Ethiopean 787 fire at Heathrow
Joined: Jul 2013
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From: Eastern Anglia
Finally, why is it taking Boeing and its insurers so long to even decide whether to repair or scrap since July if no safety of flight issue?
Joined: Jul 2013
Aviation Qualifications: Non-Aircrew
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From: Everett, WA
It may have nothing to do with safety of flight - but it has everything to do with public perception, not to mention Boeing's stock price.
Joined: Feb 2009
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From: Virginia
Lots of aluminum airplanes have been lost or badly damaged due to fires. I'd guess almost all of those fires started small, then found fuel somewhere besides the aircraft skin.
Perhaps there will be a whole new class of fires caused by heat sources in proximity only to composite skins. I personally doubt that will happen, but time will tell.
Perhaps there will be a whole new class of fires caused by heat sources in proximity only to composite skins. I personally doubt that will happen, but time will tell.
Joined: Jan 2008
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From: Los Angeles
FAA studied fire hazard of composite skin
Sorry I can't find the reference again - I mentioned it a couple of times in the original battery thread - but the FAA commissioned a study at a university on composite material that iirc was specifically that which was intended for the B787. I have no expertise in the area but glanced through the report and at least did not see anything obviously bogus about the tests or conclusions (that the skin would survive fire well.) Of course, they thought the Li-Ion battery system was perfectly safe, too, so some of the points mentioned up-thread here might have been overlooked.
If anyone is interested in the report and can't find it, ask and I'll dig out a link to it.
If anyone is interested in the report and can't find it, ask and I'll dig out a link to it.
Joined: Dec 2006
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From: Florida and wherever my laptop is
There is one here http://www.fire.tc.faa.gov/pdf/07-57.pdf
Joined: Jul 2007
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From: My Stringy Brane
Joined: Jul 2007
Posts: 377
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From: My Stringy Brane
Why are you conflating interior fitment and structural epoxies?
Seems disingenuous, particularly when you don't address the specific burn properties of the modern epoxy developed for the 787.
Please enlighten us all by addressing the seven bullet points above.
Seems disingenuous, particularly when you don't address the specific burn properties of the modern epoxy developed for the 787.
Please enlighten us all by addressing the seven bullet points above.
Last edited by Machaca; 11th September 2013 at 19:21.
Joined: Mar 2002
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From: Florida
My read between the lines of the Boeing PR is the major source of toxicity is the interior panels of the aircraft.
Neither the aluminum nor the 787 outer structure contribute significantly except for the time to be defeated by an external fire.
My memory of such external fires is almost solely comprised of ground fuel-pooled fires.
An internal cabin fire is clearly another problem.
I am curious what a Asiana fuselage might look like along the fuselage top after the fire breaks through to inside the cabin, but that's just a structural damage question and not germain to toxicity.
Neither the aluminum nor the 787 outer structure contribute significantly except for the time to be defeated by an external fire.
My memory of such external fires is almost solely comprised of ground fuel-pooled fires.
An internal cabin fire is clearly another problem.
I am curious what a Asiana fuselage might look like along the fuselage top after the fire breaks through to inside the cabin, but that's just a structural damage question and not germain to toxicity.
Joined: Jul 2007
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From: United States
lomapaseo
My concern is that the vast majority of survivable crashes, (in fact the norm) for commercial aircraft result in compromised, fractured, open doors , open slides,etc, thus allowing ingress into the cabin of toxix gases and smoke from the external CFRP fire. I have cited over 150 such commercial airline survivable crashes to both Boeing and FAA since 1970, all involving compromised and fractured fuselages to no avail.
To my knowledge this critical safety condition was never tested for during development and certification of the 787. Specifically, Boeing did burn-through tests via cone calorimeters only on intact and non-compromised panels and the FAA and Boeing both refused to replicate the Air France A340 Malton overrun crash a few years back, which would serve as an ideal and totally reproducible example of such survivable fuel fed fire crashes. This could easily be performed on on of the four now non-flying 787 prototypes and such a test, replicating a survivable fuel fed fire crash with 100% passenger and crew survival in the case in the A340 with a fuel fed ground fire would end the debate on either side of the FST issue.
To quote the old aviation aphorism "One test is worth 1000 expert opinions".
My concern is that the vast majority of survivable crashes, (in fact the norm) for commercial aircraft result in compromised, fractured, open doors , open slides,etc, thus allowing ingress into the cabin of toxix gases and smoke from the external CFRP fire. I have cited over 150 such commercial airline survivable crashes to both Boeing and FAA since 1970, all involving compromised and fractured fuselages to no avail.
To my knowledge this critical safety condition was never tested for during development and certification of the 787. Specifically, Boeing did burn-through tests via cone calorimeters only on intact and non-compromised panels and the FAA and Boeing both refused to replicate the Air France A340 Malton overrun crash a few years back, which would serve as an ideal and totally reproducible example of such survivable fuel fed fire crashes. This could easily be performed on on of the four now non-flying 787 prototypes and such a test, replicating a survivable fuel fed fire crash with 100% passenger and crew survival in the case in the A340 with a fuel fed ground fire would end the debate on either side of the FST issue.
To quote the old aviation aphorism "One test is worth 1000 expert opinions".
Joined: Feb 2013
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From: Seattle, WA
Then I guess, amicus, passengers flying on the CFRP A350 and the significantly CFRP and composite (GLARE) A380 are also pretty much whistling past the graveyard every time they board one of those planes, as well.
In fact, having flown the 787 and A380 a number of times (and with my airlines of choice also choosing the A350), I guess I better make sure my life insurance is up to date.
And god save us when the CFRP A320 and B737 replacements start entering service in the 2030s... Ralph Nader is no doubt working on a new book to lambast Airbus and Boeing on their decision to move to CFRP. I suggest he go with the title Unsafe At Any Altitude.
In fact, having flown the 787 and A380 a number of times (and with my airlines of choice also choosing the A350), I guess I better make sure my life insurance is up to date.
And god save us when the CFRP A320 and B737 replacements start entering service in the 2030s... Ralph Nader is no doubt working on a new book to lambast Airbus and Boeing on their decision to move to CFRP. I suggest he go with the title Unsafe At Any Altitude.
Last edited by Kiskaloo; 11th September 2013 at 21:04.
Joined: Apr 2009
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From: Oakland, CA
Refused who?
would end the debate on either side of the FST issue.
Last edited by olasek; 12th September 2013 at 00:00.
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From: wales
Wouldnt put the A380 'Glare' in the same league as carbon fibre . Anyone remember the hazards with the harrier composite materials in an accident . Boeing wouldnt be aware of that having responsibility for the AV8B now......!
Joined: Jul 2007
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From: My Stringy Brane
FAA Orders Inspections of Honeywell Emergency Locator Transmitters
FAA to issue AD:
The FAA is issuing an Airworthiness Directive (AD) identical to the August 26 Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) directive which requires airlines to inspect Honeywell emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) by January 14, 2014 to prevent an electrical short and possible ignition source. The FAA AD has the same deadline for the U.S. fleet and will impact approximately 4,000 airplanes at a total cost of approximately $325,720. The investigation of the July 12, 2013 Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 787 fire at Heathrow Airport continues under the leadership of the United Kingdom Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB).
