HS 125 Crash Dakar (GOOY)
This is only effective if the other aircraft are Squawking which means they should have a serviceable Transponder too. All too often there are aircraft flying without a transponder and thus would be blind to your TCAS.
Not a biz-jet pilot, but I find it a bit hard to believe that one of them wasn't squawking at that altitude.
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2 to Tango
yes thanks, I am aware that both aircraft need servicable equipment.
I was some years in an African company where the MEL gave 3 days with it u/s which would have rendered everybody blind ... having operated for one of those three days, the aircraft remained on the ground for the remaining two.
In the procedural only and somewhat "unique"SS environment, it should really be a no go item imho.
Never again :-)
I was some years in an African company where the MEL gave 3 days with it u/s which would have rendered everybody blind ... having operated for one of those three days, the aircraft remained on the ground for the remaining two.
In the procedural only and somewhat "unique"SS environment, it should really be a no go item imho.
Never again :-)
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Teddy: The problem as I understood it in this case , is not about TCAS or the MEL, but the HS125 Transponder or altimetry. If we have to believe the rumours relayed in the Senegalese press, this particular HS125 was not airworthy and should not have been flying.
ATC Watcher...
Your last post sums up the African civil aviation situation very well: the aircraft was likely not airworthy.
As you and I (and many others) well know, on any given day there are dozens of non-airworthy aircraft flying in Africa, dozens of non-qualified pilots flying, dozens of landings on runways that should be declared unserviceable (and I'm talking about runways at real airports here, not "landing strips"), and dozens of incidents involving inadequate ATC. And for those of you not familiar with Africa, I am not overstating the situation; when I say dozens I mean dozens.
Sadly, the African context means these facts, though well known by regulators (if we can call them that) and even ICAO, are only mentioned after an accident.
It is a terribly irony, but almost a certainty, that no significant improvements will take place until and unless a major international carrier is involved in such an accident. If, for example, the HS125 had hit an Emirates aircraft there would have been incredible pressure for a proper investigation, an effort to locate the HS125 (which there has never been), immense international media scrutiny, and at least a glimmer of hope for some change to the "Wizard of Oz" world that is African civil aviation.
Your last post sums up the African civil aviation situation very well: the aircraft was likely not airworthy.
As you and I (and many others) well know, on any given day there are dozens of non-airworthy aircraft flying in Africa, dozens of non-qualified pilots flying, dozens of landings on runways that should be declared unserviceable (and I'm talking about runways at real airports here, not "landing strips"), and dozens of incidents involving inadequate ATC. And for those of you not familiar with Africa, I am not overstating the situation; when I say dozens I mean dozens.
Sadly, the African context means these facts, though well known by regulators (if we can call them that) and even ICAO, are only mentioned after an accident.
It is a terribly irony, but almost a certainty, that no significant improvements will take place until and unless a major international carrier is involved in such an accident. If, for example, the HS125 had hit an Emirates aircraft there would have been incredible pressure for a proper investigation, an effort to locate the HS125 (which there has never been), immense international media scrutiny, and at least a glimmer of hope for some change to the "Wizard of Oz" world that is African civil aviation.
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Amen to that!
One day we were just doing a hop from Port Harcourt NAF Base to DNPO, Port Harcourt International Airport, under IFR. It's not very far from one place to the other, so that we got a late hand-off from NAF Tower to DNPO Approach.
We were being vectored for a close-in final when something didn't feel right, even though there was nothing on TCAS, so that I asked about any other traffic. It turned out that, yes, there was a Fokker 27 on about a five-miles final, about where we were just positioning!
We did a go-around and then re-positioned behind the F-27 for a normal landing. Once we had parked I went over to speak to the captain on the F-27, who turned out to be a Filipino or an Indonesian or something like that. I told him that we had nearly had a collision there, depending, and that his transponder did not seem to be operating, since we had seen nothing on our TCAS.
That cued a sort of vague look around the F-27's cockpit, to locate the transponder control head looking rather dusty and unused. He explained that, no, they never used it, because there was "no radar" in Nigeria, as there was not.
I mentioned that ICAO had recommended squawking Mode C in any case, so that one might show up on TCAS, which he seemed to take as a not very interesting bit of aviation trivia. As another local crew had once told me, they did not have TCAS themselves, so that there probably did not seem to be much point in squawking.
Welcome to Africa!
We were being vectored for a close-in final when something didn't feel right, even though there was nothing on TCAS, so that I asked about any other traffic. It turned out that, yes, there was a Fokker 27 on about a five-miles final, about where we were just positioning!
We did a go-around and then re-positioned behind the F-27 for a normal landing. Once we had parked I went over to speak to the captain on the F-27, who turned out to be a Filipino or an Indonesian or something like that. I told him that we had nearly had a collision there, depending, and that his transponder did not seem to be operating, since we had seen nothing on our TCAS.
