So you read a checklist in between touchdown and T/R deployment ? You do take the time to get your emer checklist out for a bounced landing ?
Did they forget ANY ITEM required and covered by the CL ? Flaps, Gear ?

They shouldn't have tried to land, since the entire approach was unstable.

On what do you base this assessment?

They were definitely too fast but the approach seems reasonably stable...

If you have to fly the entire approach on idle thrust, something is more than just wrong. Period.

See Post 12 video. Doesn’t look like scud running.

"Airspeed management was a significant issue..."
 

Doesn't the Textron/Garmin data show that at approximately 500' AGL, the airspeed was 170 KIAS?
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/64000-64...015/637211.pdf

Anyone think that Vref +60 with throttles still at idle is stabilized?


https://cimg5.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....6ef85830da.png
https://cimg6.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....2bab898224.png

Thanks for the link. After reading the report, I would consider; initially, just a little glitch happens to the pilot, a speed excursion to 220 KIAS, probably he assumed the autothrottle being still engaged.
So he entered high 'total energy' condition. To avoid and/or exit that condition, he has few options:
- Plan the final approach with reduced speed. The report suggests 160 KIAS.
- Interrupt descent to reach gear and flap speed. After intercept glide path from above.
- perform a 360' to reduce total energy and reach the stabilised condition
- if unsuccessfully notice a non stabilised approach, perform a go-around

In my opinion, after the flare, some confusion arrived. Firstly let me highlight, the report proofs; at Vref=119 the available runway was sufficient to stop the aircraft with brakes only that day.
The first touchdown was at 3 wheels simultaneous, with 1,4 G and at a relatively low angle of attack. Under that condition, the aircraft likely bounces immediately. I learned it that way:
-the PM considering: on the ground, then extend the speed brake.
-the PF considers stable on the ground, then activate reverser.
No rush needed. I miss the call outs from PM. His first call was about the CAS-message, 9 seconds after bounce? I haven't read the transcript yet.
The pilot was in doubt about the position of the TR but I reckon his problem was the proper handling of a bounce. I learned it that way:
If push the airplane down, it will bounce again, likely to higher. In a subsequent bounce, structural limits are easy exceeded.
So, stabilize the airplane, execute a second landing. Flare normal. If in doubt, do a go-around.
Of course, as long as the AFM prohibits TR in the air and speed-brakes with full flaps, the position needs to be checked and set to the stored position.
After the 3. bounce, airplane condition has to assumed as not airworthy, an emergency stop has to apply.

Surley not and altitude to high, to conclude total energy to high.

The PF was seated on the left side and was also PIC for the flight.
The C680 cockpit layout doesn't accommodate operation of the speedbrake lever from the RH seat particularly well.
The lever would be fully forward at touchdown - requiring the right seat occupant to reach around the throttles to pull the lever aft.

Yes, the bounce recovery was botched and made far more difficult by the T/R deployment.

The extraordinarily high energy state throughout the approach was the core issue; the decision not to take it around was unprofessional; the mishandling of the speedbrakes and T/Rs assured a very bad result.
Crew and pax were lucky; this one could have turned out far worse.

More photos here:
https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/64000-64...015/637208.pdf
https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....c2a0e7be4d.jpg










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Stable approach
 

A stable approach also means being at the correct speed.

No, I don't. Those are called memory items, and those also were not done. Either way, there were no checklists done. Are you really going on record here that checklists are not necessary? Or professional? Or prudent?

Did you read the CVR transcript? Seems like far too much talk about clouds and terrain...I suppose it is subjective, but when there is a perfectly useful GPS approach available it seems at best completely unnecessary, at worst soft scud running.

Christ. Several parameters were outside stable approach by most operator’s standards.

NTSB Final Accident Report: https://t.co/CmmCiUTM7g?amp=1