action; they are typically non-critical, giving the pilot or crew time to refer to a checklist or Quick Reference Handbook (QRH).

What does "went through your head" mean in this context? We are talking about the verbalisation of a takeoff safety briefing.

A good point about improved engine reliability but there are very few jet or diesel engined C152s or PA 28s at flying schools! There are however a lot of pilots who still do not seem to understand fuel drains, carburettor icing and the requirement to manage fuel to keep the engine running! Of course It would also help if these vintage trainers actually had serviceable and reliable fuel gauges.

You mention LOC, so looking at BPFs take off briefing for his Cessna 172, can you point out which parts covers possible LOC (I) including it’s mitigation and recovery? After all, it was a take off emergency brief.

Without speaking on Genghis' behalf, I can imagine that "normal" and "abnomal" actions (as you mention) rarely require immediate memory action, thus probably also don't require a crew briefing - or in the context of this thread, teaching to brief during instruction. Thus, to me, and as I do, I refresh my thinking (in my head) of these non emergency actions before takeoff. Relevant emergency actions are verbally briefed to a second crew member, or, if I'm by myself, [go] through my head. When I fly an RG airplane, regardless of solo or with another occupant, landing gear position, and landing surface are spoken aloud before each final approach (not just 'through my head).

For the more simple single engine GA types I normally fly and train in, I will train emergency event pre takeoff briefings appropriate to the type, and possible emergency, but as brief as possible, to prevent diluting the whole thing in too many words...

Centaurus, a lot has changed since you flew the Dakota and the Lincoln, including auto brake, carbon brakes, two wheels per leg, spoilers and thrust reversers and most importantly the realisation that the only thing dangerous on an aircraft is the pilot! I can assure you that my Airbus stops very well! A few years back a 319 landed at LBA with the parking brake on and took all the wheels and tyres out, it stopped well too!

The other big change is on my take off briefing when as PF I can state how much runway I will have left from a V1 stop after my unnatural claw like grip closes the thrust levers. Hand on the thrust lever to V1 and then off prevents getting trigger happy after V1. Nonsense comes in many flavours but standard operating practice only comes in one.

By the way, my colleague, who has recently died, flew the Lincoln that is in the UK RAF Cosford museum!

Hmmm... not what I teach on GA airplanes! Hand on power levers until safely airborne, established in the climb [and need to remove it for gear and flaps]. There have been a few King Air accidents in recent years attributed, at least in part, to un gaurded power lever(s) rolling back just after breaking ground.

I'm far from an Airbus pilot, but I can say that the right procedure, normal, abnormal, or emergency, may be type specific. Briefing actions may also be type specific.

- How I'm going to fly the take-off, particularly key speeds.
- What I'm going to do if I lose the engine during, or shortly after take-off.
- Any immediate actions just after the take-off.

This typically takes 20-30 seconds, then I get on with the take-off. Much as was the case with my RAF colleagues in the 90s.

There is no QRH in most light singles, and if there was, for the pilot to start mucking about with it in a single pilot operation, when they've had an engine failure after take-off would not be wise. I'm well aware that things are different on a part 25 transport aeroplane, but that's not what I fly and instruct on.

G

I believe that makes my point about the lack of experience from some instructors to hold their students accountable. Where I live we are having our first real snowfall today. If an instructor flying with a student today is not covering the possibility of fuel contamination when refueling the aircraft, carb icing when flying, or the change in fuel/air mixture with extreme temperature changes that are needed to keep the engine running smoothly, then it's not the student I'd be most concerned about. I do agree with the serviceability and reliability of fuel gauges, but even on a jet those gauges can be MEL'd with the alternate procedure being the magnetic dipstick and pen and paper for fuel burn, so teaching proper fuel management procedures from an early point in one's career sets a pilot up for success the whole way through.

Sure. If the pilot fails to properly adhere to the emergency procedures of the aircraft, many of which are memory items as laid out by BPF, that pilot might incorrectly manage an engine failure after takeoff which could lead to a stall, and thus a loss of control event. Had that pilot taken 10-20 seconds to mentally brief their DVAs, it is possible that the pilot would manage an engine failure or other systems malfunction better than they would had they not reviewed their procedures.