That cued a sort of vague look around the F-27's cockpit, to locate the transponder control head looking rather dusty and unused. He explained that, no, they never used it, because there was "no radar" in Nigeria, as there was not.
I mentioned that ICAO had recommended squawking Mode C in any case, so that one might show up on TCAS, which he seemed to take as a not very interesting bit of aviation trivia. As another local crew had once told me, they did not have TCAS themselves, so that there probably did not seem to be much point in squawking.
Welcome to Africa!
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Air Senegal is famous for being a well below standard operator. Its aoc had been suspended. But they got i back at the time of the accident.
The old Hawker had been short of airworthiness certificate for a while too.But got it back, even though it was full of snags.
Captain was neither experienced nor famous to be proficient.
In Flight Broadcast Procedure on 126,9 and Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure are more than a suggestion. They are implelented as written on the charts.
On a hs125-700, if you take off from Ouaga to Dakar, with the prevailing west winds (108 kt few days ago on the same route), it can be more than 3,5 hours.
If you do not transfert the ventral and dorsal tank in the wings (because you are knocked out ?), the aircraft could very well fuel starve shortly after passing DKR.
My Two cents
The old Hawker had been short of airworthiness certificate for a while too.But got it back, even though it was full of snags.
Captain was neither experienced nor famous to be proficient.
In Flight Broadcast Procedure on 126,9 and Strategic Lateral Offset Procedure are more than a suggestion. They are implelented as written on the charts.
On a hs125-700, if you take off from Ouaga to Dakar, with the prevailing west winds (108 kt few days ago on the same route), it can be more than 3,5 hours.
If you do not transfert the ventral and dorsal tank in the wings (because you are knocked out ?), the aircraft could very well fuel starve shortly after passing DKR.
My Two cents
According to Avherald:
"On Sep 5th 2016 Senegal's BEA released a brief interim statement reporting that the investigation has been almost completed, the final report is currently being drafted and will then be sent out to the parties involved for comments that can be submitted within 60 days. The resulting final report will then be published. The BEA reported that the HS-125 has not been found, the search for the aircraft has been formally suspended, the aircraft thus remains missing. The BEA have analyzed records of flight operations, maintenance and monitoring of both the Ceiba Intercontinental as well as the Air Senegal aircraft as well as enforcement of aircraft and crew certification."
"On Sep 5th 2016 Senegal's BEA released a brief interim statement reporting that the investigation has been almost completed, the final report is currently being drafted and will then be sent out to the parties involved for comments that can be submitted within 60 days. The resulting final report will then be published. The BEA reported that the HS-125 has not been found, the search for the aircraft has been formally suspended, the aircraft thus remains missing. The BEA have analyzed records of flight operations, maintenance and monitoring of both the Ceiba Intercontinental as well as the Air Senegal aircraft as well as enforcement of aircraft and crew certification."
Regardless of the findings in the final report I must correct at least one misleading statement from the Sengalese BEA. They stated that the "the HS-125 has not been found, the search for the aircraft has been formally suspended".
There was never any search for the HS-125. Never. Not one search aircraft or vessel, not for one minute. Though I'm ever the optimist, I have significant experience in this part of the world, so I don't have much faith in the quality or even the accuracy of the report. I have even less faith that the report and its findings will lead to any significant (and badly needed) change in West Africa.
There was never any search for the HS-125. Never. Not one search aircraft or vessel, not for one minute. Though I'm ever the optimist, I have significant experience in this part of the world, so I don't have much faith in the quality or even the accuracy of the report. I have even less faith that the report and its findings will lead to any significant (and badly needed) change in West Africa.
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All the SAR job over Western Africa (ocean + desert) is done by a lone Breguet Atlantique of the French Navy, positioned at Dakar - and it has been like that since 1960, year of independance. Crew and aircraft are rotated from France....Dozens of successful rescue operations performed since, like the South African Shackleton which crashed in Mauritania years ago.
So everybody flying or sailing there should thank the French taxpayers first (because ALL the local governments there simply don't care about what's happening out at sea)
Now maybe this aircraft at that particular moment was busy somewhere else (Mali ?) or they did try a little bit, or they were not informed in due time.....
You want some change there ? Your money is welcome !
So everybody flying or sailing there should thank the French taxpayers first (because ALL the local governments there simply don't care about what's happening out at sea)
Now maybe this aircraft at that particular moment was busy somewhere else (Mali ?) or they did try a little bit, or they were not informed in due time.....
You want some change there ? Your money is welcome !
Hi
recceguy...
My comment is no reflection on the French Navy's contribution to SAR out of Dakar because, in this case, they were not informed or tasked to carry out any search.
Re your suggestion that more money (from outside West Africa) will precipitate change, no it won't.
recceguy...
My comment is no reflection on the French Navy's contribution to SAR out of Dakar because, in this case, they were not informed or tasked to carry out any search.
Re your suggestion that more money (from outside West Africa) will precipitate change, no it won't.
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Yes, grizz I know
Sorry to have been misunderstood - there was no sarcasm in my post, it was just informative, for fellow aviators (and seamen by the way) to acknowledge how it is in that part of the world
Sorry to have been misunderstood - there was no sarcasm in my post, it was just informative, for fellow aviators (and seamen by the way) to acknowledge how it is in that part of the world
MODS: Did you read or understand the subject of this thread before you moved it (after a year) from "Rumours and News" to "Bizjets"? This thread is about a mid-air collision between a scheduled air carrier flight (Ceiba Intercontinental Boeing 737-800, registration 3C-LLY performing flight C2-71 from Dakar, Senegal to Cotonou, Benin) and an HS-125.
If this mid-air collision had occurred over Europe or North America (or anywhere other than Africa) it would certainly remain in "R&N". Cultural bias in the global business of civil aviation?
If this mid-air collision had occurred over Europe or North America (or anywhere other than Africa) it would certainly remain in "R&N". Cultural bias in the global business of civil aviation?
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On Feb 19th 2017 The Aviation Herald was able to obtain a copy of the preliminary report in French released by Senegal's BEA on Jan 8th 2016. The BEA reported that C2-71 had been cleared to climb to FL350 at 17:50:54Z, the aircraft was subsequently handed off to Dakar Center. Dakar Center instructed C2-71 to maintain FL350 and report passing GATIL waypoint. At 18:15:32Z C2-71 contacted Dakar Center again, Dakar Center in response handed C2-71 off to the Bamako Control, the crew however reported that they saw traffic very near them in opposite direction, they believed it was a near collision. A minute later the crew advised they believed the opposite traffic had hit their wing. In the meantime Dakar Center tried to raise 6V-AIM, however, did not receive any response. Dakar informed C2-71 that the traffic in opposite direction was 6V-AIM, cleared to maintain FL340, they were unable to contact the aircraft. At 18:19:23Z C2-71 was handed off to Bamako Control, the crew inquired with Bamako Control about the traffic in opposite direction 5 minutes earlier. Bamako advised that the traffic, a Hawker Siddeley HS-25 was supposed to maintain FL340. Bamako tried to call the Hawker several times but did not receive a reply. At 18:24Z Bamako told C2-71 that the Hawker was in the Dakar Control Zone but could not be contacted. C2-71 advised they would file a inflight collision report.
The HS-125 had departed runway 22 of Ouagadougou Airport and at 17:01Z was cleared to climb to FL340. The aircraft was subsequently handed off to Bamako Control. On Bamako the crew estimated waypoint GATIL at 18:10Z and Dakar at 18:54Z. At 17:13Z the crew requested to climb to FL380 due to clouds ahead and was cleared to climb to FL380 at 17:13z. At 17:19z the crew reported turbulence at FL380 and requested to descend or climb advising they had a sick passenger on board. At 17:22Z the crew was cleared to climb to FL400, however, reported at 17:30Z that there was turbulence too and requested to descend to FL340 again. At 17:31z the HS-125 was cleared to descend to FL340 and at 17:55z reported passing waypoint ENINO at FL340. Bamako Control instructed the HS-125 to contact Dakar Control upon passing waypoint GATIL at FL340. At 18:00z the Hawker contacted Dakar Center requesting a deviation of 10nm to the left of the airway to avoid bad weather. Dakar instructed the aircraft to maintain FL340 and set transponder to 5040. ATC requested the HS-125 to confirm they were maintaining FL340, the crew confirmed, then the crew requested ATC to confirm their transponder code 5040, ATC repeated transponder code 5040. This proved to to be the last radio contact with the aircraft, the crew did not respond to any further radio calls anymore. The aircraft appeared on Dakar's radar screen at FL350 at 18:22Z showing the transponder code 5004 (instead of 5040). At 19:01Z the aircraft overflew Dakar VOR at FL350 and continued on a track of 293 degrees. At 19:07Z the radar shows the aircraft began to descend and turned right. A short time later the aircraft descended through FL126 and disappeared from radar screen about 59nm from Dakar VOR at approximate position N14.9789 W18.4703.
The HS-125 was flown by a captain (59, CPL, 7,685 hours total, 5,500 hours in command) and a first officer (35, CPL, 3,339 hours total). The aircraft had accumulated 13,279 flight hours in 11,877 flight cycles.
The Boeing 737-800 was flown by a captain (45, ATPL), a second captain (45, ATPL) and a first officer (33, 585 hours total). The aircraft had accumulated 1,568 flight hours in 1,761 flight cycles.