Part of what we have to remember here is that when teaching ab initio, you are not dealing with someone who has thousands of hours of experience to draw upon. If I suddenly forget every SOP my company wrote tomorrow, I know I can manage to fly the aircraft just fine, even if it's not the way Mr. Boeing wants. However, a student with 15 hours total time has no experience to draw upon and, as such, must be remindended at every opportunity so that we can quickly build that experience. Likewise, when you started flying your first jet with reverse and spoilers, I doubt that you managed to get the spoilers out following every RTO in the sim. If you did, you're a far better pilot than I. So taking a moment for most pilots to quickly refresh one's memory at the beginning of the day is not a bad thing, especially if that happens to be the difference between a successful outcome and a loss of control of any given day.

Don't want to interfere with discussions on how to instruct, but here's how I was instructed, and what I read to myself, aloud before every flight, well, perhaps not aloud if there are sensitive souls aboard:
1. Engine failure during start run: Power off, get off the rwy if able
2. Engine failure after takeoff and under 500 ft AGL: Nose down IMMEDIATELY, full flaps, land wherever possible
3. Engine failure above 500 ft AGL: Standard procedure - which I then go through.

Great stuff but it doesn’t answer my question!
Same with Ghengis, didn’t answer my questions!

You are not interfering at all, not as far as I am concerned anyway. Your self briefing is better than nothing and many PPL’s don’t bother at all! How do you think your briefing could be improved, have you missed anything out? Asking these sort of questions prevents sitting on an experience plateau.

The very first action in the second part of the brief

"In the event of an engine failure or any fire after liftoff I will
-push forward on the wheel/stick and establish the gliding attitude"

I didn't encounter take off briefings until my IFR training. Initially I found them very silly. Mostly because the instructors at The Professional Flying School were more concerned about the regurgitation of the briefing than actually conveying the information.

Lately I have learned to appreciate the general idea more, even when flying single pilot. But more on a higher level, as in 'i woud turn left/right and land there ' not 'and apply brakes and shut down the engine'.

For multi crew ops i find them very valuable if they are short. IMO they shouldn't contain any standard info, only what deviates from the standard.

I would suggest that human factors research has shown that internalizing even basic actions is important when pilots are placed in a situation of unexpected and sudden stress. I think setting the park break after the aircraft has come to a stop on an RTO is important because it sets the mental message that the airplane is going to stay stopped until there is clarity over what has happened and what is next.

I am sure I have missed out on something, and I suspect you are an instructor and am likewise suspecting you have suggestions for improvements, feel free !

Rejected Take Off and briefings
 

I am impressed that you said, "I am sure I have missed something out." That's a rare sentence on a forum! You would seem to be the only person to actually question what they believe to be right. A questioning attitude is a core element of Crew Resource Management (CRM) and effective Threat and Error Management (TEM). It reflects the belief that performance is malleable and improvable through critical analysis and continuous learning, but that is only ever likely to occur if you have a growth mindset rather than a fixed mindset.

Your suspicions are correct, but I prefer the term, 'teacher.' Instructors dump information on students; teachers follow a scientifically proven academic process that, amongst other things, encourages the self-development of the thinking pilot. Put another way: instructing is for the moment, teaching is for life. Pun intended!

As part of that teaching and learning process, rather than me tell you what I think, I would rather encourage you to come up with some suggestions yourself. This is facilitation—yet another important difference between instructing and modern-day flying teaching!

A good starting point for question and debate on the Rejected Takeoff (RTO), which I use on both FI courses and for airline training, is the Manchester, UK 737 accident of 1985. This was a watershed moment for the airline industry and forced us all to fundamentally reconsider the RTO procedure.

There are also some spring-off-the-page errors in some of the posts above, which seem to be the result of outdated thinking and a fixed mindset. I can perhaps understand this attitude in basket weaving or blacksmithing, but I find it difficult to understand how this exists in such an obviously modern, progressive, and high-consequence industry such as aviation.

The original poster's RTO call is incorrect and certainly not a standard CAP 413 call. In fact, the phrase ‘emergency brief’ is also not technically correct. Abandonded Take Off is a phrase no longer in use in the UK.

The use of the phrase ‘immediate abnormal actions’ is also incorrect. If a procedure calls for time-constrained immediate action, it is not an abnormal procedure; it is an emergency procedure. Neither I, nor any of my colleagues, have ever come across the term ‘immediate abnormal actions,’ but I am always happy to be corrected, given factual evidence!

Below is the link to a Wiki page that gives further useful links. The Smithsonian video is particularly interesting as it interviews some of the survivors and reinforces some key points. Without the link, it can be found on a search engine by using: Manchester 737 disaster 1985.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_M...rport_disaster