The HS-125 has not been found to date, the BEA reported. Part of the right winglet was missing from the Boeing, the part has not been found.
The BEA reported that according to weather reported there were thunderstorms and low clouds present in the vicinity of the FIR boundary between Senegal (Dakar) and Mali (Bamako). However, there was no problem of visibility at the cruise levels.
The flight data and cockpit voice recorders of the Boeing 737 were read out normally by the BEA France, representatives of BEA Senegal, representatives of the CAA Equatorial Guinea and the operator were present. The flight data recorder contained 90 hours of flight storing 1200 parameters. The cockpit recorder contained 124 minutes of flight, the recording did not include the actual event. The FDR revealed the Boeing 737 was enroute at FL350 with autopilot engaged. TCAS was operative and in good condition (editorial note: the report does not mention a TCAS traffic or resolution advisory nor does the report mention that no advisory was generated).
Accident: Ceiba Intercontinental B738 over Senegal on Sep 5th 2015, midair collision with ambulance jet
The HS-125 had departed runway 22 of Ouagadougou Airport and at 17:01Z was cleared to climb to FL340. The aircraft was subsequently handed off to Bamako Control. On Bamako the crew estimated waypoint GATIL at 18:10Z and Dakar at 18:54Z. At 17:13Z the crew requested to climb to FL380 due to clouds ahead and was cleared to climb to FL380 at 17:13z. At 17:19z the crew reported turbulence at FL380 and requested to descend or climb advising they had a sick passenger on board. At 17:22Z the crew was cleared to climb to FL400, however, reported at 17:30Z that there was turbulence too and requested to descend to FL340 again. At 17:31z the HS-125 was cleared to descend to FL340 and at 17:55z reported passing waypoint ENINO at FL340. Bamako Control instructed the HS-125 to contact Dakar Control upon passing waypoint GATIL at FL340. At 18:00z the Hawker contacted Dakar Center requesting a deviation of 10nm to the left of the airway to avoid bad weather. Dakar instructed the aircraft to maintain FL340 and set transponder to 5040. ATC requested the HS-125 to confirm they were maintaining FL340, the crew confirmed, then the crew requested ATC to confirm their transponder code 5040, ATC repeated transponder code 5040. This proved to to be the last radio contact with the aircraft, the crew did not respond to any further radio calls anymore. The aircraft appeared on Dakar's radar screen at FL350 at 18:22Z showing the transponder code 5004 (instead of 5040). At 19:01Z the aircraft overflew Dakar VOR at FL350 and continued on a track of 293 degrees. At 19:07Z the radar shows the aircraft began to descend and turned right. A short time later the aircraft descended through FL126 and disappeared from radar screen about 59nm from Dakar VOR at approximate position N14.9789 W18.4703.
The HS-125 was flown by a captain (59, CPL, 7,685 hours total, 5,500 hours in command) and a first officer (35, CPL, 3,339 hours total). The aircraft had accumulated 13,279 flight hours in 11,877 flight cycles.
The Boeing 737-800 was flown by a captain (45, ATPL), a second captain (45, ATPL) and a first officer (33, 585 hours total). The aircraft had accumulated 1,568 flight hours in 1,761 flight cycles.
The HS-125 has not been found to date, the BEA reported. Part of the right winglet was missing from the Boeing, the part has not been found.
The BEA reported that according to weather reported there were thunderstorms and low clouds present in the vicinity of the FIR boundary between Senegal (Dakar) and Mali (Bamako). However, there was no problem of visibility at the cruise levels.
The flight data and cockpit voice recorders of the Boeing 737 were read out normally by the BEA France, representatives of BEA Senegal, representatives of the CAA Equatorial Guinea and the operator were present. The flight data recorder contained 90 hours of flight storing 1200 parameters. The cockpit recorder contained 124 minutes of flight, the recording did not include the actual event. The FDR revealed the Boeing 737 was enroute at FL350 with autopilot engaged. TCAS was operative and in good condition (editorial note: the report does not mention a TCAS traffic or resolution advisory nor does the report mention that no advisory was generated).
Accident: Ceiba Intercontinental B738 over Senegal on Sep 5th 2015, midair collision with ambulance jet
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Update: Final report in French
Faulty altimeters on 6V-AIM. Previous flights deviated from assigned altitudes as well. The maintenance engineer authorized to overview maintenance and sign the aircraft with its defective altimeters airworthy...
http://avherald.com/h?article=48c031e2/0001&opt=0
Faulty altimeters on 6V-AIM. Previous flights deviated from assigned altitudes as well. The maintenance engineer authorized to overview maintenance and sign the aircraft with its defective altimeters airworthy...
http://avherald.com/h?article=48c031e2/0001&opt=0